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Abstract
This thesis falls into two distinct parts. The first gives an account of the
economic and social factors which contributed to the emergence of the new post-
Cartesian world order in early nineteenth-century Germany and attempts to ground the
German response to the French theories of mimesis in this broader context. The
second, larger, part engages in an analysis of the philosophical aesthetics of the critic
and writer Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder, and the Idealists Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph
Schelling and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, paying particular attention to the
notions of musical closure embedded in the their usage or intimation of the terms
autonomy, ontology and the ideal. To this end, this thesis attempts to analyse the
relationship between the organic structures of early nineteenth-century
Naturphilosophie and aesthetic approaches to music from that same period.
Ian Biddle, the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, July 1995.
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Introduction
The Problem of History
Theory and Practice 
To undertake a broad survey of music theory and philosophical aesthetics in
early nineteenth-century thought in a work of this size seems foolhardy. Even to limit
such an undertaking to a survey of the distinct discourses of the German tradition
seems overly ambitious. For this reason alone, this undertaking is focused on an
attempt to give an account of the texts on music by Wackenroder, Schelling and Hegel
that coheres. That is not to say that there is, implicit to this undertaking, some anxiety
in the compilation of disparate sources or that its central aim is to make cohere what
otherwise should not. On the contrary, it is the fundamental assertion of this work that
there is, in early nineteenth-century German culture, an underlying coherence which is
intimately bound to the emergence of the commodity. The emergent specialisation of
scholarly labour in the early nineteenth century is thus not to be attributed solely to the
'collapse' of universal Cartesian reason, but also to the radical shift in the economic
requirements of post-Napoleonic Europe.1
In confronting the generic permissiveness of some of the metaphysical writings
on music from this time, however, we become painfully aware of the alien nature of
these texts and, similarly, in analyses of music by early analysts such as Vogler and the
generic theories of Koch, Ttirk and Forkel, we are constantly bewildered by a language
that seems so to blur the distinctions between description, analysis and criticism that
they seem wilfully uncentred in any clearly coherent discourse. What many of the
aesthetic and theoretical texts of early nineteenth-century Germany seem to have in
common is an urge to articulate the boundaries of music - to somehow give an account
1 For a more detailed analysis of economic and administrative theory in post-Napoleonic Germany,
see Chapters 1 and 2.
2of how music might be musical. They were, in short, anxious attempts to create a
culture of debate in which music could emerge as a self-contained discursive
phenomenon, an autonomous art form. The frequency of the designation Theorie is
thus not surprising in these texts since there are all consistently grounded within a
searing dichotomy: how to articulate music's self-quality through the medium of
language which is external to it. As if to recognise such a dichotomy, music theory and
musical aesthetics at this time were burdened with a the need for metaphorical
abstraction, driven both by the systematising requirements of German Idealism and the
poetic urge of the Weimar classicism of such works as Goethe's Die Leiden des jungen
Werthers and Schiller's Kabale und Liebe.
The hermeneutic sensitivity that these texts require is perhaps most clearly
demonstrable in the early nineteenth-century usage of the term 'theory'. It is not always
clear what the German T7zeorie might mean since it is often indiscriminately
interchanged with Wissenschaft ('science' or 'scholarship' or 'knowledge). The apparent
confusion demonstrates perhaps the early nineteenth-century tendency towards
discursive promiscuity. Where such terms seemed, by the end of that century, to be
reasonably clearly delineated and disciplined, they were, in the earlier part of that
century, less clearly separated, constantly spilling over into organicist resemblance
across discourses. It is interesting that Marx saw the need - perhaps the single most
unifying tendency of his complete oeuvre - to ground theory in the social, economic
and political discourses. To read early nineteenth-century theory, therefore, requires a
radicalised reinvention of theory as a practice that, whilst admittedly protocol-driven,
opens itself across many discourses and blurs the distinction between its own apparent
circumspection and the 'otherness' of empirical reality.2
The protocol of early nineteenth-century systematic theorising 3 requires, then, a
certain purity of form and thus demands, in particular, the extremities of style. Such
2 In other words, the procedural 'rules' of a theory spring from its relationship with previous theories.
Such a relationship can be expressed in certain structural or stylistic responses to its own past.
Similarly, its 'protocol' can also be determined by its historical predicament, the questions with which
that theory's contemporary social environment requires it to engage.
3 Henceforward referred to merely as 'theory'.
3extremities motivate dissatisfaction with pragmatic reality and theory thereby conjures
up for itself, in forced clear relief, a somewhat anxious account of reality's mediocrity.
Such extremities, often dogmatically characterised by pragmatists as overblown
'abstractions', are not a retreat from reality, nor are they a kind of reification of reality.
Theory's alternative to the mundane does not consist in some kind of surrogate after-
life; it is, rather, a drive for the initiation of action. Theory can thus be seen as an
instrument to mould reality and in this sense it is profoundly proactive.
Nor is theory a quagmire or a vacuum, free of value. Theory's very existence,
its very initiation, springs from the urge which brings forth action - it is a form of social
practice, if somewhat abstract_ But this qualification in itself, this very abstraction or
extremity, instigates critical action. When, however, theory becomes historicised, when
it becomes a reified abstraction after the usefulness of its action is overturned, then that
theory remains as merely a residue of the social nexus that it once constituted. If we
mistake this 'shell' of theory as Theorie an sich, then we run the danger of imputing
some kind of closed value, a kind of internalised or immanent essence that is somehow
moulded into the closed ontological configuration that remains. This is the danger of
structuralist accounts of theory that evoke the development of theory merely in terms
of the theoretical texts themselves. Thus this strange creature called The History of
Theory, largely synonymous with the German ldeengeschichte, ignores the proactive
dimensions of theory and at best trivialises the presence of theory in praxis.
This thesis is not such an undertaking; it is not an account of a theoretical
moment in the closed structuralist history of thought. It is, rather, an account of a
theoretical moment in situ, as a kind of formal account and response to its
synchronous mundane environs. The 'urge' from which this moment sprang, and which,
in turn, it constitutes, is presented in its historical context, as integrated firmly in the
dynamics of social and political life.
The 'moment' under scrutiny here stretches from 1780 to 1820. This period,
barely reaching a few years beyond the defeat of Napoleon, was subject to a massive
number of upheavals: the numerous redistributions of land and power within the
4German speaking lands played no insignificant part in the refashioning of a new
German world vision. The Enlightenment found its expression in Germany in the
enlightened despotism of Prussia and Austria and the philosophical idealism of Fichte,
Kant, Schelling and Hegel. This confrontation between the enlightened pragmatism of
German Polizeiwissenschaft, born out of the dissolution of baroque cameralism, on the
one hand, and the metaphysical impulses of impotent intellectuals on the other, was
part of a unified paradigm: the movement towards an atomisation of reality into self-
contained reified commodities. The idealism of Schelling and Fichte, in particular,
imported a sense of the absolute, of the immanent self-quality of the individual, whilst
Prussian cameralism and the administrative order of the organic state and its
Staatsvernunft began a dismantling of impedance to state power, actively encouraging
a re-ordering of reality around the centrality of the commodity. The autonomous
individual, free to exchange commodities with other free-standing individuals: this was
the mythology of the early nineteenth-century world vision.
There was thus a heightened urgency to the project of a science of immanent
meaning, of a meaning carried deep within the commodity, as inextricably a part of it,
its essence. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the empiricism and apparent
fragmentation of German science into highly specialised, almost autonomous,
disciplines is powerful testament to this process. However, the closure, at the
beginning of that century, of the objective realm, the Kantian external, from Cartesian
instrumental reason, is the moment which seems to demonstrate the more fundamental
epistemological shift. The rejection of the mimesis aesthetic, the emergence of a deeply
ontological impulse in philosophy and the negation of Cartesian notions of discursive
conspicuity through clear argument and 'visible' truth in favour of demands for anew
internalised complexity, a reason more sensual and less sterile, are all symptoms of this
profound epistemological schism.
The urgency of a systematic account of immanent meaning is nowhere more
palpable at this time than in the emergent symbolic or 'metaphysic' of instrumental
music after c.1780. The desire to articulate a certain fluency, a certain intangible, inner,
5essence beyond reason, beyond words, represents a closure of music from the
instrumentality or functionality of the previous mimesis aesthetic. This closure finds
expression both in the technical literature of Koch, Tiirk, Forkel and Vogler and the
metaphysical, meditative writings of Wackenroder, Tieck and Hoffmann. 4 On the one
hand, immanent meaning is seen as articulated in the hierarchy of harmonic, melodic
and phrase structures, whereas for the metaphysicists, on the other hand, music is a
'dark' and 'indescribable' realm of intangible wonders.5
This departure from the Cartesian Affektenlehre in favour of a notion of
musical autonomy complies with theoretical protocol. First, it is extreme and motivates
a certain disdain for contingent reality and for the text-centrism of the mimesis
aesthetic: the 'anxious account' of reality it conjures is addressed by notions of the
sublime [das Erhabene, die Erhabenheit], as a powerful antithesis to mundane reality.
Second, this departure is powerfully present in contemporary reality: structuralist
histories of music, analysis and score-centred accounts of music engage with the
problematic of immanent meaning in a manner indebted to the moment of
Wackenroder's Phantasien iiber die Kunst and Forkel's Allgemeine Theorie der Musik.
Yet, the German music theories of this time are also profoundly indebted to
Naturphilosophie, a discourse which attempted to apprehend reality in terms of a
broadly metaphysical agenda. In this sense, the position of music in the world system
was one which demonstrated not merely a disdain for reality, but also gave account of
the emergence of the new ontology such that music existed in reality, not merely in
response to it.
This notion of music as existing within reality is charged with the ontological
agenda of the Naturphilosophie of Fichte, Schelling and, to a lesser extent, Hegel. It
rests on the assumption of a closure or self-contentment of the musical work such that
4 In terms of the simple division of the autonomists into 'technical' and 'metaphysical', Hoffmann is
problematic given that he indulges in both styles of narrative. The main thrust of his oeuvre, however,
despite numerous analytical articles, seems to me to be metaphysical.
5 See Wackenroder 'Das eigentiimliche innere Wesen der Tonkunst und die Seelenlehre der heutigen
Instrumentalmusik in Phantasien fiber die Kunst far Freunde der Kunst (1799). The edition used here
is that published with Herzensergiefiungen and titled simply Wackenroder by Gustav Kiepenheuer
Verlag, Potsdam 1925. The reference here is 182-3.
6its defined limits articulate its status as object or entity. Hence, to dismiss the
Naturphilosophe as mere idealists ignores the powerfully naturalistic reflex of their
methodologies. In Schelling, in particular, we shall see the emergence of the notion of
an artistic Real, a bountiful, natural complexity as the central category of the pre-
Hegelian aesthetic.6
Structuralist Histories and their Indebtedness to the Moment of
Naturphilosophie 
The articulation of musical boundaries or limits has profound consequences for
the emergence of the systematised discourse of Musikwissenschaft. To 'close' the
musical work on itself is to lay the way open for an interiority, an immanence of
meaning which finds contemporary expression in the notion of a structuralist history of
music. The belief that the real, or at least the definable, meaning of music lies
somewhere within its mechanisms of construction is central to many of the practices of
contemporary musicology. The centrality of autonomy is so ingrained in the psyche of
the collective musicological consciousness that it has come to feel like a given, real or
authentic predicament. Even in musicologies that attempt to operate outside of this
notion of musical autonomy (such as ethnomusicology or the sociology of music)
methodologies are constrained by this 'authentic', 'given' predicament. The
inconceivability of addressing music without recourse to some kind of examination of
its internal mechanisms of construction feels real - it has, so to speak, presence. The
methodological consequences of this presence are clear: the score becomes the central
object of scrutiny and is seen to give up its secrets, its 'meanings' and its 'essence', to
competent specialised scrutiny. The belief is based upon the assumption that music,
seemingly more difficult to analyse in terms of 'fixed' or 'literal' semantic content than
the other arts, consists in an abstraction or even a kind of perverse representation of
reality in terms of a wholly autonomous system. This system, therefore, is 'violated' or
'trivialised' when it becomes the product of a broader historical, cultural or political
6 The division between the Schellingian and Hegelian aesthetics is clearly articulated in Tolstoy's
What is Art, in Tolstoy Centenary Edition, 1929, volume 18, 99-100.
7context. The 'history of music' becomes a structuralist history, one which concerns
itself with internal mechanisms and with comparative methodologies across the
continuum of musical works. Outside of this closed stratum lie 'other' disciplines which
musicologists often feel inclined to import: sociology, psychology, semiotics,
linguistics, history and so on. The schizophrenia implicit in the multi-disciplinary 'new'
musicologies is particularly evident in the advent of the so-called authenticity debate
where musicologists have needed to become archivists, statisticians and historical
sociologists. In a sense, despite the highly autonomous motivations for an 'authentic'
performance of a 'reliable' score, this debate has intensified the problematics of a
structuralist history of music. The confluence of many disciplines in musicology begins
to pose the question of authority: wherein lies the central authority of music? If music
should be seen as a history of structures - as autonomous - , then the central object of
scrutiny is, inevitably, the score, seen somehow as a neutral or self-evident model for
music's dissemination, free from ideology, free from extra-musical 'distortions' of any
kind. But if music needs to be 'reconstructed' in its 'authentic' performance context,
then the score becomes an object which is seen as fundamentally flawed and
'inauthentic' in so far as it alone cannot furnish the 'authentic' experience.7
This crisis of cultural authority is one which characterises our age - the
'postmodern condition' as Lyotard 8 has called it. This condition is a symptom of a deep
pessimism which its proclaimers dress in an hysterical language of celebration. The
nature of the relationship between the artist, his/her art and its audience has become
highly problematised; or to put it another way, the quest for the authoritative centre of
the creative process in art has become, or has been made, so problematic as to negate
the very possibility of a centre.
The break with determinist thought9
 that the pessimism of much postmodern
7 The 'authentic aesthetic presence' that is recognised in the score in the notion of musical autonomy
is mediated in authenticity by a sense of the 'authentic historical presence'. Authenticity's contingency
and notions of an authoritative centre beyond the score are thus not as compatible with autonomy as
they might first seem.
8 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, Manchester, 1984.
9 The term 'determinist thought', as used here, refers to thought which attempts to explain reality by
recourse to implicit or explicit causal mechanisms.
8theory represents, revolves around this loss of cultural authority. It is of no surprise,
therefore, that such 'determinist authorities' as Hegel, Marx, Engels and Ranke are the
objects of much derision in contemporary theory. 1 ° If we are to understand the
contemporary predicament of musicology, a detailed analysis of the epistemological
context from which it sprang is necessary. In so far as this context was characterised
by a set of clear ideological agendas and by a wilful dismantling of the older patriarchal
discourse in favour of a number of smaller universalising discourses (anatomy,
philology, the natural and social sciences and musicology, for example), we can
characterise it as a 'rupture' or paradigm shift. The relationship between this 'mother
epistemology' of musicology and the paradigm of postmodernism, is thus inevitably
highly confrontational. Whereas the determinist nineteenth century presided over a
politicisation or socialisation of the population of much of Europe and the heightening
of antagonism between specialist discourses, each claiming to be the one authentic
truth-retrieval-system, postmodernism has attempted, at least, to blur these distinctions
by removing the very notion of an 'authentic truth' from the argument. Musicology's
apparently precarious predicament can thus be seen to stem from this fundamental
violation of its epistemological premise by the new postmodern 'paradigm'. The
confrontation of these incongruous epistemologies, postmodern and determinist
thought, can be usefully demonstrated in a short comparison of the attitudes of the
Hegelians and Michel Foucault to the possibility of history, this opposition providing a
useful case study.
The Postmodern Discourse and its Language
To come to terms with Foucault's non-normative prose style, it is essential to
apprehend, first of all, the operations of his discourse in terms of its relationship to the
language of modernism. Terry Eagleton addresses postmodernism in the following
terms:
1 ° The rather overstated claim of the post-modern theorists such as Foucault, Lyotard, or Derrida that
German Idealism and its heirs represent a kind of intellectual terrorism, a tendency to violate the
complexity of its object of scrutiny is something we shall attempt to re-examine later. See, in
particular, Chapters 4 and 5.
The depthless, styleless, dehistoricised, decathected surfaces of postmodernist
culture are not meant to signify an alienation, for the very concept of alienation
must secretly posit a dream of authenticity which postmodernism finds quite
unintelligible. Those flattened surfaces and hollowed interiors are not 'alienated'
because there is no longer any subject to be alienated from, 'authenticity' having
been less rejected than merely forgotten.n
Although Eagleton fairly acknowledges postmodernism's limited subversive
applications 12 , his argument is clear: 'the postmodern' is that which positively affirms
what the modernists saw as threatening - the loss of political cohesion and the
heightening of man's alienation from his environment 13 Man's alienation from
environment is man's alienation from contextualising discourses - history, narrative -
and the consequent denial, after modernism, of 'historical causality'. Whereas the
modernist often saw fragmentation to be a hindrance to the utopian vision, the
postrnodernist sees this fragmentation as a positive, quasi-utopian, phenomenon in
itself - as Eagleton puts it, 'fact is value". What characterises this new age, then, is the
fragmentation of critical dialogue, and, curiously, the affirmation of the institution./5
The loss of a dynamic, quasi-narrative, vision of historical change has meant that
dialogues requiring historical validation - arguments for social change based on the
demonstration of the present's unassailable relativity, for example - are undermined.
Without a dynamic vision of historical change, then, political action stagnates on all but
the most local, pragmatic, levels and this, in turn, informs a profound disillusionment
with active participation in political life. Thus, critique is left fragmented, coherent
opposition all but disintegrated and historical determinism discredited; the institution
stands to gain much. In this sense, 'the political' has become something of an anathema
to the postmodernist, and the institution is moved as far as possible from cognitive and
11 Eagleton, Against the Grain, Cambridge, 1986, 132.
12 Ibid., 95.
13 Ibid., 93.
14 Ibid., 133.
15 Institution refers to all acts of administration which include not only the acts of government and/or
state, but of market regulation, isolationism, and all attempts to organise social life at the macro level
as against the anarchic impulse of the market. Market, on the other hand refers to all acts of trade in
their purest form, as distilled from the organisational encumbrances of the institution. Thus, in these
forms, neither institution nor market exists as free from the other's action. The uses here should be
understood to represent the deepest impulses of the two polarities and not always necessarily their
material mechanisms.
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critical range - those mechanisms whereby such institutions can be undermined or
criticised are disarmed of their subversive force. The 'postmodern project' has
effectively instated the institution as an inviolate absolute.
Where the institution or the organisational impulse is reified, the market is
elusive, even anarchic. Its elusiveness has allowed it to pass largely self-determined
from a basically subservient role to one whereby it has become almost self-animated, a
kind of intangible 'given' that must remain unassailable. With postmodernist
mechanisms of fragmentation, the market acquires the ability to appear inviolate and
even the most critically-minded uphold this authenticity alone above and beyond any
other. 'Future' becomes little more than a minor variant of present and the historical
narrative dissolves into a vortex of innumerable existential moments, each concerned
only with itself, turning inwards and closing itself completely to scrutiny. The
commodity is the only truth.
In language, bourgeois modern man, the precursor of the postmodern
consumer, fragmented narrative and sought to problematise cultural authority by an
intensification of what might be termed the existential language: 16 this pessimistic
response to his/her impotence in the face of the advancing forces of industrialisation
was characterised by a fetishism for the extremes of language, be it the estranged
mythologising of a Kafka or the naturalistic obsessiveness of a Dostoevsky. These
extremes can be defined in terms of either a highly metaphoric language such as in
Kafka 17 where sympathetic symbolic meanings compete to undermine narrative, or a
highly metonymic language such as in Dalin" where a taxonomy of details in
proximity undermine linearity. The effect of both these extremes is to create a sense of
a heightened existential isolation. Indeed, this existential impulse in the face of the
brutalising effects of late capitalism can ultimately be implicated in the collapse of an
16 The existential vocabulary was one of alienation, separation and agonising autonomy from the
external world of political meanings.
17 See in particular the aphorisms and short prose passages such as Auf der Gallerie or Der Geier.
18 See, for example, Berlin Alexandoplatz which juxtaposes Biberkopfs almost existential discourse
with documentary-like passages, seemingly taken from contemporary newspapers and radio
broadcasts.
11
'organised' political offensive and, indeed, forms the basis on which the non-normative
subjectivism of postmodernism is constructed. The bourgeois ego is thus enshrined at
the centre of a nexus of administrative failures: failure to comprehend unprecedented
industrial expansion; failure to respond to the loss of a critical community; failure to
halt the expansion of the administered world.
There seems little sense, then, in seeking to separate postmodernism too far
from the processes described above. The same fragmentation and existential closures
occur in postmodernism that occurred in modernism. The differences, such as they are,
consist in postmodernism's 'forgetting' of the misery of this predicament - hence the
hysterically celebratory language of much postmodern theory. As Raymond Williams is
reputed to have said:
What has quite rapidly happened is that modernism quickly lost its anti-
bourgeois stance, and achieved comfortable integration into the new
international capitalism. Its attempt at a universal market, transfrontier and
transclass, turned out to be spurious. Its forms lent themselves to cultural
competition and the commercial interplay of obsolescence, with its shifts of
schools, styles and fashion so essential to the market. The painfully acquired
techniques of significant disconnection are relocated, with the help of the
special insensitivity of the trained and assured technicists, as the merely
technical modes of advertising and the commercial cinema. The isolated,.
estranged images of alienation and loss, the narrative discontinuities, have
become the easy iconography of the commercials, and the lonely, bitter,
sardonic and sceptical hero takes his ready-made place as star of the thriller.19
The failed universal market, or the failed project of universal commodity-equivalence is
central to the problems of theorising in the postmodern world. The so-called grand
theories of the nineteenth century, constantly straining for an ontological absolute or
an inviolate basis from which to reconstruct the individual or citizen, have come to be
seen as somehow oppressive or intrusive_ As an attempt to rebut such grandiloquent
attempts at social reconstruction, postmodernism is thus a kind of radicalised or
entartete liberalism. The poverty of much postmodern theory, then, stems from a kind
of forgetting or reification of the isolation of the bourgeois ego, which, as we have
seen, has meant that a sense of the existential rather than the historical pervades
19 Williams, The Politics of Modernism, London, 1989, 35.
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contemporary thought.
Foucault versus History
To a certain extent, musicology has avoided the more ludicrous excesses of
postmodern theorising and, to the extent that it has remained, despite the authenticity
debate and its more radical ramifications, largely empirical and score-centred, it has
been able to close itself from the more general malaise in systematic thought. Indeed, it
has been its very lack of system that has, until now, insulated it from the onslaught of
value-destruction. In one sense, this state of affairs must rest on the notion of musical
autonomy, one that still permits the ontological impulse of analytical procedures and
structuralist histories. One such challenge to the musicological epistemology, in its
later guise of the structuralist history, is the work of Michel Foucault. A true
postmodernist in the strict sense of one who attempts to avoid a normative notion of
truth, his critique of nineteenth-century causal histories owes much to the writings of
Friedrich Nietzsche.
Foucault attempts an adaptation of Nietzsche's Umwertung aller Werte 2° into
an anti-historical discourse on change, both social and cultura1 21 . Before turning to
Foucault's critiques of history, we should first analyse Nietzsche's legacy. Although he
rarely acknowledges the influence, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) is ever-present in
Foucault. A critic of history and the assumptions of that endeavour, Nietzsche
launched a scathing attack on historicism as a sign of his age's weakness. He addresses,
in particular, the 'cultural' phenomenon of history:
Die zweite Unzeitgemasse (1874) bringt das Gefdhrliche, das Leben-Annagende
und Vergiftende in unsrer Art des Wissenschafts-Betriebs an's Licht-: das
Leben krank an diesem entmenschten Raderwerk und Mechanismus, an der
"UnpersOnlichkeit" des Arbeiters, an der falschen Okonomie der "Theilung der
Arbeit". Der Zweck geht verloren, die Cultur:- das Mittel der moderne
20 Nietzsche's call for the revaluation of all values has been seen by many to be a call for a value-free
manner of operation that sees all truth as relative and reality as wholly culturally mediated. The
recognition of cultural value in others requires a sense of value as a autonomous, self-referential,
construct. The observer must be untouched by value, or at least recognise the relativity of his/her own
values. See Also sprach Zarathustra, numerous references.
21 See Foucault, The Order of Things, 1973, Discipline and Punish, 1977, The Archaeology of
Knowledge, 1977.
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Wissenschafts-Betrieb, barbarisirt... In dieser Abhandlung wurde der
"historische Sinn", auf den dies Jahrhundert stolz ist zum ersten Mal als
Krankheit erkannt, als typisches Zeichen das Verfalls.22
The second Untimely One brings to light what is dangerous and gnaws at and poisons
life in our kind of traffic with science and scholarship - how life is made sick by this
dehumanised and mechanical grinding of gears, the 'impersonality' of the labourer, the
false economy of 'the division of labour'. The aim is lost, genuine culture - and the
means, the modern traffic with science, barbarised. In this essay the 'historical sense'
of which this century is so proud was recognised for the first time as a disease, as a
typical symptom of decay.23
The alternative to history that Nietzsche provides is an existential sense of the relativity
of all truth, and thus of all language. The 'symbolic weight' of language is thus to be
seen as the product of a particular cultural moment and as nothing more. All truth is
thus subject to its momentary context, and the absolutes morality, history and theology
are merely products of a particular manner of seeing or understanding the world.
So, each age, then, is seen by Nietzsche to be governed by a certain way of
understanding the sensual world, such that music, for example, seemed for the
nineteenth century romantic to facilitate a discourse of heavy symbolic reference or
meaning:
An sich ist keine Musik tief und bedeutungsvoll, sie spricht nicht vom "Willen",
vom "Dinge and sich"; das konnte der Intellect erst in einem Zeitalter wahnen,
welches den ganzen Umfang des inneren L,ebens ftir die musicalische Symbolik
erobert hatte. Der Intellect selber hat diese Bedeutsamkeit erst in den Kiang
hineingelegt, wie in die Verhaltnisse von Linien und Massen bei der
Architektur ebenfalls Bedeutsamkeit gelegt hat, welche aber an sich den
mechanischen Gesetzen ganz fremd ist.24
No music is deep and full of meaning in itself, it does not speak of 'will', of the 'thing in
itself; that could be imagined by the intellect only in an age which had conquered for
musical symbolism the entire range of inner life. It was the intellect itself that first gave
this meaning to sound, just as it also gave meaning to the relation between lines and
masses in architecture, but which in itself is quite foreign to mechanical laws.25
Nietzsche's point here is that the function of music, or rather its perceived function, is
springs first and foremost from the state of man's understanding of music as it exists at
22 Ecce Homo, in Nietzsche Werke, volume VI3, published Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1969, 314.
23 Ecce Homo, trans./ed. Walter Kaufmann, Random House, 1967, 276.
24 Menschliches, Allzumenschliches in Nietzsche Werke, volume II, published Walter de Gruyter,
Berlin 1969
25 Human, All-Too-Human. in Nietzsche, The Complete Works, translated by Dr. Oscar Levy, 1910,
192-3. Emphases are as given in the original.
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the moment of reception. Thus the nature of not only music theory, but, in effect, the
nature of music itself constantly shifts according to its socio-historical predicament.
Hence, we can see in Nietzsche the emergence of a music aesthetic based upon a
deeply relativistic apprehension of the world. The example of music used here
demonstrates the sense in which Nietzsche can be seen as a significant precursor to
Foucault, who, in his later works in particular, can be described as attempting a
genealogie of the human sciences. It is in the pervasive relativism, the cold, detached,
objective surface of his prose style that Foucault takes the consequences of the
Nietzschean relativity to its logical conclusion.
Foucault's oeuvre can be usefully divided into two distinct, but related,
methodological phases, the earlier archiologie and the later genealogie. Archeologie,
as represented in the published works from 1971 to 1978, can be contrasted with
'classical' Hegelian or Rankean histories in the following manner: whereas tistory,26
attempts to give reality meaning according to bi-polar methodologies based on the
category pairs new/old, revolutionary/regressive, or original/banal, archeologie
attempts a critique of such polarities as representing diffuse manifestations of history as
a discourse; whereas 'history' sees contradictions as something to be overcome or
explained away in favour of a deeper coherence, archáologie takes such contradictions
to retain a high degree of autonomy and sees them as the primary objects of scrutiny;
whereas 'history' is essentially concerned with narrative, with linear exposition,
26 The term 'history' always refers here to the so-called 'classical' historical models of Hegel, Ranke
and the Berlin Revolutionaries. The models, whilst demonstrating many central differences, are all
concerned with the dynamics of historical change and its causality. These models might therefore be
termed 'determinist' histories. With the collapse of the revolutions in Europe of 1848-9, came a
disillusionment with Hegelianism, and a new positivist model for history emerged in the work of the
so-called Berlin Revolutionaries. An almost exact contemporary of Hegel, Berthold Georg Niebuhr
(1776-1831, born six years after, died same year as Hegel) wrote of the turn of the century in the
following terms: 'It was a time when we were experiencing the most incredible and exceptional
events, when we were reminded of many forgotten and decayed institutions by the sound of their
downfall. 'History' thus figured large in the nineteenth century consciousness, and the Berlin
Revolution in historical thought reacted largely to the metaphysics of Hegel not to the historical model
itself. The revolutionaries retained the narrative structures of history compilation that were implicit in
the Hegelian system, and owed much to Niebuhr's early empirical histories. Thinkers after Niebuhr
brought about a clear agenda for the historical project and under the torch-bearer of the new order,
Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), engaged in a parcelling up of the historical continuum into causes
and effects. The 'epic' history is born.
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archeologie foregrounds gaps and ruptures, making difference, not linearity or
coherence, a central feature of the discourse. In short, we might see this opposition of
classical history and archeologie as the confrontation of a narrative discourse and a
radically empirical discourse.
This case opposition brings into relief the differences between the old and the
new histories. This new history, archeologie, is one element of the broader new
epistemology of postmodernism. Where Foucault ascribes a discursive regularity, by
which we presume him to mean a pattern of 'similar enunciations', political meaning is
replaced by a nexus of momentary relationships or intertextualities which undermine
critical praxis. The autonomy or verticality of such connections relieves the past of its
implications or its 'lessons' and relieves the future of its immanence. Foucault's
archeologie estranges context - an action has little or no causal meaning, has little
effect and is lost outside its moment. Whilst many of its surface mechanisms attempt to
mitigate the loss of an overtly formal political aganda, archeologie is nonetheless
opposed to formal political praxis at the fundamental level.
The political impotence of arclzeologie is addressed in the methodology of the
latter part of Foucault's oeuvre which he terms genealogic. The focus of this second
phase is power. Seen in a more or less Nietzschean manner, power manifests itself in
numerous ways. Again, these can be contrasted with notions of power in 'classical'
histories in the following manner: instead of discovering truth in terms of the polarities
mentioned previously, genealogic analyses the 'hazardous play of dominations';
whereas history de-prioritises contradiction in favour of unity, genealogic. , in line with
archeologie, focuses on singularity and contradiction in order to rediscover the
multiplicity of factors that constitute, and not cause, an event; in contrast with history's
'totalising' tendencies, genealogic is informed by a profound relativism; above and
beyond a linearity of perception, genealogie represents the articulation of the action of
historical change on the body. So, whereas archeologie represents an empirical
response to historical linearity, genealogic is the articulation of that response, together
with an anthropological impulse, so to speak, onto the body - sexuality, power, desire
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and hate.
It is to this central role of power in the later Foucault that Marxists have
addressed their most vehement critiques.27 Broadly speaking, Foucault's understanding
of power differs from the Marxist understanding in several ways 28 . For the Marxist,
power is the mechanism of class oppression, whereas Foucault sees power as the
network that constitutes the social domain. As Poulantzas29 has pointed out, Foucault
thereby places himself in a position of critical impotence. If power is synonymous with
sociality, then the critic is faced with a profound challenge to his/her authority: in
failing to distinguish between particulars of power, or, in other words, in failing to
allow for differences of value between power(s), Foucault imprisons both the most
radical, anti-institutional and the most conservative, institution-compliant, powers in
the same impotent existential moment. This represents a profound closure of social
reality. Without this value differentiation in power, its analysis becomes merely passive,
ordering social reality according to innumerable ontologies. The closure of reality in
the empirical fetishism of archeologie and then the non-prescriptive ontological
fragmentation in genealogie, both discard the central category of prescriptive critique:
causality.
The Nietzschean-Foucauldian vision of history, then, is informed by a
profoundly anti-rationalist impulse. In this reading of Nietzsche, Foucault has much in
common with other contemporary French theorists such as Lacan, or Derrida.
However, his link with the 'circle' of so-called 'poststructuralists' is too often over-
stated. Indeed, Foucault is quick to deny the link in the uncharacteristically transparent
'Foreword' to the English Edition of The Order of Things. These characteristically
post-Anna/es questionings of history, we can say, attempt to analyse those moments
when the causal order of history seems at its weakest, when movement erupts into the
open world of historical change and old institutions are swept away or fundamentally
27 See Callinicos, Is There a Future for Marxism?, 1982, and Poulantzas, Political Power and Social
Classes, 1973.
28 See also later broader discussion of neo-Hegelian opposition to Foucault.
29 Poulantzas, Power. There are numerous references here to Foucault's apparent position of
impotence.
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mutated in a matter of years. So, if not poststructuralist, we might say of Foucault's
works that they fall into the post Marxist French tradition of thought after Sartre that
rapidly became uneasy with explicit causality as a way of understanding the basis for
institutional change:
The problem of causality. It is not always easy to determine what
caused a specific change in science. What made such and such a discovery
possible? Why did this new concept appear?...It seemed to me that it would not
be prudent for the moment to force a solution I felt incapable, I admit, of
offering: the traditional explanations - spirit of the time, technological or social
changes, influences of various kinds - struck me for the most part as being
more magical than effective.30
Such terms as 'spirit of the time', 'technological or social changes' are aimed directly at
the tradition that has most opposed the 'new history', the Marxist and neo-Hegelian
traditions.
In an attempt to avoid the characteristically 'magical' explanations of Hegelian
and Rankean histories, Foucault's works, in both phases, might be summed up as
undertaking the following clearly delineated tasks: first, an inquiry into the nature of
the conditions of existence for a certain epistemological phenomenon - notice here the
existential imperative the conditions of existence and, indeed, this is no causal 'where
are we from?' or 'how do we come to be here?' but seeks to analyse from a position of
value-less impotence, with little concern for the linearity of a phenomenon's exposition;
second, an inquiry into the nature of the structures of connection that govern this
phenomenon's contextuality - these 'structures of connection' here, relate to the manner
in which the phenomenon related to other phenomena around it so that, enclosed in a
momentary web of hidden meanings and resonance, the phenomenon takes on a kind of
closed momentary essence, mutating in this 'context' at every moment, constantly
deferring its essence; third, an inquiry into the nature of the phenomenon's demise - the
posing of the question of the nature of the demise - avoids the 'problem of causality'
that Foucault refers to in the 'Foreword' to The Order of Things and the analysis of the
nature of the process of change can eradicate any need to address the question of
30 Foucault, Order, xii - xiii.
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linearity or affect and allows for an ontological fetishism for change as a closed essence
in itself rather than an analysis of the effect of that process and its cultural, political and
social meanings: its basis in praxis.
Neo-Hegelian Opposition and The Reclamation of Causality
As we have seen, the Foucauldian discourse foregrounds rupture and
discontinuity rather than continuity and reference. The implicit opposition to
Foucauldian models of the neo-Hegelian models is quite clear: meaning versus context,
linearity versus discontinuity. It might be useful here to pause for a moment to recall
the Hegelian method in order to reassess the usefulness of linearity in history.
As we shall see later, Hegel's vision of history sees social and political
movements as manifestations of the great Spirit or Mind 31 which manifests itself to the
watchful historian and is thus a deep-lying structure, a zugrunde lie gende Mee, which
articulates the great early nineteenth-century fascination with structures that are buried
deep below the surface of the visible world, a tendency usefully characterised as
interiority. Thus, the cohesion of reality has to be somehow decoded or discovered
from the apparent confusion of a wilful reality. Furthermore, this tendency towards the
interior recesses of the universe, the deep substrata, the great singular metaphysical
principle of existence, requires that the watchful historian position himself at the
correct 'vantage point', so to speak: only when the time is 'right', when man's thinking
has progressed to a point where it can comprehend this single unifying principle, can
the subject comprehend the cohesion of the universe.
Hegel's epistemology, then, involves completion of the system at the point of
comprehension. Thus Hegel stands at a completion point so that he is able to recognise
the system in its totality. Truth, then, is arrived at by the completion of the system. As
Michael Rosen has repeatedly pointed out, this leaves the critic of Hegel with a severe
difficulty: to criticise Hegel's epistemology is, in Hegelian terms, to criticise the
system. 32 The system is insufficient or faulty only when it is incomplete, and thus
31 In German, Geist which can mean either spirit or mind. I use capitals to distinguish the distinctly
Hegelian uses.
32 Michael Rosen, He gel's Dialectic and its Critique, Cambridge, 1982.
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criticism of the system involves recognition of this incompleteness. The critic is thus
faced with a dilemma: how to criticise the system without laying oneself open to the
critique of incompetence - the system cannot be faulty if it is complete, and to ascribe
'faultiness' to it is to regard it from a position of incompleteness, from the wrong place.
Thus the Hegelian system closes itself to attack by recourse to false completion:
closure exists at that point where the system is correct; without the recognition of such
'correctness', the system is not simply faulty but is essentially not a system. False
completion can thus be employed to close the system in so far as the system's very
premises lie in its completion: the systematiser begins at that point and constructs the
system to validate its completion. This paradox, termed somewhat strangely by Rosen
the post festum paradox, has been seen both as a strength in the Hegelian system 33 and
as evidence for the deep-seated totalitarianism of the system34.
The movement of the system falls into three stages and thus Hegel's work is
characterised by a succession of trios. First, Spirit, the moving force, the all-
encompassing totality of reality in all its past and present forms, is complete - as thesis
[These] - but is naive as it has no comprehension of either its quantity or its diffuse
parts; when Spirit begins to comprehend its many parts it disintegrates - as antithesis
[Antithese] - taking difference to mean a lack of unity; when spirit comes to reclaim its
cohesion - as synthesis [Synthese] - it comprehends both its diffusion and its unity. In
this manner, the inner and outer, the subjective and the objective, are reconciled
dialectically.
This account, perpetuating what has become a crass cliche for readers of
Hegel, is criticised by Dunayevskaya as a misrepresentation of Hegel's system and
quotes Hegel's own scathing account of Fichte and Schelling's 'triplicity' in The Science
33 See particularly Callinicos, Marxism, 1983 and Dunayevskaya Philosophy and Revolution, New
Jersey, 1973, 3-95.
34 See Rosen's argument in Critique. Indeed, Hegel's assertion that the centralised, organic Prussian
state represents the final social synthesis of his system, might suggest that this reading is a fair one.
However, the system itself can provide a very useful solution to the problem of disunity and can
account for differentiation in a value-rich discourse. Hegel's ludicrous misreadings of contemporary
history are not sufficient to discredit the mechanics of the system but are a testament to the bizarre
metaphysics of the system's application.
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of Logic. 35 The incomprehensibility of Hegel's critique of these triplicities in the light of
his own triplicity suggest that Dunayevskaya's remarks miss the mark: Hegel seems
here more concerned to rescue the 'originality' of his own work from the contemporary
near equivalents.36
The implicit causality of the Hegelian system is still not the causality of the
empirical historians of the Berlin Revolution. Hegelian causality concerned itself with a
metaphysical abstraction of historical movements and changes. Whilst the Rankeans
retained the linearity of historical discourse, so central to the Hegelian system, it was
the young Hegelians Marx and Engels that opened the system from its closed
metaphysical unity into a world of social relations.
In the aftermath of a Marxist redefinition, Hegel's metaphysical system is
dragged from its idealist origins and homed at reality, as an explicit participation within
it. Hegel, after Kant, then,
have the courage of his idealist virility, penetrating to the very essence of
the object and delivering up its inmost secret. He will carry the contradictions
of thought right into the thing itself, into the veiled and tabooed, and so will
risk fissuring the reality which for Kant must remain chastely intact, dividing it
against itself by the labour of the negative.37
As Eagleton points out,38 Hegel attempted to remove Fichte's self-referential autonomy
of the subject into the world of objects, to ground the subject in that very reality that
Cartesian reason had learnt, in its death throes, to scorn. The metaphysical vocabulary
and the abstractions, the transcendental signifiers, are discarded by Marx, in an attempt
to reground theory in reality, to collapse the false difference between theory and
practice. It has been the ongoing attempt of the Marxist project to bring this
reconciliation about so that theory can no longer be hypostatised or frozen in a false
35 Dunayevslcaya, Philosophy, 13.
36 To be fair, however, it must be stated that the terms thesis, antithesis and synthesis were very
probably first used by Schelling and Fichte, and not Hegel. Indeed, the cliché of triplicity in Hegel is
further compounded by the notion that synthesic Spirit is some kind of utopian unity of all things. As
we shall see in Chapter 5, the notion of spirit as unified with externality at this stage is not accurate.
In fact, Hegel goes to great lengths in the Vorlesungen to explain Synthese as a return of Spirit to
itself.
37 Eagleton, Ideology of the Aesthetic, Oxford, 1990, 121.
38 Ibid. 123-4.
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vacuum by the pragmatism of capitalism.
The postmodern splintering of the creative process into a multitude of closed
ontologies, devoid of authorship, of place or of meaning, devoid of authenticity, has
meant that autonomy has closed in on itself. We return to Eagleton's critique:
The depthless, styleless, dehistoricised, decathected surfaces of postmodernist
culture are not meant to signify an alienation, for the very concept of alienation
must secretly posit a dream of authenticity which postmodernism finds quite
unintelligible. Those flattened surfaces and hollowed interiors are not 'alienated'
because there is no longer any subject to be alienated from, 'authenticity' having
been less rejected than merely forgotten.39
Autonomy's closure in on itself, then, has left art bereft of authenticity, bereft, that is,
of any demonstrable meaning, the semantics of art having become little more than a
rather dubious and speculative non-discipline.This extreme autonomy, the very roots of
which lie in the emergent ontological neurosis of post-Cartesian thought, neutralises,
or at best minimises, the presence of values in approaches to culture. We are not
surprised, therefore, to find a detached coolness in Foucault's almost voyeuristic
account of pre-rationalist exercisements of power. In the brutal regimes of the leper
colonies, in the ruthless exclusionism of medieval and renaissance culture and the
insistent institutionalisation of madness in the enlightenment, Foucault chooses to find
no moral questions, no politics, no reason to make value judgements. He is untouched
by such barbarity. As Eagleton, leading the neo-Hegelian critique of Foucault, has
written:
Foucault's style is scrupulously non-judgmental, his commentaries purged of
the least hint of normativity. This stylistic mode is not far at times from a
certain perverse eroticism, as the most sensational materials - the torture of a
human body, for example - are mediated through a distanced, dispassionate
tone, a measured, mandarin French serenely unruffled by its own shocking
contents.40
The cold voyeurism of Foucault's postmodernism is closely linked with the
perceived failure of the Marxist project to bring about a happy mutuality between
theory and practice. The possibility of entering into any engagement with
39 Eagleton, Against the Grain, Oxford, 1986, 132.
40 Eagleton, Ideology, 384.
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contemporary culture without the correct 'relativist' distance, the correct alienation,
from that culture, has fallen so far from our grasp that we have become less concerned
with the proactive dimension of theory and, it seems, more concerned with the
jouissance that such an activity as theory affords.
The corollary of the over-closure of reality in postmodernism is the over-
closure of what might be termed the 'work' (the cultural artefact, object or product)
and this is nowhere more apparent than in the musical work. The musical autonomy
recognised by early nineteenth-century German culture is distinctly unique. Its
uniqueness lies in the following features: first, there is a kind of urgency to the project
of ontological closure - the work becomes self-sufficient in order to enable its
exchangeability in the market; second the work's self quality can be articulated from
within as an expression of the uniqueness of the musical language itself; third, the
ontology of music is infused with a nihilism as we see in Wackenroder's short story EM
wunderbares morganlandisches Meirchen von einem nackten Heiligen in Phantasien
iiber die Kunst fiir Freunde der Kunst (1799)41 - music is the place where man
momentarily escapes the torture and anguish of reality.
The ontological closure of the work at this time began a process of ever-
deepening crisis. Meaning retreated into the depths of the work until postmodernism
could triumphantly declare the death of the author, of authenticity in a monumental act
of forgetting and could announce the poverty, and ultimately the death, of the work in
favour of the multiplicity of the text. This multi-faceted text, an almost magical
incitement to subvert, a pre-packed patriarchy ready and waiting for dismantling, is
snapped up by the active critic and devoured in a frenzy of consumption. Yet even this
reified subversion, this democratisation of the critical urge is, in the final analysis, little
more than a receptacle of interpretative impotence. The alienation of the ego is the
corollary of its democratisation: to each text-critic comes the ability to recreate the self
and its environment, to close the oppressive forces of coercion and organisation
41 W. H. Wackenroder, Pltantasien liber die Kunst ftir Freunde der Kunst, Gustav Kiepenheuer
Verlag, Potsdam, 1925.
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outside the cognitive realm: in short, this newly acquired ability in the emergent
'radical' consumer is little more than the wholesale commoditisation of the critical
process itself. It is as if the radical has been welded into the political system,
commoditised in itself, as a process to be bought and sold, acquired at a price and
passed on as the next text in the spiral of incitement to consume. The object itself, the
innocent product of art, one which sprang from the belief in a kind of creative
authenticity, has somehow been squeezed dry of its immanence, normalised by the
great democratic sweep of late capitalism and ousted by a kind of immanent critique,
one which carries in itself the deferred immanence of objectivity, reproduced in itself as
a kind of insidious authority. The new micro-centre, the new cultural authority resides
now in an impotent response, in a radicalised gesture of acquiescence, to the external
world as it is given. From the authority of genius and the autonomous product of art,
we moved to the death of the author and the absolute authority of the product, and
now, in this paradigm, the draining of the product of all significant internal meaning in
favour of a semantic free-for-all, an interpretative jamboree.
This new text, an empty vessel, loudly resonant and yet imbued with a deep
semantic ambivalence, is blissfully playful, free to flit across genres or to create new
ones at every opportunity. The burying of meaning deep below the surface, far from
the grasp of instrumental reason, has resulted in a two-way polarisation of approaches
to the old work: in the first approach, the work is seen as a receptacle of aesthetic
data, decodable on its own terms, accessible to a specialised scrutiny and yet, in itself
empty; the second approach engages in a kind of extravagant fetishism for synchronous
detail - an obsession for the minutiae of the historical moment, deliberately and
carefully avoiding any explicit ideological position. 42 In this sense, the emergence of
autonomy instigated a kind of witch-hunt against meaning, first of visible surface
conspicuity, then of the deeper authentic semantic resonance leading to the authentic
object of the New Criticism, and finally to art's return as mere ancillary to the
42 See, for example, much of Derrida's work after Of Grarnmatology, Foucault's works from The
Order of Things
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externalised process of creative interpretation.
The notion of musical autonomy can be defined, then, as an ideal one, as a
theoretical construct governed by the rules of theoretical extremes: the theoretical, as
we have said, must abstract the purest most extreme model from a formidably
mediocre reality and make of it a critical perfection. The belief that music is an
autonomous, self-regarding system, that music functions free from the intrusion of the
outside world and its mediocrity, is necessitated in the early nineteenth century by a
moment where the cultural aspirations of the bourgeoisie outstrip the ability of the
infrastructure to capitulate to such aspirations. It had long had to live alongside tardy
theories of pragmatic meaning and mimetic calls for music's subjugation before the
text. Autonomy, in its extreme forms, thus emerges as a defensive aesthetic, driven by
the professional desire to sustain an intrinsic commodity status, to sustain music's
ontological self-sufficiency, and to wrap that desire in a metaphysic that makes of it an
absolute. It has been this stubborn metaphysical basis for the authority of the score that
has, as we have said, sustained musicology through these difficult times. In this
confrontation we see two ends of the same process slammed together as if in a wilfully
bizarre postmodern anachronism - the beginning of the closure and the end of the
closure.
In an attempt to re-open some of the concerns of German Idealism, in
particular its engagement with the notion of musical autonomy, this thesis undertakes
to bring into relief the salient features of the epistemological configuration of the early
post-Cartesian paradigm and its consequent attitude to music, grounding this
undertaking in a sensitivity to the historical predicament of that paradigm and to the
hermeneutic requirements of texts from that period. In the following chapters, we will
attempt to find a position which does not buy wholesale into the neo-Hegelian histories
but which is nonetheless not afraid to look for causalities or relationships of ideology,
political meanings or other more generally epistemological agendas. To this end, the
first two chapters of the thesis are concerned with the relationship of music theory to
its historical and epistemological environs.
Chapter One: 
The Dissemination of Music in the Old Reich
The musical culture of the German speaking lands of the Old Reich in the
eighteenth century was one characterised by small, de-centred units of production,
each servicing its immediate Umgebung. 'Art music' in these servicing centres was
consumed by a small number of privileged initiates who were allowed access to this
culture only by grace of the local ecclesiastical or monarchical patron. The general
structure of this dissemination we can define as monarcho-corporatist. As the term
suggests, the monarcho-corporatist culture was one which demonstrated features both
of monarchical absolutism and the older 'corporatist' communities. In the monarchical
community, the production of art music tended to take place in small centres of
excellence, dependent on the financial centralism of 'little' monarchy. These centres
were connected to each other across great distances by means of mutability: each of
the centres was usually well informed on the activity of the others and technical
exchanges were common. The corporatist culture, on the other hand, tended more
towards the functional incorporation of music into urban ritual. Thus, members of the
urban patritiate would patronise music in order to mark certain events in the political
calendar.' As we shall see, the huge number of states in the Old Reich and their wildly
differing structures, and the huge variations in the status of urban centres vis-a-vis the
territory in which they were situated, make any generalisations on the musical culture
at this time extremely difficult. The term monarcho-corporatist, then, designates a
culture which is characterised largely by social complexity and, more importantly, strict
1 The ecclesiastical states could be said to fall somewhere between the two, where religious feasts were
invariably marked by music. These ritualist/functional demands were often tempered by the almost
monarchical status of some of the archbishops. The powers of the archbishop of Passau over the
musical life of the state is a good example. For a fascinating and thorough account of these declining
cultures in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, see Donalcowski, A Muse for the
Masses: Ritual and Music in an Age of Democratic Revolution, Chicago and London, 1977.
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social hierarchies. The decline of this complexity was a result, first of all, of the shift of
power to the territorial monarchs, and thereafter, of the decline of the smaller states in
favour of the 'big three', Prussia, Austria and, to a lesser extent, Bavaria. This
centralisation of monarchical power and the effective dissolution of the smaller centres
had a profound effect on the nature of the musical culture, its dissemination and the
manner in which music was understood to integrate into society. In particular, it was
the emergence of aesthetics as a global discourse on art that was to have the most
profound effect on the epistemological buoyancy of a functional music:
The call for an aesthetics in eighteenth century Germany is among other
things a response to the problem of political absolutism. Germany in that period
was a parcellised territory of feudal-absolutist states, marked by a particularism
and idiosyncrasy consequent on its lack of general culture.. .A lack of capital
and enterprise, poor communications and locally based trade, guild-dominated
towns marooned in a backward countryside: such were the unpropitious
conditions of the German bourgeoisie in this parochial, benighted social order.2
This is how Eagleton defines the genesis of aesthetics. As 'a response to the problems
of political absolutism' then, aesthetics was a globalising or metaphysical discourse.
The metaphysical basis of such a discourse was a fundamental requirement of the
emergent centralised monarchical territories. More than that, the global discourse can
be seen as a kind of preparation for nationhood: embedded within the grand systems of
German philosophical aesthetics at the end of the eighteenth century, then, lies the
urgent call for a universal national culture. In order to understand this urgency, we
must attempt to construct a picture of the passing of the old order into the new and
examine the catalysts of cultural change.
The Decline of the Monarcho-Corporatist Order
The reliability of demographic data from this period is notoriously weak. Most
contemporary demographic historians 3 are agreed, however, that the eighteenth
century foreshadowed the remarkable demographic explosion of the nineteenth century
to a remarkable extent. Indeed, there is sufficient evidence to suggest significant
2 Ideology of the Aesthetic, Oxford 1990, 14.
3 De Vries, Meusel, Benzing, Rodgers, Pounds. See bibliography entries.
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population growth around the middle of the century, a phenomenon Andrei Rogers
calls the vital revolution.4 The causes for this 'revolution' are extremely difficult to
ascertain; Sheehan has suggested that marginal improvements in health care tipped the
balance, so to speak, in favour of lower rates of child mortality thus creating a rapid
demographic expansion. 5 This revolution had significant social and cultural
consequences, not least for the German 6 bourgeoisie, such as it was. 7 As we shall see,
Germany's peculiarity in response to the vital revolution is of no small significance for
the eventual emergence of an independent bourgeois culture and, indeed, the notion of
the aesthetic. It is important, first of all, to realise that the function and character of the
bourgeoisie in eighteenth century urban German society should not be accounted for in
terms of one unified economic or cultural unit. Suffice to say that the very diverse
nature of regional experience was in itself a fundamental element of the German
experience. Three basic categories of response to the demographic changes of the
eighteenth century are discernible and these models serve to emphasise the fragmented
nature of German urban life at this time.8
Medieval towns such as Nuremberg, Regensburg or Landshut were
characterised by a profound failure to respond positively to the 'vital revolution'. 9 This
demographic upheaval began to weaken the old traditional order which, in essence,
had changed very little since late medieval times. Sheehan characterises this stagnation
thus:
About many things, Europeans seemed to know little more at the
beginning of the eighteenth century than they had in the ancient world: medical
students still read Galen, strategists studied Caesar, architects followed
Vitruvius. People still travelled as the Romans had, sometimes on roads less
4 in De Vries, European Urbanisation 1500-1800, London, 1984.
5 See Kisskalt, K. 'Die Sterblichkeit im 18. Jahrlaundert', in Zeitschrift far Hygiene, 1921, 438-511.
6 For ease, the terms Germany or German are used here to denote the German-speaking lands of the
old Reich. This usually includes western Austria and western parts of former Bohemia tBOlimeril now
the larger part of the Czech Republic.
7 For the problems inherent in the term bourgeoisie as applied to the German situation, see later
arguments.
8 James J. Sheehan, German History 1770-1866, Oxford 1989, 73-90.
9 Wherever appropriate, German names will be used. In the case of such well-known towns as
Niirnberg, Köln, Miinchen or Wien, their anglicised names shall be used: Nuremberg, Cologne,
Munich and Vienna.
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well constructed; the techniques of farming had not improved much since the
Middle Ages; other technological advances, whilst often impressive
individually, were scattered and uneven.10
The proto-bourgeois of the traditional order was constrained by the mechanisms of the
older community: craftsmen's guilds exercised considerable constrictive power over its
members and the possibility of a bourgeois network of trade and culture across large
geographical areas was fundamentally hindered, in Germany in particular, by the lack
of a coherent infrastructure and the primacy of the communal, and thus local,
experience. The guilds, for example, existed to protect the common good of its
membership not by attempting to maximise the incomes of each individual member but
by attempting to ensure there was enough work to keep its members gainfully
employed." The peculiarly collectivist nature of the guild system reflected the
structure of the traditional community - to practise a trade one had to have completed
an apprenticeship, thus providing masters with cheap labour, after which one was
required to leave the community and travel to serve with a master in the 'outside world'
and thence return to submit oneself for membership, available only after competence
had been demonstrated and ritual completed. The role of ritual in guilds served to
reaffirm community ties and, along with religious ritual at births, marriages and deaths,
stated the mutual interdependence of all members of the community. The guild system
was characteristically stronger in small communities where it exerted considerable
control over the craftsman's social and political life. In the larger walled cities 12 such as
Nuremberg, the guilds had a much more limited economic role but, for the traditional
citizen, had a strong putative or symbolic function. This symbolic power could be, and
in Nuremberg was, emphasised by the guilds' high profile in city politics. Urban Politics
in such cases was a chaotic vortex of incongruous interests dictating economic policy
in a piece-meal and haphazard manner.
The ramshackle towns of early eighteenth-century middle Germany, with their
10 Sheehan, History, 79.
11 Mack Walker, German Home Towns, London, 1971 and Black, Guilds and Civil Society,
Cambridge, 1984.
12 See later discussion of the various gradations of the rural and urban orders in the Holy Roman
Empire. Nuremberg was an imperial city.
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medieval centres largely intact, were extremely insular. Separated from the outside
world by both physical and symbolic walls, the city, like its guilds, guarded its .
privileges carefully. Anyone failing to comply with accepted values and modes of
behaviour was in danger of cutting him- or herself off from basic means of subsistence.
Traditionally mistrustful of outsiders without trade - Bodenhasen - , walled cities
accepted newcomers rarely unless they were journeymen. To leave one's community
without trade, then, was to invite hunger and severe deprivation. The ties of
community and guild membership were thus extremely strong where corporatist
community values had come into least contact with the growing international markets.
Nuremberg's isolation perpetuated its medieval corporatist guild structures which
hastened its demise.
In contrast stood the hanseatic harbour city of Hamburg, the very existence of
which as a city depended not on some medieval function as refuge and trading post
along some long since defunct overland trading route (as with Nuremberg), but in the
modern international market and sea-bound trade. Where the international market had
encroached for longest on traditional corporatist order, the guild structure was
weakest Characterised by a dynamic economic life, Hamburg flourished during the
vital revolution. International trade required complex administrative procedures to
ensure that production, transport and price mechanisms were appropriate and efficient
The role of bankers and other money lending institutions was thus a significant one, for
without this venture capital larger concerns were impossible. The existence of the
Fabrik or Manufaktor hails a revolution in production techniques, although surface
similarities with the modern factory system are deceiving. Such manufacturing
concerns were set up and overseen by an entrepreneur but staffed by independent
craftsmen brought together under one roof by the overseer, each working
independently of the others. The guild structure still applied, then, as long as the
entrepreneur recognised the authority of the guild, but with increased foreign
competition, the need to keep production costs at a minimum outweighed his
inclination to maintain the traditional order. Thus the tendency to buy in cheaper non-
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guild labour spelt the death of the guild system in Hamburg and other progressively
minded cities.
The third example Sheehan chooses is Berlin. This city, the capital of the
ascendant kingdom of Prussia, demonstrates the largely progressive role played by
larger state structures in the production revolution. The growth of Prussia as a military
power ensured a centralisation of authority and a decline in the micro-economics of the
guild-based communities. Already in 1731, with the issuing of the empire-wide
Imperial Trades Edict, the Prussian government, despite its vociferous complaints that
economic matters were state and not imperial matters, utilised the reforming and anti-
corporatist elements of the edict to hinder guild practices". The much later
Allgemeines Landrecht of 1794 finally placed the guilds under the control of
centralised government administration. As in Hamburg, the decline of guild structures
was accompanied by the emergence of the entrepreneurial class, which was actively
encouraged by the central authorities.
The role of state in the production revolution should not be seen as a purely
progressive one. The Krefeld silk industry, for example, suffered constantly under the
state's meagre attempts to set up a silk industry in Berlin in competition: Krefeld's
dynamism seemed to be of little consequence to the central authorities who deemed it
fit and proper to expect silk to be made in the capital. Similarly, the authorities
constantly demonstrated a destructive tendency to favour the short term interests of its
most loyal subjects over the longer term interests of the industrial infrastructure in
general. The example always quoted is that where merchant interests were constantly
favoured above the health of the Silesian weaving industry. Thus a tendency towards
progressive policy was often undermined by state self-interest; progressive policies
could sometimes be high on rhetoric but low in effect.
Alone of all the German speaking cities of the last hundred years of the Holy
13 Walker, Towns, 93-94. Walker points out that the edict was worded such that different governments
could interpret it as they wished. Thus the edict had the effect of strengthening local character and
idiosyncrasy and differentiating more rigidly between different types of community. This was le mot
juste of cameralist administrative practice. See later discussion on cameralism.
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Roman Empire 14 , Berlin, with the exception of Vienna 15 , managed to sustain a level of
demographic growth comparable with cities in Europe west of the Rhine. From 20,000
inhabitants in 1650 to 150,000 in 1800, the rapid expansion was bound, more than
anything else, to weaken traditional corporate order. Born out of 'the community' as a
manageable social environment, the guilds could not respond to the new
internationalism of trade without thoroughly undermining the corporatist basis for their
existence. The new order, however, at first demonstrated itself to be incapable of filling
what we might call the 'guild gap' - the vacuum where social order seemed to have no
centre. The number of inhabitants that were without trade had reached nearly half the
recorded population of Berlin by 1780. 16 As the number of poor grew, the symbolic
power of the urban underworld grew. Crime rates rose dramatically and poverty
became a recognised problem in the consciousness of the entrepreneurial classes. The
opening of new workhouses in 1774, along with the prohibition of begging kingdom-
wide represented the new order's response, from the centre, to a broad social problem
that violated the corporatist rule of self-contained localised action. The workhouses, a
symptom of a new social logic, were designed to institutionally exclude those elements
that could not be addressed by the new order's macro-economic basis.
Sheehan's three cities, chosen to demonstrate the diversity of German urban
life, represent three paradigms of the urban experience: guild encroachment on
economic and demographic expansion and consequent stagnation; long-term exposure
to international trading, facilitating an anti-corporate response to demographic
expansion; centralisation of state authority and a consequent macro-economy,
undermining local communities in favour of a larger unit, the nation. These economic
upheavals in German urban life, however, are accompanied, paradoxically, by a
significant, if short-lived, decentralisation of labour and production away from urban
centres. Those cities that failed to hold in check the guilds' active animosity towards
the new production methods suffered, but the surrounding rural hinterland of such a
14 The official demise being in the year 1806 with the victories of Napoleon over Prussia and Austria.
15 see footnote 3
16 See De Vries, European Urbanization, 1500-1800, 1984. 269ff.
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city benefited considerably. Strange as it now seems, it was the ultra-corporatist
communities of the home towns and smaller rural settlements that provided the
entrepreneur with labour free from the formalised guild hindrances of the city. As the
rural population swelled, production necessarily diversified to provide employment for
the optimum percentage of the local population. The increase in non-skilled labour
meant that the guilds simply lost their 'market share' of labour. The social factors
accompanying demographic expansion and diversification in rural areas also
contributed to the demise of the rural guild structure: an easing of marriage and -
fertility controls; the growth of a landless labour force. As testament to the expansion
of rural industry at this time, as many as half of all craftsmen in Prussia lived outside
the cities as free labourers by 1800.
Sheehan's three paradigms represent a broader geographical separation of
German civil life in the Holy Roman empire. The Nuremberg paradigm might be said
to represent the imperial cities of the 'individualised country' 17 of Middle Germany. In
so far as such cities clung to corporatist order, we might include in this paradigm
'home towns' such as Darmstadt, Wiirzburg and Bamberg along the Main, the Upper
Danube region from Rottweil in Wiirttemberg through Regensburg, Deggendorf and
Plattling down as far as, but not including, Passau, now on the Austrian border
(Franconia and Lower Bavaria). Some Northern towns might be said to belong to this
paradigm also: Osnabriick; Westphalian towns such as Dortmund and Rhineland towns
such as Aachen and Bonn. The Prussian state centred around Berlin, home of Prussian
cameralism, and the Habsburg kingdom of Austria both exercised a more centralised
'modern' control of fiscal and political policy. The geographical opposition of North
and South to middle is thus clear.
The Holy Roman Emperor, traditionally a member of the Habsburg dynasty,
thus usually had a monarchy of his own to attend to above and beyond his imperial
duties. Administrative practices in the German territories of the Empire were
reflections of the bewildering array of diverse governmental structures. Broadly
17 Mack Walker Towns, 1-2, 23.
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speaking one can see the following patterns, beginning with the largest units:
Monarchic territories or kingdoms such as Hohenzollern Prussia or Habsburg
Austria and, from 1806, Wittelsbach Bavaria
Princely territories and electorates such as pre 1806 Bavaria, pre 1806 Baden,
Hannover, Hesse-Darmstadt, Hesse-Kassel, Saxony and
Wiirttemberg l 8.
Ecclesiastical states such as Main, Trier, Ltittich, Minster, Salzburg and
Passau.
Imperial cities (often with ecclesiastical territories, but with a separate status)
such as Regensburg, Augsburg and Passau.
Home towns - self-contained, walled towns of the individualised country - such
as Deggendorf, Plattling, Fulda, Osnabruck, and NOrdlingen.
These distinctions were in practice far from stable, and the list given above should be
seen merely as a 'rule of thumb' against which to measure patterns of German civil life.
Certainly, the notion of Reichsunmittelbarkeit, of an unimpeded, unmediated line to
and from the imperial authorities themselves was jealously guarded by the smaller cities
and towns. Such towns existed within princely territories or some other administrative
structure, but received peculiar rights of autonomy granted at various times by the
imperial Aulic Council [Reichshofrat] or the Cameral tribunal.
Cameralism: a Baroque Science in Crisis 
Perhaps it is from the latter body, the Cameral tribunal, less bound to the cycles
of the imperial reign than its Aulic counterpart, that one of the most significant
consequences of the crisis in administration in the late Holy Roman Empire gets its
name: the bureaucratic science of cameralism. 19 In its purest form, cameralism was
enacted only in those parts of the Reich where centralisation was least in evidence.
Thus, so-called Prussian cameralism represents a centralised bastardisation of this
Cartesian 'science'. The essence of cameralism can be seen in its reliance on the visible.
18 Between 1803 and 1806, Max Joseph of Zweibriicken acquired ecclesiastical states and imperial
cities including Augsburg, Regensburg and Passau. In 1806, he declared Bavaria a kingdom.
19 In actual fact it is far more likely that both the imperial body and the science get their names from
the german word Kammer or Cammer referring not merely to the more modern 'room' but to the
palace affairs of the local landowner. As a science of domestic administration, cameralism thereby
adheres to the Aristotelean unity of house, home and state.
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It made all categorisations according to what it could see, according to those things
that gave themselves up for scrutiny. It was essentially an attempt to marry the
apparently diametrically opposed notions of fiscal and/or civil diversity and imperial
unity:
Cameralism was a baroque science....Cameralism was a science whose
symmetry depended on its being seen from a distance, and whose rationality
was in abstract outline seen from the top, subject to giddiness when attention
moved from that to concrete detail. It accepted the existence of all discrete
parts of German civil society, each with a set of detailed qualities and rules
peculiarly its own, and worked from the assumption that if all of them could be
comprehended at once an essential harmony among them would emerge above
their apparent diversity. That was a metaphysical assumption and even, to begin
with, a religious expression of faith. In cameral practice, the medium of
harmony among the discrete parts was the state's fiscal administration,
analogously a social abstraction composed of men above and beyond the
discrete parts of society.20
As Walker points out 2, , this science was based on an encyclopaedic notion of unity -
that each part could be indexed, boxed and labelled, accessed later, still retaining its
autonomy, whilst, conversely, remaining apart of the whole.
The basis of cameral action was to intervene only when a part's autonomy, its
essential character, was under threat by such distortions as 'oligarchy and corruption'.
Cameralism thereby attempted merely to 'maintain a community's essential character'.22
The cameralist chancellor of the University of Halle, Veit Seckendorff (1626-1692)
summed up this process of government as one with 'alles nach Maasse des alten
Herkommens und jedes Ortes Gelegenheit'.23
Cameralism might thus be seen to extend from the guild theories of Johannes
Althusius24 and is first and foremost an affirmation of corporatist diversity. The 'new'
element, however, consists in the latter part of the proposition: fiscal and civil diversity
2° Walker, Towns, 145.
21 Ibid. 146.
22 Ibid. 147.
23 Walker, Towns, 147. Literally 'all in accordance with old custom and each place's circumstance'
24 Also known as Johannes Althaus, d.1638. See Black, Guilds and Civil Society, Cambridge, 1984,
131-142. The importance of Althusius' Politica Met hodice Digesta, first edition 1603, extended
second edition 1610, lies in the extensiveness of its argument. Black's book provides a useful
bibliography.
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within unity. This admittedly encyclopaedic notion of unity found its most radical
practice in the administrators and administrative theorists of the Old Reich, notably in
the works of, of course, Veit Seckendorff, J. J. Becher (1635-82), Christian Thomasius
(1655-1728), Christian Wolff (1675-1754) and the notable conservative Justus MOser
(1720-94):
Devoted as he [MOser] was to an ideal of Germanic community implicitly
focused upon the small guild town, he decried entrepreneurial commercialism,
the putting-out system and large scale manufacture. The implied rejection of
the prescriptive power of economics as an autonomous science was to become
a feature of nineteenth-century German thought, Marx included: personality
and social life - 'ethics' - defined what economics was about.25
If one reads cameralism as a descriptive science, a non-proactive theory 'prone to
giddiness', then the element of unity in it must have represented the metaphysical
element necessary to make sense of the 'benighted social order' of the Reich: 26 the
strain for order and unity, despite a wilful reality, is at the root of this Cartesian hybrid.
In Prussia, the unity element was easily subsumed into the post-cameralist
bureaucracy of an interventionist state and it is the Prussian paradigm that was to
prove the most pervasive in the new emergent order. The culmination of a universalist,
state-sponsored administrative science came in the 1790's with the enactment of the
Prussian General Code. The unity element of camerahst doctrine now required that all
parts be measured according to categories based 'not on local corporations and clusters
of social relations, but on social and legal types marked out and recognised by the
state.'27 Johann Justi's (1705?-71) theoretical strains for Zusammenhang in Prussian
civil life, based around the individual's answerability to the state alone, now found
expression in Prussian administrative practice: diversity existed only in so far as it
expressed the all-embracing totality of the organic state.28
The German Bourgeoisie
In strict economic terms, the middle class, a postulated mid-point between
25 Black, Guilds, 128
26 Eagleton, Ideology, 14.
27 Walker, Towns, 159.
28 Sheehan, History, 55-72, 193-5 and Walker, Towns, 145-174.
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those who control capital and thus inevitably control labour (the capitalists), and those
who sell their labour (the proletariat), did not exist in early nineteenth-century
Germany. The notion of a bourgeois culture, then, in the sense of a definitive class
culture, is problematic: the emergent cultural landscape of the nineteenth century was
essentially based, therefore, on a putative culture which was largely constructed.. This
'classless' culture, born into a post-cameralist climate characterised by notions of state
as a unity or organism, thus represented a bizarre perversion of the 'high' art of the
rococo and baroque courts, transmuting its 'highness' into an esoteric abstraction of the
universal: this democratic imperative made the assumption that the new order could
reconstruct a kind of community as a larger unit based around the universal
inclusiveness of all its members. It is important to realise that this putative 'democratic'
high culture was not the culture of the major venture capitalists, whose number was
distinctly limited, but of a disparate group of workers whose commodity in the
capitalist market was, although still labour, now a labour which brought a sufficient
income that enabled the pretence of economic autonomy. If citizenship was a right,
given to all 'living under God's grace' then the active exchange of mutual support, the
proactive participation in community in order to remain a member, must inevitably give
way to the opposite inclination - the urge for separateness, for a degree of autonomy
away from the roar of the masses. Those that managed such a partial separation have
become known as the bourgeoisie. Thus the emergence of autonomy under the flag of
universality engendered a propaganda of the putative home-centred world vision based
around a sentimental vision of the family as the base unit on which a democratic and
Christian society could rest. 29 The non-sentimental imagery of the utility family of the
corporatist order now gives way to the new 'universal' aspiration of domestic bliss.
The new post-cameral 'universal' culture and the collapse of the corporatist
order are both implicitly bound up in the demographic upheavals of the 'vital
revolution'. Without perpetrating a crude causal model, one can clearly discern that this
29 This is, of course, particularly true of the so-called Vormarz or Biedermeier period between
Napoleon's defeat and the 1848 revolutions. For a vivid account of music in this period, see A. M.
Hanson, Musical Life in Biedermeier Vienna, Cambridge, 1985.
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rapid shift in the demographic order played a significant role in the passing of the old
and the emergence of the new orders. Whilst the notion of a 'middle' or 'bourgeois'
class as a distinct economic unit is problematic, one can see the emergence of the
episteme3° of 'autonomy' (both economic and cultural) contributing to this middle
layer's sense of 'otherness'. The uneasy coincidence of the notion of a universality of
expression and individual autonomy gave rise to a tortured symbolic of the universal
individual, that metaphysical mechanism through which the last vestiges of the
corporatist world vision are dispelled. Cameralism had at last collapsed into tiny
atomised units - individuals. To order this potentially anarchic splintering of Cartesian
order, the new culture required what cameralism had required, some notion of or place
for unity. Whereas cameralist unity had evolved around the metaphysical symbolism of
imperial authority, 'bourgeois' unity invested its material powers in the microcosm of
the individual and the fit mechanisms of mutual exchangeability - trade, universal
expression and so on.
The rift that capitalism instigated between the disenfranchised labourers
without guild status and the venturists who could persuade bankers to finance their
Manufaktoren was addressed by the rhetoric of a universal mission of piety,
Christianity, democracy and nationhood to which every citizen was bound to align
himself in the interest of the greater good. What Bracher calls the 'socialisation' or
'politicisation' of the citizens was an inevitable result of the decline of corporatism.
Without recourse to the constraining mechanisms of corporatist community, the
danger of a mass alignment against the centre became a distinct possibility. As Bracher
further argues, the emergence of a 'democratic', majority-rule mode of government was
accompanied by an inevitable centralisation of the mechanisms for the dissemination of
information and an intensification of censorship. The 'people' were thus mobilised
'through propaganda':
In sum, this development might be called the assertion of the rule of the
30 This Foucauldian term refers to an element of the epistemological paradigm which is clearly active
within it. In this Foucauldian sense, the notion of autonomy is bound up with the broader socialisation
and politicisation of the individual.
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autonomous individual within the state yet at the same time a manifestation of
the threat posed to him by this modern, all-encompassing state.m
Such cosy formulae can overstate the consistency of the social and cultural
transformations of this period. Yet, within the 'bourgeois' culture of the first two
decades of the nineteenth century, the notion of an uninterrupted line of
communication between individual and state, individual and God was loudly
proclaimed if the reality of social practice at that time suggested little to complement
such liberal polemics:
The detailed control taught by the chairs of cameralism and urged by
eighteenth-century statesmen seemed to have reached the limit of its possibility
and failed. It was dropped from the university curricula now. But yet that oddly
necessary offshoot of cameralism, the doctrine of the harmony of individual
wills, still had a way open to it. It was mainly a change in emphasis and political
method, in a sense not more than a change in tactics: but a very important one.
Liberalization appeared as an alternative weapon to control, another way to
break up the impenetrable and immovable communities, and to integrate them
with the larger life and purpose of the society and the state - to make them
enter the general estate of the movers and doers32.
New Disseminations
Evidence for a distinctly new network of dissemination mechanisms at the end
of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries in Germany can be found in
the indices of book fairs and publishing lists. The comparative study of these indices in
Frangois33 demonstrates convincingly that demographic indicators in population
censors can often distort certain features of the cultural landscape. By using book fair
and publishing indices, Francois is able to construct a reasonably reliable picture ,
 of the
changing dynamics of cultural dissemination practices in this period. Bracher's
description of a mobilisation 'through propaganda' 34 holds the key to an understanding
of the new culture: the policies set out in the Prussian General Code find their
demographic expression only during the second phase of Napoleonic occupation. Out
31 Bracher, The German Dictatorship, Cologne, 1969, 14.
32 Walker, Towns, 213-4.
33 Francois, 'The German urban network between the 16th and 18th centuries: cultural and
demographic indicators' in van der Woude, Hayami and de Vries (ed.'s) Urbanization in History,
1990. 84-100.
34 Bracher, Dictatorship, 1971.
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of the old imperial order, shattered by the Napoleonic wars, emerged the two axis
powers of Prussia and Austria. The political reality, however, seems, as Francois
shows, to have had a considerable basis in the cultural dynamics of eighteenth century
Germany. The bi-polarity of Berlin-Leipzig and Vienna in publishing lists and indices
of authors and publishers underlines a cultural centralisation preceding the political and
economic bi-polarity of the nineteenth-century post-Napoleonic German lands:
Table 1.1
Top Four Publishing Towns
by Number of Titles35
1610-19
(rank)
1765-1805
Leipzig 2296 [1] Leipzig 5556
Frankfurt 1799 [2] Berlin 2423
Cologne 1375 [3] Vienna 1235
Wittenberg 804 [4] Halle 1154
In the second, later index, Frankfurt rated lower in the rank and published only 1137
titles, showing a decline over the specified period. Similarly, Cologne rated lower than
33rd on the later rank thus showing a serious decline. The ratios of the highest ranking
town to that of the fourth highest demonstrate the centralism of the later index:
approximately 3:1 for the earlier list and 5:1 for the later list. Clearly, however, this
simple comparison is not sufficient and, as Francois shows, these trends can only be
determined in the context of the other indices.
The other indices can underline the argument, then. The numbers of publishers
in the towns show a similar polycentrism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for
example:
35 The tables shown here are taken from Francois' tables. The first earlier index takes its information
from book fair lists and the second is taken from book fair catalogues. The problem of the real
comparability of these two indices is underlined by the growing importance of the catalogue as both
record and advertisement for a house's products. The trend is certainly tangible but not accurately
measurable in such indices: methods of storing lists and the efficiency with which such lists were
maintained may have significantly changed in this period. We can thus only assume a fair
comparability. Note that the later index is based on numbers of titles on a ten yearly average between
1765 and 1805, whereas the earlier index refers only to the circumscribed ten years 1610-19.
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Table 1.2
Top Four German Towns
by Number of Publishers in
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries36
(rank)
[1] Frankfurt/M 118
[2] Augsburg	 107
[3] Leipzig	 88
[4] Nuremberg	 86
Despite a certain bi-polarity that Francois recognises, centred around the south-west
region and around Thuringia and Saxony, the centrality of a single regional capital is
reserved only for the north east provinces centred around Leipzig and Berlin. Thus, the
south west region demonstrates a high degree of polycentrism at this time. 37 A later
index demonstrates a distinct alteration in that pattern:
Table 1.3
The Four Largest Publishing Towns
in 1806 According to Number
of Resident Authors38
(rank)
[1] Vienna	 382
[2] Berlin	 288
[3] Leipzig	 178
[4] Dresden	 129
Whilst population indices from the same periods demonstrate a similar trend
towards bi-polar centralisation:
36 Francois has taken these figures from J. Benzing, 'Die deutschen Verleger des 16. und 17.
Jahrhunderts: Eine Neubearbeitung', Archiv	 Geschichte des Buchwesens, 18 (1977), cols. 1077-
322.
37 The ratios of the two respective capitals to their second largest towns in that region are given by
Francois thus:
Leipzig-Wittenberg 2.9:1
Frankfurt-Cologne 1.3:1
38 Taken from J. G. Meusel, Das Gelehrte Teutschland oder Lexikon der jetzt lebenden Schriftsteller,
1806, xii.
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Table 1.4
Population by 1,000s of Inhabitants39
(rank)
1600 1800
Danzig 50 [1] Vienna 231
Vienna 50 [2] Berlin 150
Prague 50 [3] Hamburg 100
Augsburg 48 [4]
ratio of rank Ito rank 4:
Prague 77
25:24
	
3:1
Francois believes there to remain an attenuated polycentrism:
We can draw three conclusions from the preceding arguments. The first related
to the unification of the network of 'publishing' towns under the leadership of
Leipzig, and more generally to the hegemony over intellectual life in Germany
exercised by Berlin and Leipzig. This contrasts with the absence of a clear
demographic capitol in Germany and the continuing polycentrism of the
German urban network. It was partly due to the fact that integration occurs
more easily in the cultural than in the demographic area: books and ideas
move more freely than do people. But it also goes to show that the cultural
integration of Germany preceded her political and economic integration and
that Germany was a Kulturnation long before becoming a politische Nation.4°
Whilst population indices clearly point towards a new type of super-city in Vienna and
Berlin, the polycentrism of the older German order is maintained in the lower ranked
towns :
Table 1.5
Population by
(rank)
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
1,000s of Inhabitants, 1800
Konigsberg 59
Dresden	 55
Breslau	 54
Cologne	 42
Danzig	 40
Magdeburg 37
Bremen	 36
Frankfurt	 35
ratio of rank 5 to rank 12: c.2:1[1.68:1]
39 Some of Frangois' figures for population are taken from de Vries, European Urbanization 1500-
1800, 1984. I found the appendices particularly useful, especially Appendix I, 269ff. The German
cities are found on pages 272-3 and entries are given, where possible, from 1500 to 1800 at fifty year
intervals. The ratios of this table clearly show that the largest cities of the new post-mercantisalist
markets are disproportionately larger than the next few cities in the ranking. Compare Prague with
Vienna or Berlin.
40 Francois, 'German urban network...' 99.
43
Indeed, as Francois points out:
In the different regions there are networks such as those centred on Munich
and Dresden, for example, which retained coherence and autonomy. The links
between the various decentralised regional sub-systems were provided by the
'relay' towns, ports such as Hamburg, or the market towns, such as Frankfurt,
Breslau and Leipzig.41
The publishing indices after the top four ranking towns demonstrate a very different
pattern, as one would expect, given the above assertion:
Table 1.6
Number of Titles, 1765-1805
(rank)
[5] Frankfurt/M 1,137
[6] Nuremberg	 972
[7] Hamburg
	 890
[8] Gottingen
	 787
[9] Breslau	 569
[10] Augsburg	 466
[11] Dresden	 459
[12] Jena	 445
ratio of rank 5 to rank 12:
c.3:1[2.5:1]
Whilst author indices tend to show a polycentrism, explained, possibly, by the role of
the new university towns and the proliferation of the so-called Residenuttidte during
the baroque period:
Table 1.7
Number of Authors, 1806
US = university town;	 rs = Residenzstadt
(rank)
[5] Prague	 1191i5
[6] Munich	 114rs
[7] Hamburg	 106
[8] Stuttgart	 105'1
[9] Breslau	 83's
[10] Halle	 8014S
[11] Gottingen	 7 lig
[12] Nuremberg	 70
publishing indices show a much clearer picture of the new centralisms of post-cameral
disseminations of culture.
41 Ibid., 90.
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Robert Eitner's Model 
The analysis of Meusel and Benzing's materials given by Francois demonstrates
how powerful an indicator cultural indices can be. Clearly, there was some kind of
fundamental shift in the manner in which printed matter was distributed well before the
forced decline of cameralism under Napoleon's occupation. The absolute necessity of
such centralised means of production and distribution seems to have been motivated by
what might be termed the commodity-equivalence paradigm. 42 The metaphysical
assumption of this paradigm was free-exchangeability according to coinage value only,
either internally within a single state or quasi-nation or, as was later the case, across
international boundaries. As we have seen, those towns and cities that sought to trade
beyond the small confines of their circumscribed corporatist world began to emerge in
the eighteenth century as the strongest wealth creators in the Old Reich. Such cold,
levelling, 'democratic' pressures as the commodity required, forced numerous hitherto
corporatist communities out from behind the old protecting veil of so-called
Reichsunmittelbarkeit into the centre stage of German consciousness.
To what degree, then, can the production and distribution of music be seen to
participate in this same paradigm shift? Is there any evidence for a similar emergent
centralism of publishing towns? The data bases that might answer this question are
those by Robert Eitner43 , Hannelore Goricke44 and Alexander Weinmann. 45 Of
particular use is the oldest source, Eitner's index - still a profoundly useful reference.
Indeed, both Weinmann and Goricke have made extensive use of the references given
by Eimer and appear to have added few names to his findings. The 'Buch- und
Musikalien-Handler....' index" consists of extensive lists of publishers, traders and
42 A term used here to capture the sense in which the notion of 'commodity' and fair parity of markets
was becoming as much a feature of the epistemological landscape as the economic.
43 His 'Buch- und Musikalien-Handler, Buch- und Musikaliendrucker nebst Notenstecher, nur die
Musik betreffend' the Beilage from Monatshefteffir Musikgeschichte, issue 36, Leipzig, 1904. Reprint
New York 1962.
44 Der Wiener Musikalienhandel von 1700 bis 1778, 1960.
45 'Wiener Musikverleger und Musikalienhandler von Mozarts Zeit bis gegen 1860: emn
firmengeschichtliche und topographischer Bebelf in Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften,
Philosophische-historische Klasse. Sitzungsberichte, 230. Band 4. Abhandlung, Festgabe der
Akadetnie far Teilnehmer des lnternationalen Musikwissenschaftlichen Kongress, Vienna 1956.
46 Henceforward referred to simply as Musikalienhandler.
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printers of music, arranged in alphabetical order. As far as one can tell from the index,
little or no differentiation is made between entries which own their own business and
those which merely participate in a business as an employee. Thus, Druckerei might
mean 'a printing house' owned by the named entry, whereas Drucker might mean 'one
who is involved in printing.' This differentiation is not always obvious. Similar
problems arise with the pairs VerlagNerleger, Musikalienhandlungl
Musikalienhandler and Musikhandlung/ Musikhandler.47
The index, which covers Europe and the United States, is, like Meusel and
Benzing's earlier indices, taken from a number of sources, but most notably from book
fair catalogues, in-house catalogues and municipal tax records. Entries are ordered
alphabetically according to surname or firm title. No ordering is made for either period
or place. Appendix I has sorted the towns into alphabetical order and grouped all
entries for each of those towns into 50 year periods. No references have been
reproduced outside the Old Reich borders of 1789, to facilitate a comparison with
Francois' figures. The appendix, ordered in this way, still presents several fundamental
problems in the nature of this material. First, through no fault of Eitner's, the
information available for the exact dating of many of the publishing/printing/trading
entries is scant to say the least Thus we often find such date references as 'end of the
18th century'48 , or worse, '19th century'49
 or even no date at al1. 50 Also, when dates are
more specific, there is rarely enough information to ascertain exactly when the entry
finished practising his/her craft. The following analysis of the index thus takes for each
dated entry the earliest year and constructs an index of participation in the music
industry based on this global nile:5'
47 To remain as faithful to Eimer as possible, all references given either in the main text or in
Appendix I translate trade descriptions as follows: Druckerei: 'printing house' or 'printer's'; Drucker:
'printer'; Verlag: 'publishing house' or 'publisher's': Verleger: 'publisher'; Musikalienhandlung: 'sheet
music dealer's' or 'dealership in printed music'; Musikalienhandler: 'sheet music dealer' or 'dealer in
printed music', Musikhandlung: 'music dealer's/ dealership', Musiaandler: 'music dealer'.
48 See page 124, the entry for Kunst- und Industrie-Coraptoir: '...in Leipzig und Berlin, Ende des 18.
Jahrhunderts.'
49 See page 148, the entry for Mayer and Wigand: '...Verleger in Leipzig im 19. Jahrhunderi'
50 See for example page 120, the entry for Koch. Eitner merely states '...Verleger in Leipzig.'
51 Wherever possible I have stuck to the accepted Anglicisation of some of these names. The
exception, however, is Kassel which seems no longer to be called Cassel in English.
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Table 1.8
Participants in the German Music Industry, (printers, engravers, etc. of music)52
[rank]
1600-1650
[rank]
1650-1700
[1] Leipzig 28 [1] Leipzig 32
[2] Frankfurt/M 23 [2] Franlcfurt/M 23
[3] Nuremberg 13 [3] Nuremberg 16
[4] Erfurt 11 [4] Augsburg 12
[5] Rostock 9 [5] Hamburg 11
[6] Magdeburg 8 [6] Dresden 9
[7] Augsburg 7 [7] Jena 8
[8] Hamburg 6 [8] Frankfurt/0 5
[9] Dresden 5 Cologne 5
Jena 5 LUbeck 5
Vienna 5 Regensburg 5
[12] Berlin 4 [12] Stuttgart 4
Braunschweig 4 [13] Bremen 3
Passau 4 Breslau 3
[15] Danzig 3 Kassel 3
Innsbruck 3 Ulm 3
[17] Breslau 2 Vienna 3
GOrlitz 2 [18] Berlin 2
Halle 2 Darmstadt 2
Kassel 2 Freiburg/Br53 2
Cologne 2 GOrlitz 2
Regensburg 2 Gotha 2
Tubingen 2 Halle 2
WUrzburg 2 Munich 2
[25] Bremen 1 Weimar 2
Darmstadt 1 WUrzburg 2
Freiburg/Br 1 [27] Erfurt 1
Gotha 1 Hanover 1
LUbeck 1 Mainz 1
Mainz 1 Passau 1
Munich 1 Prague 1
Prague 1 Tiibingen 1
Ulm 1 [33] Braunschweig 0
[34] Dtisseldorf 0 Danzig 0
Frankfurt/0 0 Diisseldorf 0
Hanover 0 Innsbruck 0
Mannheim 0 Magdeburg 0
Stuttgart 0 Mannheim 0
Weimar 0 Rostock 0
52 As we have said, the entries were counted and organised in terms of the first dated record that
Eimer could find. The low level of information for dating necessitated an analysis of first dates: thus
an entry for 1730-80 would only be included in the 1700-1750 figures.
53 i.e. Freiburg im Breisgau, in Baden-Wurttemberg. Freiburg in Saxony, is referred to throughout as
Freiburg/S. Not to be confused with Freiberg in Saxony.
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Table 1.9
Participants in the German Music Industry, (printers, engravers, etc. of music)
[rank]
1700-1750
[rank]
1750-1800
[1] Leipzig 25 [1] Leipzig 68
[2] Augsburg 19 [2] Berlin 47
[3] Nuremberg 16 [3] Vienna 39
[4] Hamburg 14 [4] Hamburg 29
[5] Frankfurt/M 8 [5] Frankfurt/M 13
[6] Erfurt 6 [6] Braunschweig 8
[7] Berlin 5 Nuremberg 8
Jena 5 [8] Halle 7
[9] Dresden 4 Mannheim 7
Vienna 4 [10] Breslau 6
[11] Bremen 3 Hanover 6
Cologne 3 Kassel 6
Munich 3 Liibeck 6
Passau 3 Prague 6
Ulm 3 Stuttgart 6
[16] Braunschweig 2 [16] Augsburg 5
Breslau 2 Magdeburg 5
GOrlitz 2 Mainz 5
Ltibeck 2 Weimar 5
Magdeburg 2 [20] Danzig 4
Regensburg 2 Gotha 4
Rostock 2 [22] Bremen 3
Stuttgart 2 Darmstadt 3
Weimar 2 Dresden 3
[25] Danzig 1 Regensburg 3
Darmstadt 1 [26] Erfurt 2
Frankfurt/0 1 Freiburg/Br 2
Freiburg/Br 1 Jena 2
Gotha 1 Cologne 2
Kassel 1 Rostock 2
Mainz 1 Ttibingen 2
Prague 1 [32] DUsseldorf 1
WUrzburg 1 Frankfurt/0 1
[34] DUsseldorf 0 GOrlitz 1
Halle 0 Innsbruck 1
Hanover 0 Munich 1
Innsbruck 0 Ulm 1
Mannheim 0 Wiirzburg 1
Tubingen 0 [39] Passau 0
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Table 1.10
Participants in the German Music Industry, (printers, engravers, etc. of music)
[rank]
1800 - 1850
[rank]
[1] Leipzig 80 120) Gotha 5
[2] Berlin 78 Wilrzburg 5
[3] Vienna 41 [23] Mainz 4
[4] Stuttgart 19 Regensburg 4
[5] Breslau 16 [25] Bremen 3
[6] Dresden 14 Darmstadt 3
Erfurt 14 Diisseldorf 3
[8] Hamburg 13 Freiburg/Br 3
Munich 13 GOrlitz 3
[10] Prague 11 Innsbruck 3
[11] frankfurt/M 10 Nuremberg 3
[12] Augsburg 9 Ulm 3
Halle 9 [33] Liibeck 2
[14] Braunschweig 8 Passau 2
Cologne 8 Tubingen 2
[16] Hanover 7 Weimar 2
Kassel 7 [37] Mannheim 1
Magdeburg 7 Rostock 1
[19] Jena 6 [39] Frankfurt/0 0
[20] Danzig 5
Augsburg
The example of Augsburg can be seen to represent a paradigm of the fate of
the inland Reichssttidte in the post-Cartesian era. Whereas the patronage and dynamic
mercantilism of the Fugger and Welser families had helped to make Augsburg a
banking and financial centre for the south west during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, Augsburg demonstrates a severe decline as a result of population decimation
during the so-called Thirty Years War (1618-1648). The relatively low level of
information in the index for participants in the music industry, 54 1600-1650, can be
seen to misrepresent Augsburg's cultural importance in the first half of the seventeenth
century. Whereas Augsburg lies at rank 7 in the music index, its place in Francois'
indices would seem to suggest a marginally more significant cultural and demographic
54 Henceforward to be termed merely 'music index.'
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function: rank 4 in the population index and rank 5 in the titles index. 55 Augsburg's
ratio with her nearest large neighbour, Munich, of 6:1 in the titles index and 4:1 in the
population index would certainly seem to suggest that Augsburg functioned as one of,
if not the most significant, demographic and cultural centres for the individualised
country of the south west. Even the emergent giant, Nuremberg, cannot compete at
this stage with Augsburg's cultural ranking: 2:1 [Augsburg: Nuremberg] in the authors'
index. Thus, Augsburg's disproportionately low performance in the music index might
be seen as a result of too small a data base for this period, 7:13 [Augsburg:
Nuremberg].
By the latter half of the seventeenth century, however, Augsburg rises to rank 4
on the music index, seeming to underline to a greater extent Francois' and de Vries'
figures. Thus, Augsburg's data can be represented as a factor or proportion, n, of
Nuremberg's thus:56
[N(n) = A]
music index: n = 0.75
population index: n = 1
authors index: n = 2
Again, Augsburg's relationship with her nearest urban neighbour, Munich, would seem
to underline her cultural significance as a regional capital for present Bavaria and
Baden-WUrttemberg:
[M(n) = A]
music index: n = 6
population index: n = 2
By the first half of the 18th century, Augsburg takes rank 2 in the music index
55 Of course, at this stage, the data margins are so small as to be almost wholly unreliable. Hence, the
necessity to con textualise the tendencies shown by each of the indices in the broader indexical
contour.
56 In all cases, the upper case letters represent the towns referred to in the preceding text. Thus, N =
data for Nuremberg, and A = data for Augsburg. It might seem strange to compare in this way the
music index, a comparative index, with other 'absolute' indices such as those provided by Francois and
de Vries (see next note). But, there is clear evidence that population growth and cultural growth are
not as determinately linked as traditional wisdom would have it. Therefore, I have stuck to non-
growth indices or 'absolute' indices for comparison.
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having remained consistently ahead of her larger neighbour, Nuremberg, with a ratio of
c.6:5. No other indices are available for further comparison apart from de Vries'
figures. 57 Thus the following factors would seem to largely underline the only cultural
indicators available, the music index:
[N(n) = A]
music index:" n = 1.9
population index: n = 1
The second half of the eighteenth century sees Augsburg slip to rank 16, having
at last been overtaken by Nuremberg which slips only to rank 6 giving the new ratio of
5:8 [Augsburg: Nuremberg]. A comparison of this with Francois' and de Vries' figures
demonstrates a severe decline for Augsburg, both cultural and demographic,
throughout the eighteenth century: rank 16 for population [Nuremberg, 18], rank 15
for authors [Nuremberg 12].
In essence, Augsburg is so far proving herself, like so many of the former
Reichsstiidte, to be a victim both of eighteenth-century rationalisation (the emergence
of the new regional Residenzstiidte) and of a new centralised culture of commodity
equivalence. The following table shows Augsburg's participation rate for the music
index as a factor of that of rank 1:
[L(n) = A]
Table 1.11
Augsburg's Participation in the Music Industry as a Factor (n) of Leipzig's
1600-1650 1650-1700 1700-1750 1750-1800
n=	 0.25 0.33. 0.76 0.08
The 1800-1850 indices would seem to show that Augsburg was able to sustain
a lesser function, and consolidated its rank position to 12 in the music index. This
sustained level of regional servicing contrasts starkly with that of Nuremberg for the
same index, from rank 6, 1750-1800, to rank 25, 1800-1850. Thus, in terms of music
57 De Vries' figures in Urbanization, 272-3.
58 Where the factor has more than four decimal places, the figure is approximated to four decimal
places. So, whereas the factor here is in fact 1.9047619, the rounded up figure is 1.9048.
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participation, when shown as a factor (n) of Nuremberg's participation rates in this
index, Augsburg's survival to the detriment of Nuremberg is clearly demonstrable:
[N(n) = A]
Table 1.12
Augsburg 's Participation in the Music Index as a Factor of Nuremberg's
	
1600-1650
	
1650-1700	 1700-1750	 1750-1800	 1800-1850
n =	 0.54	 0.75	 1.2	 0.63	 3
and the same expression of Augsburg's participation with Munich emphasises its
emergent regional function in an ever increasing area, eventually to be superseded by
Munich's new regional function:
[M(n) = Al
Table 1.13
Augsburg 's Participation in the Music Index as a Factor of Munich's
	
1600-1650	 1650-1700	 1700-1750	 1750-1800	 1800-1850
n=	 7	 6	 6.33 	 5	 0.69
Thus the importance of Augsburg as a regional centre declines, then, in favour of
Munich in the nineteenth century. This was due as much to Munich's new status as a
Residenzstadt as to its emergent industrial function.
Berlin
Berlin demonstrates the trend towards large central places for the dissemination
of culture that undermined the older Reichssteidte's regional functions. In the first half
of the seventeenth century, its population was so small as to remain out of the top 33
ranks. Similarly its position on the music index is only rank 12. Its relationship with its
nearest virulent neighbour, Leipzig, is as follows:
52
[L(n) = B]:
music index: n = 0.14
titles index - [Berlin too low]
[publishers index: n = 0.11]59
population index: - 1.79
Thus, despite Berlin's political significance as a population centre point of Prussia, its
cultural function seems to be still limited to that of regional servicer. Francois says the
following about such towns:
...their real vitality is less than would appear at first sight based on their size
alone, for their demographic and economic potential is not matched by an
equivalent cultural dynamism.°
During the second half of the seventeenth century, Berlin has fallen to rank 18 on the
music index, and its population size falls to only 12,000. In relation to Leipzig, Berlin
demonstrates the following factors:
[L(n) = B]
music index: n = 0.06
population index: n = 1.09
The disproportional weight of Leipzig's music industry participation rate
suggests a specialisation of the industry in and around Leipzig, to Berlin's detriment.
This specialisation is, as we see in Hohenberg and Lees, 61 quite common:
If one compares the big capitals with Bruges or Augsburg, Norwich or
Bologna, the former seem almost like a throwback to an older, Asian form: a
minimum of autonomy, more consumption than production, shocking contrasts
of grandeur and misery. Yet they and the governments and elites they housed
came to exert powerful political control and intellectual domain over the plains
of Europe.62
Thus Augsburg's disproportional cultural function was often the case across Europe.
59 This comparison can be misleading as Francois takes data from the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. 'The German urban network...', in van der Woude, Hayami and de Vries (ed.'s),
Urbanization in History, 1990, 92.
60 'The German urban network...', in van der Woude, Hayami and de Vries (ed.'s), Urbanization in
History, 1990, 93.
61 Paul M. Hohenberg and Lynn Hollen Lees, The Making of Urban Europe, 1000-1950, 1985. Thus,
at this stage, Leipzig and Augsburg belong to a similar cultural type-category.
62 Ibid. 169.
53
Similarly, the case of Leipzig would seem to uphold such a model. Berlin's dwarfed
cultural function underlines the specialisation in which such cities as Leipzig and
Augsburg participated:
They have developed beyond the provision of basic urban services by
specialisation in transport functions, industrial production or ecclesiastical
administration but are not possessed of central governmental functions.63
By the early eighteenth century, Berlin's function as a cultural centre point for
Prussia seems to become comparable with Leipzig's function as the Saxon centre point.
Berlin's population grows to 55,000 and Leipzig's to 22,000. 64 The participation rate in
Berlin remains low, but its rank climbs to 7:
[L(n) = B]
music index: n = 0.2
population index: n = 2.75
By 1750, Berlin's position as the biggest population centre of the North East is
clear, its population rising to 90,000, compared with Leipzig's to 35,000. 65 This gives
the following factor n:
[L(n) = B]
population index: n = 2.57
Berlin's rise to rank 2 on the music participation index underlines its emergent
cultural function for Berlin served by its Residenzstadt status. Thus, its music index
factor n of Leipzig's data is improved:
[L(n) = B1
music index: n = 0.69
For 1800-1850, we can again compare the figures counted from Eitner's
Musikalienhandler with Francois' cultural indicators. This comparison demonstrates
Berlin's emergence both as an economic and demographic centre point:
63 De Vries, European Urbanization 1500-1800, 1984, 48.
64 Not given in Francois. These figures are again taken from de Vries, Urbanization, 272-3.
65 Ibid. 272-3.
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[L(n) = 13]
music index: n = 0.98
titles index: n = 0.44
authors index: n = 1.62
population index: n 4.69
Despite Leipzig's near proximity, then, Berlin does not appear to be stifled by the
apparent vibrancy of her neighbour's cultural index. Indeed, there is sufficient cause to
argue that Berlin and Leipzig formed a kind of bi-polarity where both functioned as
servicers of the north-east region.
In terms of music participation, Berlin demonstrates the following relationship
with Leipzig, termed as a factor of Leipzig's participation:
[L(n) = 13]
Table 1.14
Berlin's Music Participation as a Factor of Leipzig's
1600-1650 1650-1700 1700-1750	 1750-1800 1800-1850
n	 0.14	 0.06	 0.2
	 0.69	 0.98
Thus, despite Leipzig's rapid growth as a centre of the music industry, Berlin's
later rise is consistent with a bi-polar model. Indeed, the rise of this bi-polar axis can be
demonstrated in the relationship of Berlin to the second largest city for music .
participation in present Germany. Where Berlin itself becomes rank 2, the next highest
ranking German66 (not Austrian or Bohemian) entry is used:67
Table 1.15
Berlin's Music Participation as a Factor of the German Rank 2
[F(n) = 13]	 [F(n) = 13]	 [A(n)= B]	 [H(n) = 13]	 [S(n) = 13]
	
1600-1650 1650-1700	 1700-1750	 1750-1800	 1800-1850
n =
	 0.17	 c.0.09	 0.26	 1.6	 3.7
66 When italicised in this manner, German or Germany refers to present day Germany rather than the
Old Reich.
67 Here, F = Frankfurt's data, A = Augsburg's data, H = Hamburg's data and S = Stuttgart's data.
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Therefore, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, Berlin's growth rate was
consistently higher in the music index than any other German town apart from Leipzig.
The above factors demonstrate the degree to which Berlin was able to remain a
cultural centre in its own right despite Leipzig's aggressive centrality. The bi-polar
centrality of these two towns in the cultural indices, and of Berlin in the population
index, is fully born out by Francois', de Vries' and Eitner's data.
In comparison with Augsburg, then, the royal patronage of Berlin as a centre,
its status as a Residenzstadt and its ability to sustain a cultural growth almost
comparable with the most culturally vibrant town of the Old Reich is testament to its
emergent centrality. It is easy to see how such centrality was necessitated by the
commodity equivalence paradigm and how Berlin's ability to supply such centrality
accounted for its later significance as the centre of the new German Kulturnation.
Rostock, Hamburg. Liibeck and Bremen
The decline of the ports in the Old Reich can be seen in the examples of
Rostock, Bremen and Ltibeck. Hamburg's decline was of a very particular nature and
we shall return to her shortly. Whereas such river cities as Augsburg, Frankfurt and
Cologne survived as a result of a long and stable tradition of local trading, the coastal
towns, particularly those on Prussia's Baltic coast, found international trading to be a
delicate enterprise, much more prone to the machinations of inter-state diplomacy and
war.
Rostock's relatively small size seems to be out-weighed by its cultural function
in the seventeenth century. We can make the following comparison for Rostock and
her nearest large neighbour, Hamburg, using de Vries' and Francois' figures and the
music index:
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[I1(n) = R]
music index: n = 0.66'
titles index: n = 1.3
[publishers index - [Rostock too low]]
population index: 68 n = 0.25
Despite Hamburg's 40,000 inhabitants and Rostock's less than 10,000, we see Rostock
able to sustain quite a vibrant music publishing culture. This characteristic
specialisation and the port culture of Rostock seems to have been rudely suspended in
the aftermath of the population decimations of the Thirty Years War which the North
East inevitably suffered. From a music participation ratio of 3:2 with Hamburg [R:111
and a considerable titles rate, the second half of the seventeenth century sees a music
participation rate of 0 for Rostock, compared with Hamburg's respectable rate of 11.
De Vries' figures for this period show Hamburg's dynamism quite clearly. Whereas
Rostock still remains well below 10,000 inhabitants, Hamburg grows rapidly to 75,000
in 1650, sustaining that population at around 70,000 in 1700. Hamburg's demographic
growth to 1700 seems to be followed in the period 1700-1750 by a comparable growth
in the music index, moving from rank 6, 1600-1650, to rank 5, 1650-1700, to rank 4,
1700-1750. Only in the period 1800-1850 does Hamburg drop below this to rank 13.
Thus the music growth and population growth for Hamburg can be compared as
follows:
Table 1.16
Hamburg's Population Change as a Percentage (absolute)69
1600-1650	 1650-1700	 1700-1750	 1750-1800	 1800-1850
n =	 +87%	 -7%	 +7%	 +33%	 [no figures]
68 De Vries merely gives Rostock 0 as a code for less than 10,000 inhabitants in Urbanization, 273.
69 All these percentage calculations are compound, that is, they are worked out in comparison with
the previous previous fifty year period.
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Table 1.17
Hamburg's Music Growth as a Percentage (absolute)
1600-1650	 1650-1700	 1700-1750 1750-1800	 1800-1850
n =	 [no prior	 +25%	 +17%	 +107%	 -123%
figures]
This clearly shows that despite certain notable periods of dropping population,
Hamburg's music industry managed to sustain some kind of growth levels until the
early nineteenth century. Hamburg's demise to rank 13 in the 1800-1850 period,
however, demonstrates an imbalance in Hamburg's growth vis-a-vis growth as a whole
in Germany. The demise of the Hanseatic league must have much to do with this. The
so-called 'decline' of the ports, though, should be carefully delineated. The demise of
the Hanseatic league was merely part of the process of preparation for nationhood in
which German culture was participating at this time. Whereas Berlin emerges as the
demographic centre and, with Leipzig, exercises intellectual and cultural domain over
the nascent nation, Hamburg becomes a vessel for that new function and its 'decline'
seems somewhat attenuated.
Hamburg's apparent decline constituted merely a rationalisation and
specialisation of her function in the emergent Kulturnation. Thus her growth compared
to the average for all de Vries' entries seems large:7°
Table 1.18
1600-1800 Population Growths as a Percentage'
average absolute growth:	 +73%
highest absolute growth:	 +500%
lowest absolute growth (= decline):
	
-50%
Hamburg's growth in absolute terms:
	 +150%
Hamburg's relative growth 72 :	 +77%
Despite the decline of Hamburg's cultural indices rank, she seems to have sustained a
70 Urbanization, 272-3
71 These figures do not include present Austria.
72 Relative growth here means growth above or below the German urban average.
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growth well over the German urban average.
The case of the port and Reichsstadt of Ltibeck is in many ways similar to that
of Rostock. Similar relative declines in population are evident: the 23,000 level of
1600 had barely altered by 1800 her rank moving from 11 to 23. The 1650 highest
entry of 31,000 seems merely to have been a short-term expansion fuelled by the
sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century demand for grain due to the intensified
specialisation of the cities' agriculture:
Agriculture in many regions turned away from arable farming and toward
specialities after 1500. Dutch tulips and cheese, English and Spanish sheep and
Italian silkworms are cases in point. Why? One key to the puzzle is that rising
grain prices meant rising property incomes and urban demand for luxuries,
including delicacies from the land. Yet if the nearby countryside turned away
from producing basic foodstuffs, how could the thriving cities feed their
growing mass of workers, servants, and even paupers? The answer is that they
drew on more distant breadbaskets. The grain trade expanded greatly in the
sixteenth century, and the demand from west European cities stimulated a
transformation of agriculture and society to the east, notably in Poland.73
Ltibeck's easy proximity to the east must account in part for the sustained growth she
was able to make during this period of expanded grain trading. The swelled population
of Liibeck, then, can be seen to follow as a result of the affluence of the sixteenth
century. Birth rates generally continue to rise some time after such a propitious period,
and we might surmise that the apparent high-point of 1650 was the beginning of the
decline again. Therefore, for 1600, we see the population is at about 23,000. The
decline in the grain trade is explained by Hohenberg and Lees:
The grain trade levelled off in the seventeenth century. In addition to the
cyclical reversal in urban fortunes, special factors intervened. The weakening of
the Mediterranean region and the Thirty Years War affected the demand for, as
well as the production of, grain even in the first half of the century.74
Liibeck, more than Hamburg, then, was affected by the grain trade. The increased
demand for grain placed Libeck at the heart of the Hanseatic league, but by the end of
the seventeenth century, her strong dependence on this trade meant a severe decline, in
favour of the more diversified Hamburg.
73 Paul M. Hohenberg and Lynn Hollen Lees, The Making of Urban Europe, 1000 . 1950, 1985, 119.
74 Hohenberg and Lees, Europe, 119-120.
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LUbeck's cultural anaemia, then, is of no surprise. The short-lived mercantilist
frenzy of the sixteenth century proved too unstable a basis for the attraction of an
indigenous Gelehrtenstand. On the music index, Liibeck remains consistently lower
than Hamburg. The following factors demonstrate her disproportional cultural anaemia
as compared with Hamburg's:
[H(n) = L]
population index: n = 0.575
music index: n = 0.1667
titles index: [Liibeck too low]
[publishers index: n = 1.8696]
Whereas the publishing trade seemed to be flourishing in relation to Hamburg's,
the weak state of the music and titles indices for Lubeck might suggest a rather
transient cultural centrality for its immediate servicing area.
For 1650, this position is slightly improved:
[H(n) = L]
population index: n = 0.4133
music index: n = 0.4545
[publishers index: n = 1.8696]
despite a slightly lower population factor, LUbeck manages to greatly increase its
music factor.
For 1700 and 1750, de Vries gives the population data as 'unknowns' 75 and we
therefore only have the music index as any kind of indicator:
[H(n) = L]
1700-1750 music index: n = 0.1429
1750-1800 music index: n = 0.2069
a large decline in the first instance, followed by a growth, relative to Hamburg.
75 Urbanization, 272-3. We might estimate these figures according to the decline hypothesis. Such
decline has consistently shown itself to follow an attenuated exponential concave curve, whether in
terms relative to the average urban growth or in terms of the absolute change in population levels.
Thus, for 1700 and 1750 we might estimate an attenuated exponential decline to the 1800 23,000
figure. For 1700 this would suggest a figure of around 27,000 and for 1750, around 25,000.
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For 1800, then, there is sufficient data to give us a broader picture of Ltibeck's
cultural life:
[H(n) = L]
population index: n = 0.23
music index: n = 0,1538
titles index: [Liibeck too 1014]76
authors index: [Lubeck too lowin
Thus Lubeck demonstrates a largely static population around the low 20,000's.
The following percentages demonstrate this real decline quite eloquently where the
average, highest and lowest growths represent those for all of Germany:
Table 1.19
1600-1800 Population Growths as a Percentage'
average absolute growth:	 +73%
highest absolute growth: 	 +500%
lowest abso. lute growth (= decline):	 -50%
Liibeck's absolute growth:	 0%
Lilbeck's relative growth:	 -73%
A comparison of this data with similar data for titles and music-industry participants
underlines that, in Libeck es case, the economic decline was accompanied by an even
more massive cultural decline:
76 i.e. less than 178. Therefore the factor n would be at least as low as 0.2
77 i.e. less than 34. Therefore the factor n would be at least as low as 0.3206
78 These figures do not include present Austria.
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Table 1.20
1600-1800 Growth in Titles Numbers as a Percentage
average absolute growth: +92%
highest absolute growth: +5,669%
lowest absolute growth (= decline): -78%
Liibeck's absolute growth:79 -324%
Liibeck's relative growth: -416%
Table 1.21
1600-1800 Growth in Music Industry Participants as a Percentage
average absolute growth:
	 +162%
highest absolute growth:	 +1,850%
lowest absolute growth (= decline): 	 -10%
Liibeck's absolute growth: 	 +100%
Liibeck's relative growth: 	 -62%
The fact that Liibeck's music industry was so parochial in the early 1600's as to Sustain
only one participant on this index, probably accounts for the relatively low decline.
That Ltibeck doubled its count to two participants is such a low margin as to render
these figures ludicrous.
For Bremen, another Reichsstadt-port, a far more detailed picture of the
demographic and cultural profile in this period is available. For 1600, the following
figures are available where the factor n is Bremen's data as a factor of the emergent
port of Hamburg's:
[H(n) = B]
population index: n = 0.5
music index: n = 0.1667
titles index: n = 0.596
[publishers index: n = 0.3488]
79 These figures, of course, exclude Ltibeck so that comparisons can be made with the other towns.
Hence Lubeck appears to be lower than the 'lowest absolute growth.'
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Whereas Bremen only has one participant on the music index for the 1600-1650
period, by the second half of the seventeenth century, her standing vis-à-vis Hamburg
improves considerably:
[H(n) = B]
[population index: 80 n = 0.3425]
music index: n = 0.2727
[publishers index: n = 0.3488].
This short-lived growth is, however, too anaemic to survive the final demise of the
grain trade and the trend towards decline becomes more marked as we approach the
1800's:
[H(n) = 13]
1700 [1700-1750]:
population index: n = 0.3871
music index: n = 0.2143
1750 [1750-1800]
population index: n = 0.3733
music index: n = 0.1034
1800 [1800-18501
population index: n = 0.36
music index: n = 0.2308
The last music index entry does not constitute a real growth bur reflects Hamburg's
drop from 29 to 13 entries for the periods 1750-1800 and 1800-1850.
In terms of the broader German picture, one can compare the following
percentages to gauge the real decline of Bremen:
80 I have had to estimate the population of Bremen for 1650 as neither Francois nor de Vries have any
figures for Bremen. Given that the 1600 figure given by Francois is 20,000 and that de Vries' figure
for 1700 is 27,000, climbing at fifty year intervals to 28,000 and then 36,000 for 1800, and given the
inevitable decline during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), then an estimate of around the low
20,000's might be in order. I have chosen the rather arbitrary 23,000.
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Table 1.22
1600-1800 Population Growths as a Percentagesi
average absolute growth:	 +73%
highest absolute growth:	 +S00%
lowest absolute growth (= decline):
	
-SO%
Bremen's absolute growth:
	 +80%
Bremen's relative growth:	 +6%
Table 1.23
1600-1800 Growth in Titles Numbers as a Percentage
average absolute growth:	 +92%
highest absolute growth:	 +5,669%
lowest absolute growth (= decline):	 -78%
Bremen's absolute growth: 	 +51%
Bremen's relative growth:	 -41%
Table 1.24
1600-1800 Growth in Music Industry Participants as a Percentage
average absolute growth:	 +162%
highest absolute growth: 	 +1,850%
lowest absolute growth (= decline): 	 -10%
Bremen's absolute growth:
	
+300%
Bremen's relative growth:	 +138%
and, if we ignore the 1600 low point of one entry, too low for any sensible analysis,
then the 1650-1800 0% growth leaves Bremen's relative growth over that period, as
compared to the average for that period of 65%, at relative decline in the music
industry of -64%.
The ports and Reichsstadt-ports declined in a fundamentally different manner
than the inland Reichsstiidte. The inland towns tended, on the whole, to have a much
more vibrant and sustained cultural index which tended to decline later than the ports'
81 These figures do not include present Austria.
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cultural profiles which seem to have peaked suddenly from nowhere and disappeared
just as rapidly. As we have said, the specialisation of the more prosperous ports and
the decline of grain-reliant cultures was part of the rationalisation process that
characterised the later baroque period in Germany. The main reason for the decline of
the three lesser ports rests on the auspicious position of Hamburg and the increasing
desire of the 'movers and doers' of centralisation to minimise duplication. Despite many
efforts by the territorial princes to save indigenous industries from the competition, and
to limit intellectual movement, the increased parochialism of the individualised country
and the far north-eastern ports was unavoidable.
From Reichsstlidte to Residenzstiidte
The following towns all enjoyed the privileges of varying degrees of
Reichsunmittelbarkeit and had Reichsstadt status:
Aachen
Augsburg
Bremen
Cologne
Frankfurt
Hamburg
Nuremberg
Regensburg
Until the end of the seventeenth century, the status of Reichsunmittelbarkeit had
facilitated a stark division of city and state. With the advent of cameralism and the
ensuing rationalisation, the states' increasing role in the execution of Agrarpolitik and
the seeping of power to the territorial princes all undermined the Reichsstadte's •
autonomy. The basis on which they had established themselves, the free cultivation of
their own Umlande, was now threatened by ever more centralised government by the
states of the little monarchs. It was in particular this loss of agrarian autonomy which
ripped the old corporatist walls asunder. Only Hamburg had managed a sustained
growth, accompanied by diversification, over this period. She had been hardly
damaged by the Thirty Years War and was quick to engage in the diversified markets
of western Europe.
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Augsburg and Nuremberg, on the other hand, represent the archetypical decline
of the cities of the individualised country of the South. As we have seen, Augsburg and
Nuremberg declined with the establishment of Munich as Residenzstadt. Thus the
following regional political shifts are apparent in the eighteenth century:
Old Reichsstlidte
Augsburg
Nuremberg
Regensburg
Augsburg82
Aachen
Cologne
Bremen
Liibeck
Frankfurt
New Residenzstddte
Munich
Stuttgart
Diisseldorf/Kassel
Hanover
Mainz/Mannheim
Whilst these political redistributions of centrality did not always signal a corresponding
demographic shift (the older cities had, after all, a long tradition of local servicing that
could not be undone over night) they often bled the older corporatist cultures dry and
attracted artists and intellectuals away from the old cities.
This apparently simple equation for the cultural effects of the rationalisation of
centralisation the eighteenth century, cultural drain from the older cities into the newer
central places, is mediated to a considerable extent by the added factor of the
university towns. In the early seventeenth century, the following towns had indigenous
universities:83
82 Augsburg was arguably part of two local systems, that centred around Munich and around
Stuttgart. Hence the double presentation of Augsburg.
83 Francois, The German urban network...', 91.
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rs = Reichsstadt
town:	 university founded:
Cologne s	1388
Erfurt
	
1392
Frankfurt/0
	
1506
Freiburg/Br
	
1457
Giessen
	
1607
Herborn
Heidelberg
	
1386
Ingolstadt	 1472
Jena	 1548 academy, raised to university status 1577
Leipzig
	
1409
Mainz	 1477
Marburg	 1527 (Europe's first Protestant university)
Prague
	
1348
Rostockrs	1419
Tiibingen	 1477
Vienna
	
1365
Wittenberg	 1502
Wiirzburg	 1582
and the following were formed shortly afterwards:
town	 university founded
Altdorf	 1622
Bamberg	 1648
Duisburg	 1655
Halle	 1694
Kiel	 1665
Salzburg	 1623
The intellectual decline of the older cities was thus hastened in most cases by the
consistent founding of universities elsewhere, with the exception of Cologne. Similarly,
those towns that had established universities by the end of the eighteenth century were
able to boost their titles ratings. By this time," the following universities had been
opened or were still open:
84 Francois uses the year 1806 as her final arbiter, Ibid., 96.
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town:	 university founded:
Breslau	 1728
Erlangen
	
moved from Bayreuth in 1743, founded in Bayreuth in 1742
Giessen
	 [1607]
Halle	 [1637]
Heidelberg	 [1386]
Jena	 [1548 academy, raised to university status 1577]
Kiel	 [1665]
Leipzig
	 [1409]
Mainz	 [1477]
Prague
	 [1348]
Rostock
	
[1419]
Salzburg	 [1623]
Tiibingen	 [1477]
Vienna
	 [1365]
Wittenberg
	
[1502]
The following growth rates must therefore be seen also within the intellectual context:
Table 1.25
Absolute and Relative Growth in Population, 1600-1800.
average growth = 73%
[relative growth italicised]
Old Reichsstiidte %growth New Residenzstlidte %growth
Augsburg -42%, -115%
Nuremberg -32%, -105% Munich +70%, -3%
Regensburg [no data]
Augsburg -42%, -115% Stuttgart +55%, -18%
Aachen +50%, -23% Dtisseldorf +75%, +2%
Cologne +5%,
	 -68% Kassel +66%, -7%
Bremen +25%, -48% Hanover +59%, -14%
Liibeck 0%,	 -73%
Frankfurt/M +49%, -24% Mainz +10%, -63%
Mannheim +55%, -18%
Thus, for these inland Reichssttidte where data is available, the average relative growth
rate is -55% whereas for the newer Residenzstadte it is -17%. The trend whereby the
newer towns are consistently able to expand at a rate much closer to the German urban
norm is all the more pronounced in the titles index:
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Table 1.26
Absolute and Relative Growth in 10 Yearly Numbers of Book Titles Published,
1600-1800.
average growth = 92%
[relative growth italicised, university towns italicised]
[entries given in smaller pitch are estimated85]
Old Reichsstadte
	 %growth
	
New Residenzstadte %growth
Augsburg	 +10%, -82%
Nuremberg	 +271%,+179%	 Munich	 +275%,+183%
Regensburg [too low in both indices]
Augsburg
	 +10%, -82%	 Stuttgart86	 +517%, +444%
Aachen	 [too low in both indices]
	
Diisseldorf [too low in both indices]
Colognes"	 -87%,	 -160%	 Kassel88	 [too low in both indices]
Bremen	 +51%, -41%	 Hanover'', 	 +660%, +568%
Liibeck	 [too low in both indices]
Frankfurt/M	 -37%, -129%	 Mainz	 [too low in second index]
Mannheim90 	 +512%, +420%
Here the average relative growth for the older towns is -33% and the average relative
growth for the newer towns is +403% 9'. The magnitude of cultural growth over this
period in these repositioned central places is well over the German urban norm. Thus it
seems that as a rule the Residenzst&Ite were able to expand their cultural lives at a rate
far in excess of their demographic growth. If we look at the figures for music growth
over this same period, the model is more than upheld:
85 Estimates are made on the basis of one of the two indices. The missing data from the other index is
taken as the lowest entry at least. Thus the small pitch declines and expansions are conservative
estimates. Their inclusion is for information only.
86 Less than 42 titles on first index.
87 Less than 178 titles on second index.
88 Sagarra, A Social History of Germany, 1648-1914, 81. Kassel's university was a flop, managing to
stay open for only nineteen years after 1633.
89 Less than 42 on first index with 319 on second.
90 Less then 42 on first index with 239 on second.
91 The estimates have also been used for these calculations.
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Table 1.27
Absolute and Relative Growth in 50 yearly Numbers of Music Industry Participants,
1600-1800.
average growth = 93%
[relative growth italicised, university towns italicised]
[smaller pitch entries represent data which are probably too low to be taken seriously]
Old Reichsstadte %growth New Residenzstadte %growth
Augsburg -40%, -133%
Nuremberg -38%, -131% Munich 0%, -93%
Regensburg +50%,	 -43%
Augsburg -40%, -133% Stuttgart +600%, +507%
Aachen [no data] Diisseldorfn [data too low]
Cologne 0%,
	 -93% Kassel +200%, +107%
Bremen +200%, +107% Hanover +600%, +507%
Ltibeck +500%, +407%
Frankfurt/M -43% -146% Mainz +400%, +307%
Mannheim +700%, +507%
Obviously the very low levels of data here make any meaningful comparisons difficult.
Therefore in the following table, the time period is expanded to include the fifty year
period 1800-1850. 1600-1850 is now our growth period, and we see that the later fifty
year period accentuates the Reichssttidte/Residenzsttidte division:
92 1600-1650 - 0; 1750-1800 - 1. This low data tells us very little other than that Diisseldorf did not
establish for itself a music-publishing culture.
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Table 1.28
Absolute and Relative Growth in 50 Yearly Numbers of Music Industry Participants,
1600-1850.
average growth = 164%
[relative growth italicised, university towns italicised]
[smaller pitch entries represent data which are probably too low to be taken seriously]
Old Reichssttidte %growth New Residenz,sttidte %growth
Augsburg -29%, -193%
Nuremberg -77%, -241% Munich +1,300%,+1,136%
Regensburg +100%,-64%
Augsburg -29%, -193% Stuttgart +1,900%,+1,736%
Aachen [no data] Diisseldorf93 +300%,	 +136%
Cologne94 +300% +136% Kassel +250%, +86%
Bremen +200% +36% Hanover +700%, +536%
Liibeck +100% -64%
Frankfurt/M -57%	 -221% Mainz95 +300%,	 +136%
Mannheim 96 +0%	 -164%
The Napoleonic Factor
The demonstration of cultural bi-polarity above shows a consistent move
towards centralised mechanisms of cultural dissemination in the latter half of the
eighteenth century. The political landscape did not necessarily comply with this
centralisation until Napoleon forced the issue: political institutions are always much
slower to respond to new paradigms than cultural indices. The Napoleonic occupation
of the German lands, the so-called Fremdenherrschaft, consisted in two distinct
phases: the first was less concerned with the imposition of a new centralised order
based on the enlightened French model than with the consolidation of land; the second
phase concerned itself much more with the imposition of a new order and the legal
disenfranchisement of the old guild order.
93 Diisseldorfs participation rates were consistently low, rising from 0 in 1600-1650, to 3 in 1800-
1850. The data is thus disproportionate.
94 The consistently low levels of participation make these figures seem disproportionately large: for
1600-1650, Cologne had only 2 participants and for 1800-1850, only 8.
95 1600-1650 - 1; 1800-1850 -4.
96 1600-1650 - 1; 1800-1850 - 1.
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Prussian self interest or Staatsvernunft97 played no small part in preparing the
way for the break up of the Old Reich: in the first phase, Napoleon was able to exploit
the differences of Prussia and Austria and played them off against each other, paying
astute attention to Prussia's tendency to favour its own interests over that of the Reich.
Between 1795 and 1803, the years that might be said to circumscribe the first phase of
Napoleonic occupation, it was Germany, and in particular Prussia, that abandoned the
Reich, settling the separate Peace of Basle with France. Thus, while one part of the
Reich, Habsburg Austria, continued to fight France, Prussia and other parts of
Germany developed good trade relationships with its ascendant neighbour. The
formation of the imperium in imperio in the North German territories with Prussia as
the central axis power seemed an act of betrayal to the Austrians. This collapse of
imperial co-operation, a process that had long since been underway with Prussia's
ascendancy, spelt the political death of the Reich.
In the second phase, Napoleon's bureaucrats extended French structures of
government to many enlarged middle-sized territories, doing away with many of the
more complex cameralist varieties of government including the ecclesiastical
territories. One such Napoleonic territory, exemplary in its new French structure, was
the newly-created kingdom of Westphalia. Napoleon awarded the seat of king to his
younger brother Jerome. The rhetoric, and in certain limited instances the practice, of
state policy was distinctly 'enlightened'. The people were promised a new prosperity
free from the encumbrances of the old German Herrschaft and education became much
more widely available to the masses. In reality, however, the kingdom was merely a
satellite to Napoleon's empire, subservient to its military aspirations and the system of
taxes under the old Herrschaft regime was merely replaced with a centralised cash-
collection, more burdensome in real terms than the previous system. As Napoleon's
defeat neared, the centralisation of taxes intensified in these territories and the rhetoric
of enlightened government seemed more and more strained.
Without wishing to reiterate the complex string of treaties that led up to the
97 literally Reason of State'.
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restoration of German autonomy, we see, with the collapse of Napoleon's military
aspirations, the emergence of Prussia as the new axis power. In this period immediately
after the Napoleonic wars and before the 1848 revolutions, the emergence in Germany
of a neo-conservative, anti-reformist majority is clear. The backlash against the
humiliations of the Napoleonic occupations and the subsequent disenchantment with
French intellectual ideas became the hallmarks of a neurotically house-centred
bourgeois culture, Biedermeier.
The above analysis of some of the available demographic data from this period,
then, would seem to suggest that the emergent post-cameral musical culture of early
nineteenth-century Germany was essentially a national one. Well before Germany was
ready to construct a national political infrastructure strong enough to coerce its
peoples into territorial wars for the new second Reich, she indulged in a distinctly
national culture which functioned as a driving force in the mobilisation of the German
people under the Prussian expansionist autocracy.
Thus the decline of the smaller cultural regions in favour of ever larger regions
centred around newly defined monarchical centres represents a decline of the older
functionalist corporatist cultures in favour of a newer commoditised culture. This
process runs parallel to the decline of cameralism and the emergence of the
Kulturnation. In the following chapter, the parity of this process with the decline of the
Cartesian world view is placed in the context of the emergence of a universal
discourse of the senses, aesthetics.
Chapter Two: 
The New Ontology
The emergence of the score as commodity, as emanating from specialised
centres of distribution, was part of a broader cultural shift. In particular, the emergence
of a Musikwissenschaft or 'science' of music history, relied on the accurate
reproduction and efficient dissemination of its object of scrutiny, the score, and it was
the commodity equivalence paradigm which therefore proved the incubator that was to
germinate this later science.
So far, the commodity equivalence paradigm has been shown to comply with
certain demographic and economic patterns. Yet these patterns did not spring self-
determined from the cameralist economies of late monarchical absolutism and
corporatism. Certainly, the demographic shift of the vital revolution and the emergent
specialisms of urban centres were both significant factors in the emergence of the new
paradigm and yet, as merely external factors, measurable and visible, they demand an
epistemological grounding. In short they demand the emergence of the belief in the
possibility of 'thinking that' l and this is addressed in particular by two axiomatic
disciplines of discourse: the empirical and the metaphysical. The crisis of epistemology
in German science at the outset of the nineteenth century is well documented. 2 This
crisis can be summarised broadly not merely as magical transformations of the
scientist's field of vision, as the transformation of 'ducks to rabbits' as Kuhn wittily puts
it, 3 but as a shift in the significance of the scientific discourse itself. Science finds it can
1 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, New York, 1974, v.
2 See in particular: H. N. Jahnke and Michael Otte, Epistemological and Social Problems of the
Sciences in the Early Nineteenth Century, Universitat Bielefeld: Institut fiir Didaktilc der Mathematik,
1981.
3 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, 1970, 111.
Kuhn writes: 'What were ducks in the scientist's world before the revolution are rabbits afterwards.
The man who first saw the exterior of the box from above later sees its interior from below.'
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do different things, that its purpose is changed, its fields of research mutated such that
the happy security of a particular mode of finding or retrieving truth is fundamentally
undermined and thereafter reinstated in a radically altered form.
In philosophy, the shift is clearly similar. Here, too, the quest for truth leads the
metaphysicist along a radically altered route, to a kind of truth that undermines and
supersedes the older truth. The crisis, then, leads to the emegence of a new set of
tools, of new methodologies, of new conceptions of reasonable, given, or permissible
logic.
The new paradigm, furthermore, was based upon both an empirical and
metaphysical transformation of humankind itself. As we have seen, the cultural nation
emerged well before the political state, which would seem to suggest the primacy of
essentially cultural determinants in the new paradigm. Indeed, one of the most striking
features of the new order was the fundamental cogency of its epistemological
infrastructure. If the cameralist world vision saw in civil reality a unity that consisted in
the full sum of its parts, an encyclopaedic unity, the new, expanded monarchical
centralisms of Prussia, Austria and, to a lesser extent, Bavaria, represented a profound
limit to civic pluralism and thus a fundamental challenge to imperial order. The
Prussian state, in particular, emerged in its resplendent totality not as a nomenclature
or as an encyclopaedic amalgam but as an organism: the organic state conveyed
citizenship according to a notion of functional membership that demanded
differentiation according to certain specialised services required by the centre. This
first premise of statehood has been termed by Foucault function. 4 The citizen's
recognised Junction thus becomes more a matter of allocation or prescription than
hitherto. As Foucault points out, this notion of function represents not merely a new
order of government, but also a profound shift in the relationship of signs and signifiers
to nature and labour. If Junction is thus a basic epistemological as well as economic
category of the new order, then we should look to find it embedded into the operations
of the two primary disciplines of empiricism and metaphysics.
4 Foucault, Order, 227-30.
76
Despite Foucault's antagonism to nineteenth-century discourses, there is, in his
account of the new episteme, a brilliant clarity, as if his wilful alienation from
normative discourse provides an objective distance from which to view it in its 'raw'
state, so to speak. For this reason, Foucault is able to provide profound insight into the
epistemological structures of the commodity equivalence paradigm. In an attempt to
demonstrate paradigm cogency, Foucault is able to apply function to the three spheres
of discourse: language, nature and labour. In a brilliant exposition of this paradigm
cogency, Foucault looks first to labour for evidence of function.
As we have already seen, the citizen of the nascent state is allocated a labour
function. In contrast to the blood lineage of the guild structures, a kind of caste system
by another name, the new defining element of labour is an irreducible unit of value:
Wealth no longer establishes the internal order of its equivalence by a
comparison of the objects to be exchanged, or by an appraisal of the power
peculiar of each to represent an object of need...; it is broken down according
to the units of labour that have in reality produced it. Wealth is always a
functioning representative element: but in the end, what it represents is no
longer the object of desire; it is labour.5
What is interesting in this analysis is the constant magnetism of the recess: wealth, in
itself, the Cartesian index of trade, is merely a visible trace of a deeper order. The
irreducible presence of labour is the 'underside', so to speak, of wealth. In other words,
labour attains a degree of autonomy or non-reducibility which is buried beneath the
surface and is only accessible to specialised scrutiny; it has to be decoded, discovered,
prised away from the deceitful forms of the visible world, the forms of Cartesian
rationality.
The epistemological consequences of this apparent retreat of reality into the
darker recesses or undersides of phenomena are clear. Reason has to become more
sensual, to 'get closer' to its object of scrutiny, to touch, to feel, to enter into the very
essence of the object. Labour has thus to be touched by a reason no longer indifferent
5 Foucault, Order, 223.
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to invisible functions. Clearly, Cartesian notions of visible clarity, termed here visible
conspicuity,6 are profoundly at odds with post-Cartesian notions of function.
Similarly in natural history, the organic structure emerges to supersede
Cartesian tables of similarity in favour of characterisation according to essential (for
example, reproductive) functions. The 'character' of a species is defined much less by
visible conspicuity than by internal hidden relationships. Thus character becomes:
...a visible sign directing us towards a buried depth; but what it indicates is not
a secret text, a muffled word, or a resemblance too precious to be revealed; it is
the coherent totality of an organic structure that it weaves back into the unique
fabric of its sovereignty both the visible and the invisible.7
In Schelling's Philosophie der Kunst, we shall see how the organic structure of living
things as perceived in the new paradigm is taken on as a powerful structural metaphor
for the philosophical discourses. The most significant element of this shift is the retreat
of conspicuity, of clearly interpretable elements of reality into the heart of the object of
scrutiny. This Foucault terms the 'deeper cause':
To classify...will mean. ..to relate the visible to the invisible, to its deeper cause,
as it were, then to rise upwards once more from that hidden architecture
towards the obvious signs displayed on the surfaces of bodies.8
Not only is this 'deeper cause' a matter officnction, of the sexual reproductive organs
of Lamarck's La Fiore francaise (1778) but also of the centrality of essence,
represented in the German notion of Wesen. There is in this drive inwards a penetrative
urge to discover the epistemological possibility of an ontological science:
...living beings.. .possess characters which language can scan and define because
they have a structure that is, in a way, the dark, concave, inner side of their
visibility: it is on the clear discursive surface of this secret but sovereign mass
that characters emerge, a sort of storehouse exterior to the periphery of
organisms now bound in on themselves.9
6 I have devised this term in order to try to capture the characteristic use of sight as a metaphor in
much Cartesian discourse. Through a process of comparisons of the visible surfaces of the world, its
structures become obvious, hence visible conspiciiity.
7 Foucault, Order, 229
8 Ibid., 239.
9 Ibid., 237-8.
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The 'clear discursive surface' of this mass suggests a model of meaning, of a semantics,
in crisis. Reason must now push beyond the confines of Cartesian order and seek a
kind of immanent fusion of objectivity with function and essence.
In particular, the most profound consequences of the new ontology are to be
discovered in the epistemological model of the commodity. Clearly, the notion of a
meaning 'trapped' inside of the object of scrutiny, carried along with it, is the semantic
framework for the possibility of commodity. A compact, meaning-rich, value-laden
object, distilled into objective form and somehow limited distinctly for the market is an
essential epistemological basis for the commodity equivalence paradigm. In this sense,
Foucault's labour-nature-language trio recognises this point. In particular, Adam
Smith's The Wealth of Nations (1776) which proposes the unit of labour-hours as a
fundamental, arbitrary, and therefore absolute unit, makes the possibility of
commodity, as a central category of trade, real:
As men experience things... what they are exchanging is what is 'indispensable,
commodious or pleasurable' to them, but for the economist, what is actually
circulating in the form of things is labour - not objects of need representing one
another, but time and toil, transformed, concealed, forgotten.m
In the nascent 'science' of Musikwissenschaft, as yet unnamed, an object was
soon to emerge which complied with the commodity-equivalence epistemology. This
object was not some rediscovered entity, or an element of the older practices of the
Cartesian epistemology, transformed or renewed, but was, in effect, a deliberately
constructed object. This object of scrutiny required an ever more specialised discourse
to decode its secrets and was, to all extent and purposes, actually distilled from
musical practice, be this composition, performance or reception. This was the score, a
kind of neutral level, closing in on itself, burying its zugrunde lie gende Idee below the
visible surface. It emerges, then, as commodity, as cipher of the external process of
exegesis, removed and objectified. It becomes both the atomised residue of a 'universal'
culture, its natural and exchangeable 'unit' and the object of scrutiny for a newly
specialised elite of emergent Musikwissenschaftler. Further to this, the score is born as
I ° Foucault, Order, 224-5.
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an organism, guarding its inner treasures on the 'clear and discursive surface' of its
'secret but sovereign mass.'
Discernible in the period circumscribed by the years 1780 and 1830, then, is a
profound shift from a unified Cartesian view of the world to a fragmented,
compartmentalised reality served by an impulse to ontologise. Language is wrenched
from the surface of the objective world and turns inwards in meditation. The
meditative essentialising ecstasy of Wackenroder, Tieck and Hoffmann is thus a
symptom of the ontological impulse - since objective reality is atomised and partially
obscured, language becomes isolated and scurries like a frightened rat across the
surface of the referent. This deep shift in the relationship of signifier to signified is as
evident in theoretical and philosophical writings on music as in the specialised
metaphysics of Hegel, Schopenhauer or Schelling. For once, music theory is not
dragged kicking and screaming into the new configuration, but blazes its own path into
the new paradigm unimpeded by its own innocence.
The Significance of Music: Mimesis versus Poiesis - from Gottsched to Forkel 
The nature of the relationship between theory and the epistemological
framework of the commodity equivalence paradigm is complex. In an analysis of the
numerous treatises and philosophical texts on the question of music's purpose and
meaning, the question must be asked to what extent such texts, the introspective
discourses of the literate classes, prejudice our understanding of the aesthetic
landscape of this period. The appeal to a myth of universality, to the notion of an
overriding authenticity in the bourgeois literate experience and to a putative culture of
mutually exchangeable atomised constituents as necessitated by the paradigm's claims
to early capitalist democracy, are all deeply embedded in the operations of many such
texts after 1750. Indeed, the drive of much theory at this time was towards the
establishment of unassailable models of musical propriety against which a universal
culture could measure the fruits of its labour. Whilst the project was never
convincingly realised, the urge to subscribe to a central thesis as to music's proper
internal order was strong. This drive for a kind of musical ontology inevitably favoured
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musics of the literate culture to the detriment of orally-transmitted musics. Such
'artefacts' as aesthetic treatises should not be seen, therefore, as the self-evident, self-
governing expressions of the 'spirit of the age' but as symptoms of the ontological
impulses of an, as yet, still isolated Gelehrtenstand. Misgivings as to the overriding
authenticity of the bourgeois experience aside, the elitist texts of aesthetic theory can
help to articulate some of the operations of the dominant discourses of the putative
experience: to represent an internal dialogue within the self-conscious discourses of
literate privilege.
In the mid-eighteenth century, Germany was proving receptive to certain
French theories of musical propriety. Yet these French theories, springing from the
home-grown Cartesian tradition of clarity, propriety and simplicity, sat uneasily
alongside a very different German tradition. The mid-seventeenth century Cartesian
'revolution' in philosophy, whilst having borne the hybrids cameralism and the
Affektenlehre, had little effect on the quasi-feudal infrastructure of the German-
speaking lands. As Braudel has written, the traditional citizen was still:
...an unconscious prisoner of the frontier marking the inflexible boundaries
between the possible and the impossible. Before the eighteenth century, his
sphere of action was tightly circumscribed, largely limited to what he could
achieve.'
This was particularly true of Germany, even until the late eighteenth century. This rigid
circumscription of reality, deeply symptomatic of the restrictive monarcho-corporatist
order, might properly have been challenged by the mimetic theories of the Cartesian
rationalists. Yet the fatalism of the German baroque world vision which, in the form of
the cameralist administration in particular, certainly reaches as far as the beginning of
the revolutionary period, was fuelled and sustained by the stubborn persistence of the
'older' conservative vested interests of the monarcho-corporatist order. The mimesis
paradigm in Germany represented much more a part of this intransigent order insofar
as it was imbued with a profound sense of the impenetrable materiality of social order.
11 F. Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life, New York, 1973, xiv. Quoted in Sheehan, German
History 1770-1866, Oxford, 1989, 79.
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Indeed, whilst the rationalism of French theory, characterised by a vision of
music as properly a mirror of nature and a place for a naturalist mimesis of human
passionate utterances, belonged to a broader drive for the clarification and radical
reordering of the external world in France, the German reception of such ideas allowed
to a far lesser extent for such an alignment of mimesis and radicalism. The conservative
readings of mimesis theory in Germany engendered a sense of the impenetrable, bleak
stasis of the external order. Such a material reality, furthermore, remained material
only as long as the mischievous, impish hand of theory restrained from anything other
than its salutation. At this point cameralism and German mimesis overlap: both are
characterised by a pervasive, almost crippling, pragmatism.
In France, Jean-Phillipe Rameau, the contemporary of the German baroque
mimesis theorists Mattheson and Mizler had, by 1722, produced his startling Traiti de
l'harmonie reduite a ses principes naturels' 2 which attempted to furnish a deductive
Cartesian interpretation of harmony, based upon a system which reduced the seemingly
endless number of chords to a number of triads and inversions. The dominance of text
in French mimetic theory had meant an overriding emphasis on melody and its 'proper'
reflection of the passions; now a self-referential system of harmony, of tonal meaning
according to function within that closed system could undermine melody's primacy in
France. In trying to provide a system of ordering harmony based on Cartesian notions
of clarity and intelligibility, Rameau had, to some extent, undermined quite
fundamentally the basic tenets of mimetic theory. With Rameau's Traite, music begins
to turn inwards on itself away from external reality and representation.
One can see how the Cartesian world vision destroyed itself from within: the
will to encompass everything within the domain of the intelligible took mankind into
the centre of the object and there lost all sense of the visible. In Rameau, following
from Mersenne's mathesis of the Harmonie universelle (1636) the turn inwards came
from the burning curiosity of Cartesian science. Rameau's system - a profoundly
12 L'harmonie referred not simply to harmony in terms of the simultaneous sounding of more than one
note, but also to counterpoint.
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reductive and yet ontological methodology - instigated in part this loss of the 'visible' in
music theory. It was now legitimate to attempt to find out how the 'system' of music
not only represented nature as understood by the baroque Cartesian 6lite, but also to
question how its 'internal' physical properties related to those of nature. The notion of
semiological fixity and separateness" in this question began to necessitate ever greater
levels of ontological analysis before the nature of the relationship could become clear.
It is easy after the event to see the profound significance of the triadic system in
Rameau's Traite, but mimesis persisted in France alongside such works and proved
largely impervious to such covert attacks until much later. Indeed, the ideas of the
'emotionalist' Jean Baptiste Dubos (1670-1742) continued to retain considerable
currency: the beauty of music derives from its ability to imitate the human voice and in
particular its ability to represent the voice in a stylised manner that was acceptable to
French notions of truth or verisimilite. 14 Whilst appealing to what seem now like more
authentically nineteenth-century watchwords 'genius' and 'mastery', mimetic propriety
remains the overriding category. The opposition of 'truth' to 'scholarly music' is telling
in these texts: French theory had profound mistrust for music that was highly
constructed or contrived or that demonstrated a high degree of complexity 15 for such
music was deemed to trespass into the meaning of the text. Similarly the later theorist
Charles Batteux (1713-80), even more influential on German theory than his
predecessor, 16 held that music could, and should at all costs, imitate nature, even if this
nature was a reductionist, highly stylised image of nature. This view was also shared by
13 These terms are discussed at length shortly. For the moment, semiological fixity is the consequence
of representation. For one element to represent another, they must be separate, and this separateness is
premised in the Cartesian semiology by a fixed, obviated relationship between sign and referent.
14 Dubos, Reflexions critiques sur la poesie et sur la peinture. Paris 1719. See also Gottsched's
Versuch einer kritischen Dichtkunst, 1730. Fourth enlarged edition, Leipzig 1752.
15 Hence Rousseau's critique of harmony as 'gothic' or 'barbaric' in his Dictionnaire de Musique. Paris
1768.
16 Examples of explicit recognition of Batteux' Les beaux arts reduits a un rnEsme principe, Paris 1746
are almost too numerous to list here. Gottsched's Auszug aus des Herrn Batteux Scheinen Ktinsten aus
dent einzigen Grundsatze der Nachahmung hergeleitet etc. Leipzig, 1754, Scheibe's Der critische
Musicus, a periodical which ran from 1738 -1740, Hamburg, and Rainier's 'Auszug aus der Einleitung
in die schOnen Wissenschaften, nach dem FranzOsischen des Herm Batteux mit Zusatzen vermehree
in Historische-Kritische Beytrage 5, 1798-9 are but a few examples.
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many German contemporaries, Friedrich Wilhelm Marpurg (1718-1795) among
them.17
Batteux' name, then, occupies a central position in many authoritative German
mimetic writings of the mid-eighteenth century and his writings seem to have informed
much of the debate on music's mirror-propriety in Germany. And yet, despite the
apparent prevalence of Batteux' thoughts in German theory, its richness at this time
stems ostensibly from the internal schizophrenia of its practice: on the one hand, the
cultural presence of French thought and theory was strong; on the other hand, the
reception of that theory was tailored to the economic reality of a backward and
fragmented Germany, providing a painful reminder of the otherness of the exotic
foreign culture. Particularly characteristic of the extremes of the rationalist side of the
German debate was the work of Johann Christian Gottsched, professor of poetry at
Leipzig university whose Versuch einer critischen Dichtkunst of 1730 was taken by
other mimesists as a battle cry against the 'barbarism' of music that had become too
complex.
As representative of the rationalist extreme, then, Gottsched's deliberations on
Nachahmung 18 in art served as a powerful constraint on the emergence of an aesthetic
of instrumental music. In the fourth HauptstUck of the Versuch, 19 Gottsched identifies
three modes [Gattungen] of imitation in which art may properly participate. The
'lowest' of these modes is the most severe:
Die erste ist eine bloBe Beschreibung, oder sehr lebhafte Schilderey von einer
natiirlichen Sache, die man nach glen ihren Eigenschaften, SchOnheiten oder
Fehlern, Vollkommenheiten oder Unvollkommenheiten semen Lesern klar und
deutlich vor die Augen malet, und gleichsam mit lebendigen Farben entwirft: so
da3 es fast eben so viel ist, als ob sie wirklich zugegen w5.re.20
17 See in particular Der critische MUSiCUS an der Spree, Berlin 1749-50.
18 Literally, 'imitation'.
19 Fourth edition, Leipzig, 1751, 142ff.
20 Ibid., 142. References are from the unaltered modern photo-mechanical edition of the
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesselschaft, Darmstadt, 1962. This text, therefore, is in the original German
type face and emphasis is added by emboldening them. When such emphases are used in any of the
given extracts, they are represented by italics.
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The first is a simple description, or a very vivid depiction of a natural thing, which one
paints in the eyes of the reader, taking into account all its particularities, its beauties or
flaws, its perfections or imperfections, at the same time drafting it in vivid colours: so
that it almost seems as if it were really present.21
This last sentence holds the key: art must humble itself before the complexity of the
visual surface of the thing. This object of depiction, a closed and finite thing bearing all
its essentials to the empirical eye is le mot juste of Cartesian rationale. The semiology
of the Cartesian object in Gottsched is fundamentally depictive in tone and yet
reductive in its order. The apparently simple representations of this system belie a
profound schism that is necessitated in the notion of Nachahmung itself. On the one
hand, there are the things that, in themselves, motivate classification according to
apparently obviated 22 visual similarities, a kind of given order of similarities that
somehow require visual connection. On the other hand, there is the as yet
unquestioned viability of an accurate depiction of these similar things within the system
of signs: indeed, the very notion of representation or imitation requires this
fundamental separation between 'thing' and 'sign' for resemblance must take place
across separate entities. In this sense, art is not merely a discovering of a priori signs,
but, at first glance, an aligning of its signs to an a priori visual realm of natural things.
It is a profound dilemma of rationalist thought that universal reason or the discourse of
categories, in its late Cartesian mutation to become empirical science, required for
itself a certain distance from natural things in order to constrain and tame them. Art,
then, as a fundamental element of the neo-Aristotelean science forced itself onto
nature, subsumed it and yet played the humble servant_ The apparent humility of art in
this regard is an essential part of separation - a certain separateness must also mean a
certain unfamiliarity or even fear of the 'thing'. This dichotomy is particularly clear in
Gottsched's writings where the urge to exalt nature must be mediated by the restraint
21 As far as I am aware, no English translations of this text are available. The translations provided
are my own.
22 The relationship in English between 'obvious' and 'obviated' is no mere accident of usage. If
something is seen as 'obvious' then it can, effectively, be dispensed with in the critical discourse.
Indeed, these mimetic paradigms, the Affekten, obviate any justification in the Cartesian discourses.
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of the prudent artist who does not wish to 'overload' his prose with countless
descriptive details:
Wie viele Dichter haben nicht bey uns wider diese Regeln verstoBen; die uns
wohl gar ganze Bucher voller Beschreibungen und geldinstelter Schildereyen
aufgedrungen haben? ...Noch ldcherlicher sind diejenigen, die uns ganze
Lehrbilcher von den Beschreibungen geschrieben. Sie machen eine Sache, die
doch kein Hauptwerk des Dichters ist, ohne Noth schwer, und verdunkeln
durch ihre unendlichen Abtheilungen und Zergliederungen dasjenige, was emn
muntrer Kopf ohne alle Regeln weit besser trifft.23
How many poets amongst us have contravened these rules, have forced upon us whole
books full of desriptions and contrived depictions? ...Even more laughable are those
who have written for us whole text books on such descriptions. They make something
which is not the poet's main concern unnecessarily difficult, and obscure with their
endless categorisations and divisions, something an alert person can comprehend much
better without all the rules.
The almost naturalistic consequences of the Cartesian mimesis aesthetic, then, with the
possibility of endless and meaningless metonyms, are fundamentally curtailed by
notions of order. Art's signification of nature is thus also a filtering out of the unwieldy
multiplicity of nature in favour of a clear, skeletal depiction. This filtering is a covert
recognition of the improbability of total representation, an implicit problematisation of
signs as natural and a fundamental separation of signification from the natural realm.
In filtering nature, then, art proceeds to a paradoxical function of both demonstrating
subservience to the objective realm and undertaking its improvement:
Virgil wird deswegen gelobt, weil er in Beschreibungen so bescheiden gewesen.
Er hat wohl zehnmal Gelegenheit gehabt, den Regenbogen abzumahlen: und
was wUrde uns da ein poetischer Maler von Profaion, nicht mit seinem Farben
gequdlt haben! Aber der bescheidene Virgil sagt nichts mehr, als: 'Mille trahens
varios adverso sole colores.'24
Virgil is thus praised since he was restrained in his use of description. He had countless
opportunities to paint the rainbow: how the professional poetic painter would have
tortured us with his colours! But, restrained by modesty, Virgil says nothing more than
'Mille trahens varios adverso sol colores.'
Whilst the contradictions of the natural versus the signifying are implicit in this
aesthetic, it is true to say, also, that what now appears as contradiction was then seen
23 Versuch, 144.
24 Versuch, 144. Notics the characteristic omission of the finite part of the past tense ist gewesen.
Such omissions seem to abound in this text. It is a characteristic of Gottsched's style.
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as proper and necessary separation. Furthermore, the separation itself was often
deliberately minimised as in Gottsched's maxim 'als ob sie wirklich zugegen ware.' Thus
the separation is so conflated as to suggest a nature in praesentia. The representational
gesture of Gottsched's lowest mode of Nachahmung was thus characterised by a
notion of art as showing nature, of an art hiding itself in favour of the emergence of
nature as nature. This, as we shall see, was to be vilified by Schelling and others as das
Naïve in der Poesie.25
The declared agenda, at least, of the lowest form of representation/imitation,
then, was the sensible presentation of nature through the medium of art. In this form,
art is at its least ontological and at its most perfunctory. In the second mode, however,
art steps forward from its feigned modesty and allows its tendency to filter the natural
to play a much more obviously determining role:
Die andre Art der Nachahmung geschieht, wenn der Poet selbst die Person
eines andem spielet, oder einem, der sie spielen soil, solche Worte, Gebarden
und Handlungen vorschreibt und an die Hand giebt, die sich in gewissen
Umstanden fiir ihn schicken.26
The other type of imitation occurs when the poet himself plays the character of another
or prescribes and makes available to another attempting to play the character such
words, gestures or actions as befit that character in particular circumstances.
In this type of Nachahmung, then, the devices of the art form are more actively
significant or signifying. Here art strives to present, in somewhat stylised form, the
outer 'signs' of emotion such as gesture, inflection or intonation. Each art form is thus
better at representing a particular element of the visible signifiers of an emotional state.
Painting can capture gesture or facial expression, drama word inflection, or gesture,
poetry inward thought and verbal nuance and music the 'raw' inflections and rhythms of
the voice or a general 'mood'. The 'devices' of each art can thus determine which
outward signifiers of the Affekt art can depict. An essential element of this form of
Nachahmung is the necessity of a unified emotional state: a work of art must not
25 F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophie der Kunst, 1802-3, first published EBlingen 1859. Available in
unaltered reprographic print from the Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1980, 114-6.
26 Versuch, 144-5. 'an die Hand giebt' is probably an odd form of 'an die Hand gibt.'
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confuse the listener/reader/audience by attempting to show more than one Affekt. This
unanimity of Affekt is premised both in Athanasius Kircher's Musurgia universalis, sive
Ars magna consoni et dissoni (Rome, 1650) and Descartes' Les passions de l'Zime
(1647) and Musicae compendium (Utrecht, 1650) in which the notion of a passion (or
an Affekt) is predicated by a reductive notion of the emotions to a number of unified,
unchanging, states such that one Affekt not only represents its own presence but the
absence of the others. The Affekten, then, are static, non-mutating moods. To attempt
to represent more than one of these states at any one time, or to change wildly from
one to another, is thus fundamentally to undermine the reductive model: the
mechanistic doctrine of the affects sustains its viability of each mood as isolated,
categorised and closed from the others. Non-unanimity in this case is synonymous with
a lack of clarity:
Die Klaggedichte, die Raniz und Besser, auf ihre Gemahlinnen gemacht,
werden sonst als besondere Muster schOn ausgedruckter Affekten angesehen.
Man kann sie auch gar wohl unter dieser Art der Nachahmung rechnen, ob sie
gleich ihren eignen Schmerz, und nicht einen fremden vorstellen wollen: denn
so viel ist gewiB, daB emn Dichter zum wenigsten dann, warm er die Verse
macht, die voile Starke der Leidenschaft nicht empfinden kann. Diese wiirde
ihm nicht Zeit lassen, eine Zeile aufzusetzen, sondem ihn nOthigen, alle seine
Gedanken auf die GrOBe seines Verlusts und Ungli.icks zu richten.27
The Kiaggedichte, which Raniz and Besser wrote to their consorts, are otherwise seen
as special examples of the beautifully expressed affects. One can include them in this
type of imitation if they attempt to represent their own pain and not that of others:
since this much is certain: the poet can feel the full strength of the suffering least of all
when he is composing his verses. This would not leave him any time to put down the
lines [of the verse] but would necessitate his turning all his thoughts to the enormity of
his loss and misfortune.
This assertion that the poet (and, by analogy, the artist or the composer) is naturally
unable to fully feel the intensity of another's suffering is premised by a sense of art as
an intervention in the natural process of feeling. Art crystnllises and distils the unwieldy
emotion into a generalised or stylised form. To this end:
27 Versuclt, 145.
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Der Affekt muB schon ziemlich gestillet seyn, wenn man die Feder zur Hand
nehmen, und alle seine Klagen in einem ordentlichen Zusammenhange
vorstellen will.28
The affect must be somewhat stilled if one wishes to take the quill in the hand and
depict all one's complaints in a coherent order.
This idea, of a 'stilled' Affekt, expressed in an ordered form, is the most significant
element of this mode of Nachahmung and to some extent follows from the previous
notion of unanimity within a single emotional state. The simple division of the world
into signs and things is made somewhat more complex here and yet this subsequent
complexity is, in itself, the corollary of that division: for the bipartite world to function
viably, the sign should not remain a mere sign, a mere closed thing in itself without
referent, but must also demonstrate the manner in which it will connect itself with that
referent, before the act of signification. It must be latent and must, so to speak, show
not merely itself, but the process by which it exists as sign. Without such an immanent
marker, the sign would be impotent, merely 'meaningless' and, in fact, would exist
merely as referent or isolated object. By the very nature of its existence, the sign could
only emerge as an element of a nature recast, in short, that is, already received. The
received nature of the Cartesian order is discursive in so far as it arrives signified at the
gates of conception. The Affekt is just such a self-reflective sign, perhaps the most
obvious of such signs. Art signifies what it has already received: nature parcelled into
unified elements, the emotions categorised and marked according to mechanical
reductive states. Indeed, it is the unanimity of the Affekt that constitutes this received
element, the representation of representation itself. Gottsched therefore makes the
necessity of a singular unified emotional state clear in the following passage:
Ob ich nun wohl nicht laugne, daB diese trefflichen Stiicke des beriihmten
Amthors Klagen, in gleichem Falle, weit vorzuziehen sind: so kOnnte doch emn
scharfes Auge, auch in diesem zweyen MeisterstUcken, noch manchen gar zu
gektinstelten Gedanken, und gezwungenen Ausdruck, entdecken; den gewiB emn
wahrer Schmerz nimmermehr wiirde hervorgebracht oder gelitten haben. Was
hier von dem Schmerze gilt, das muB von allen Affekten verstanden werden.29
28 Versuch, 145-6.
29 Versuch, 146.
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Whether or not I feel that these excellent Klagen by the famous Amthor are to be
preferred in this case, the sharp-eyed could still discover, even in these two
masterpieces, some far too contrived thoughts and a forced expression, which was
never produced by nor suffering [underl true pain. What is true here for pain must be
understood for all the affects.
These two modes of representation, the descriptive and the reductive are still
not problematised by the bipartite order of signs and objects. Despite the
contradictions of mimesis versus prescription implicit in this aesthetic, the general
tenor of the prose points towards an underlying acceptance of these contradictions as
an inevitable consequence of good analysis. Analysis, in the sense presented in
Gottsched, is always proactive to the extent that it orders or reconstructs the objective
realm as a mechanical perfection. In this manner, mimetic art sets out to select and
codify the external in terms of a quasi-moral order. The moral propriety of the
rationalist world is premised, therefore, by notions of nature as somehow didactic.
Indeed the morality of this aesthetic is built on the firm foundations of an unspoken
and fixed semiology where separateness is conflated to mere relation. Like the
Copernican sun in a fixed constellation, signs and objects spread across the semantic
heavens in fixed array.
This semiological fixity is the fundamental basis on which Gottsched's third and
highest mode of Nachahmung is constructed. This third mode Gottsched terms 'plot'
[die Fabel]. Like fixed points in the dynamic of a classical tale of the archetypal
elements or gods, the characters of a narrative are to be strictly delineated according to
the given Cartesian principles of unanimous reduction: they are shown to be alive by
assigning to each an archetypal quality which is then tested in a set of interactions and
finally distilled to its most unified element. Already in his exposition of the second
reductive mode, Gottsched recognises the necessity of semiological fixity:
Auf dieser Kunst nun beruhet fast die ganze theatralische Poesie: was namlich
die Charactere einzelner Personen, ihre Reden in einzelnen Scenen, und ihre
Handlungen anlanget. Denn hier muB emn Poet alles, was von dem auftretenden
Helden, oder wet es sonst ist, wirklich und der Natur gemaB hatte geschehen
kOnnen, so genau nachahmen, daB man nichts unwahrscheinliches dabey
wahrnehmen kOnne.30
30 Versuch, 146.
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This art is the basis of almost all dramatic poesy: that is, the characters of single
people, their speeches in single scenes and their actions. The poet must imitate
everything which could have happened to the hero, or whoever else, realistically and
according to natures laws, in such a way as not to be able to discern anything
improbable.
Yet the fixity of the plot, whilst underpinned by Gottsched in his quotation of
Aristotle:
Wenn Aristotel sagen will, was die Fabel in einem Gedichte eigentlich sey, so
spricht er: 'Es sey die Zusammensetzung oder Verbindung der Sachen.'31
When Aristotle wishes to say what the plot in a poem actually is, he says: 'It is the
composition32 or connection of things.'
is still problematised by separation. On the one hand there are the elements of simple
separation such as the representation of nature in the lowest form of Nachahmung and
the filtering processes of the mechanisms of the Affekt in the second form, whilst, on
the other hand, there is the self-contained constellation of the plot, a kind of other
world that shows within itself the generalised order of the lesser types of Nachahmung.
The grid of separations is thus accumulated according to the principles of an ever-
widening complexity: the plot, in this sense, as the culmination of this process,
represents the external by means of what Foucault terms mathesis:
When dealing with the ordering of simple natures, one has recourse to a
mathesis, of which the universal method is algebra.33
Nature in the Cartesian theory of art is just such a 'simple nature'. The visibility of all
its elements is reduced to the complex moral algebra of die Fabel. And yet this
algebraic network is somehow cordoned off from complex nature. The mechanisms of
Cartesian reduction constantly refine and reorder until visible signs of nature are
deliberately subsumed under an ordered moral code. The impotence of the contrived
signs of art is thus compensated for by a prejudicial eye such that 'separateness'
becomes so ingrained into representation as to appear natural:
31 Ibid., 149.
32 Literally, 'putting together'.
33 Foucault, Order, 72.
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Ich glaube derowegen, eine Fabel am besten zu beschreiben, wenn ich sage: sie
sey die Erzahlung einer unter gewissen Umstanden mOglichen, aber nicht
wirklich vorgefallenen Begebenheit, darunter eine niitzliche moralische
Wahrheit verborgen liegt. Philosophisch kOnnte man sagen, sie sey eine
Geschichte aus einer andern Welt.34
I therefore think it is best to decribe the plot as the narration of an event which is
possible under certain circumstances, but did not really happen, hidden under which,
lies a useful moral truth. Philosophically, one could say it is a story from another
world.35
The three levels of Nachahmung recognised by Gottsched, the representative,
the reductive and the archetypal or mathesic, are all concerned to articulate a certain
relationship between discourses (and in the Cartesian sense, nature can be seen as a
discourse), as a fixed constellation of signs and referents in clear, stable and
conspicuitous relationships.
Gottsched's 1730 Versuch was to be followed by numerous critiques and
apologias, notably Scheibe's admiring acknowledgement of Gottsched's influence in
many of his articles in Der critische Musikus (1737-40) and Nicolai's scathing critique
in his Briefe iiber den itzigen Zustand der schiMen Wissenschaften in Deutschland
(1755). As sustained by Leipzig pupils such as the music theorist J. A. Scheibe, then,
Gottsched's theories of verisimilitude remained both formative and contentious in the
broader German debate on music's function and meaning until the last quarter of the
eighteenth century. Musicians felt their beloved music to be under attack by the
effeminate theories expounded across the Rhine. It was not really until the publication
in 1750 of an extremely contentious treatise on the fine arts that music found a defence
other than that of professional indignance.
Alexander Baumgarten's 1750 watershed Aesthetica enunciated a distinct
movement inwards, away from the immediacy of visible nature. The pelfectio
cognitionis sensitivae represents the freeing of sensual perception from
34 Versuch, 150.
35 I have omitted the 'wenn ich sage ['when I say] since the sentence in English is difficult to
construct without recourse to the rather cumbersome 'I think therefore, it is best to describe a plot
when I say....
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instrumentality. Leibniz36 had assigned to perception the role of instrument, a means to
truth, a kind of neutral mirror through which to observe truth. For Baumgarten,
however, the persistent existence of beauty as an experience, so to speak, represented
the unassailable truth that perception was a 'thing in itself; such an assertion calls
implicitly for the emancipation of the sensual from the cold grip of rationalism or at
least the emancipation of a 'discipline of perception' from the general Cartesian
categories of semiological fixity. In line with the ontological impulse of late eighteenth
century science, Aesthetica initiated a compartmentalisation of theoretical approaches
to music; music theory now splinters into the specialist, almost autonomous disciplines
of analysis, aesthetics, philosophy, and history.
For many Germans, the most influential disseminator of Baumgarten's aesthetic
theory was Georg Friedrich Meier. Indeed, his Anfangsgriinde der scheinen Ki,inste
und Wissenschaften (3 volumes, 1748-50) is often cited as if it were written by
Baumgarten himself. 37 Meier attempted a cogent argument for a Baumgartian theory
of the fine arts: whereas the rationalists lambaste certain of the arts (especially music)
for their innumerable contrasts and disunity, Meier praises such contrasts as
stimulating inn erliche Wirkung. 38 Thus any 'perfection' in art does not consist in a
propriety of imitation, but in variety and diversity, in an internal drama of contrasts
which sustain die Aufmerksamkeit. 39 If Aufmerksanzkeit is to be sustained, the listener
must not be confused by a chaotic plethora of diffuse elements. Within Baumgartian
diversity there must be a unity such that levels of surprise and contrast are managed
and controlled so as never to lose the Aufinerksainkeit. Contrast and surprise must thus
be mediated by 'direction' or some sense of structural integrity.
Thus Baumgarten, as we have said, articulated an inward movement, a retreat
from the external world of visible nature into a sensuality of art. Aesthetics thus
36 Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, Epistolae ad diversos (1712) in Philosophische Werke, II ed.
Cassirer, Leipzig, 1906, 132.
37 Bellamy Hosier, Changing Aesthetic Views of Instrumental Music in Eighteenth-Century Germany,
U M I Press, Ann Arbor, 1981, 89ff.
38 Literally 'inner effect'.
39 Literally 'the attention'.
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attempts to find immanent value within the artwork itself and although it rarely
manages to free itself from a morality of music, its language is not primarily moral.
The value of a piece of music, by analogy, thus lies in its mechanisms of construction,
in the quality and competence of its 'internal' discourse.
The Lutheran tradition of music making in Germany proved a fruitful basis on
which to build a Baumgartian aesthetic: whilst keen to stress music's use as a past-
time, as a harmless secular recreation, Luther himself had stressed the 'out-of-world'
quality of music: its ability to suspend time and aid meditation. 40 Thus the German
tradition was historically quite open to the 'post-rationalist' theories of Baumgarten and
Meier. The Lutheran tradition was a significant factor in the formulation of the new
aesthetic theory.
What Meier terms Verwunderung" becomes an axiom of the new theory: this
term, loosely translated as 'bewonderment', evokes a quasi-spiritual state in which the
subject, enchanted by the unexpected and the wonderful, reaches a heightened level of
perception where the sensual and the sentient merge to make truth tangible.
In the wake of the new theory there came no sudden abandonment of the
mimetic paradigm in Germany. The new sensuality was to some extent subsumed into
mimetic theory, the two theories sitting uncomfortably side by side for at least the next
thirty years. The theorist Christian Gottfried Krause, for example, is very characteristic
of what Hosler terms this 'German critical synthesis'. 42 Krause's essay of 1753, Von der
musicalischen Poesie, clearly owes much to Baumgarten. In it he attacks Gottsched in
particular, but more significantly attempts to construct a systematic theory of musical
form. The parallelisms Krause draws between form and emotion represent an early
attempt at a theory of expression. Elements of the old rational morality still remain,
40 The spiritual quality of music is particularly clearly addressed in Luther's Lob und Preis der
loblichen Kunst Musica of 1538 where music's otherness from the material world is said to enrich
man's soul, to allow him to contemplate the otherness of the spiritual realm.
41 Georg Friedrich Meier, AnfangsgrOule der Schdnen KUnste und Wissenschaften, Halle, 1748-50,
volume 3, 298.
42 Hosier, Views, 97.
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however, in his moralistic notion of music as having both 'order and proportion'43 , both
of which instil the correct moral values in the individual.
Other theorists such as Johann Georg Sulzer" and Karl Ludwig Junker45
demonstrate similar syntheses. Both attempted to move beyond the Affektenlehre
towards a more vague notion of music's self-referentiality. Sulzer, for example, was
torn between more 'radical' notions of music as an Ausgiessung of lebhaften Gefiihlen
and more conservative notions of music as instilling or representing moral propriety.46
In Junker, however, there is a more cogent attempt to bring the Affektenlehre
'up to date'. Whereas Sulzer had appealed to music's sublimity as its salvation from the
excesses of anti-musical rationalism, 47
 Junker wanted to articulate a more complex
vision of the passions and music's relationship to them. He believed that music had the
power to articulate those confused states of change from one psychological state to
another. This emphasis on process is, of course, central also to Baumgartian theory:
art is representative of process alone - its content need not represent things outside
itself.
In Johann Niklaus Forkel, a theory of musical autonomy emerges: keen to
extend the dynamic vision of the passions or affections, Forkel attempted to broaden
Krause's dynamic Affektenlehre to encapsulate a theory of what he called musical
rhetoric." This new theory stresses a dynamism or process of the affections such that
all things become subsumed into the movements of the soul.
In the articulation of rhetoric, Forkel draws music into a separation from
nature that is premised no longer by semiological fixity but by the outer margins of
Cartesian representation. Close in many ways to the English scepticism of Hume's A
43 Ibid., 99.
44 See his Allgemeine Theorie der schOnen Ktinste, first edition Berlin 1771-74, second edition
Leipzig, 1792.
45 See, for example, Betrachtungen tiber Mahlerey, Ton- und Bildhauerkunst, Basel 1778;
Musikalischer Almanach ftir das Jahr 1782, Alethinople, 1782; Tonkunst, Bern 1777; Ueber den
Werth der Tonkunst, Bayreuth 1786.
46 Allgemeine Theorie, 423.
47 See also Schiller in this regard: Ueber das Erhabene, in the Taschenausgabe, 1847, volume 12,
292.
48 See in particular, Allgemeine Geschichte der Musik, Leipzig 1788, second edition Leipzig 1801.
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Treatise of Human Understanding (1739) and Henry Home's (Lord Karnes) Elements
of Criticism (1753), Forkel problematised the unanimity of the Affekt in favour of a
Junkerian articulation of changing states such that representation, reduction and
mathesis are effectively banished. In the Allgemeine Geschichte der Musik in
particular, Forkel ascribes to music a profoundly ontological quality, an essential and
autonomous level of signification based around a systematic analysis of musical
meaning according to six fundamental categories: die Phrase or Periode; der Stil; die
Gaming; Einhalt und Charakter; die Deklamation; die Kritik.49
In the first of these categories, period, Forkel foreshadows the musical
aesthetics of German Idealism, most notably the Schellingian-Hegelian primacy of
cadence. It is significant that Forkel names rhythm as the first sub category of period.
In Schelling, we shall see how rhythm functions as a kind of self-significatory level
within music and Forkel's account is close to that of the idealists. As a kind of internal
account of time, rhythm is further articulated by the 'higher' categories of Logik,
Homophonie, and Polyphonie. It would seem that 'logic' represents the articulation of
rhythm within pulse, the strong-weak pulse of bars and the periodic cessation of pulse
at cadences.
Further to the rhythm-logic elements, Forkel gives an account of Homophonie
as the harmonic counterpart of rhythm and Polyphonie as that of Logik. Homophony,
then, is the simple simultaneous sounding of pitches, the basic form of harmony and
polyphony is an articulated harmony, a higher or more complex manifestation of the
forms of logic.50
In Sti/, Forkel makes an essentially sociological, rather than historical,
distinction between the various Schreibarten51 according to function. These
distinctions are complemented by a set of quasi-Cartesian distinctions according to
49 These can be translated thus: phrase or period, style, genre, content and character, declamation.
criticism.
50 Note, in particular, the organic model of layers of signification: each layer retains a degree of
autonomy, separateness from the others and yet, each is, in some way, a reflection on the others. See
in this regard chapter 4 on Schelling's organicism.
51 Literally, 'modes of writing'.
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Affekten-like definitions. The three social functions are termed Kirchenmusik,
Kammermusik and Theatermusik, and it is these that serve as the final arbiters of
category: Forkel demonstrates that certain 'functions' are more disposed to certain
modes of Affektendarstellung. Thus Kirchenmusik represents the affects in a manner
closest to Cartesian semiological fixity, whereas Kammermusik is better suited to that
Schreibart he terms erhoben, ruhig or abgeschlossen. It is interesting that
The atermusik contains elements we would not normally include under that category
today. These include not only the Gottschedian plot genres but also, implicitly, a kind
of archetypal or generalised plot which we might now subsume under the term
'dramatic musical argument' in its broadest sense. 'Absolute' orchestral music can thus
also be included under this category.52
Indeed, under Gaming Forkel makes distinctions according not only to the
three sociological paradigms but also to texture: thus, under theatre one can envisage
drama as encapsulating both narrative genres such as opera and general narratives
such as symphony or concerto by virtue of both a certain textural orientation and the
sociological function of narration, implicit or explicit. Genres emerge, then, both as the
products of certain modes of labour and as entities empowered by their own internal
mechanisms: they are both functional and ontological.
The ontological consequences of this system are further divided in Einhalt und
Charakter. These two terms seem indistinct from each other but are both concerned
with the relation of internal modes of construction to their reception or Wirkung. In
this category, music's character can be seen to comply with Foucault's account of post-
Cartesian biology:
It will be seen that character is no longer drawn from the visible structure, and
without any criterion other than its presence or absence; it is based upon the
52 This might result from the rather confused origins of the symphony, springing perhaps from the
scenic halt of narrative progress in the sinfonia of Italian opera. Its disconnection from drama might
thus not yet be fully articulated. Perhaps, on the other hand, this metaphorical use of 'theatre' might
signal the final separation in so far as absolute music is thereby seen to have its own internal
narrative.
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existence of functions essential to the living being, and upon relations of
importance that are no longer merely a matter of description.53
As we have seen, the collapse of unanimous reduction inevitably leads to the
internalisation and specialisation of unanimity; similarity or repetition of features
becomes a by-product of an internal ficnction:
Character is not, then, established by relation of the visible to itself; it is nothing
in itself but the visible point of a complex and hierarchical organic structure in
which function plays an essential governing and determining role. It is not
because a character occurs frequently in the structures observed that it is
important; it is because it is functionally important that it is often
encountered.54
The most striking element of this new epistemological schema for music is the
conflation of the separate elements of Gottsched's Copernican constellation to a single,
amorphous and finite entity. Music now subsumes within itself both the rhetorical or
communicative, apparently remnants of seventeenth-century German Figurenlehre,55
and the 'aesthetic' or formal. Thus apparently external elements of representation are in
themselves functions of the music's ontology,
Forkel's dynamism and his appeal to emotional fluidity represent two
tendencies of nineteenth century musicology in embryonic form: a spiritualism of music
and a functional theory of musical form. After Forkel, the synthesis of emotional
dynamism seemed complete: Wackenroder, Tieck, and later Hoffmann, all wrote
effusively on the merits of instrumental music, and whilst certain rhetorical remnants of
the imitation paradigm remain, they seem little more than mere gestures to the older
French theory.
The Challenge to a World of Visible Meanings
Challenges to Cartesian science, then, inevitably bring challenges to mimesis
theory, the latter being a hybrid of the former. Alongside the self-orchestrated demise
of mimesis arose a new science, which, as we have said, attempted to engage rationally
with the notion of a closed essential self-quality in reality. The new science thus
53 Foucault, Order, 227-8.
54 Ibid., 228.
55 See Vincent Duckles, 'Johann Nocolaus Forkel: the beginning of music historiography' in
Eighteenth-century Studies 1968: volume 1, 277-90.
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required a universality of method, an overriding set of references that were closed to
questions of value. In short, it required a pragmatism that accepted the truth only of its
scientific method, induction.
If it was based initially on the seemingly clear deductive modes of argument -
beginning, that is, with a considered meditation on the nature of the question and
proceeding by a process of continual internal dialogue until the discourse brings the
answer - Cartesian thought was highly vulnerable to the new pragmatism of empirical
inductive methods such as those posited by Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) and, in a
much earlier 'philosophical' or abstract form, by Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1627).
Induction, the methodological antithesis of deduction, proceeds by a method of trial
and error, of constant experimentation until some sense or pattern emerges that leads
the observer to discover some 'truth'. Whilst not necessarily antithetical to Cartesian
tables of visible similarity, 56
 the inductive method had the significant consequence of
atomising reality, of splintering it into tiny empiricities. In positing a universal
scientific model for the retrieval of truth, induction brings about a retreat into ever
smaller units of measurable matter, each detail more clearly defined with every fine-
tuning of the system. Each new detail seemed to succumb again and again to the new
inquisitive eye. This 'universal', 'all-purpose' , seemingly infallible, epistemology
undermined the cameralist basis of the old corporatist order in that it began to allow
for the proactive dimension of reason. The loss of the old cohesion and the
fundamental undermining of cameral order that induction entailed produced a kind of
social rupture: the threat to cohesion at the level of community meant the subsequent
reconstruction of community at the level of the larger social unit: the nation. Induction
can thus be seen to play no small part in the emergence of the myth of universality and
the ontological impulse. The tiny empiricities of inductive method begin the process of
objectification that so clearly lies at the basis of function, essence and the invisible.
The overreaching enquiry of inductive method into nature, its wish to give meaning by
56 It is now clear to see how mimesis undermines itself. If visibility and induction conspire to create
the notion of essence, then the sole right of mimesis to truth is assailed.
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observation, fell foul of nature's 'invisible' elements: to make such elements visible, it
had first to leave the world of the visible on a kind of reconnaissance mission and,
outside its own visible realm, discovered that the very visibility that had served as an
infallible measure of truth now lay open to the ravages of a more sensual post-
Cartesian reason. The similarity table proved too course a tool with which to measure
reality. The paradigm had shown itself to be inadequate.
If inductive method played a part in the emergence of the ontological impulse,
then we might expect to find similar moves towards an objectification in musical
theory. When the 'absoluteness' or 'infallibility' of the inductive empirical method
instigated the collapse of the deductive modes of thinking and posited man's
universality, induction became a central sovereign truth which all men recognise and by
which they are measured. In this sense, induction was a profoundly democratic
phenomenon. The democratic element in music theory can be seen in the emergence of
the score as object of inductive scrutiny. It is the emergence of this phenomenon, and
its relationship to broader intellectual and cultural developments in the eighteenth
century, the path of music theory into the new paradigm that we shall now analyse
more closely in the general philosophical schemata of Schelling and Hegel and in the
ecstatic soliloquising of Wackenroder.
Chapter Three
Wackenroder: Music beyond Articulation
W. H. Wackenroder's Phantasien iiber die Kunst fiir Freunde der Kunst (1799)
conflates the semiological fixity of Gottsched's mimesis, the separateness of sign and
object, by a deliberate problematisation of musical semantics. Written in an inward-
looking, meditative style, the fantasies are emotionally charged and tragic. Although
works of literature in themselves, the Berglinger essays on music are nonetheless a
kind of practical demonstration of Forkelian/Junkerian emotional dynamism. This is a
prose purged completely of the Cartesian morality and emotional unanimity. The
constellation of Cartesian semantics is cast out in favour of a new Seelenlehre, a
doctrine of the soul, where the human soul is seen first and foremost as an ever more
'ausgebreites Gewebe von immer feineren Zweigen.1
This conflation of separateness emerges a few years later in systematic
philosophy as 'organic structure' and yet at this stage music is taken up in a deliberately
non-empirical manner resulting in a mystical salutationary tone addressing music as
somehow wanton and magical, as das Dunkle, Unbeschreibliche.
Each of the four essays in the Phantasien deals with a different aspect of
music.2 Some allegorise the sufferings of the character Berglinger, others are driven by
an almost hysterical delight in music and the letters recount his anguish and torture, the
'poison' in his veins and his self-loathing. Always, though, music is shown to be a kind
of spiritual other world, a realm above the mundane reality of the objective realm.
1 Phantasien, in Wackenroder, Gustav Kiepenbeuer Verlag, Potsdam, 1925, 183.
2 There are, in fact, four essays and two fragments from fictitious letters from Berglinger to friends
and colleagues.
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This 'otherness' is particularly strong in the first essay, 'Eiri wunderbares
morgenldndisches Marchen von einem nackten Heilgen.' 3 The hermit or naked saint
represents, in allegorical form, the tortured Berglinger. Isolated and driven by an
internal frenzy, the hermit finds no rest from his self-imposed purgatory. He lives in a
far distant wilderness, somewhere in the Orient, die Heimat alles Wunderbaren. 4 The
use of the Orient here is striking: it is a place where signs and things are interwoven,
where the old Copernican constellation of natural elements is wholly inappropriate:
Das Morgenland ist die Heimat alles Wunderbaren, in dem Allertume und der
Kindheit der dortigen Meinungen findet man auch hOchst seltsame Winke und
RUtsel, die immer noch dem Verstande, der sich far kltiger, aufgegeben werden.
So wohnen dort in den EinOden oft seltsame Wesen, die wir wahnsinnig
nennen, die aber dort als tibernattirliche Wesen verehrt werden.5
The Orient is the home of everything wondrous. Amidst the antiquity and childlike
simplicity of attitudes there, one also finds very strange signs and puzzles which
present a problem to the mind that considers itself to be more clever. Strange beings
often dwell in the wilderness there, beings whom we would call insane, who are
however worshipped there as supernatural beings.°
In this exotic land, Wackenroder is able to construct a semiology that lies wholly
outside the Cartesian model. The Winke and Reitsel of this land represent the
overlapping of the Cartesian separate elements of signs and things. Signification
remains ambivalent to its signifieds and the clarity of representation is wholly
undermined. The unwieldiness of meaning in this fictitious realm imbues obvious
visible elements with an antiquarian sense of the supernatural:
Der orientalische Geist betrachtet diese nackten Heiligen als die wunderlichen
Behaltnisse eines hOhern Genius, der aus dem Reiche des Firmaments sich in
eine menschliche Gestalt verirrt hat, und sich nun nicht nach Menschenweise zu
gebarden weiB.7
3 Literally: 'A miraculous oriental tale of a naked saint' in Phantasien, 158-163.
4 Literally: 'the home of all things miraculous/wonderfuUremarkable'.
5 Phantasien, 158.
6 Edward A. Lippman, (ed.), Musical Aesthetics: A Historical Reader - The Nineteenth Century,
Pendragon Press, 1988, b. The translation is that by Schubert. See bibliography.
7 Phantasien, 158.
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The oriental mind regards these naked saints as wondrous receptacles of a higher spirit
which strayed away from the realm of the firmament into human form and now does
not know how to conduct itself in a human manner.8
Thus, in those places where Cartesian order would close, confme and distribute
meaning according to a table of clear and visible categories, the Orient opens,
fragments and disperses meaning across a broad canvass. The apparent 'madness' of the
saint in Cartesian eyes is shown in this other world as a higher, more mysterious state.
In this sense, the saint is complex and it is this complexity, closed to the Cartesian
Verstand, that imbues the saint with its semantic bounty. In short, the saint, as allegory
of the tortured creative genius, is both sign and referent, an immanent semantics of
hidden truths, distant from the common Verstand.
The saint's closure from the external is also represented in the *metaphor of the
distant wilderness and the cave by a small river. He is tortured by what he perceives to
be the rushing torrential sounds of the turning wheel of time, cannot escape this
torment and must constantly turn the wheel of time so that time does not stand still.
The Sisyphian grandeur of this tragedy belies a fundamental distinction that will
emerge in Schelling between Laut and Kiang:
Wie emn Wasserfall von tausend und abertausend briffienden StrOmen, die vom
Himmel herunterstiirzten, sich ewig, ewig ohne augenblicklichen Stillstand,
ohne die Ruhe einer Sekunde ergossen, so tOnte es in seine Ohren, und alle
seine Sinne waren machtig nur darauf hingewandt, seine arbeitende Angst war
immer mehr und mehr in den Strudel der wilden Verwirrung ergriffen und
hineingerissen, immer ungeheurer verwildeten die einfOrrnigen Tone
durcheinander;9
Like a waterfall of thousands of roaring torrents which plunged down from the sky,
eternally, eternally poured forth without a momentary pause, without a second's peace,
thus is sounded in his ears and all his senses were intently focused solely on this. His
labouring anguish became more and more caught up and carried away in the whirlpool
of this wild confusion; the monstrous sounds grew more and more ferociously wild;10
This tortuous sound, the unwieldy, unleashed power of einfOrmige Tone, contrasts
with the litherische Musik encountered at the end of the tale. The former sound is
8 Aesthetics, 6.
9 Phantasien, 159.
I° Aesthetics, 7.
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unordered, mundane, profane, even, whereas the latter, as we shall see, is spiritual,
creative. For Schelling this distinction between Laza and Kiang is that between an
unordered or interrupted sound and a constant, ordered, uninterrupted resonance:11
Furthermore, Laut is profane because it is not creative, not formed by the act of
creativity whereas Kiang springs from the individual creativity of genius.
A similar contrast exists between the frenzied turning of the wheel of time
which torments the saint and the kleinlichen irdischen Beschaftigungen of the
pilgrims:
Aber noch viel wilder und gefdhrlicher wurde seine Raserei, wenn es sich
zutrug, daB in seiner Mlle irgendeine kOrperliche Arbeit vorgenommen wurde,
wenn emn Mensch, der ihn nicht kannte, etwa bei seiner HOhle Krauter sammelte
oder Holz Mite. Dann pflegte er wild aufzulachen, daB unter dem graBlichen
Fortrollen der Zeit noch jemand an diese ldeinlichen irdischen Beschaftigungen
denken konnte...12
But his frenzy became much more wild and dangerous whenever it happened that any
physical labour was undertaken in his surroundings, for example, whenever a person
who didn't know him gathered herbs and felled wood near his cave. Then he tended to
burst out laughing hysterically over the fact that someone was still able to think of
these trivial earthly concerns amidst the frightful rolling on of time...13
The separation of the hermit from the mundane everyday pastimes of the contented
pilgrims is an image common to much early Romantic literature. As Schubert points
out in his footnotes to the English translation, a notable example is Novalis' Heinrich
von Ofterdingen. As a &Mere Genius, the naked saint is to be revered as a figure of
legend, an isolated, higher prophet of the supernatural. The tone of the language and
the imagery here reminds one of Nietzsche's hermit figure of Zarathustra in Also
sprach Zarathustra (1883-5). And yet, Wackenroder's Obermensch is not the prophet
of self-overcoming, of self-betterment through the meditative discipline of the higher
creative discourse, of Selbstiiberwindung, but a tortured, unfulfilled genius denied the
/1 'Ich brauche den Unterschied des Klangs von Schall und Laut nicht weitlaufig auseinandersetzen.
Schall ist das Generische, Laut ist Schall, der nur unterbrochen; Kiang ist Schall, der als Stetigkeit als
emn ununterbrochenes FlieBen des Schalls aufgefaBt wird. F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophie der Kunst,
133.
12 Phantasien, 160.
13 Aesthetics, 7.
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solitary creativity in which Zarathustra revels. The essential difference here is between
a proto-Schopenhauerian vision of live as mere illusion, as driven by the ,Wille zum
Leben, and Nietzsche's affirmation of life: 'Das Leben ist emn Born der Lust; aber wo
das Gesindel mittrinkt, da sind alle Brunnen vergiftet.' 14 Wackenroder's naked saint,
however, is tormented not merely by the poisoning Gesindel but by every tortured
moment of his existence: a tragic black vision of the objective realm as a living
purgatory. His tortures are so extreme that all ability to function as a member of the
alien community of pilgrims, to engage in communicative action, is suppressed or
suspended:
Er war nicht imstande, semen Arm irgeneinem Gegenstande auszustrecken,
oder etwas mit der Hand zu ergreifen; er konnte keinen Schritt mit den FiiBen
tun, wie andre Menschen."
He was not capable of stretching out his arm toward any object or reaching for
anything with his hand; he couldn't take a step with his feet like other people. 16
The despair of the saint, unable to engage in objective existence without pain, is
seldom relieved. Only on those moonlit nights where all is still does the saint collapse
onto the floor of his cave in momentary relief from his purgatory.
At this point, the difference between the Schellingian Laut and Kiang is
compounded. On one such still night, two lovers float past the saint's cave in a small
boat and the atherische Musik floats from the boat upwards to the heavens:
Mit dem ersten Tone der Musilc und des Gesangs war dem nackten Heiligen
das sausende Rad der Zeit verschwunden. Es waren die ersten Tone, die in
diese EinOde fielen; die unbekannte Sehnsucht war gestillt, der Zauber gelest,
der verirrte Genius aus seiner irdischen Hiille befreit.17
At the first sound of this music and singing the roaring Wheel of Time had vanished
from the naked saint. These were the first harmonies which had drifted into the desolate
place; the unfamiliar longing was stilled, the spell broken, the lost spirit released from
its earthly she11.18
14 Friedrich Nietzsche, Also Sprach Zarathustra, in Nietzsche Werke, publ. Walter de Gruyter and Co.
Berlin 1968, 120.
15 Phantasien, 160-1.
16 Aesthetics, 8.
17 Phantasien, 163.
18 Aesthetics, 9.
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The ordered Kiang of this music, then, releases the saint from the tortured existence
and the phantom that remains floats into the heavens. Music, then, born from a natural
uncontrived joy, is a release, an other-world which transforms the objective realm. This
music is no mere escapism, it is a metaphysical element of the world, one which
resonates as an abstracted, mystical, construction. In this sense, the old Cartesian fixity
is exorcised from music and a new dark and mysterious autonomy emerges. Notice,
first of all, how the effects of music are articulated in such a highly metaphorical
language, as if mere descriptive, fixative, words profane the complexity of this
mysterious phenomenon.
These wonders, stemming ostensibly from the apparent semantic indeterminacy
of created music are further analysed in 'die Wunder der Tonkunst', the second essay of
the Phantasien. 19 . Berglinger begins in rapturous account of his response:
Wenn ich es so recht innig genieBe, wie der leeren Stine sich auf einmal, aus
freier Willkiir, em n schOner Zug von 'Mien entwindet, und als emn Opferrauch
emporsteigt, sich in Luften wiegt, und wieder still zur Erde herabsinkt; - da
entsprieBen und drangen sich so viele neue, schOne Bilder in meinem Herzen,
daB ich vor Wonne mich nicht zu lassen weiB.2°
Whenever I so fervently enjoy how a beautiful strain of sounds suddenly, in free
spontaneity, extricates itself from the empty stillness and rises up like a sacrificial
incense, floats gently on the breezes, and then silently sinks down to earth again; - then
so many new, beautiful images spout forth and flock together in my heart that I cannot
control myself out of rapture. 21
There are two essential elements in this opening declamation. First, that music
somehow springs from the stillness, self-determined, aus freier Willkiir, as if it is
somehow self-animated, free from the bodies which are agitated to produce it. Second,
that such a creature as this self-animated music speaks directly to the individual -
Berglinger - in such a potent, debilitating manner that he/she somehow loses a sense of
self, is so intoxicated by the overwhelming rush of sentiments that the rational ego is
momentarily suspended, giving way to the unleashed confusion of the id.
19 Phantasien, 164ff.
Phantasien, 164.
21 Aesthetics, 10.
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This twofold character of music - as autonomous, self-animated and as ego-
negating narcotic - is then spread across a broad arc of metaphorical indulgence from
absolute self-animation to absolute perfection. Wackenroder takes this broad sweep
through several stages. He begins with the imagery of the phoenix:
Bald kommt Musik mir vor wie emn Vogel PhOnix, der sich leicht und kiihn zu
eigner Freude erhebt, zu eignem Behagen stolzierend hinaufschwebt, und
GOtter und Menschen durch semen Fliigelschwung erfreut.22
Sometimes music appears to me like a phoenix, which lightly and boldly raises itself
for its own pleasure, floats upwards triumphantly for its own gratification, and pleases
gods and men by the flapping of its wings.23
This notion of self-activation, of a birth through self-will is a fundamental element of
Wackenroder's notion of autonomy. That the phoenix emerges zu eignem Behagen,
relating to the initial declamation on music as emerging aus freier Willkiir, suggests a
music which plays for itself, that speaks to its own internal organs, that moves itself in
some kind of internal self-signifying dialogue. The phoenix, as an image of
resurrection, a life out of objective non-animacy, is also a release, an escape from the
mortality of the mundane objective realm. The emotive symbolism of a dead child
serves to extend this notion of music as a kind of spiritual resurrection:
Bald diinkt es mich, Musik sei wie emn Kind, das tot im Grabe lag - em n rtitlicher
Sonnenstrahl vom Himmel entnimmt ihm die Seele sanft, und es genieSt, in
himmlischen Ather versetzt, goldne Tropfen der Ewigkeit, und umarmt die
Urbilder der allerschOnsten menschlichen Traume.24
At other times it seems to me as if music were like a child lying dead in the grave; - one
reddish sunbeam from heaven gently draws its soul away and, transplanted into the
heavenly aether, it enjoys golden drops of eternity and embraces the original images of
the most beautiful human dreams.25
Thus music draws a mortal life into a higher form of spiritual life, a higher
consciousness. The suspension of the finitude of life and the positing of the eternal is
thus fundamental here. Music is an abstraction or 'fundamental representation' of
" nantasien, 164.
23 Aesthetics, 10.
24 Phantasien, 164.
25 Aesthetics, 10. The translation of Urbilder as 'original pictures' is inept: a better alternative is
'archetypes' since this ties in with Schelling's reading of this passage in Philosophie.
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certain eternal truths, certain Urbilder or fundamental signs/images. Music therefore
transcends the mere separation of sign and thing given in Gottsched's semiology and
proposes a much 'deeper' fundamental unity of music and 'the spiritual' as a utopian
realm standing in opposition to the rational, the real, the objective. Hence, music
represents only in the most archetypal manner. Wackenroder thus gives music the
function of a kind of 'cosmic model' for the fleeting of life into death:
Und bald - welche herrliche Fiille der Bilder! - bald ist die Tonkunst mir ganz
emn Bild unsers Lebens: eine riihrend kurze Freude, die aus dem Nichts entsteht
und ins Nichts vergeht - die anhebt und versinkt, man weiB nicht warum: - eine
ldeine, frOhliche, griine Insel, mit Sonnenschein mit Gang und Kiang - die auf
dem dunkeln unergrUndlichen Ozean schwimmt.26
And sometimes, - what a magnificent fullness of images! - sometimes music is for me
entirely a picture of our life: - a touchingly brief joy, which arises out of the void and
vanishes into the void, - which commences and passes away, why one does not know: a
little merry green island, with sunshine, with singing and rejoicing, - which floats upon
the dark, unfathomable ocean.27
Again, Wackenroder resorts to images of self-animation, emergence and submergence
via some unfathomable force, man weifi nicht warum. This fleeting beauty of the
utopian island, a metaphor for the painfully transitory nature of life's joys, underlines
the volatility of music as an art form. Music can only provide fleeting - mortal -
glimpses into the perfect world of infinite abstraction. The broad metaphorical sweep
of music from autonomous self-animation through resurrection, the abstract
representation of archetypes, to visions of utopian well-being is so painfully brief as to
heighten the beauty of music, to make it a tragic beauty.
The transitory nature of music, its very brevity, leaves the analytical imperative
of semiological fixity bereft of any mechanism to engage with music on any but the
most superficial levels. In this sense, it is the wilful materiality of music, its unwieldy
opaque mechanisms of signification that are the fundamental principles of the post-
Cartesian aesthetic. Wackenroder's deliberate use of almost Nietzschean hysteria points
to a deliberate conflation of metaphor and experience. This development of an
26 Phantasien, 164.
27 Aesthetics, 10.
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aesthetics premised by metaphor as almost tangible experience is significant. Only
through such a creative-poetic indictment of music's materiality could Wackenroder
construct such an aesthetic, and it is to this metaphorical end that he lambastes
analytical language:28
Oh, so schlieB' ich mein Auge zu vor all dem Kriege der Welt - und ziehe mich
still in das Land der Musik, als in das Land das Glaubens, zurtick, wo alle unsre
Zweifel und unsre Leiden sich in em n tOnendes Meer verlieren - wo wir alles
Gekrachze der Menschen vergessen, wo kein Wort- und Sprachengeschnatter,
kein Gewirr von Buchstaben und monstrOser Hieroglyphenschrift ins
schwindlig macht, sondem alle Angst unsers Herzens durch leise Beriihrung auf
einmal geheilt wird.29
0, then I close my eyes to all the strife in the world - and withdraw quietly into the land
of music, as into the land of belief, where all our doubts and our sufferings are lost in a
resounding sea, - where we forget all the croaking of human beings, where no
chattering of words and languages, no confusion of letters and monstrous hieroglyphics
makes us dizzy but, instead, all the anxiety of our hearts is suddenly healed by the
30gentle touch.
The casting out of the sign is, as we have seen, an essential element of the process via
Forkelian isomorphism, of ontologising music. The retreat from the monstrOser
Hieroglyphenschrift into a discourse of objective self-quality and impenetrable
otherness is the first stage of this process. The drive for the internal essence, the
ontological impulse, is thus, at first, a deliberate forgetting of meaning for notions of a
semantic determinacy are premised by the admission of an external, non-essential,
element. In the Wackenroderian sense, the 'meaning' of music is abstract
inarticulability which can only be traversed by a self-conscious language of metaphor:
"...Werden hier Fragen uns beantwortet? Werden Geheimnisse uns offenbart?" -
Ach nein! aber statt aller Antwort und Offenbarung werden uns lustige, schOne
Wolkengestalten gezeigt, deren Anblick uns beruhigt, wir wissen nicht wie;
28 The simple use of the term metaphor here is not meant to deliberately undermine some of the
profoundly contiguous relationships at work in Wackenroder's rich prose style. The nexus of
metaphors and metonymies constructs, rather, a fable of allegorical unity where both metaphor and
metonymy are constrained by the intensity and inarticulability of the aesthetic experience. To this end,
one might say, Wackenroder uses a language which precludes its own fixity and undermines the
determinacy of its signified. Indeed, one might ask after Barthes, what is it in this tearful old monk
that poses for me the question of the signifier? (See Image-Music-Text, Fontana, 1982, 56. Barthes
refers to a 'tearful old woman.')
29 Phantasien, 165.
30 Aesthetics, 11.
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- wir begrilBen und umarmen fremde Geisterwesen, die wir nicht kennen, als
Freunde, und alle die Unbegreiflichkeiten, die unser Gemilt bestiirmen, und die
die Krankheit des Menschengeschlechtes sind, verschwinden von unsem
Sinnen, und unser Geist wird gesund durch das Anschauen von Wundem, die
noch weit unbegreiflicher und erhabener sind.31
Are questions answered for us here? Are secrets revealed to us? -0 no! but, in the place
of all answers and revelations, airy, beautiful cloud formations are shown to us, the
sight of which calms us, we do not know how; - we greet and embrace as friends
strange spiritual beings whom we do not know, and all the incomprehensibilities which
besiege our souls and which are the disease of the human race disappear before our
senses, and our minds become healthy through the contemplation of marvels which are
far more incomprehensible and exalted.32
The proto-Nietzschean quality of the metaphorical language impresses itself here.
Other similarities are also to be found. References to notions of the 'superhuman' [dos
Obermenschliche] abound. The manner in which music portrays human feelings auf
eine iibermenschliche Art" and the imagery of the isolated, higher genius, complete in
his higher inarticulable knowledge, are strikingly Nietzschean:
Wohl dem, der, wann der irdische Boden untreu unter semen Fili3en wankt, mit
heitern Sinnen auf lustige Tone sich retten kann, und nachgebend mit ihnen bald
sanft sich wiegt, bald mutig dahertanzt, und mit solchem lieblichen Spiele seine
Leiden vergiBt134
Happy the one who, when the earthly soil shakes unfaithfully under his feet, can rescue
himself serenely on airy tones and, yielding to them, now rocks himself gently, now
dances away courageously and forgets his sorrows with such pleasing cliversion!35
Compare this with Zarathustra's teachings in 'Vom hOheren Menschen':
Wie Vieles ist noch mOglich! So lemt doch iiber euch hinweg lachen! Erhebt
eure Herzen, ihr guten Tanzer, hoch, hOher! Und vergesst mir auch das gute
Lachen nicht!36
How much is still possible! So learn to laugh beyond yourselves! Lift up your hearts,
you fine dancers, high! higher! and do not forget to laugh well!37
31 Phantasien, 165-6.
32 Aesthetics, 11.
33 Phantasien, 168.
34 Phantasien, 166.
35 Aesthetics, 11.
36 Part IV of Also Sprach Zarathustra, in Nietzsche Werke, publ. Walter de Gruyter and Co., Berlin
1968, 363.
37 R. J. Hollingdale, (trans.) Thus Spake Zarathustra, Penguin 1969, 306.
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The proto-Nietzschean tone of the isolated individual, the heavy metaphorical
discourse of the anti-rational, are all the more remarkable in that they were conceived
at the end of a century terrified by the consequences of an unfettered subjectivism. And
yet, despite numerous other striking similarities with Nietzsche 38 , the fundamental
differences are telling. Berglinger's tortures are the result of a kind of problematised
subjectivity, a heightened spiritual sensitivity, of an oppression of the over-sensitive
individual by the overwhelming tragedy of beauty. Zarathustra, on the other hand,
emerges from the turmoil of his trials to attain highest enlightenment, the supreme
synthesis of ego and id, a life-affirming gesture which stands the nihilism of the
Friihromandker on its head. In Wackenroder, the creative genius is tormented, laden
down by the mundane monotony of life whereas the Obermensch transcends these
mundanities and surmounts the Gesindel in heroic isolation.
This fundamental alignment of music and tragedy is clear. Although music
evokes 'height' and lofty isolation:
Die Musik aber halte ich fOr die wunderbarsten dieser Ethndungen, weil sie
menschliche Gefiihle auf eine Obermenschliche Art schildert, well sie uns alle
Bewegungen unsers Gernins unkOrperlich, in goldne Wolken lustiger
Harmonien eingeldeidet, iiber unserm Haupte zeigt...39
But I consider music to be the most marvelous of these inventions, because it portrays
human feelings in a superhuman way, because it shows us all the emotions of our soul
above our heads in incorporeal form, clothed in golden clouds of airy hannonies,4°
these joys are mere contrivances and we deceive ourselves in such artificial exultation
of our own creativity:
Wenn aber die Engel des Himmels auf dieses ganze liebliche Spielwerk
herabsehen, das wir die Kunst nennen, - so miissen sie wehmiitig lacheln iiber
das Kindergeschlecht auf der Erde, und lacheln ilber die unschuldige
Erzwungenheit in dieser Kunst der Tone, wodurch das sterbliche Wesen sich zu
ihnen erheben
38 Compare, for example, 'Das Nachtwandler-Lied', Part IV of Zarathustra, with Wackenroder's
'Morgenlandisches Marchen'.
39 Phantasien, 168.
40 Aesthetics, 13.
41 Phantasien, 170.
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But when the angels of heaven look down upon this entire delightful playing which we
call art, - then they must smile in tender sadness over the race of children on earth and
over the innocent artificiality in this art of sounds, through which the mortal creature
wants to elevate himself to them.42
Beyond the tragedy of the proto-Nietzschean genius emerges music, a contrived
construct, a manufactured metaphor for the fleeting joys of a tormented life. This
metaphorical construct, then, relates in a complex way to reality. No longer is there a
simple fixity of sign and thing; music consists of a quasi-natural construction in itself.
Its internal contrived mechanisms are so complex, so unfathomable, that they take on a
kind of self-life, like the phoenix rising zu eignem Behagen from the stillness.
That music is shown here as a metaphorical construct is significant. The sad
arrogance of genius is mitigated by the closeness music brings man to 'the angels' and it
achieves this by metaphor: only through such a pitifully contrived device can man
construct for himself a reflection of the external, of non-man. The impossibility of
literal reflection and a move towards the emergence of more metaphorical modes of
representation begins the process of the recognition of device as a bearer of the
integrity of the endeavour. The beauty of music is thus to be assessed not according to
the manner in which it represents accurately but according to the manner in which it
'takes flight', so to speak, on the wings of imagination, a process which will involve the
construction of innumerable pathways to the external. Each endeavour recasts this
problem anew: the tragedy here is profoundly existential since man's most noble
labours are merely contrived. Since each endeavour requires a new forging of a route
from conception to meaning, the generic permissiveness of the nineteenth century
emerges as a microcosm of this semiological specialisation. Each genre emerges as a
new response to externality and the modes of signification that are recast in it. To this
end, the problems of signification are internalised and, more significantly,
particularised. In short, the collapse of the 'semantic pathway' from music to meaning
so clearly constructed in the Cartesian mimesis aesthetic led to the fragmentation of
fixity in favour of an overwhelming semantic pragmatism. The genre itself became
42 Aesthetics, 14.
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bearer of the external or the non-musical and each work seemed more and more to
encompass a newly recast pathway to the external in itself.
The 'wonders' of music are perceived as relative to the absolute
inconsequentiality of man in the face of an overwhelming cosmos. These innumerable
'wonders' are real only in so far as they are in sharp relief to the mundane - subsistential
- pastimes of man. Each recast pathway to the external, then, represents a rejection of
a normative mode of signification. We have already seen the separation of the objective
realm of subsistence from the noble realm of spiritual striving in the tale of the naked
saint. The saint is overwhelmed by the unbearable multiplicity of the noises of the
wheel of time, confused by its unfathomable relentless raging and incapable of the
normative communicative modes demonstrated by the pilgrims. His isolation from the
normative is, in the first instance, tragic and oppressive. Through a new pathway to the
other, that offered by the lovers' music, the saint frees himself from the torment of the
subsistential and the normative and floats rejoicing into the void.
Internalised in this new pragmatic semiology is the mathesis of archetypal plot.
Whereas in Gottsched, the third mode of Nachahmung represented a dialogue of
external archetypes, each marked according to simple reductive characteristics such as
manner, Affekt and appearance, the new dynamic is so internalised, so removed from
the normative externality of mechanistic reduction as to cast out all but the most
archetypal forms. In Schelling, we shall see a crystallisation of the new mathesis in the
notion of Begrenzung, the limitation of each internal element of the dynamic according
to specific characteristics and yet, leaving room for each element to 'take up' the
archetypal structure of the whole, as a kind of microcosm of it.
The deliberate complexity, the organic unity of characteristic autonomy,
reminiscent of the second Gottschedian mode of Nachahmung and its participation in
'the totality' is the metaphysical expression of the Baumgartean maxim 'unity in
diversity, diversity in unity.' Wackenroder's avoidance of such systems has as much to
do with his unfamiliarity with philosophical rigour as with his disdain for systematic
theory.
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The parallels here, however, are significant. Schelling and Wackenroder arrive
at strikingly similar conclusions. In Wackenroder's aesthetic, music has the ability to
abstract and regroup reality in a fleeting perfection. It is, as we have said, a kind of
'cosmic model'. Thus, by the very nature of its autonomy, its abstraction, music
constructs for itself a deep sympathy with the totality of the universe. Meaning is
evoked, then, by a cosmic parallelism where music functions as a structural
recollection of the cosmos. This structural recollection thereby evokes not only the
generalities of the universe in archetypal form, but also represents a kind of showing of
the particularities of human expression:
Wenn mir emn Bruder gestorben 1st, und ich bei solcher Begebenheit des Lebens
eine tiefe Traurigkeit gehOrig anbringe, weinend im engen Winkel sitze, und alle
Sterne frage, wer je betriibter gewesen als ich, - dann, - indes hinter meinem
Rticken schon die spottende Zukunft steht, und iiber den schnell verganglichen
Schmerz des Menschen lacht, - dann steht der Tonmeister vor mir, und wird
von all dem jemmervollen Handeringen so bewegt, da13 er den schOnen
Schmerz daheim auf semen TOnen nachgebardet, und mit Luft und Liebe die
menschliche Betrtibnis verschOnert und ausschmtickt, und so em n Werk
hervorbringt, das aller Welt zur teifsten Riihrung gereicht.43
When a brother of mine has died and, at such an event of life, I appropriately display
deep sorrow, sit weeping in a narrow corner, and ask all the stars who has ever been
more grieved than I, - then, - while the mocking future already stands behind my back
and laughs about the quickly fleeting pain of the human being, - then the virtuoso
stands before me and becomes so moved by all this woeful wringing of the hands, that
he recreates this beautiful pain on his instrument at home and beautifies and adorns the
human grief with desire and love. Thus, he produces a work which arouses in all the
world the deepest compassion.'"
The genesis of the Schellingian system is clear here. Music recalls the cosmos in
totality, Schelling's das Absolute, and such a totality requires all notions of particularity
to be subsumed within it to comply with properly complete totality. Thus, the
particularisation of Gottsched's Fabel, is subsumed into the totalising constructs of
post-Cartesian music such that in the Nachgebeirdung of a single moment of 'beautiful
pain' the totality of the cosmos is evoked in harmonious totality. This notion of each
element of particularity 'taking up' the whole or representing, in particularised form,
43 Phantasien, 169-70.
44 Aesthetics, 13-14.
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the structural complexity of the whole, is an essential element of the Schellingian
system where:
...z. B. verschiedene Gestalten jede em dienendes Glied des Ganzen und doch
bei der vollkommenen Ausbildung des Werkes wieder in sich absolut ist.45
...for example, each of various elements or forms is a part subservient to the whole and
yet from the persepctive of the overall construction of the work is absolute in itself.46
Where Schelling evokes cosmic totality, Wackenroder evokes, in more poetic terms, a
sense of Baumgartean Verwunderung at the magnificent comprehension of the
inarticulable which is sometimes also evoked as an 'all-encompassing love':
Ich aber, wenn ich Idngst das angstvolle Handeringen urn meinen toten Bruder
verlernt habe, und dann einmal das Werk seiner Betriibnis hOre, - dann freu' ich
mich kindlich fiber mein eignes, so glorreich verherrlichtes Herz, und ndhre und
bereichere mein Gemiit an der wunderbaren SchOpfung.47
But I, after I have long forgotten the anxious wringing of the hands for my dead
brother, and then happen to hear the product of his sorrow, - then I exalt like a child
over my own so magnificantly glorified heart and nourish and enrich my soul with the
wonderfull creation.48
This sense of the particular as elemental participation in totality is similarly
evoked in the next essay, 'Von den verschiedenen Gattungen in jeder Kunst und
insbesondere von verschiedenen Arten der Kirchenmusik.' 49 Wackenroder here evokes
a proto-Schellingian notion of false particularity, a dividing of the totality of the
cosmos that leads to falsehoods:
Es kommt mir allemal seltsam vor, wenn Leute, welche die Kunst zu lieben
vorgeben, in der Poesie, der Musik, oder in irgendeiner andern Kunst sich
bestandig nur an Werke von einer Gattung, einer Farbe halten, und ihr Auge
von alien andern Arten wegwenden....so kann ich doch nicht begreifen, wie eine
wahre Liebe der Kunst nicht alle ihre Gdrten durchwandern, und an allen
Quellen sich freuen sollte.50
It always seems strange to me when people who profess to love art constantly restrict
themselves in literature, in music, or in any other art, to works of one genre, one
45 F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophie, 11.
46 Douglas W. Stott (Iran) The Philosophy of Art, Minneapolis, 1989, 15.
47 Phantasien, 170.
48 Aesthetics, 14.
49 Phantasien, 171ff.
50 Phantasien, 171.
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coloration, and turn their eyes away from all other types.....I cannot understand why a
true love of art should not wander through all its gardens and enjoy all wellsprings.51
The falsehood of deliberate selectivity, an admiration of the putative supremacy of one
element of the cosmos to the detriment of the others in art is a sign of spiritual poverty:
Es wird ja doch niemand mit halber Seele geboren! - Aber freilich - wiewohl ich
es kaum iiber das Herz bringen kann, die allgiltige Natur so zu schmahen -, es
scheinen viele der heutigen Menschen mit so sparsamen Funken der Liebe
begabt zu sein, daB sie dieselbe nur auf Werke von einer Art aufwenden
kOnnen.52
No one is born with only half a soul! - But, to be sure, - although I scarcely have the
heart to defame all-bountiful Nature in this way, - many of today's people seem to be
so parsimoniously endowed with sparks of love that they can expend these only upon
works of one type.53
The consequences of genre promiscuity, an ever more particularised specialism, are
thus explicitly criticised here. The complexity of Wackenroder's vision begins now to
emerge. Predating Schelling's Philosophie der Kunst by five years, 54 Wackenroder's
Phantasien represent a profound contribution to the German Idealist aesthetic. They
are aptly named: as small fantasies on the fundamental role of music in the cosmos, as
a poetic rather than philosophical account of a new internalised post-Cartesian
ma thesis, they represent a coming together of the essential features of the debate at the
end of the eighteenth century. Their complexity lies in the interplay of metaphor and
quasi-system, of poetic vision and aesthetic mission.
In the preceding essays, Wackenroder has so far announced the main features
of his ontology: the emphasis on the mysterious complexity of the exotic in
Morgenlandisches Marchett i ; music as a release from the torments of mundane
subsistential existence; music as self-animated; music as resurrection; music as 'cosmic
model'; music as utopia. The interplay of these elements in the Wackenroderian realm
of metaphor is, perhaps, the most essential aspect of this aesthetic. Music, when
51 Aesthetics, 14.
52 Phantasien, 171.
53 Aesthetics, 14.
M Schelling is reputed to have completed the lecture course later published as Philosophie by 1805.
See 'Vorwort zum Nachdruck' in the Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft edition, Darmstadt 1959, v.
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separated, divided, is a music which subscribes only to one part of the soul. The
totality of music, a metaphor of cosmic totality in harmonious unity, is indivisible. Its
complexity is a fundamental premise of its richness. Only in the innocent embracing of.
this total complexity can one enrich and nourish iniihren] the soul:
Und so, diinkt mich, - denn die Herrlichkeit der Kunst hat mich zu einem
kiihnen Gleichnisbilde verleitet, - so wollte auch derjenige beschaffen sein,
welcher mit aufrichtigem Herzen vor der Kunst niederknien, und ihr die
Huldigung ether ewigen und unbegrenzten Liebe darbringen wollte.55
And thus it seems to me, - for the glory of art has reduced me into a bold simile, - thus
should he also be constituted, who would like to kneel down before art with an upright
heart and offer to it the homage of an eternal and boundless love.56
The particular in the totality has the following functions, then: first, for music
to be total it must evoke the cosmos in its totality; second, this totality must be
comprehensive and as such evoke particularity; third, the evocation of particularity
must constantly show itself as a microcosm of the totality. According to this organic
structure, the various discrete elements of a system of genres each has a significant
degree of autonomy in that is shows itself to be a totality in itself and, by analogy, this
microcosmic totality thereby reflects or demonstrates the totality of the cosmos, as a
model of it.
Thus, Wackenroder evokes three particularities of the Kirchenmusik to
demonstrate that each discrete pathway to immanent signification can, in itself, evoke
totality:
Allein auch diese heilige Muse redet von den Dingen des Himmel nicht
bestandig auf einerlei Art, sondem hat vielmehr ihre Freude daran, Gott auf
ganz verschiedene Weise zu loben, - und ich finde, daB jegliche Art, wenn man
deren wahre Bedeutung recht versteht, emn Balsam fiir das menschliches Herz
But this holy music does not speak of the [three] things of heaven continually in one
manner alone, but rather derives her pleasure from praising God in highly varied ways,
55 Phantasien, 173.
56 Aesthetics, 15.
57 Phantasien, 174.
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- and I find that each way is a balsam for the human heart, if one understands its true
significance correctly.58
The first of the three examples given is characterised by a simple, chlidlike joy in the
majesty of God. The metaphor of a child reading a speech to their father on his
birthday evokes this notion of an innocent, naive man straining for the grace of God:
....und lobt Gott nicht anders, als Kinder tun, welche vor ihrem guten Vater an
seinem Geburtstage eine Rede oder einen dramatischen Alctus halten, da sich
denn jener wohl gefallen 1A6t, wenn sie ihm ihren Dank mit kindlicher,
unbefangener Munterkeit beweisen, und im Danken zugleich eine kleine Probe
ihrer Geschicklichkeiten und erlangten Ktinste ablegen.59
...and praises God in the manner of children who deliver a speech or a dramatic
presentation before their good father on his birthday, for the latter is very pleased when
they demonstrate to him their gratitude with childlike, unconstrained liveliness and, in
the course of thinking, simultaneously give a little sample of their skills and acquired
arts.6o
In this sense music represents a broadly reflective or non-mediatory mode of
representation. The child holds music up like a mirror to its beloved father. The deft
passing from internal musical structures to the broad externality of God the father is
simply an expression of a corporatist mode of simple Nachahmung: the representation
of God in music such that God emerges as God. Similarly, Schelling's potence of the
naive' is the antiquarian art which holds a mirror to nature such that nature emerges
as nature. 62 The positing outwards from such a particularity to the oneness of God is
thus motivated by a naive acceptance of a generalised joy as a joy in God's love:
Sie kennen keine andre Erhebung der Seele als eine frOhliche und zierliche; sie
wissen in ihrer Unschuld fiir ihn keine andere und bessere Sprache des Lobes
und der Verehnmg, als die sie gegen einen edlen menschlichen WohltAter
gebrauchen, und sie sind nicht verlegen, von den Ideinsten Freuden und
Gentissen des Lebens mit leichter Fertigkeit zu dem Gedanken an den Vater des
Weltalls tiberzugehen.63
58 Aesthetics, 16.
59 Phantasien, 174-5.
"'Aesthetics, 16.
61 Schelling's term is Potenz, meaning one side of a higher order: the naive therefore represents one
side of the productive-creative order known as Poesie, the other side of which is the sentimental. Note
the bipolarity of the system, splitting into ever more detailed pairs of opposites. See later in this
chapter for further discussion or chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion.
62 See Schelling, Philosophie, 111.
63 Phantasien, 175.
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They know no other elevation of the soul then a gay and graceful one; in their naïveté
they know no other and better language for the praise and worship of Him than the one
they use toward a noble, mortal benefactor; and they are not embarrassed to pass with
light agility from the smallest joys and pleasures of life to the thought of the Father of
the universe.64
If the first type was fundamentally mimetic in nature, the second type attempts
to essentialise God as a broad construct; this mode is fundamentally ontological:
Im freien Taumel des Entziickens glauben sie das Wesen und die Herrlichkeit
Gottes bis ins Innerste begriffen zu haben;65
In the unconstrained delerium of ecstacy they believe that they have comprehended the
being and the magnificance of god to the core;66
This mode, then, comes closest to the notions evoked in 'Die Wunder der Tonkunst' of
music as a 'cosmic model'. By proceeding to a structural recounting of God in terms of
the broad gestural sweeps of supernatural grandeur, music retains a greater degree of
its autonomy. As a secular construct of divinity it remains secular and yet evokes the
divine through a structural sympathy with God's magnificence:
Sie achten es unwiirdig, den Ruhm des SchOpfers auf den kleinen flatternden
Schmetterlingsfliigeln kindlicher FrOhlichkeit zu tragen, sondem schlagen die
Luft mit breiten, machtigen Adlersschwingen.67
They consder it unworthry to carry the glory of the Creator on the small, fluttering
butterfly-wings of childlike gaiety, but to beat the air with the wide, powerful pinions
of eagles.68
The grandeur of this gesture suggests a very particular relationship with Schiller's
notion of the sublime [das Erhabene]. In Ueber das Erhabene 69 Schiller posited the
following elements as essential to the current notions of the sublime: first, man stands
overawed by the colossal Unbegreiflichkeit of the natural realm; second, unable to
grasp this colossal objectivity, he posits a false order or abstract framework, a
spirituality or mysticism, such that the incomprehensible is mutated into a kind of
64 Aesthetics, 17.
65 Phantasien, 176.
66 Aesthetics, 17.
Phantasien, 175-6.
68 Aesthetics, 17.
69 Taschenausgabe, Bd.12, 1847.
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metaphorical divinity; third, the final subsumption of the incomprehensible results in a
notion of 'the incomprehensible itself as a principle of judgement.' 7° Wackenroder's
second mode of divine particularity, then, deliberately overcomes its frailty in the face
of the sublime and reinvents the divine in music itself:
Die Musik ist jenen Geistern dhnlich, welche von dem allmachtigen Gedanken
an Gott so ganz iiber alle MaBe erfiillt sind, daB sie die Schwdche des
sterblichen Geschlechtes darnber ganz vergessen, und dreist genug sind, mit
lauter, stolzer Trompetenstimme die GrOBe des HOchsten der Erde zu
verkiindigen.71
This music resembles those minds which are so filled beyond all measure with the
almighty thought of God that they thereby totally forget the frailty of the human race
and are audacious enough to announce to the earth in a loud, proud, trumpetlike voice
the greatness of the Highest One.72
This ontological gesture, then, is an arrogant and harsh one. The bravura of these
auserwahlten Geistern whilst cruel in its brilliance is also capable of bringing less
fortunate souls to the exalted comprehension of God's grandeur:
Die Musik schreitet in starken, langsamen, stolzen Tijnen einher, und versetzt
dadurch unsre Seele in die erweiterte Spannung, welche von erhabenen
Gedenken in uns erzeugt wird, und solche wieder erzeugt.73
This music moves along in powerful, slow, proud strains and thereby transports our
souls to that intensified state of excitement which is generated by exalted thoughts
within us and generates such thoughts in return.74
Thus, our relationship to this music is as one to the sublime, where the
incomprehensibility of the grand gesture is sublimated to a point where it emereges
transformed as an image of the divine.
Wackenroder's third mode of divine particularity stands in vehement opposition
to such creative arrogance as shown in the second and repositions the creative genius
as one who receives sublimity rather than as one who creates it:
70 'Das Unbegreifliche selbst zum Standpunkt der Beurtheilung . , ibid 292.
71 Phantasien, 176.
72 Aesthetics, 17.
73 Phantasien, 176.
74 Aesthetics, 17.
121
Aber es gibt noch einige stille, demiitige, allzeit biiBende Seelen, denen es
unheilig scheint, zu Gott in der Melodie irdischer FrOhlichkeit zu reden, denen
es frech und verwegen vorkommt, seine ganze Erhabenheit kiihn in ihr
menschliches Wesen aufzunehmen.75
But there are also some quiet humble constantly penitent souls to whom it seems a
sacrilege to address God in the melody of earthly gaiety, to whom it seems rash and
presumptuous to absorb His entire sublimity boldly into their mortal beings.76
The humility of this music before the sublimity of God is an attitude deeply embedded
in Berglinger himself. It is this mode of particularity with which he feels most sympathy
and, indeed, the intensification of the metaphorical language here underlines the
potency of the third type:
Diese liegen mit stets gefalteten Handen und gesenktem Buick betend auf den
Knien, und loben Gott bloB dadurch, daB sie mit der bestAndigen Vorstellung
ihrer Schwache und Entfemung von ihm, und mit der wehmiitigen Sehnsucht
nach den Giitem der reinen Engel ihren Geist erfiillen and nahren. - Diesen
gehOrt jene alte, choralmaBige Kirchenmusik an, die wie em n ewiges "Miserere
mei Domine" klingt, und deren langsame, tiefe Tone gleich stindenbeladene
Pilgrimen in tiefen Talern dahinschleichen.77
These people remain on their knees continuously, with hands folded and eyes lowered,
and praise God merely in that they fill and nourish their minds with the constant idea of
their frailty and distance from Him and with melancholy longing for the music which
sounds like an eternal "Miserere mei Domine" the slow, deep chords of which creep
along in deep valleys like pilgrims laden with sin.78
Each of these three modes of divine particularity, then, represents the cosmos in
microcosm. The first, a naïve mimetic representation pleases God in its simplicity; the
second, the exultant edification of the sublime, praises God in his magnificence and
represents the granduer of his divinity in a similarly grand, ontological, music; the
third, the humble piety of the quiet soul raises no mirror to God, makes no strains to
proclaim God to the world but tells of man's sins and thereby evokes God as a
separate, higher sublime being beyond man's comprehension. In terms of a broad
ontology of music, however, each of these elements, the non-mediatory, the
expansive/archetypal amd the humbly demonstrative are subsumed in a higher order by
75 Phantasien, 176. Emphasis added.
76 Aesthetics, 17.
77 Phantasien, 176-7.
78 Aesthetics, 17-18.
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virtue of music's semantic ambivalence. This ambivalence, born out of musical
complexity, its mysteries of significance, pose a profound challenge to explicit mimesis.
Hence, in 'Das eigentiimliche innere Wesen der Tonkunst und die Seelenlehre der
heutigen Instrumentalmusik', the mimetic consequences of the first divine particularity
are deliberately internalised. Almost in the manner of a Foucauldian discourse,
Wackenroder heaps metaphor upon metaphor to affect and comprehensive semantic
multiplicity thereby internalising the external into the fabric of music itself. As we have
already seen, Foucault articulates the epistemological schism as just such a movement:
To classify...will mean... to relate the visible to the invisible, to its deeper cause,
as it were, then to rise upwards once more from that hidden architecture
towards the obvious signs displayed on the surfaces of bodies.79
Such an internal mode of signification is posited by Wackenroder in several ways.
First, music acts as a kind of 'recepticle' that carries within itself some external quality.
And yet, conversely, this externality is, in itself, subsumed into the very ontological
core of music. Hence, an image of meaning as immanent in music emerges:
Die sinnliche Kraft, welche der Ton von seinem Ursprunge her in sich fiihrt, hat
sich durch dieses gelehrte System eine verfeinerte Mannigfaltigkeit erworben.
Das Dunkle und Unbeschreibliche aber, welches in der Wirkung das Tons
verborgen liegt, und welches bei keiner andern Kunst zu finden ist, hat durch
das System eine wunderbare Bedeutsamkeit gewonnen.80
The sensual power which the tone has carried within itself from its origin has, through
this learned system, acquired a refined diversity. The dark and indescribable element,
however, which lies hidden in the effect of the tone and which is to be found in no other
art, has gained a wonderful significance through the system.81
The 'system' to which Wackenroder refers here is based on certain notions of music as
beholden to 'proportion' and 'number' which were brought from OrakelhOhlen by
certain weise Manner:
Aus diesen geheimnisreichen Griiften brachten sie die neue Lehre, in
tiefsinnigen Zahlen geschrieben, ans Tagelicht, und setzten hiernach eine feste,
79 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, 239.
80 Phantasien, 183.
81 Aesthetics, 21.
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weisheitsvolle Ordnung von vielfachen einzelnen TOnen zusammen, welche die
reiche Quelle ist, aus der die Meister die mannigfaltigsten Tonarten schOpfen.82
Out of these secret vaults they brought to light of day the new theory, written in
profound numbers. In accordance with this, they constructed a fixed, knowledgeable
order of multitudinous individual notes, which is the plentiful fountainhead from which
the masters draw the most varies tonal combinations.83
This metaphor is difficult to decode. If we read this as proto-Schellingian, the notion of
'number' seems significant. As we shall see, the parallels Schelling draws between
music and consciousness of self are based around his readings of Pythagoras' notions
of soul as 'number':
Die Musik ist emn reales Selbstzahlen der Seele - schon Pythagoras hat die Seele
einer Zahl verglichen...84
Soul recounts itself, therefore, in a linear accumulation of unitary pulses, divided by the
hierarchies of Takt, Periode, and Teil. 85 Rhythm in Schelling's conception, is a positing
of multiplicity in the unitary. This ability of rhythm to diversify itself within a unitary
construct is a form of internal signification. Wackenroder's notion of numbers might
thus be likened to the Pythagorean-Leibnizian notion of music as an accumulative
numbering of the soul.86
Also, this 'rhythmic' notion of number as linear accumulation can be contrasted
with notions of musical pitch as proportion. Certainly, if these weise Manner are
likened to Sauveur or Mersenne, then the harmonic series, based again on Pythagorean
divisions of the octave, might represent 'the system.' And yet, the ambivalence of
Wackenroder's style to notions of system might imbue this rather patriarchal notion of
music's emergence from the 'darkness' of pre-rational cultures with some irony.
Certainly Wackenroder's later critiques of systematisers of musical theory would seem
to make this final reading the most appropriate:
82 Phantasien, 183.
83 Aesthetics, 21. The translation of Queue as 'fountainhead' is too figurative. 'Source' is preferable.
84 Schelling, Philosophie der Kunst, 135. Full reference and translation given in next chapter.
85 Literally, 'bar, period and section.' See Philosophic, 137, 138 and 139 respectively.
86 Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibnitz, Epitolae ad diversos (1712) in Philosophische Werke II, ed.
Cassirer, Leipzig 1906.
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Dutch diese gelehrten Manner ist das innere Maschinenwerk der Musilc, gleich
einem ktinstlichen Weberstuhle fiir gewirkte Zeuge, zu einer
erstaunenswiirdigen Vollkommenheit gebracht worden; ihre einzelnen
Kunstst-iicke aber sind oftmals nicht antlers als in der Malerei vortreffliche
anatomische Studien und schwere alcademischen Stellungen zu betrachten.8'
The inner machinery of music, like an ingenious weaver's loom for woven cloth, has
been developed to a level of perfection worthy of astonishment by these learned men;
their individual works of art, however, are often to be regarded no differently from
excellent anatomical studies and difficult academic postures in the art of painting.88
The tone of the prose would certainly seem to indicate a profound disdain for the
pedagogy of some eighteenth-century composition. And yet this disdain is not a disdain
for the system in itself. Wackenroder takes great pains to acknowledge the place of
such a system at the heart of music's ontology:
Es hat sich zwischen den einzelnen mathematischen Tonverhaltnissen und den
einzelnen Fibem des menschlichen Herzens eine unerklarliche Sympathie.
offenbart, wodurch die Tonkunst emn reichhaltiges und bildsames
Maschinenwerk zur Abschilderung menschlicher Empfmdungen geworden ist89
Between the individual, mathematical, tonal relationships and the individual fibres of
the human heart an inexplicable sympathy has revealed itself through which the
musical art has become a comprehensive and flexible mechanism for the portrayal of
human emotions.90
Therefore, the ontological consequences of a music as, first and foremost, a system,
are attenuated by earlier notions propounded in 'Die Wunder der Tonkunst' of music as
a kind of 'cosmic model'. Just as Schelling posits the various types of art as
particularities each of which evokes the totality by its structural sympathy with it, so
Wackenroder explains music's inner nature, dos innere Wesen der Tonkunst, and its
powers to move the heart, to 'express' the complexity of the soul, by nature of its
structural sympathy with the soul.
Taking these arguments back, for a moment, to the divine particularities, we
can see that both 'the soul' and 'God' can be read as pre-Schellingian absolutes. If man
is made in God's image, then the soul of man relates to God by virtue of its imagery of
87 Phantasien, 184.
88 Aesthetics, 23.
89 Phantasien, 183.
90 Aesthetics, 21.
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the divine: 'image' in the Wackenroderian sense, then, refers not to some kind of covert
mimesis, but to a notion of structural sympathy or a recounting of the larger form,
God, in the smaller, the soul. Similarly, music 'depicts' by this same process and
because of the structural sympathy of 'soul' and 'God', music attains a depiction of God
and soul by the same structural means. Hence, the notion of music as 'cosmic model'
accounts for all three divine particularities: the first, beholden to a simple mimetic
response, is internalised; the second, the ontological expression of divinity, is an
elemental structural sympathy; the third, the structural presentation of man's soul in its
relationship to God, therefore evokes God through comparison with man's, the soul's,
weakness and proposes the organic unity of music-soul-God as hierarchical
particularities of the third category, the absolute.
The ontological cogency of this argument, however, is beholden to a basic
internal division. Music has one essence and yet consists in two apparently distinct
functions:
So hat sich das eigentilmliche Wesen der heutigen Musik...gebildet. Keine
andre vermag diese Eigenschaften der Tiefsinnigkeit, der sinnlichen Kraft der
dunkeln, phantastischen Bedeutsamkeit auf eine so ratselhafte Weise zu
verschmelzen.91
Thus has the characteristic inner nature of today's music developed. ..No other is
capable of fusing these qualities of profundity, of sensual power, and of dark, visionary
significance in such an enigmatical way.92
This division, however, does not evoke an ontological schism. The very distinction
between the sensual and the semantic is already confused by the pairing with these two
categories [sinnliche Kraft and Bedeutsamkeit] of the terms Tiefsinnigkeit and
dunkeln, phantastischen respectively. Sensuality is not mere sensuality, but a sensuality
imbued with deep profundity and music's significance is not mere significance but one
imbued with dark mystery. Hence these extra terms, functioning as predicates, impart
elements of the opposite core term to its own substantive.
91 Phantasien, 183.
92 Aesthetics, 21.
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Nonetheless, the division remains. To understand the division, one needs to
sustain the ontological unity of music and to see the two categories sensuality and
meaning as proto-Schellingian Potenzen. The 'potences' in Schelling's system of
philosophy are opposite terms each of which represents one side of a two-sided single
totality, which, in turn, is one of two sides of a higher single entity and so on forever
upwards towards the final unity, the absolute. If the potences emerge in Schelling as a
result of certain modes of determination [Bestimmungsarten] or manners of signifying
the given totality, then the absolute is the final unity of vision, belief and unanimity of
thought. To liken Wackenroder's God with the Schellingian absolute is to recognise
organicism in the Phantasien. Hence the apparent divisions represented in sinnliche
Kraft - Bedeutsamkeit are forms of proto-Schellingian modes of Bestimmung.
As if to underline the ontological unity of music and the purely intellectual role
of the apparent division of meaning and sensuality, Wackenroder makes the following
point directly after his recognition of this apparent division:
Diese merkwiirdige, enge Vereinigung so widerstrebend-scheinende
Eigenschaften macht den ganzen Stolz ihrer [music's] Vorziiglichkeit aus;
wiewohl eben dieselbe auch viele seltsame Verwirrungen in der Ausiibung und
im Genusse dieser Kunst, und viel tOrichten Streit unter Gemiitern, welche sich
niemals verstehen kOnnen, hervorgebracht hat.93
This remarkable close fusion of such apparently contradictory qualities constitutes the
whole pride of its superiority; although precisely this same thing has produced many
strange confusions in the exercise and in the enjoyment of this art and many a foolish
argument between mentalities which can never understand each other.94
There is, however a fundamental difference between Schelling's potences and
Wackenroder's division. Whereas Schelling evokes the potences in order to systematise
difference in a broad ontological schema, Wackenroder deliberately bypasses such
involved schematisation in favour of emotive metaphor and a deliberate evocation of
anti-rational non-system: 'Keine andre [Kunst] vermag die Eigenschaften...auf eine so
ratselhafte weise zu verschmelzen.' 95 Rather than attempting to demonstrate the unity
93 Phantasien, 183-4.
94 Aesthetics, 21.
95 Phantasien, 183.
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of the sensual and meaning, to devise a third point of completion, Wackenroder
deliberately sustains the division with ever greater vehemence:
Eine ewige feindselige Kluft ist zwischen dem fiihlenden Herzen und den
Untersuchungen des Forschens befestigt, und jenes ist em selbstdndiges
verschlossenes gOttliches Wesen, das von der Vemunft nicht aufgeschlossen
und gelOst werden kann.96
An eternally hostile chasm is entrenched between the feeling heart and the
investigations of research, and the former is an independent, tightly sealed, divine
entity, which cannot be unlocked and opened up by reason.97
The unitary gesture in das rtitselhafte Verschmelzen is thus a deliberately anti-
intellectual gesture. There is no systematic clear perceptible unification but a dark and
mysterious one. Music unifies, therefore, when 'meaning' and 'sensuality' imperceptibly
merge, when the intellectual, literal meanings of the intellectual/scientific discourses are
'cast out' Explicit critiques of the 'rational' approach to music abound:
Was wollen sie, die zaghaften und zweifelnden Verntinftler, die jedes der
hundert und hundert Tonstiicke in Worten erklart verlangen, und sich nicht
darin finden kOnnen, daB nicht jedes eine nennbare Bedeutung hat wie emn
Gemdlde?9,
What do they want, the faint-hearted and doubting reasoners, who require each of the
hundreds and hundreds of musical pieces explained in words, and who cannot
understand that not every piece has an expressible meaning like a painting?99
So, whereas music magically unifies the semantic and the sensual in itself as an •
immanent and closed ontology, the descriptive sciences want clarity and conspicuity.
The critique here of a Gottschedian fixity is implicit:
Streben sic [die Verniinftler] die reichere Sprache nach der drmeren
abzumessen, und in Worte aufzulOsen, was Worte verachtet? Oder haben sic
nie ohne Worte empfunden? Haben sie ihr hohles Herz nur mit Beschreibungen
von Gefiihlen ausgefiillt? Haben sie niemals im Inneren wahrgenommen das
stumme Singen, den vermummten Tanz der unsichtbaren Geister?103
Phantasien, 186.
97 Aesthetics, 23.
98 Phantasien, 187-8.
99 Aesthetics, 24
100 Phantasien, 188.
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Are they trying to measure the richer language with the poorer and to resolve into
words that which disdains words? Or have they never felt without words? Have they
filled up their hollow hearts merely with descriptions of feelings? Have they never
perceived within themselves the mute singing, the masked dance of invisible spiritsvoi
That music confounds these Verniinftler is a fundamental element of its magnificence,
a magnificance born ostensibly out of semantic obscurity. The enigmatic unity of the
semantic and the sensual demonstrates a particular mode of ontological operation not
wholly synonymous with the Schellingian method. As we have seen in 'Die Wunder der
Tonkunst' Wackenroder's ontology is a deliberate forgetting of literal meaning. All his
notions of meaning are so ingrained into the ontological fibres of music as to lose all
sense of their 'communication' of 'signification.' The Bedeutsamkeit of Wackenroder's
Seelenlehre, therefore, is a significance that is bound in on itself and closed from the
external in all but the most general, structurally sympathetic manners.
The obscurantism of this non-system, riddled with metaphorical confusion and
semantic ambivalence, is the central feature of the ontology. From the release of the
saint, the self-animation of the Kiang, the resurrection of dead stillness, through the
cosmic model, the organic wholeness of the souls and God to the enigmatic fusion of
meaning and the sensual, music's 'otherness,' its Unbegreiflichkeit is what the
Friihromantiker were most intrigued by.
A discourse which attempts to quantify, penetrate, order and categorise the
essential, concrete meanings of music, therefore, violates the very autonomy on which
music's essence is constructed. As we have seen, then, the language of music criticism
must slip carefully from metaphor to rapture, from clarity to allegorical Marchen
without evoking stable unified elements of musical significance. This is the Seelenlehre
with which Wackenroder attempts to oust the old Affektenlehre. From Les passions de
l'ame to Phantasien iiber die Kunst, from conspicuitous clarity to the dark ontology of
the soul, this is the fundamental shift represented in Wackenroder from the Cartesian
to the Romantic Weltanschauung.
101 Aesthetics, 24.
Chapter Four
F. W. J. Schelling: Music as Potence
Schelling's contribution to the emergence of an ontological discourse on music
is significant. His Philosophie der Kunst consists of a metaphysical argument which
leads from the establishment of a set of fundamentals through the various forms of art
to an eventual amalgamation of these specifics into the general system of the arts. First
published in 1859 by Schelling's son Karl F. A. Schelling, the work is constructed from
several sets of lectures given by Schelling in Jena and Wiirzburg, at the respective
universities in 1802, 1802/3 and 1804/5. The latter set was given at Wiirzburg and
constitutes a reworking and expansion of the earlier lectures given in 1802/3 at Jena.
K. F. A. Schelling's edition takes from all three sets and remains now the standard.
Most modern editions, however, also attempt to incorporate the Ergtinzungen into the
main text, as do most modern English translations because the 1859 edition placed
those extracts duplicated elsewhere in the Stimtliche Werke in appendices. These
Ergtinzungen include the following; Ergeinzung 1 - from the Vorlesungen ilber die
Methode des akademischen Studiums given in 1803, the '14. Vorlesung: Ober
Wissenschaft der Kunst, in Bezug auf das akademische Studium l ; Erganzung 2 - from
the 'Achte Vorlesung: Ober die historische Konstruktion des Christentums' 2 from the
same set of lectures; extracts form the Kritischer Journal der Philosophie including
the treatise [Abhandlung] on the relationship between the philosophy of nature and
transcendental (general) philosophy - 'Abhandlung tiber das Verhaltnis der
Naturphilosophie zur Philosophie tiberhaupt.' 3 Other Ergtinzungen are not so useful
1 Included in volume V of the Samtliche Werke, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt,
1980, 344-352.
2 Included in volume V of the Samtliche Werke, 287ff.
3 Included in volume V of the Samtliche Werke, 121ff.
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for our purpose here. 4 Of the modern translations available, Douglas W. Stott's
translation seems to be reliable.
The Philosophie der Kunst is a consistent attempt to break the deadlock of
Kant's noumenon/phenomenon separation and Fichte's all-encompassing ego. As we
have said, the Idealists after Kant sought to define the absolute limits of reason
without confining it to its own impotent vacuum where, as in Kant, it can know
nothing other than itself. In Schelling, his urge to unleash reason, to set it free into the
world of matter, magnetism and objectivity, involved a yearning for a third, higher
order than either the subjective or objective worlds. The same yearning, as we shall
see, had fundamentally different consequences for Hegel. For the moment, however,
we confine ourselves to Schelling's solution. This third order Schelling defined as 'the
absolute'.
The unfolding of philosophy is the unfolding of this absolute into its varied
forms - its particularities [Besonderheiten] and generalities [Allgemeinheiten], its
unities and divisions, its universals and its specifics. The philosophy of art, then, is an
undertaking which seeks to find art's place in this absolute; how does this 'higher term'
manifest itself in art? How is it possible for the absolute to have various forms? Before
proceeding to Schelling's solution to this question, it will be necessary to discover
exactly what this absolute really is.
The absolute exists for Schelling as a fundamental necessity of philosophy. It is
the one overriding entity in which all things and all ideas dwell. So far, Schelling seems
to posit the absolute as a kind of encyclopaedic amalgam that contains all things
regardless of compatability with that whole. This potential reading of 'the absolute' is
made impossible very early in Philosophie der Kunst:
Es ist wahrhaft und an sich nur Ein Wesen, EM absolutes Reales, und dieses
Wesen als absolutes ist untheilbar so daB es nicht durch Theilung oder
Trennung in verschiedene Wesen ilbergehen kann.5
4 These include an extract from the Kritischer Journal der Philosophie, rUeber Dante in
philosophischer Beziehung.' and Veber das VerhaltniI3 der Naturphilosophie zur Philosophie
iiberhaupt.' available in the Samtliche Werke, volume V, 152-163 and 106-108 respectively.
5 Philosophie der Kunst, henceforeward, Philosophie,10. Notice the emphatic use of capitals for Dn.
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There is truly and essentially only one essence, one absolute reality, and this essence,
as absolute, is indivisible such that it cannot change over into other essences by means
of division or separation.6
There is, then, only one essence, one absolute reality and this absolute is totally one,
completely indivisible. This unity is fundamentally at odds with that of the cameralists
for whom a unity is a stable state equalling merely the totality of its many parts, and
consisting in their sum, a mere amalgam of the objective realm. To even think of 'parts'
of the absolute, to attempt to split or divide it is an attempt to alter it fundamentally, to
make it what it is not. Schelling continues, however:
...da es untheilbar ist, so ist Verschiedenheit der Dinge Oberhaupt nur mOglich,
insofern es als das Ganze und Ungetheilte unter verschiedenen Bestimmungen
gesetzt wird.7
Since it is indivisible, diversity among things is only possible to the extent that it is
posited under various determinations as the indivisible whole.8
Apparent disunity, or diversity of things, then, comes about as a result of the
perspective in which the things are posited, from the approach brought to bear on 'the
absolute.' The very notion of separateness is only possible because the whole and the
undivided appear in a manifestation that is brought about by a certain mode of
determination [Bestimmung]. These modes are termed by Schelling the 'potences':9
'...diese Bestimmungen nenne ich Potenzen'. i° The real difference between the
cameralist and Schellingian unities comes, however, in the manner in which these
potences relate to the Absolute. The Absolute is all-encompassing, total, completely
unified. Yet, to be the total unity, surely it must contain, somehow subsumed within
itself, the notion of difference, of disunity, of separateness. And, indeed, this is what
Schelling says:
6 Translation by Douglas W. Stott, The Philosophy of Art, University of Minnesota Press,
Minneapolis, 1989. Henceforeward, Philosophy. Translation modified.
7 Philosophie, 10.
8 Philosophy, 14. Translation modified.
9 Schueller translates Schelling's Potenzen as 'potencies' in his paper 'Schelling's theory of the
metaphysics of music.' in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. XV no. 4, June 1957, but I
prefer the more abstract 'potence' which Stott opts for in his translation: Philosophy of Art, University
of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1989.
10 Philosophie, 10.
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Sie [die Potenzen] verandern schlechthin nichts am Wesen, dieses bleibt immer
und nothwendig dasselbe...11
They change absolutely nothing in the one essence. It always and necessarily remains
the same;12
So, to be whole, the Absolute must contain within itself the notion of incompleteness,
for without it, it would not be complete. This 'incompleteness' within completeness is
what causes the Absolute to manifest itself in the potences. These potences, moreover,
are thereby present in each other as the Absolute is indivisible. But, how can these
potences be present in each other? Is this some form of dialectical reasoning?
Certainly, Schueller seems to think that the dialectic is at the root of Schelling's notion
of art:
But art has a real side and an ideal side; it is a dialectical movement toward the
synthesis of both.' 3
Certainly, art, as we shall see, has both sides of the Absolute, the real and the ideal, but
Schueller is wrong to use the term 'dialectic' so indiscriminately here. Simply because
there are two terms which seem to be yearning for a third, this does not mean that
process in the form of dialectic is at work here. In particular, the dialectic always aims
for a third term which is immanent in the two opposites whereas in Schelling, the one
third term is the absolute. In Hegel, for example, immanence results in a critical
subsumption of previous syntheses in favour of an ascendant one. There is no such
linearity in Schelling's system. Art already contains both potences, the real and the
ideal, and encompasses them as an Absolute in itself. In other words, art represents a
kind of cosmic model, similar to that posited by Wackenroder. Process is merely the
changing from one potence to another, the changing from one mode of determination
or perception to another. It is thus, to a certain extent, outside of art - it is historical
and not essential. Schelling's approach to history, that driving force of the Hegelian
dialectic is fundamentally different from Hegel's. For Schelling, the Weltgeist is always
11 Philosophie, 10.
12 Philosophy, 14. Translation modified.
13 'Schelling's theory of the metaphysics of music.' in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,
volume XV no. 4, June 1957, 467.
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present, always in and around everything, it never changes; only through the false
consciousness of history, the socio-cultural baggage of a non-essential discourse, can
the Weltgeist be seen to alter or change itself at all. Such changes, historical changes,
are imposed on the Absolute by the nave empiricism of lesser minds. The following
passage from early in Philosophie demonstrates clearly this disdain for historical
thought:
In den Zeitaltem der blidhenden Kunst ist es die Nothwendigkeit des allgemein
herrschenden Geistes, das Gliick und gleichsam der Friihling der Zeit, der unter
den groBen Meistem mehr oder weniger die allgemeine Uebereinstimmung
hervorbringt, so daB, wie dieB auch die Geschichte der Kunst zeigt, die groBen
Werke gedrdngt aufeinander, fast zu gleicher Zeit, wie von einem
gemeinschaftlichen Hauch und unter einer gemeinsamen Sonne, entstehen und
reifen.... Wenn em n solches Zeitalter des Gliicks und der reinen Produktion
vorbei ist, so tritt die Reflexion und mit ihr die allgemeine Entzweiung em; was
dort lebendiger Geist war, wird hier Ueberlieferung.14
In periods in which art flourishes, the necessity of the generally dominant spirit of the
time, fortunate circumstances, and what one might call the springtime of the age
generate more or less a common, fundamental agreement among the great masters. As
the history of art shows, this causes the great works of art to arise and mature virtually
on one another's heels, almost simultaneously, as if animated by a common breath of
life beneath a common sun...When such a fortunate age of pure production has passed,
reflection enters, and with it an element of estrangement. What was earlier living spirit
is now tradition.15
If everything simply is, if all the disparities and varieties of reality are to be
explained away as merely false apparitions of nave minds or as automatically parts of
the whole, how can Schelling be said to escape charges of encyclopaedism? What
makes life dynamic if the essential whole never changes? This apparent lack of
dynamism is addressed in Schelling's notion of organic unity. If Schelling's potences
are one and the same, viewed from different sides, what, then, motivates this division,
what causes the diversity of modes of determination? This motivation Schelling calls
'difference' [Differenz], the motivation to divide, and is therefore the opposite of
'indifference' Unclifferena the opposing motivation to unify.16
14 Philosophie, 4.
15 Philosophy, 10. Translation modified.
16 The term 'motivation' is probably misleading. These potences can also refer to states of variety or
unity.
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A further set of potences that Schelling refers to is the antithesis of the real and
the ideal series. The term series [die Reihe] suggests an order that incorporates lower
differences and constructs a system of absolute difference, the confrontation of the real
and the ideal. The apparent simplicity of these terms is deceptive; they are not merely
synonyms for object and subject, or nature and mind. They refer, rather, to a further
mode of determination, the highest mode, that of intuiting [das Anschauen]. The real
series constitutes, therefore, the intuiting of the infinite into the finite and the ideal is
the intuiting of the finite into the infinite. They both represent process, in the manner of
the potence-shifts we have already discussed, but here, process is aligned to a stable
potence rather than a shift from one to another. This is the final completion of the
absolute, the 'taking up' [das Aufnehmen] of process, that 'externality' of history, into
the absolute itself. Without such externality, how could the absolute be whole? In this
sense, then, how can difference/indifference be a different potence pair to real/ideal?
On the level of the absolute, they are, of course, identical although Schelling seems to
utilise 'difference/indifference' for the highest, most general structures, and the second
two for particulars or more detailed analyses.
This represents a fundamental schism with the encyclopaedism of the
rationalist/empirical paradigm. If a unity can contain within itself both difference and
indifference, dynamism and stability, then that unity is surely an organic one, driven by
Foucault's 'secret but sovereign'17 internality:
§17. In der idealen Welt verhdlt sich die Philosophie ebenso zur Kunst, wie in
der realen die Vernunft zum Organismus...
§18. Das organische Werk der Natur stellt dieselbe Indifferenz noch ungetrennt
dar, welche das Kunstwerk nach der Trennung, aber wieder als Indifferenz
darstellt.18
§17. In the ideal world, philosophy is related to art just as in the real world reason is
related to the organism.
§18. The organic work of nature represents the same indifference in an unseparated
state that the work of art represents after separation yet as indifference.19
17 Foucault, The Order of Things, 1970. 237-8
18 Philosophie, 27-8.
19 Philosophy, 30.
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and also, from the Einleitung:
DieB ist eben jene Verbindung des Besonderen und Allgemeinen, die wir in
jedem organischen Wesen, so wie in jedem poetischen Werk, wiederfinden, in
welchem z. B. verschiedene Gestalten jede em n dienendes Glied des Ganzen und
doch bei der vollkommenen Ausbildung des Werks wieder in sich absolut ist.2°
This is precisely that union of the particular and the universal we find in every organic
being as well as in every poetic work. In the latter, for example, each of the various
elements or forms is a part subservient to the whole and yet from the perspective of the
consummate construction of the work is absolute in itself.21
In this organic work of nature, then, there exists a pulsating vibrancy, born out of the
difference of its internality, its subsumption of opposites into a set of hierarchical
potences, each level referring absolutely to the next, each part unified in its own
autonomy, equal, yet different as in Goethe's Urpflanze 22 where an archetypical plant is
conjured up by Goethe to represent organic structure such that each part of the plant is
also a miniature representation of the whole.
Not only does Schelling's system represent a stylistic change from the language
of rationalism/empiricism, but also a fundamental shift in content, and, more
significantly, a wholly new approach to form, an elemental distillation of the paradigm
after Kant, secreted into the heart of systematic thought. Indeed, very early in
Philosophie, in his Einleitung, Schelling separates himself from the Kantian paradigm:
Sollte zuvOrderst der Philosoph, dessen intellektuelle Anschauung allein auf die,
sinnlichen Augen verborgene und unerreichbare, nur dem Geiste zugangliche
Wahrheit gerichtet seyn soli, sich mit der Wissenschaft der Kunst befassen,
welche nur die Hervorbringung der schOnen Scheins zur Absicht hat, und
entweder bloB die tauschenden Nachbilder von jener zeigt, oder ganz sinnlich
ist, wie sic der grOBte Theil der Menschen begreift, der sie als Sinninreiz, als
Erho lung, Abspannung des durch emstere Geschafte ermiideten Geistes
ansieht, als angenehme Erregung, die vor jeder andem nur das voraus hat, daB
sic durch em zarteres Medium geschieht, wodurch sic aber für das Urtheil des
Philosophischen, auBerdem daB er sic als eine Wirkung des sinnlichen Triebes
betrachten muB, nur das noch verwerfliche Geprage der VerderbniB und der
Civilisation erhalten kann. Nach dieser Vorstellung derselben kOnnte
Philosophic sich von der schlaffen Sinnlichkeit, welche die Kunst sich wegen
Philosophie, 11.
21 Philosophy, 15. Translation modified.
22 See Erich Heller, The Disinherited Mind, 1971.
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dieser Beziehung gefallen lal3t, nur durch absolute Verdammung derselben
unterscheiden.23
In the first place, should the philosopher, whose intellectual intuition should be directed
only toward that particular truth that is concealed to sensual eyes, unattainable and
accessible only to the spirit itself - should that philosopher concern himself with the
science of art? For the latter intends only the production of beautiful appearances, and
either shows merely the deceiving, reflecting images of the same or is totally sensual.
This is how the majority of people understand art, viewing it as sensual stimulation, as
recreation, as relaxation for a spirit fatigued by more serious matters and as a pleasant
stimulant, one with the advantage of occurring through a more delicate medium. For
the judgment of the philosopher, however, who in addition must review it as an effect
of sensual impulse or desire, it thereby acquires the even more objectionable imprint of
corruption and civilization. According to this view, only through absolute
condemnation might philosophy distinguish itself from the flaccid sensuality art
tolerates in this respect.24
This common-place approach to art, the classic Cartesian disdain of the sensual, is
immediately refuted:
Ich rede von einer heiligeren Kunst, derjenigen, welche, nach den Ausdrticken
der Alten, em Werkzeug der GOtter, eine Verktindigerin gOttlicher
Geheimnisse, die Enthtillerin der Ideen ist, von der ungeborenen SchOnheit,
deren unentzweihter Strahl nur reine Seelen inwohnend erleuchtet, und deren
Gestalt dem sinnlichen Auge ebenso verborgen und unzugAnglich ist als die der
gleichen Wahrheit.25
I am speaking of a more sacred art, one that in the words of antiquity is a tool of the
gods, a proclaimer of divine mysteries, the unveiler of the ideas; that unborn beauty
whose undesecrated radiance only dwells in and illuminates purer souls, and whose
form is just as concealed and inaccessible to the sensual eye as is the truth
corresponding to it.26
Art, hidden from the sensual eye, its secrets turned in on itself, is no longer open to the
cold glare of Cartesian reason, its ontology is to be sought in an altogether different
discourse - the philosophy of art. For such a philosopher, art must be seen as a 'flowing
out' of the absolute into concrete form:
sie ist...eine nothwendige, aus dem Absoluten unmittelbar ausflieBende
Erscheinung...27
It is a necessary phenomenon emanating directly from the absolute...28
23 Philosophie, 384.
24 Philosophy, 4.
25 Philosophie, 384.
26 Philosophy, 4. Translation modified.
27 Philosophie, 384.
28 Philosophy, 4.
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The significance of the discourse is demonstrated by Schelling in his discussion of the
relationship between philosophy and art: where, in answer to this question:
Kann man das unter Gesetze bringen und bestimmen wollen, dessen Wesen es
ist, kein Gesetz als sich selbst anzuerketmen?29
Can one claim to subsume and to determine according to laws that whose essence is
precisely to recognize no law other than itself?3°
he responds:
So kOnnte man emn gewisser Enthusiasmus reden, der die Kunst nur in ihren
Wirkungen aufgefaBt hatte, und weder sie selbst wahrhaft noch die Stelle
kennte, welche der Philosophie im Universum angewiesen ist Denn auch
angenommen, dal3 die Kunst aus nichts HOherem begreillich sey, so ist doch so
durchgreifend, so allwaltend das Gesetz des Universum, daB alles, was in ihm
begriffen ist, in einem andem sein Vorbild oder Gegenbild habe, so absolut die
Form der allgemeinen Entgegenstellung des Realen und Idealen, daB auch der
letzten Grenze des Unendlichen, da wo die GegensAtze der Erscheinung in die
reinste Absolutheit verschwinden, dasselbe VerhaltniB seine Rechte behauptet
und in der letzten Potenz wiederkehrt. Dieses VerhdltniB ist das der Philosophie
und der Kunst....
...Beide begegnen sich also auf dem letzten Gipfel und sind sich, eben kraft der
gemeinschaftlichen Absolutheit, Vorbild und Gegenbild.31
Such could speak a certain enthusiasm that has comprehended art only in its effects,
and which was genuinely acquainted neither with art itself nor with the position given
to philosophy in the universe. Even assuming that art is not comprehensible from any
higher perspective, that law of the universe which decrees that everything encompassed
by it have its prototype or reflex in something else is so pervasive and so omnipotent,
and the form of the universal juxtaposition of the real and the ideal is so absolute, that
even at the ultimate boundaries of the infinite and the finite, where the contradictions of
phenomenal appearance disappear into the purest absoluteness, the same realtionship
asserts its rights and recure in the final potence. This is the relationship between
philosophy and art...
...Hence, both encounter one another on the final pinnacle, and precisely by virtue of
that common absoluteness are for one another both prototype and reflex.32
Indeed, as art presents the absolute in a reflected image [Gegenbild], so philosophy
presents it as an archetype [Vorbild]. This means, then, that the philosophy of art
represents a Wissenschaft des All in der Form oder Potenz der Kunst. 33 We can now
construct the set of potences where the philosophy of nature represents the real series,
29 Philosophie, 386.
3 ° Philosophy, 5.
31 Philosophie, 387.
32 Philosophy, 5-6.
33 Philosophic, 12.
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in which art functions as a kind of given object of scrutiny, the transcendental
philosophy represents the ideal series, and the philosophy of art represents the
indifference of these two potences. Thus, as indifference, the philosophy of art is a
high form of discourse.
In so far as the absolute contains both the real and the ideal, all potences
contain in turn each of these antitheses, in the manner of the organic structure already
discussed. It is of no surprise, therefore, to find in Schelling that art has both a real and
an ideal side, and that each side contains the other within it. Schelling divides the arts
according to this premise:
Jeder dieser Formen, insofern sie entweder in der realen oder idealen Einheit
begriffen sind, entspricht eine besondere Form der Kunst, der realen, sofem in
der realen, entspricht die Musik, der idealen die Malerei, der welche innerhalb
der realen wieder beide Einheiten in-eins-gebildet darstellt, die Plastik. Dasselbe
ist der Fall in Ansehung der idealen Einheit, welche wieder die drei Formen der
lyrischen, epischen und dramatischen Dichtkunst in sich begreift Lyrik =
Einbildung des Unendlichen ins EndEche = Besonderem. Epos = Darstellung
(Subsumtion) des Endlichen im Unendlichen = Allgemeinem. Drama =
Synthese des Allgemeinen und Besonderen. Nach diesen Grundformen ist also
die gesammte Kunst sowohl in ihrer realen als idealen Erscheinung zu
construiren.34
A particular form of art corresponds to each of these forms to the extent that they are
encompassed within the real or ideal unity. Music, corresponds to the real form within
the real series. Painting corresponds to the ideal form within the real series. The
Plastic arts correspond to that form within the real series that represents the confluence
of the previous two unities. The same holds true as regards the ideal unity, which in its
own turn encompasses within itself the three forms of lyric, epic, and dramatic poetry.
Lyric poetry = the informing of the infinite into the finite = the particular. The epic =
the representation (subsumption) of the finite within the infinite = the universal. Drama
= the synthesis of the universal and the particular. Hence, the entire world of art is to
be construed according to these basic forms both in its real and ideal manifestation.35
The series of the arts, then, is divided into the two potences and within each of these
the two potences are both present, such that each of the art froms can be posited as an
indifference in itself and yet can also be posited as demonstrating certain ontological
differences such as the tendency we shall later see in music towards the real side.
There are thus six basic categories - music, painting, plastic arts, lyric, epic and drama.
34 Philosophic, 15.
35 Philosophy, 18.
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It is interesting, then, that there is thus no place for a hierarchy of all the forms
of art insofar as each contains the whole 'taken up' faufgenommen] into itself. 36 Thus
music is not the somewhat de-emphasised art form we see in Hegel's Vorlesungen but
represents the 'real within the real'. To understand exactly what this means, and how
music takes the whole up into itself, careful account of the first three chapters of the
Philosophie must be given before proceeding to those passages on music in the
massive Chapter 4 of K. F. A. Schelling's edition.37
K. F. A. Schelling separated his father's lectures on art into two halves, the
first38 consists of the first three, relatively short, chapters - 'Construktion der Kunst
iiberhaupt und im Allgemeinen,"Construktion des Stoffs der Kunst;' and 'Construktion
des besonderen oder der Form der Kunst.' The second half consists of the more
detailed analyses of the various potences of art and is littered with numerous examples
and comparisons. 39 Note that each of these is concerned with a Construktion. This
should not be seen as necessarily equivalent to its usage in modern German nor the
English near equivalence of 'construction'. Here, it means more a close rehearsal of the
argument, a stream of consciousness, which seeks to delineate a framework of
proportions, relationships and interconnections that underlie art; this 'relationism' is
most clearly demonstrated in Schelling's discussion of the Platonic Socrates and
Pythagoras, and, in particular, the parallel properties of number and proportion in
music and in Pythagoras' theory of the music of the spheres:
Sokrates bei Platon sagt: Derjenige ist der Musiker, der von den sinnlich
vernommenen Harmonien fortschreitend zu den unsinnlichen, intelligibeln und
ihren Proportionen.4°
In Plato, Socrates says: That person is a musician who progresses beyond physically
perceived harmonies to the suprasensible, cerebral harmonies and their proportions.41
36 To be strictly fair, however, there is a tendency in Schelling to favour those art forms of which he
has a more specialist knowledge: literature. This is not unusual in philosophy from this time, though,
and does not detract from the original point.
37 'Besondere Theil der Philosophie der Kunst: Construktion der Kunstformen in der Entgegnsetzung
der realen und idealen Reihe.', 132ff.
38 'Allgemeine Theil der Philosophie der Kunst.'
39 As we shall see, however, this is not the case for those passages on music.
40 Philosophic, 147.
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Pythagoras' theorem can clearly be disputed on empirical grounds, but Schelling re-
instates it on metaphysical, that is relational or proportional, grounds. Thus,
Construktion refers to an engagement with a set of metaphysical principles, of the
intuiting of the Absolute into division, division into reality and reality back into the
Absolute.
The Construktion of the first chapter is that of the general metaphysical profile
of art to find the essential relationship between philosophy, art and nature. It contains
some fascinating passages on the so-called organic product, a fundamental category
not only of Schelling's work but of much aesthetic theory of this time. The chapter
opens with a startling claim:
§1. Das Absolute oder Gott ist dasjenig, in Ansehung dessen das Seyn oder die
Realitat unmittelbar, d.h. kraft des bloBen Gesetzes der Identitat aus der Idee
folgt, oder: Gott ist unmittelbare Affirmation von sich selbst.42
§1. The absolute or God is that with regard to being or reality follows immediately
from the idea, that is, by virtue of the simple law of identity, or God is the immediate
affirmation of himself.43
The notion that God affirms himself and constantly completes his unity in objective
being seems initially bizarre. Yet this first declaration gives its own conclusion - kraft
des blofien Gesetzes der Identitiit. This notion of identity is one on which Hegel was to
pour scorn. It is, in fact, the very basis on which difference and indifference can be one
and the same. Identity in the Schellingian sense is that other way of seeing that which
has been divided in the potences. Identitat is thus the opposite potence of Potenz."
Sections 2 to 13 all rehearse this notion of God's identity both to the absolute and to
being in its objective sense. 45 Only in §13 do we encounter art for the first time:
Wissen und Handeln indifferenzirn sich also nothwendig in einem Dritten,
welches als das Affirmirende beider die dritte Potenz ist. In diesen Punkt fait
nun die Kunst,46
41 Philosophy, 117.
42 Philosophic, 17.
43 Philosophy, 23.
44 See also page 10 of Philosophie: 'Ich nenne dieses Princip eben deswegen, well es keiner
besonderen Potenz gleich ist, und doch alle begreift, den absoluten Identiteltspunkt der Philo sophie.'
45 Henceforward Schelling's paragraph symbol - § - will be used to denote his sections.
46 Philo sophie, 24.
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Knowledge and action therefore necessarily integrate themselves in indifference within
a third element, which as the element affirming both is the third potence. Here we find
art,47
and, at the outset of the next section:
§14. Die Indifferenz des Idealen in Realen als Indifferenz stellt sich in der
idealen Welt durch die Kunst dar."
§14. The indifference of the ideal in the real as indifference manifests itself in the ideal
world through art.49
On one level, then, art is an indifference in itself, it is the highest potence of the real
world whereas philosophy is its counterpart in the ideal world. It seems, then, that art
is given some magical ability to transcend difference and yet remain in objective form,
remain, therefore, as Potenz. This is what Schelling means by 'highest potence' of the
real world. It is the absolute intuiting of the infinite into the finite, represented in
concrete form.
Out of this conflatory quality of art, Schelling constructs a metaphysical proof
of the necessity of beauty:
Schtinheit ist da gesetzt, wo das Besondere (Reale) seinem Begriff so
angemessen ist, daB dieser selbst, als Unendliches, eintritt in das EndEche und
in concreto angeschaut wird.50
Beauty is posited wherever the particular (real) is so commensurate with its concept
that the latter itself, as infinite, enters into the finite and is intuited in concreto.51
So art's confiatory nature is proven in its informing of beauty by its ability to
make rational 'simultaneously phenomenal or sensual.'52 A more thorough discussion of
beauty's 'finitude' vis-à-vis the Schillerian sublime is given in the second Construktion,
which is dealt with shortly. 53 For the moment, suffice it to say that beauty allows a
perfect matching of the real and ideal as expressed in a concrete form - the product of
art.
47 Philosophy, 28.
48 Philosophie, 24.
49 Philosophy, 28. Translation modified.
50 Philosophie, 26.
51 Philosophy, 29.
52 Philsosphie, 26: 'Das Rationale wird als Rationales zugleich em Erscheinendes, Sinnliches.'
53 Philosophie, 40ff.
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Further to art's significance, Schelling stresses the conflatory qualities of art in
terms of freedom [Freiheit] and necessity fNothwendigkeit], the one representing the
chaotic or unordered, the other the ordered and symmetrical. They are, as Schelling
says, related to the unconscious and the conscious:
§19. Nothwendigkeit und Freiheit verhalten sich wie BewuBtloses und
Bewates. Kunst beruht daher auf der Identitat der bewuBten und der
bewuBtlosen Thdtigkeit.54
§19. Necessity and freedom are related as the unconscious and the conscious. Art,
therefore, is based on the identity of conscious and unconscious activity.55
We see, now, that the notion of art as conflation is only part of the Schellingian
mission of art. It is not so much that art can bring about a Fichtian suspension of the
objective world or that it affords a Hegelian cadence of the objective and the subjective
into the total where art is seen as a kind of cosmic therapy. It is, rather, the very
identity of necessity and freedom, of the conscious and the subconscious:
Die Vollkommenheit des Kunstwerks als solchen steigt in dem VerhdltniB, in
welchem es diese Identitat in sich ausgedriickt enthalt, oder in welchem Absicht
und Nothwendigkeit sich in ihm durchdrungen haben.56
The perfection of a work of art as such increases to the degree it expresses this identity
within itself, or to the degree purpose and necessity interpenetrate one another within
it.57
The notion of a kind of immanent identity, the Identitat in sich ausgedrackt which the
artwork 'contains' [enthtilt] within itself is, for our purposes, one of the most
significant elements of the Schellingian aesthetic, and one which will emerge again and
again throughout this work. To the extent that a work of art expresses within itself this
absolute identity, and only to that extent, so is the artwork correspondingly perfect.
Thus, artistic perfection is synonymous with immanence, or the ability to 'express'
[ausdracken] the indifference or identity of unleashed fantasy of purpose [Absicht],
unfettered creativity, and the objective concreteness of necessity [Nothwendigkeit],
54 Philosophie, 28.
55 Philosophy, 30.
56 Philosophie, 28.
57 Philosophy, 30-1.
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Foucault's 'formidable materiality'. 58
 Stott wisely avoids the difficulties of translation
here and ignores the problems caused by enthalt altogether - 'to the degree it expresses
this identity within itself - although even this does not solve the placing of 'in
itself/'within itself. Whereas the rendering 'in itself is closer to the German an sich, it
would seem that the combination of in sich and entheilt points to some kind of
immanent relationship between identity and containment. Thus the ambiguity actually
underlines the quality of immanence, internal containment of self-identity. An
alternative rendering might be 'The perfection of an artwork increases
[proportionately] to the extent that it contains this identity [of necessity and freedom,
the unconscious and the conscious] internally.' This demonstrates Schelling's careful
construction of a blanket immanence such that in sich expresses immanence across the
relationship as both an attributive and an adverb. It is this apparent ambiguity that
actually clarifies and emphasises the notion of a metaphysical autonomy of art. As an
object, a concrete form, it nonetheless contains the metaphysical truth of identity
within itself as immanence.
Schelling continues to elaborate on this identity and constructs a new pair of
differences or potences, truth and beauty:
§20. SchOnheit und Wahrheit sind an sich oder der Idee nach ems. - Denn die
Wahrheit der Idee nach ist ebenso wie die SchOnheit Identitat des Subjektiven
und Objektiven, nur jene subjektiv oder vorbildlich angeschaut, wie die
SchOnheit gegenbildlich oder objektiv.59
§20. Beauty and truth are essentially or ideally one, for truth, just as beauty, is ideally
the identity of the subjective and the objective. For truth, however, this identity is
intuited subjectively or prototypically, whereas for beauty it is intuited objectively or in
a reflected image.60
58 The immanence of this identity is particularly clearly expressed in the ambiguity of in sich in the
original German. Meaning 'in (inside) itself, one would normally expect it to be placed in a
subordinate clause such as this (after 'in which' [in welchem]) before the finite verb ent halt.
Unfortunately, the clarity that such a placing would provide, in that it would suggest the rendering
'contains within itself is undermined by the placing of ausgedrackt (literally, 'expressed') which
thoroughly clouds the meaning. Certainly, 'in itself could belong to 'identity' or to 'contains' thus
giving the possible senses: ...to the extent that it contains within itself this identity, expressed...; ...to
the extent that it contains, expressed, the identity within itself...; ...to the extent that it contains the
identity expressed in itself...; ...to the extent that it contains the identity expressed within itself..?
59 Philosophie, 28.
60 Philosohpy, 31.
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This is a clear indictment for Schelling of the mimesis paradigm. Whereas truth
is a kind of archetypal or prototypical vision of the identity of subjective and objective,
beauty represents the opposite intuition into the objective or concrete manifestation.
Thus, those that speak of 'truth' or verisimilite in art speak of an inadequate truth:
Die Wahrheit, die nicht SchOnheit ist, ist auch nicht absolute Wahrheit, und
umgekehrt. - Der sehr gemeine Gegensatz von Wahrheit und Schlinheit in der
Kunst beruht darauf, da.13 unter Wahrheit die trtigerische, nur das Endliche
erreichende Wahrheit verstanden wird. 61
Truth that is not beauty is also not absolute truth, and vice versa. The extremely crass
antithesis between truth and beauty in art rests on understanding truth as that deceptive
truth that extends only as far as the finite.62
and here is the crux of the critique:
Aus der Nachahmung dieser Wahrheit entstehen jene Kunstwerke, an welchen
wir nur die Kiinstlichkeit bewundern, mit der das Nattirliche an ihr erreicht ist,
ohne es mit dem GOttlichen zu verbinden. Diese Art der Wahrheit aber ist noch
nicht SchOnheit in der Kunst, und nur absolute Schtinheit in der Kunst ist auch
die rechte und eigentliche Wahrheit.63
From the imitation of this truth arise those works of art in which we admire only the
artificiality with which the artist has captured the natural without combining it with the
divine. This kind of truth, however, is not yet beauty in art, and only absolute beauty in
art is genuine and actual truth.64
If beauty, then, is the intuiting of objective and subjective as identity into
concrete form, then it follows that a mimetic aesthetic such as Scheibe's or Gottsched's
is a false aesthetic: reality for Schelling already contains the ideal within it
archetypically rather than literally, or visibly. The notion of nature in the Cartesian
aesthetic is thus inadequate as is its assumed relationship with art. The false 'objective
truth' of mimesis is that of empirico-rationalism in which the 'purely natural' is achieved
without recourse to any spiritual or divine element. In other words, the pretence of
'natural givenness' or 'visible conspicuity' of empirico-rationalism is a presumption that
allows for no God.
61 Philosophie, 29.
62 Philosophy, 31. Translation modified.
63 Philosophie, 29.
64 Philosophy, 31. Translation modified.
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In this sense, God is the general creativity of Schelling's universe, or rather the
creative archetype without which reality is a meaningless vortex of 'accidental beauty'
or beauty without the absolute, a merely corporeal beauty that resides in a 'crass
synthesis' [gemeine Gegenwart] of nature and art where autonomy must give in to
mere reflection. Visible conspicuity, then, undermines Schelling's notion of the organic
in which, as we have seen:
...verschiedene Gestalten jede emn dienendes Glied des Ganzen und doch bei der
vollkommenen Ausbildung des Werks wieder in sich absolut ist.65
...each of the various elements of forms is a part subservient to the whole and yet from
the perspective of the consummate construction of the work is absolute in itself.66
In order for a structure to be truly 'organic' the parts must each be somehow
universes in themselves; that is, they must express the highest order of the universe in
their immanence and therefore demonstrate a profound autonomy. In the introduction,
Schelling provides a clue as to the laws of autonomy in a passage on genius:
...welche nicht allein selbst autonomisch ist, sondem auch zum Princip aller
Autonomie vordringt.67
It is not only itself autonomous but also penetrates through the principle of all
autonomy.68
Thus autonomy as an attribute must also be an autonomy in general reflected in
the particular. Thus an art which is lamely hitched to the externality of nature is an art
that retreats into mere sensuality and becomes a vessel for nature's expression. Art's
expressive quality is to be somehow aimed, for Schelling, at the forms of 'things in
themselves' and such autonomous things demonstrate microcosms of absoluteness that
a wholly instrumental thing cannot:
§24 Die wahre Construktion der Kunst ist Darstellung ihrer Formen als Forrnen
der Dinge, wie sie an sich, oder wie sie im Absoluten sind,69
65 Philosophie, 11.
66 Philosophy, 15. Translation modified.
67 Philosophie, 388.
68 Philosophy, 6.
69 Philosophie, 30.
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§24. The true construction of art is a presentation of its forms as forms of things as
those things in themselves, or as they are within the absolute,7°
and later:
Die Kunst ist namlich dargethan als reale Darstellung der Formen der Dinge,
wie sie an sich sind - der Formen als Urbilder also.71
Art has been designated as the real representation of the forms of things as they are in
themselves, and hence of the forms as archetypes.72
Thus the crass antithesis of art and nature is predicated by the assumption that nature
in itself, that is pure externality, is the archetype. This nature without the ideal is
inadequate to the absolute and its general aesthetic ramifications are thus falsehoods.
Chapter two of Philosophie, 'Construktion des Stoffs der Kunst', attempts not
merely an analysis of the 'material' of art but goes further to analyse art's relationship
with its own material manifestations. 73 Schelling begins with a question:
In §24 is bewiesen worden: die Formen der Kunst miissen die Formen der
Dinge seyn, wie sie im Absoluten oder an sich sind. Demnach wird
vorausgesetzt, diese besonderen Formen, wodurch eben das Schtine in
einzelnen realen und wirklichen Dingen dargestellt wird, seyen besondere
Formen, die irn Absoluten selbst sind. Die Frage ist, wie dieB mi5glich sey.74
In §24 we proved that the forms of art must be the forms of things as they are within
the absolute or in themselves. Accordingly we are presupposing that these particular
forms - precisely by those means of which beauty is represented in individual, real,
actual things - are particular forms within the absolute. The question is how this is
possible.75
How is it possible that beauty is represented in individual, real, actual things? How can
there be particular forms in the absolute? This is a fundamental question for Schelling:
how can diversity exist within unity? How can the absolute contain non-unity or non-
identity? It is no surprise to see Schelling's answer to this question constantly invoking
the organic structure in order to resolve the apparent dichotomy. In §25 Schelling
provides the first of a number of metaphysical elucidations of this problem. These
particular forms are pure; this means they are forms-in-themselves in so far as they are
70 Philosophy, 32.
71 Philosophie, 31.
72 Philosophy, 32. Translation modified.
73 Philosophie, 32ff.
74 Philosophie, 32.
75 Philosophy, 33.
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without essence [ohne Wesentheit]. As we have already seen, Schelling is driven by the
urge to dig as deep as possible, right into the objective and ideal realities to discover
their fundamental qualities. So what does he mean here when he says that the pure
forms are without essence? If the one essence pervades all things, then how can these
forms be without essence? This problem is addressed by the notion of potences:
...es kOnnen also im wahren Universum keine besonderen Dinge seyn, als
inwiefern sie das ganze ungetheilte Universum in sich aufnehmen, also selbst
Universa sind.76
...hence, there can be no particular things within the true universe except to the extent
that they take up the entire undivided universe into themselves, and are thus themselves
universes.77
The potences of autonomy and integration are fundamental to this proposition. For
particularity to exist (as autonomy) it must 'take up' the essence into itself as a
concrete form. Thus objectivity is both autonomy and integration. How far this is from
Kant's rational impotence. So, although the essence of the absolute is non-division, it
takes objectivity, difference, into itself as a potence such that each particularity, each
objective fragmented entity, contains within itself the ideal and the absolute:
§26. Im Absoluten sind ale besonderen Dinge nur dadurch wahrhaft
geschieden und wahrhaft ems, daB jedes fiir sich das Universum, jedes das
absolute Ganze ist.78
§26. Within the absolute all particular things are truly separated and truly only one to
the extent that each is the universe for itself, and each is the absolute whole.79
The delineation of the potences continues in §27 with an analysis of the real and the
ideal. The 'particular' things Schelling equates here with the so-called 'ideas' [Icleen] -
the universe in the form of the particular. Schelling is concerned with both the ideal
and real series and equates ideal particularity with the urge to inform the finite into the
infinite. This urge, we can see, is somehow buried within objectivity and releases itself
when seen from the ideal potence. Objectivity within the real potence, on the other
76 Philosophie, 32-3.
77 Philosophy, 33.
78 Philosophie, 33.
79 Philosophy, 34. Translation modified.
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hand, is the end of the opposite urge, to intuit the infinite into the finite. Thus, 'the real
is always the universe.'80
 There is a sense here, then, that objective reality seen from
the real potence, is the universe as an amalgam, it is whole by means of encyclopaedic
conspicuity. The empirical urges of the cameralist are thus represented here as one side
of the equation: the cameralist real-as-such, the final result of the real urge is only
absolute insofar as its opposite, the urge to abstract, to make each object a universe, to
intuit into the object the infinite, is present within it.
Things are 'without essence', then, if they are seen as such. To stop at this
visible conspicuity or self-evidence of the thing, is to deny the absolute or the 'one
essence'. This absolute comes about only as a result of its completion within the thing
itself, thus making of it the whole in and for itself. Particularity exists within beauty as
a concrete necessity of beauty. The various particularities or pure forms of beauty are
the encyclopaedic parts of its whole. Beauty thus belongs to the real series.
So the real series, then, is fundamentally characterised by its result, the reality
of the objective world when seen as a 'given' amalgam of its various parts. The reality
of this series, then, is quite different to that of the opposite potence, the ideal series.
This opposition is underlined in the 'two unities' of the ideas:
Jede Idee hat zwei Einheiten, die eine, wodurch sie in sich selbst und absolut
ist, die also, wodurch das Absolute in ihr Besonderes gebildet ist, und die,
wodurch sie als Besonderes in das Absolute als ihr Centrum aufgenommen
wird.81
Every idea has two unities: the one through which it exists within itself and is absolute
- hence the one through which the absolute is formed into its particularity - and the one
through which it is taken up as a particular into the absolute as its own centre.82
This duality whereby an 'idea' is both absolute in itself and 'takes up' the absolute into
its own centre is the fundamental dualism of all things:
Diese gedoppelte Einheit jeder Idee ist eigentlich das GeheirnniB, wodurch das
Besondere im Absoluten, und gleichwohl wieder als Besonderes begriffen
werden kann.83
80 Philosophie, 34: 'Das Reale ist immer nur das Universum.' Philosophy, 35.
81 Philosophie, 34.
82 Philosophy, 35. Translation modified.
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This double unity of every idea is actually the mystery by which the particular can be
comprehended both within the absolute and, in spite of this, also as a particular.84
Ideas, then, are concrete syntheses, particular In-eins-bildungen of the real and the
ideal. Schelling continues in §28 to assert that such ideas when viewed from the two
different potences are either images of the divine [Bader des Glittlichen] or the gods
[GOtter]. The antithesis of these potences, the ideal and real, is the antithesis of the
divine, or the general creativity of God (the ideal), and creativity in the archetypal
forms of the gods of antiquity (the real). This antithesis is one which Schelling sees as
fundamental for a philosophy of art: the one is an ideal archetype whereas the other is a
particular or real archetype. This introduction of the gods of antiquity as particular
archetypes begins a protracted discussion of archetypal particularity, that is, the infinite
in the form of the finite, the basis on which art makes its presence felt:
Die Idee der Goner ist nothwendig fiir die Kunst. Die wissenschaftliche
Construktion derselben fiihrt uns eben dahin zurtick, wohin der Instinkt die
Poesie in ihrem ersten Beginn schon gefiihrt hat. Was ftir die Philosophie Ideen
sind, sind fiir die Kunst GOtter, und umgekehrt.85
The idea of the gods is necessary for art. Our systematic construction of art leads us
back precisely to the point to which instinct first led poesy at its inception. What ideas
are for philosophy, the gods are for art and vice versa.86
These archetypal particularities are governed by two rules, the duality of which
comes now as no surprise. On the one hand, the gods are limited in the purest sense,
that is, they are completely particular whereas, on the other hand, they represent, as an
amalgam, the completeness of the absolute. This is the encyclopaedic unity we have
come to expect in the real series, and, as Schelling puts it, the gods, for the ancient
Greeks, were 'more real than any other reality.'" The fundamental realness of this
amalgamic unity was precisely that same means by which art was able to divide itself
into different forms. Each of the individual gods is separated from the others by strict
limitation such that each archetype was strictly particular, each containing specific
83 Pltilosophie, 34.
84 Philosophy, 35.
85 Philosophic., 35.
86 Philosophy, 35.
87 Philosophie, 35: 'reeller als jedes andere Reelle.'
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characteristics setting it apart from the others. And yet, all the gods, as an amalgam,
represented divinity as such:
Nur dadurch erstens, daB sic streng begrenzt, dal3 also sich wechselseitig
einschrankende Eigenschaften in einer und derselben Gottheit sich ausschlieBen
und absolut getrennt sind, und daB gleichwohl innerhalb dieser Begrenzung
jede Form die ganze GOttlichkeit in sich empfangt, liegt eigentlich das
GeheimniB ihres Reizes und ihrer Fahigkeit filr Kunstdarstellungen. Dadurch
erhdlt die Kunst gesonderte, beschlossene Gestalten, und in jeder doch die
Totaliat, die ganze GOttlichkeit.88
The mystery of their charm and their suitability for artistic portrayal actually lies, first
of all, in the fact that they are strictly limited; hence, mutually limiting characteristics
exclude one another within the same deity and are absolutely separated from one
another. Nonetheless, within this limitation every form receives into itself the entire
divinity.89
The rather understated Reiz holds the key here to a significant point for art:
art's charm lies in its particularity. This pr6cis of the latter part of the protracted
Anmerkung to §30 is based around a remark Schelling makes regarding particularity:
'Only in particularity is there life.' 90 Vitality, multiplicity, life, are all elements of the
particular and it is they that give existence its charm. Without such particularities, life
is void:
Das Absolute an und fiir sich bietet keine Mannichfaltigkeit dar, es ist insofern
fi.ir den Verstand eine absolute, bodenlose Leere.91
The absolute in and for itself offers no multiplicity or variety whatever, and to the
extent that it is for the understanding an abolute, bottomless emptiness.92
This interesting comment suggests a kind of ultimate unattainability for the absolute, a
point of absolute reconciliation or non-dividedness that is ultimately beyond reason.
This point is again taken up in much more detail in Chapter 3,93 but for the moment it
is a chasm that Schelling is unwilling to cross. This unattainability is something that is
immediately mediated here by the claim that the creative imagination and fantasy are
88 Philosophie, 36.
89 Philosophy, 36.
90 Philosophie, 37: 'Nur im Besonderen ist Leben.'
91 Philosophie, 37.
92 Philosophy, 36.
93 Philosophie,109ff.
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the means by which the unwieldy can be subsumed into charming form, that is,
concrete form; remember, beauty exists as the absolute in concreto, it is the material
from of the inarticulable. Art, as seen from the real series, is thus a road to a kind of
comprehension that falls outside classical reason.
Divine imagination is defined in §31 as 'that in which the productions of art are
received and formed.' 94 If this imagination is divine, that is, it is the creativity or
imagination of God, then it is, as we have already seen, a kind of general creativity or
imagination. Schelling's use here of the non-German Imagination instead of the more
usual Einbildungskraft would seem to underline the apparent abstraction of the term.
GOttliche Imagination, then, is that process which receives existing forms and through
the divine (general) filter of the imagination casts new ones. But the new forms that
ensue exist still only internally, within that general creativity. Only through the second
process, that of fantasy [Phantasie] are these forms cast out into particularity:
Im VerhAltni13 zur Phantasie bestimme ich Einbildungskraft als das, worm n die
Produktionen der Kunst empfangen und ausgebildet werden, Phantasie, was sie
duBerlich anschaut, sie aus sich hinauswirft gleichsam, insofern auch darstellt.95
I define creative imagination in relation to fantasy as that in which the productions of
art are received and formed, fantasy as that which intuits them externally, casts them
out from within itself and to that extent also portrays them.96
and, as we see, it also 'represents' these forms. Phantasie, than, resides over the
representation of the forms intuited by the divine imagination. Divine imagination is
general creativity, the community of creative beings in God, and Phantasie is
particular creativity.
Fantasy leads to concrete representation and thus to beauty:
§33. Das Grundgesetz aller GOtterbildungen ist das Gesetz der SchOnheit. -
Denn SchOnheit 1st das real angeschaute Absolute.97
§33. The basic law of all portrayals of the gods is the law of beauty, for beauty is the
absolute intuited in reality.98
94 Philosophie, 39: 'das, worm die Produktionen der Kunst empfangen und ausgebildet werden.'
95 Philosophie, 39.
96 Philosophy, 38. Translation modified.
97 Philosophie, 41-2.
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We return, once again, to the notion of beauty as the absolute intuited into
particularity. Indeed, as Schelling continues:
Man kOnnte dagegen einwerfen: eben deBwegen, weil mit Begrenzung, seyen
die GOtterbildungen nicht absolut schOn. Allein ich kehre as vielmehr urn, daB
namlich das Absolute nur in der Begrenzung, namlich im Besonderen,
angeschaut iiberhaupt schOn ist.99
One might object that precisely because the gods are limited, they are not absolutely
beautiful. I, however, would rather assert the reverse, namely, that the absolute cannot
be beautiful at all except as intuited within limitation, that is, within the particular.o°
Limitation [Begrenzung] in the form of various characteristics of the gods of
antiquity, then, is, as Schelling has already said, absolutely necessary for art. The gods
represent the archetypes of particularity, the variety of an earlier divinity, now lost in
God. As we shall see, Schelling's critique of Christian society as allegorical is based on
the necessity of particularity or limitation to beauty. If the real series is the intuiting of
the infinite into the finite, this latter term now easily subsumed into our notion of
particularity, then the gods are ultimately real, that is, their existence is fully
synonymous with unity. Thus, based on this premise of encyclopaedic unity in the real
series, Schelling is able now to assert:
§34 Die GOtter bilden nothwendig unter sich wieder eine Totalitdt, eine
Welt...ein organisches Ganzes.101
§34. The gods taken together necessarily constitute a totality, a world...an organic
whole... 102
These archetypes, then, are amalgamated by the ideal series into divinity in
general by means of the sum of their differences or characteristics. This separation of
the parts, subsumed only within an organic whole in the ideal series becomes the basis
for particularity in art. On the one hand, the various forms of art are art as a totality,
that is, they necessarily make up art in an encyclopaedic unity, and, on the other hand,
the various forms or particularities relate according to a careful separation of identity
98 Philosophy, 40.
99 Philosopltie, 42.
100 Philosophy, 40.
101 Philosophie, 43.
102 Philosophy, 41.
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and separation as represented by the organic unity itself. This separation, or
autonomy103 is addressed by Schelling in his notion of an independent poetic existence:
§35. Einzig, indem die atter unter sich eine Welt bilden, erlangen sie eine
unabhangige Existenz fiir die Phantasie oder eine unabhdngige poetische
Existenz.1°4
§35. Only by collectively constituting a world in this way do the gods acquire
independent existence for fantasy or an independent poetic existence.105
In a sense, it is as if each of the gods or archetypes is an empty vessel, ready to
entangle itself with the other gods in ever new ways:
Nachdem einmal diese eigentliche Welt der Phantasie erschaffen ist, ist der
Einbildung keine weitere Grenze gesetzt, eben deRwegen, weil innerhalb
derselben alles MOgliche unmittelbar wirldich 1st.106
After this genuine world of fantasy has been created there are no other limitations to
what can be conceived within it; this is true precisely because within it, all possibility
is also immediately rea1.107
This absolute possibility is premised by the notion of autonomy. Returning once again
to organicism, the separateness of the parts is fundamental to a higher unity. Thus the
emptiness of each archetype, its absolute divinity in itself, gives it an objectivity which
is only mediated by the narrative of mythology:
§37. Das Ganze der GOtterdichtungen indem sie zur vollkommenen Objektivitat
oder unabhangigen poetischen Existenz gelangen, ist die Mythologie.108
§37. The entirety of the poetic renderings of the gods, by acquiring complete
objectivity or independent poetic existence, is mythology.109
and immediately following this:
§38. Myth°logie ist die nothwendige Bedingung und der erste Stoff aller
Kunst.11°
§38. Mythology is the necessary condition and first content of all art lit
103 Philosophie, 388ff.
1 04 Philosophie, 43.
1 05 Philosophy, 41.
106 Philosophie, 44.
101 Philosophy, 41.
tos Philosophic., 49.
109 Philosophy, 45
110 Philosophie, 49.
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This is a difficult point to grasp. It is not that all art necessarily engages with
the tales of antiquity's gods, but, rather, art demonstrates relationships between its
various forms identical to those demonstrated between the ancient gods. The forms, in
themselves, are empty vessels, mere archetypes without particularity, but become
particular in comparison with other forms, via limitation and characterisation and ever
new inter-relationships with the past and the present, between genres. Independent
poetic existence is only possible via an understanding and strict delineation of each
form's limits, its objectivity, which, in turn, can only be grasped via an understanding of
the whole.
It is not that Schelling uses the gods as an allegory for the necessary structures
of art in particularity and universality, but, rather, that the gods represent a basic
ordering principle - the organic unity of encyclopaedic and organic unities within the
higher organic whole:
Inwiefern Poesie das Bildende des Stoffes, wie Kunst im engeren Sinn der
Form ist, so ist die Mythologie die absolute Poesie, gleichsam die Poesie en
Masse. Sie ist die ewige Materie, aus der alle Formen so wundervoll,
mannichfaltig hervorgehen.112
Insofar as poetry is the formative element of material, just as art in the narrower sense
is the formative element of form, so is mythology the absolute poesy, as it were the
poesy en masse. It is eternal matter from which all forms issue so wondrously and
variously.II3
n Ittation
We have seen how the absolute divides itself by means of mythology, that is,
the characterisation or limitation of parts according to the generality of the whole.
Schelling now proceeds (§39ff.) to a detailed analysis of the three basic modes of
depiction or representation Parstellung] in which art participates, and its relationship
with its 'material' - Mythologie. These three basic forms are the symbolic, the
schematic, and the allegorical.
111 Philosophy, 45.
112 Philosophic, 50.
113 Philosophy, 45.
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Darstellting is a form of intuiting, a mode of ontological reflection such that
one potence contains immanently within itself the other. In philosophy representation
strives towards:
Darstellung des Absoluten mit absoluter Indifferenz des Allgemeinen und
Besonderen im Allgemeinen.
Representation of the absolute with absolute indifference of the universal and
particular within the universal...
whereas art strives for:
Darstellung des Absoluten mit absoluter Indifferenz des Allgemeinen und
Besonderen im Besonderen.114
Representation of the absolute with absolute indifference of the universal and the
particular within the paticular...115
Such intuiting, such striving for the representation of absolute indifference is
not a striving for a perfect representation in objective form of some other objective
entity. There is no place for a simplistic Cartesian mimesis in the Schellingian system.
This striving must aim for a representation that shows the opposite within itself; thus
representation means here the immanent containment of things outside itself, outside
the confines of its own entity. This is not a mere mimicking of externality but a deep
ontological participation of the particular in the universal and vice versa. This perfect
mode of representation, Schelling terms the symbolic; in order to clarify his use of this
term, Schelling first gives a short definition of the two lower potences of
representation of which the symbolic is the indifference:
Diejenige Darstellung, in welcher das Allgemeine das Besondere bedeutet, oder
in welcher das Besondere durch das Allgemeine angeschaut wird, ist
Schematismus.116
That representation in which the universal means the particular or in which the
particular is intuited through the universal is schematism.117
and then the second potence:
114 Both references: Philosophie, 50. Emphasis added.
115 Both references: Philosophy, 45.
116 Philosophie, 51.
117 Philosophy, 46.
157
Diejenige Darstellung aber, in welcher das Besondere das Allgemeine bedeutet,
oder in welcher das Allgemeine durch das Besondere angeschaut wird, ist
allegorisch.118
That representation, however, in which the particular means the universal or in which
the universal is intuited through the particular is allegory.119
and, finally the synthesis:
Die Synthesis dieser beiden, wo weder das Allgemeine das Besondere, noch das
Besondere das Allgemeine bedeutet, sondem wo beide absolut ems sind, ist das
Symbolische.12°
The synthesis of these two, where neither the universal means the particular nor the
particular the universal, but rather both are absolutely one, is the symbolic.121
As a potence of the symbolic mode, the schematic mode, then, strains for the
particular. This is because it is inherently abstract and must complete itself in the
particular. Thus, by means of formalised, stylised modes of representation, the
particular is intuited. In Schelling's system, both painting and the formative arts and
epic in the verbal arts represent this tendency. In painting, the most mimetic of the arts,
colours and forms attempt a representation of the particularity of visible externality,
whereas in epic, stylised characterisation, archetypical drama unfolds to uncover, the
particularity of the narrative.122
The other potence of the symbolic is the allegorical. This potence of
representation strives always for the universal or the general. This striving is informed
by its deep particularity and this striving attempts constantly to complete itself in
universality. Therefore, in Schelling's system, the allegorical art form in the formal arts
is music and, in the verbal arts, lyric. Music, deeply material, based in the concrete
element of sound, strives fundamentally for the representation of the universal, the
spiritual, the ideal. As allegory, the forms of music are highly particularised, highly
objective, almost void of any kind of general content. Similarly in lyric, a particularity
—
118 Philosophie, 51.
119 Philosophy, 46.
120 Philosophie, 51.
121 Philosophy, 46.
122 As we shall see, however, the verbal arts belong to a higher ideal potence, hence the apparent
abstraction or idealism of epic narrative.
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of refined semantic multiplicity of inscrutably indeterminate objectivity strives for
absolute idealism, spirituality and the inward reflection of the lonely spirit.
Notice, then, how the allegorical arts seem the most autonomous of the arts.
On the one hand, the objectivity of these two arts is formidable; there seems to be an
overwhelming infinity of meaning, meanings that fail to stabilise concretely the
objectivity of their material. On the other hand, this almost chaotic multiplicity strives
for absolute form, absolute idea, absolute spirit. Objective freedom from determinate
meaning, absolute materiality, the concrete in concreto, are all synonyms for a
fundamental autonomy. Only in this absolute multiplicity of meaning can art find an
absolute freedom from externality.
The synthesis of these two, as we have said, is the symbolic mode. The use of
this term, I suggest, is not literal in the sense of one thing representing in mere mimetic
manner some other external thing. For Schelling, symbolism is the absolute indifference
of real and ideal: he claims that the requirement of absolute artistic representation is:
...Darstellung mit veilliger Indifferenz, so namlich, da13 das Allgemeine ganz das
Besondere, das Besondere zugleich das ganze Allgemeine ist, nicht es
bedeutet.123
...representation with complete indifference such that the universal is completely the
particular and simultaneously the particular is the entire universal, and does not merely
mean or signify it.124
It is not a matter of one meaning the other, then, but of one actually being the other, a
true, absolute, indifference. This apparent suspension of the basic laws of physics is a
deliberate and wilful use of a kind of super-charged metaphor, a metaphor beyond
mere literary metaphor: symbol is a metaphor not for sympathetic meaning but for
absolute identity; this absolute identity is, in turn a metaphor for immanence, for a
deep-seated drive in Schelling to enclose a fundamental resonance of the 'external
other' deep within the object:
process	 aats.	 potence
	 representation 
123 Philosophie, 55.
124 Philosophy, 49. Translation modified.
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reflection	 [a: matter]	 = real 	 > allegory
subsumption [b: light]	 =	 > schema
reason	 [c: organism] = indifference > symbol
It is as if the notion of immanent meaning, of internalised signification had been
taken one step further to the point of almost total closure such that externality is so
deeply embedded within the object that it is part of its essence, a kind of internal
cipher, signified by the structural context of its position, so much a part of the object
that externality is almost forgotten. This is explained in detail in a fascinating passage
incorporating this representational element into the previous argument for mythology.
Following the previous extract:
Diese Forderung ist poetisch gelOst in der Mythologie. Denn jede Gestalt in ihr
ist zu nehmen als das, was sie ist, denn eben dadurch wird sie auch genommen
als das was sie bedeutet. Die Bedeutung ist hier zugleich das Seyn selbst,
tibergegangen in den Gegenstand, mit ihm ems. Sobald wir diese Wesen etwas
bedeuten lassen, sind sic selbst nichts mehr. Allein die Realitat ist bei ihnen mit
der Idealitat ems (§29), d. h. auch ihre Idee, ihr Begriff, wird zerstOrt, wofern
sie nicht als wirklich gedacht werden. Ihr hOchster Reiz beruht eben darauf, daB
sie, indem sie bloB sind ohne alle Beziehung - in sich selbst absolut - , doch
zugleich immer die Bedeutung durchschimmern lassen. Wir begniigen uns
allerdings nicht mit dem bloBen bedeutungslosen Seyn, dergleichen z. B. das
bloBe Bild gibt, aber ebensowenig mit der bloBen Bedeutung, sondem wir
wollen, was Gegenstand der absoluten Kunstdarstellung seyn soil, so concret,
nur sich selbst gleich wie das Bild, und doch so allgemein und sinnvoll wie der
Begriff, daher die deutsche Sprache Symbol vortrefflich als Sinnbild
wiedergibt.125
The requirement is poetically resolved in mythology, since each figure is to be taken as
that which it is, for precisely in this way is each also taken as that which it means or
signifies. Meaning here is simultaneously being itself, passed over into the object itself
and one with it. As soon as we allow these beings to mean or signify something, they
themselves are no longer anything. Their reality is one with their ideality (§29); that is,
their idea, their concept is also destroyed to the extent that they are not conceived as
actual. Their ultimate charm resides precisely in the fact that they, by simply being as
they are without any reference to anything else - absolute within themselves -
simultaneously always allow the meaning itself to be dimly visible. I emphasize that we
are not satisfied with meaningless being, such as that given by a mere image. Just as
little are we satisfied with mere meaning. Rather whatever is to be the object of
absolute artistic representation should be as concrete and self-identical as the image,
125 Philosophic, 55-6.
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and yet as universal and significant as the concept. Hence the German language renders
the word symbol excellently with the term Sinnbild.126
Perhaps the most fascinating element of this extract is the notion of what might
be termed absolute autonomy and yet, conversely, the possibility of allowing meaning
to be dimly visible [die Bedeutung durchschimmern lassen]. This 'dim visibility' or
'shining through' of meaning from the autonomous object is, perhaps, a recognition of
the bleakness of a world of purely immanent meaning. If meaning were truly and
strictly immanent, then meaning, as a notion of some internal semantic resonance
straining outwards beyond the object itself, becomes highly problematic. This world
would be value-free, purely objective and empty of meaning. At all points in the
Schellingian system, even such extremities as this, there is always present some
element of other potences. Thus, autonomy is imbued with a kind of faint skeletal
meaning, a meaning which lies hidden, deep from the eye and yet which enriches the
object such that it contains beauty: remember, the concrete is the final stage of beauty.
So the semantic multiplicity of the object in itself is always limited, that is its absolute
objectivity can only exist by means of its completion with immanent meaning, the
inclusion of something other than itself within itself, in turn informing the very essence
of that object.
Autonomy in Schelling's view, then, can exist only to the extent that it is not
merely pure meaningless existence [blofien bedeutungslosen Seyn} but subsumes into
this apparent autonomy the essence of its opposite, the possibility of 'formulating ever
new relationships' from within. Returning again to mythology, Schelling makes the
following point:
§40. Der Charalcter der wahren Mythologie ist der der Universalitat, der
Unendlichkeit...127
§40. The character of true mythology is that of universality and infinity...128
126 Philosophy, 49. Stott gives the translation of Sinnbild as 'sense meaning/linage' which is probably
as accurate we can get without giving a clumsy rendering. The German term Sinn can be rendered as
'sense' or 'meaning' and Bild as 'image' or 'picture.' I would therefore have placed the slash between
sense and meaning thus: 'sense/meaning image.'
127 Plzilosophie, 57.
128 Philosophy, 50.
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If autonomy is to be seen as absolute objectivity, materiality beyond finite
reason, a kind of absolute finitude, then infinity, the opposite potence, must be seen in
its autonomy as absolute ideality, absolute subjectivity such that the division of the
absolute into these two potences polarises the characteristics by limitation:
Diese Unendlichkeit muB sich gegeniiber von dem Verstand dadurch
ausdriicken, daB kein Verstand fahig ist sie ganz zu entwickeln, daB in ihm
selbst eine unendliche MOglichkeit liegt, immer neue Beziehungen zu bilden.129
As far as understanding is concerned, this infinity must express itself such that no
understanding is capable of developing it entirely, and such that in it there resides the
infinite possibility to formulate ever new relationships.130
In both extremities, then, there exists on the one hand the possibility to
formulate a multiplicity of relationships and meanings, and yet, on the other, there is
always the 'dim visibility' of something meaningful, a kind of dark inner essence that
can only be uncovered by a specialised scrutiny. Regarding the question of autonomy
and meaning, Schelling continues:
...die Dichtungen der Mythologie sind zugleich bedeutend und bedeutungslos, -
bedeutend, weil emn Allgemeines im Besondere, bedeutungslos, weil beides
wieder mit absoluter Indifferenz, so daB das, worm n indifferenziirt, wieder
absolut, urn seiner selbst willen i5t.131
...the poetic renderings of mythology are simultaneously meaningful and meaningless -
meaningful because they represent a universal in the particular, meaningless because
they represent both with absolute indifference, such that the element in which they are
indifferent is itself nonetheless absolute and has integrity in and for itself.132
Mythology, then, the fundamental discourse of archetypal intuition is both meaningful
and meaningless. By this Schelling brings about an absolute point of identity, an
equality of opposites in the element of mythology rendered in poesy. This objectivity of
poesy, the early artistic expression of synthesis in concreto, remains an absolute point
of truth for Schelling. The best art strives for its own integrity, on its own terms, and in
and for itself. It is, to this extent at least, autonomous.
, n•••••
129 Philosophie, 58.
130 Philosophy 50. Translation modified.
131 Philosophie, 58.
132 Philosophy, 51.
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A clear definition of Schellingian autonomy in art is now emerging. Autonomy
exists where there is extremity, severity of objectivity, but, conversely, where that
objectivity, that 'materiality' is the form of an absolute point of identity, of the
indifference of the finite and the infinite. The extremity of this objectivity, the absolute
immanence of the products of art, is mediated by a meaning in autonomy. The
autonomy is not violated by the dim semantic resonance of the internal essence. This is
Schelling's profoundly ontological programme - the quest for internality, the quest for
that which is beyond external form.
As if to begin this quest, Schelling attempts to make some basic observations
on the content of art:
§43. Im Stoff der Kunst ist kein Gegensatz denkbar als em n formeller. Dem
Wesen nach ist namlich jener immer und ewig ems, immer und nothwendig
absolute Identitat des Allgemeinen und des Besonderen. Wenn also iiberhaupt
emn Gegensatz in Ansehung des Stoffs stattfindet, so ist er bloB forma und aLs
solcher muB er auch objektiv sich ausdrticken als bloBer Gegensatz in der
Zeit.133
§43. In the material of art the only conceivable antithesis is a formal one. Essentially
that material is always and eternally one, always and necessarily absolute identity of
the universal and the particular. If, therefore, any antithesis at all occurs as regards
that material itself, it must be merely formal and as such it must also manifest itself
objectively as a mere temporal antithesis.134
Antithesis, then, is formal, it exists outside of the content of art which is the
identity of the finite and the infinite. The formal antithesis can also be demonstrated
more clearly in the apparent outer forms of the material of art. Such forms can appear
to be products of nature on the one hand and products of freedom on the other. This is
the antithesis of necessity and freedom, the political potences. From §43 onwards,
Schelling builds a critique of historicism based around these two political axioms.
The first potence, necessity, is described as 'the unity of the universe with the
finite' [Einheit des Universums mit dem Endlichen]. Necessity is thus the indivisible
'unity' of the general and the particular, a proposition that, as we shall see, has
profound ramifications for the metaphysics of the individual. This absolute identity is
133 Philosophie, 95
134 Philosophy, 78. Translation modified.
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contrasted with the potence of freedom, the 'unity' of the finite with the infinite (the
result being infinitude, not concrete form as in necessity) and is thus the free-play of
the empirical moment as pointing to something beyond the objective.
Necessity is thus roughly synonymous with immanent immanence, a secret
fusion of object and essence, and freedom is the semantic indeterminacy, the meaning
by virtue of a relation to something else:
Im ersten Fall ist das Endliche zugleich das Unendliche selbst, nicht bloB es
bedeutend, eben darum etwas fiir sich, auch unabhangig von seiner Bedeutung.
Im andern FaIle ist es ftir sich selbst nichts, nur in der Beziehung aufs
Unendliche.I35
In the first case the finite is simultaneoulsy the infinite itself, and does not merely
signify it. Hence, it is also something in and for itself even independently of its
meaning. In the second case it is actually nothing for itself, only in its relationship to
the infinite.I36
Necessity, then, sets up a relationship whereby the finite is a symbol of the infinite, they
are identical, indivisible. In freedom, however, the finite strains for the infinite, it is
empty in itself, devoid of self-quality and is an allegory of the infinite. If mythology is
an expression of necessity, the absolute unity of infinite and finite, then freedom finds
its expression in religion, and its necessary corollary, history:
§47. In der Mythologie der ersten Art wird das Universum angeschaut als
Natur, in der andern als Welt der Vorsehtmg oder als Geschichte.137
§47. In the mythology of the first kind the universe is intuited as nature, in the second
kind as a world of providence or as history.138
So whereas universality is objective in the first type of mythology, in the second,
universality is experienced in time:
§50. Dort wird Polytheismus durch Naturbegrenzung (von dem hergenommen,
was in den Raum Mt), hier nur durch Begrenzung in der Zeit maglich seyn.
Folgt von selbst. Alle Anschauung Gottes nur in der Geschichte.139
135 Philosophie, 97.
136 Philosophy, 79. Translation modified.
137 Philosophie, 97.
138 Philosophy, 79.
139 Philosophie, 98.
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§50. In the former case polytheism will be possible by means of natural limitation
(acquired from that which exists within the parameters of space); in the latter it will be
possible only by means of limitation in time. This follows of itself. All intuition of God
is possible only in history. 140
This temporal element can be explained by our Christian notion of life as somehow
false, a prelude to the real existence in the kingdom of Christ. In mythology, the gods
are present, within reach, they are real now and they symbolise the relations of
characteristics that govern man; indeed they are one and the same. Hence space and
limitation are fundamental. In Christianity, however, this spirituality is separated from
material existence and upheld as the final reward for pious persistence in the material
realm; hence the profound significance of time. Regarding the poesies of these two
types, Schelling gives a profound insight into the respective cultural function of the
individual:
§48. In der poetischen Welt der ersten Art wird die Gattung sich zum
Individuum oder Besondern ausbilden, in der andern das Individuum ftir sich
das Allgemeine auszudriicken streben.141
§48. In the poetic world of the first sort the collective will develop into the individual
or particular, in the second case the individual will strive by itself to express the
universa1.142
This is not surprising, for if nature is the realm of the gods, then finitude is
synonymous with spirituality. Therefore the strain for the particular, as the perfect
form of the universal is clear in mythology. In this sense, individuality as a single
person, is not what Schelling means here, for such absolute individuality is impossible
in the indifference of mythology. By das Individuum Schelling means a particularity in
collectivity.
In the latter mode, the individual allegorises the universal, it is a representation
of the universal and thereby exists only by virtue of the universal. Mythology, in this
sense, then, is a world system that seems almost to function free from instrumental
cognition; for Christianity to acquire such independence, such self-conspicuity, it must
seek its natural form in time:
140 Philosophy, 80.
141 Philosophie, 97.
142 philosophy, 80. Translation modified.
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Zusatz 3. Die Ideen dieser Religion an und ftir sich selbst konnten nicht
mythologisch seyn. Denn sie sind durchaus unsinnlich. Beweis an der
Dreieinigkeit, den Eugeln u.s.w.
Zusatz 4. Nur in der Historie konnte eine solche Religion mythologischer Stoff
werden. Denn nur darin erlangen sie [die Ideen] eine Unabhangigkeit von ihrer
Bedeutung.143
Addendum 3. The ideas of this religion in and for themselves were not capable of
becoming mythological, since they are completely nonsensual. This proof could be
demonstrated using the examples of the Trinity, angels, and so on.
Addendum 4. Only in historical material could such a religion become mythological
material, since only thereby do the ideas acquire independence from their meaning. 144
We can now see how antiquity's mythology represents for Schelling a
fundamental paradigm. Art, as a concrete manifestation of the indifference of ideal and
real, participates in that division of itself by which mythology is shown to operate. The
symbolic mode of representation, the fundamental identity of signifier and signified is
the centre of Schelling's autonomy aesthetic: the signifier is bearer of the meaning or is
somehow moulded to that meaning it wishes to convey. In Christianity, this natural
harmony is somehow disturbed. The individual becomes a concrete representation of
the universal and exists only by virtue of this relationship. In other words, meaning is
present in the objective realm, undifferentiated from it in mythology, whereas the
notion of 'man' in Christian culture represents the separation of meaning from the
objective realm. Man is, in this sense, the articulation of a relationship between the
purely divine and the purely material. This mediation might exist as a semiolgical
construct, as Foucault has suggested, or as an agent in the broader dynamic of
particular and general.
It is interesting that Schelling makes this division between the individual as
allegory and autonomy as symbolic unity. Clearly, the deeper message, the subtext, of
Schelling's metaphysics lies in the absolute authenticity of the essence, the absolute and
concrete unity of real and ideal in the work of art, and in the ontology of the object of
scrutiny per se. The individual is somehow secondary to this authenticity.
,•n•••
143 Philosophic, 99.
144 Philosophy, 81.
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On Ontology 
The third chapter of part 1, 'Construktion der Besonderen oder der Form der
Kunst' constructs the particular in art. As we have already seen, the commodity of art
is the concrete embodiment of a perfect unity; Schelling now proceeds to delineate the
particular of this objective appearance. It is not surprising, therefore, that, as an
analysis of the objective characteristics of commodity autonomy, this chapter is the
most empirically inclined so far. It begins, once again, with a question:
Wie geht jener allgemeine Stoff tiber in die besondere Form und wird Materie
des besonderen Kunstwerks7145
How does the universal content make the transition into particular form and become
the material of a particular work of art?146
Having implicitly criticised Christianity, it seems strange that Schelling should find his
answer in monotheism:
§62. Das unmittelbar Hervorbringende des Kunstwerks oder des einzelnen
wirklichen Dings, durch welches in der idealen Welt das Absolute real-objektiv
wird, ist der ewige Begriff oder die Idee des Menschen in Gott, der mit der
Seele selbst ems und mit ihr verbunden ist..Dieser ist aus §23 zu fiihren, nach
welchem die formale oder absolute Ursache aller Kunst Gott ist.147
§62. The immediately productive element of the work of art or of the individual, real
thing through which the absolute becomes real-objective in the ideal world, is the
eternal concept or idea of man in God, a concept that is one with the soul itself and is
bound to it.. ..The proof is to be provided on the basis of §23 according to which the
formal or absolute cause of all art is God."
This apparent contradiction cannot be ignored. The notion of time as the essential
dimension of Christianity and the cultural primacy of historical thought in Christian
thought are both products of the central allegorical modes of representation in
Christianity. This striving for the spiritual, a direct result of the deep particularity of
the real series, is also a striving for the extreme universality, a singularity, an end to the
multiplicity of particular existence. This need is supplied by the construct 'God'.
145 Philosophie, 102.
146 Philosophy, 83. Translation modified.
147 Philosophic, 102-3.
148 Philosophy, 83. Translation modified.
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However, it seems Schelling is unwilling to shed his Christian beliefs in the
interest of the consistency of his system. He takes the Christian 'God' and uses it as a
kind of equivalence to the Absolute. The universality of God is in turn the absolute in
all forms:
Gott producirt aus sich nichts, als worm wieder sein ganzes Wesen ausgedrtickt
ist, nichts also, das nicht wieder producirte, wieder Universum
Das Produciren Gottes ist em n ewiger, d.h. tiberhaupt kein VerhaltniB zur Zeit
habender Alct der Selbstaffirmation, worm n eine reale und ideale Seite. In jener
gebiert er seine Unendlichkeit in die Endlichkeit und ist Natur, in dieser nimmt
er die Endlichkeit wieder zurtick in seine Unendlichkeit.149
God produces nothing from within himself that does not in its own turn contain and
express his entire essence, and hence nothing that is not productive in its own turn and
is itself a universe...
The productiveness of God is an eternal act of self-affirmation having absolutely no
relationship to time, and itself contains both a real and ideal side. In the former he
begets his own infinitude into finitude and is nature; in the latter he takes finitude back
again into his infinitude.150
It is this apparent contradiction, the allegorical function of Christian culture, and the
absolute function of the Christian God as general creativity that Schelling bases his
philosophy of art. Allowing God, general creativity, to slip into absolute equivalence
places creativity itself at the very heart of Schelling's cosmology. As early as §24, God
was given as the immediate cause of art. Further to that, Schelling now asserts that
God produces particularity from himself only as a mediator. He is the embodiment,
easy in its relative finitude as symbol, of the process of Hervorbringung. In this sense,
God is becoming. God's objectivity, that is the objectivity of general creativity, comes
about only through this process called God. In other words, the essence, the process
and the objective result all exist as God:
Nun producirt aber Gott unmittelbar und aus sich selbst nur die Idee der Dinge,
wirkliche und besondere Dinge aber nur mittelbar in der reflektirten Welt.
Inwiefem also das Princip der gOttlichen Ineinsbildung, d. h. Gott selbst, durch
besondere Dinge objektiv wird, insofem ist nicht Gott unmittelbar und an sich
selbst betrachtet, sondem nur Gott als das Wesen eines Besonderen und in der
Beziehung auf emn Besonderes das, was die besonderen Dinge producirt.151
149 Philosophic, 104.
150 Philosophy, 84-5.
151 Philosophie, 103.
168
God, however, produces directly and from within himself only the ideas of things, and
produces real or particular things only mediately in the reflected world. Hence, to the
extent that this principle of divine informing, that is, God himself, becomes objective
through particular thimgs, God directly and viewed in himself is not that which
actually produces particular things, but rather only God as the essence of a particular
and in relationship to a particular thing.152
In this sense, art, as a finite product of Hervorbringung is an essential element
of the cosmos, it is the central commodity of the God-centred world. This general
creativity is given mediation by particular creativity in man:
§63. Dieser ewige Begriff des Menschen in Gott als der unmittelbaren Ursache
seiner Produktionen ist das, was man Genie, gleichsam den Genius, das
inwohnende GOttliche des Menschen, nennt. Er ist so zu sagen em n Stiick aus
der Absolutheit Gottes.153
§63. This eternal concept of man in God as the immediate cause of his productions is
that which one calls genius, as it were the daemon, the indwelling divinity of man. It is,
so to speak, a piece of the absoluteness of God.154
Thus, the genius, the creative in the particular, mediates God's creativity and
produces concrete symbols (in the Schellingian sense) of perfect absoluteness - the
work of art. 155
 The separation of the individual genius from general creativity rests in
an organic ordering of all creativity in the absolute:
Jeder Kiinsder kann daher auch nur so viel produciren, als mit dem ewigen
Begriff seines eignen Wesen in Gott verbunden ist. Je mehr nun in diesem fiir
sich schon das Universum angeschaut wird, je organischer er ist, je mehr er die
Endlichkeit der Unendlichkeit verkniipft, desto produktiver.156
Each artist can thus produce only as much as is bound to the eternal concept of his
own essence in God. The more within that essence in and for itself the universe is
intuited, the more organic he is, the more he links his finitude to infinitude, the more
productive he will be.I57
The inviolate necessity of the individual is thus elucidated in terms of genius, that is the
creative individual who necessarily expresses the universal. This universality of the
individual, a rather abstracted expression of early classical liberalism, is a metaphysical
152 Philosophy, 84. Translation modified.
153 Philosophie, 104.
154 Philosophy, 84. Translation modified.
155 The 'symbol' in Schelling's system is a concrete product of the perfect unity of the real and the
idea l, or the particular and the general.
156 Philosophie, 104.
151 philosophy, 84. Translation modified.
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synonym for the democratic notions of free equivalence. Individuals, free to exchange
commodity, free to produce, fundamentally violate both Cartesian mechanic
reductionism and cameralist notions of a fixed community centred around a general
servicing point. The centralisation of specialist servicing, cutting across the more
introverted older communities constitutes, as we have seen, a kind of preparation for
nationhood. The metaphysical 'individual' in Schelling can thus be seen to represent an
argument for the inviolate necessity of some kind of universal, standardised
representation, a kind of metaphysical universal suffrage. In this sense, universality, as
the goal of the creative individual, is the metaphysical expression of the economic
notion of equivalence.
This reading of the apparent politics of the Schellingian method is not merely
metaphorical. The profound cogency of this period centres around the structural
alignment of all discourses around the product of ontology. This essentialising urge is a
partial forgetting, a driving of some element of the signification of the objective world
into obscurity. Ontology, in this sense, relies on a basic bottom line beyond which
speculation or faith must take over. In Schelling's metaphysical expression of economic
equivalence, there is a recognition of essence as a central category, but a constant
forgetting in the account of the intuition of these particular essences from the one
absolute essence. The metaphysics of the Schellingian commodity are not merely
literal, then. In §64, Schelling draws a sharp distinction between individual creativity
and individual productivity in itself:
§64... Die reale Seite des Genies oder diejenige Einheit, welche Einbildung des
Unendlichen ins Endliche ist, kann im engem Sinn die Poesie, die ideale Seite
oder diejenige Einheit, welche Einbildung des Endlichen ins Unendliche ist,
kann die Kunst in der Kunst heiBen.158
§64... The real side of genius, or that unity that constitutes the informing of the infinite
into the finite, can be called poesy in the narrower sense; the ideal side, of that unity
that constitutes the informing of the finite into the infinite, can be called art within
art:159
n•nn•••••
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Implicit in this distinction is a critique of the Cartesian aesthetic of clarity and
craftsmanship:
Unter Poesie im engeren Sinne wird, wenn wir uns auch blo13 an die
Sprachbedeutung halten, das unmittelbare Hervorbringen oder Schaffen eines
Regen verstanden, die Invention an und fiir sich selbst. Alles unmittelbare
Hervorbringen oder Schaffen ist aber immer und nothwendig Darstellung eines
Unendlichen, eines Begriffs in einem Endlichen oder Realen.160
By poesy in the narrower sense - if we stay close to the original meaning of the word -
we understand the immediate production or creation of something real, or invention in
and for itself. All immediate production or creation, however, is always and necessarily
the representation of something infinite, a concept within something finite or real.161
Poesie, then, refers to a kind of general productivity in itself - a general drive for the
particular - which in itself has to extend itself into infinity to symbolise a perfect unity.
Compare this with 'art' [Kunst]:
Die Idee der Kunst beziehen wir alle auf die entgegengesetzte Einheit, die der
Einbildung des Besonderen ins Allgemeine.162
Most of us refer the idea of art more to the opposite unity, that of the informing of a
particular into the universa1.163
Art164 by contrast is a production [Hervorbringen] which aims beyond its mere
objectivity. It is not a menial craftsmanship but an intuiting, a projection of the
individual's essence, of the absolute into concrete from, and thus raises the concrete
beyond objectivity, finitide into the infinite. In another sense, art strains for the
universal as does the individual 165 and in so straining provides a secular discourse
beyond materiality which expresses a metaphysical mode of equivalence. Man is the
equivalent of God on earth, he is the resolution of God's divinity, his absolute
presence, into finite form. The organic notion of man as a microcosm of the structures
of general divinity, God, are discussed later. For the moment, the main feature that is
of import is the notion of a structural sympathy across parts of the general structure.
160 Philosophie, 105.
161 Philosophy, 85. Translation modified.
162 Philosophic, 105.
163 Philosophy, 85.
164 To distinguish between Kunst an (and far) sich and Kunst as its potence, the opposite of Poesie, I
use Art as the general, Kunst as the potence.
165 See Philosophic', 97ff.
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As a 'part' of God, man nonetheless represents the general by means of equivalence or
resemblance.166
From §65 onwards, Schelling devotes his attention to a close analysis of this
intuiting of the universal. The two potences of this process are 'the sublime' [die
Erhabenheit] and 'beauty' [Scheinheit]. The former is described in the following terms:
Die Meinung ist eigentlich diese: wo die Aufnahme des Unendlichen ins
Endliche als solche, das Unendliche also im Endlichen unterschieden wird,
urtheilen wir, daB der Gegenstand, worm n dieB der Fall ist, erhaben sey... Die
Anschauung des Erhabenen tritt dam em, wenn die sinnliche Anschauung fill.
die GrOBe des sinnlichen Gegenstandes unangemessen gefunden wird, und nun
das waive Unendliche hervortritt, far welches jenes bloB sinnliche Unendliche
zum Symbol wird.167
The point is actually this: wherever we encounter the infinite being taken up into the
finite as such - whenever we clistinguish the infinite within the finite - we judge that the
object in which this takes place is sublime... The intuition of the sublime enters only
when the sensual, concrete intuition is seen to be inadequate for the greatness 168 of the
concrete object, and then the truly infinite appears for which the merely concretely
infinite is the symbol.169
Turning to Schiller, Schelling evokes a kind of nature spiritualism; the sublime in this
sense is a belittling of particular comprehension [Fassungskraft] in the light of a
broader, overwhelming materiality. Thus, the inadequacy of sensual intuition in the
face of awesome objectivity brings about a kind of positing outwards of nature, a
substitution of magic or mystery where finitude is severe. But this positing is not the
positing of finitude into the infinite. In one sense, it is the opposite urge, the real urge
166 This is not synonymous with the notions ingrained in Schelling's system of identity. Identity is
evoked across structures of equal stature, and stems from the use of the Bestintmungsarten as modes of
perception, allowing an equal and opposite reinterpretation of the original assumption. This point
clearly emerges in Philosophie, 148: 'Hiernach bestirrunt sich nun auch die Stelle, weiche die Musik
in dem allgemeinen System der Kiinste einnimmt. - Wie sich der allgemeine Weltbau ganz
unabhangig verhalt von den andern Potenzen der Natur, und je nachdem er von der einer Seite
betrachtet wird, das Htichste und allgemeinste ist, worm n sich unmittelbar in die reinste Vernunft
auflOst, was im Concreten sich noch verwirrt, von der andern Seite aber auch die tiefste Postenz ist:
soauch die Musik, welche, von der einen Seite betrachtet, die allgemeinste tinter den realen Kiinsten
und der AuflOsung in Rede und Vemunft am nachsten ist, obgleich van der andern nur die erste
Potenz ist.'
167 Philosophie, 106.
168 One might better translate Grafie, in the light of Schelling and Schiller's notion of the sublime as
a response to the hugeness or magnificent complexity of nature, as 'enormity' or 'immensity' since
'greatness' can suggest a sense of grandeur which is not necessarily present in the broader argument.
169 Philosophy, 85-6.
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to intuit infinity into finitude, with finitude as the final result, or, put another way, to
imbue infinity with finitude. The extremity of the sublime's objectivity is somehow
replaced by a kind of false infinity in the guise of incomprehensibility. Faced with a
formidable materiality, the particular creativity, the individual, superimposes or
presupposes a spirituality a magnificence beyond objectivity which he or she then re-
informs into the finite:
Diese Anschauung der Erhabenen ist ihrer Verwandschaft mit dem Ideellen und
Sinlichen unerachtet eine asthetische Anschauung, um hier einmal dieses Wort
zu gebrauchen. Das Unendliche ist das Herrschende, aber es herrscht doch nur,
inwiefern es in dem sinnlich-Unendlichen, das insofern wieder em n Endliches ist,
angeschaut wird.17°
This intuition of the sublime, in spite of its kinship with the element of the ideal and the
ethical, is an aesthetic intuition, to use this word here finally. The infinite is the
predominate element, yet it predominates only to the extent that it is intuited within the
sensually infinite, which to that extent is itself finite.171
So, although infinity reigns absolute, it does so only in the realm of the finite, a realm it
can never leave in the sublime. In this sense, the sublime offers a kind of release, a way
of creating something outside of the mundane, a self-constructed other-world free
from suffering:
Wie der tapfere Mann in dem Moment, wo alle Krafte der Natur und des
Verharignisses auf ihn zugleich feindlich eindringen, in dem Moment selbst des
hOchsten Leidens zur Masten Befreiung und zu einer iiberirdischen Luft
iibergeht, die alle Schranken des Leidens abgelegt hat, so geht dem, der das
Anlitz der furchtbaren und zerstOrenden Natur ertragt, das hOchste Aufgebot
ihrer verderbenden Krafte selbst, die absolute Anschauung auf, welche der
Sonne gleicht, die aus den Gewitterwolken bricht172
At the very moment when all the hostile forces of nature and of fate simultaneously
close in upon a person, at the moment of highest suffering itself, the courageous person
is able to make the transition to the ultimate liberation and otherworldly pleasure
transcending all the limitations of suffering. Similarly, the person who bears the
countenance of nature in all its terror and destruction, nature's ultimate offering of its
own destructive forces, is granted that absolute vision that is like the sun itself that
finally breaks through dark storm clouds. 173
170 Philosophie, 107.
171 Philosophy, 86. Translation modified.
1 72 Pltilosophie, 108.
173 Philosophy, 87.
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And yet, it can do this within the finite realm. We might say, then, that the sublime is
the bringing of finitude to infinity, the final objectification of infinity in the materiality
of the colossal, overwhelming realm of nature; it thus belongs to the real series. The
notion of immenseness is essential to the sublime, and, by its extremity, informs.a
passing over into infinity:
Die Form ist, wie immer, so auch hier das Endliche, nur ist die Bestimmung
hinzugefiigt worden, daB es hier als relativ unendlich, und in der Beziehung auf
sinnliche Anschauung als absolut groB erscheinen miisse. Es ist aber eben
dadurch von dem Endlichen die Form negirt, und wir begreifen hierdurch, wie
es eben das Formlose ist, welches fiir uns am unmittelbarsten erhaben d. h.
Symbol des Unendlichen als solchen wird.174
Here, too, form, as always, is the finite element, except that here the condition has been
added that it must appear relatively infinite, and from the physical perspective must
appear absolutely colossal. This, however, negates the form of the finite, and we now
see how it is precisely formlessness that most immediately acquires the character of
sublimity for us, that is, that most immediately becomes the symbol of the infinite as
such. 175
This notion of formlessness is perhaps the most interesting element of this passage. If
we recall Schelling's argument for the absolute as eine absolute, bodenlose Leere,176
there is always a sense of something unwieldy outside our grasp, something beyond
mere understanding. In the sublime, this tendency to sublimate or 'cast out' into a
magical realm those things which confuse or frustrate reason is at its most severe.
This 'casting out' or mystification of the colossal realm of nature can be seen
also in Schiller. Indeed. Schelling makes constant reference to the seminal Ueber das
Erhabene by Schiller. Of particular note is the notion they both share of das
Unbegreifliche selbst zum Standpunkt der Beurtheilung:177
Durch die Anschauung des Chaos, mOchte ich sagen, geht der Verstand zu aller
ErkenntniB des Absoluten, es sey in der Kunst oder in der Wissenschaft, iiber.
Das gemeine Wissen, wenn es, nach vergeblichem Bestreben das Chaos von
Erscheinungen in der Natur und der Geschichte mit dem Verstand
..._-,
174 Philosophie, 108.
175 Philosophy, 87.
176 Philosophie, 37.
171 Philosophie, 110. Schiller reference: Ueber das Erhabene, Taschenausgabe, 1847 Bd. 12, 292.
Literally, 'The incomprehensible itself as a principle of judgement'. Philosophy, 88.
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auszuschOpfen, zu dem Entschlul3 iibergeht, "das Unbegreifliche selbst, wie
Schiller sagt, zum Standpunkt der Beurtheilung." in
What I would like to say is that through this vision of chaos, the understanding passes
over to the perception of the absolute, be it in art or in science. After unsuccessful
attempts to exhaust the chaos of the phenomena in nature and in history by means of
the understanding, ordinary perception or knowledge resolves to take -the
incomprehensibility itself," as Schiller says, "as a principle of judgement."179
If formlessness is the highest form then it follows that chaos is always present
in the absolute. For 'chaos' in this context we might read a certain distinction or
separation from Cartesian rationality, a distancing from tables of visible conspicuity
and a movement towards a more fragmented, compartmentalised, less universal reason.
In this sense, chaos is a symbol of the autonomy of the objective world, its
independence, in part at least, from reason. It is of no surprise that notions of artistic
and intellectual autonomy should accompany the collapse of the Cartesian paradigm.
With this reaction against the clarity or sterility of enlightenment thought came the
need for a certain element of 'otherness', a means of allowing reason to participate in
reality rather than impose itself upon it. Thus, Schelling uses Chaos as a metaphor for
this alien, strange, magical element that is outside reason:
Die Natur ist allerdings nicht nur in ihrer unserer Fassungskraft unerreichbaren
GrOBe oder in ihrer unserer physischen Gewalt unbefeigbaren Macht erhaben,
sie ist es auch allgemein in dem Chaos oder, wie Schiller sie ausgedriickt, in der
Verwirrung ihrer Erscheinungen iiberhaupt.18°
Nature is sublime not only in its greatness to the extent that it is inaccessible to our
powers of comprehension, and not only in its power to the extent that it remains
absolutely impervious to our own physical strength. It is also sublime in a general
fashion within chaos, or, as Schiller puts it, in the confitsion of its own appearances at
large.181
In this way, reason can exist alongside other elements of the objective world. It
becomes one of many discourses, one of many means of participating in the objective
realm. It thus acquires a certain autonomy from other matters and turns inwards on
itself, and finally, as we have said, fragments into tiny empirical operations.
178 Philosophie, 110.
179 Philosophy, 88.
180 Philosophie, 109.
181 Philosophy, 88.
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For the moment, however, this fragmentation can be held off. Philosophy
carves for itself a universal discourse and allows itself to wield remarkable power over
other discourses. Art, too, in its even greater ability to engage with chaos, wields a
mighty and powerful hold over early nineteenth-century discourses. And for Schelling,
this 'beauty' and 'the sublime' of creative production is the key to bridging the gap
between rational impulse and objective inviolate separation. The sublime, then, affects
its power in terms of a reconstructed Ersatz-absolute.
In beauty, there is no such Ersatz. If the sublime is the confrontation of the
finite and the infinite in concrete form, then the beautiful is the perfect harmony of the
finite and the infinite in the same concrete form. If the sublime yearned outwards, away
from limitation, but remaining still in the objective realm, hence tending towards the
chaotic, beauty is inward-moving from the infinite to the finite, an imbuing of the
infinite with the finite. In concrete form, beauty is a kind of synthesis of concrete
limitation and infinity. The beautiful thus seals into itself that which is outside of itself.
It carries beneath its surfaces that which cannot possibly be limited, infinity, in limited
form. This antithesis-immanence in the form of a kind of 'shining through' of infinity182
in finitude is a fundamental premise of the art commodity in Schelling. As if to
underline the immanent commodity status of art, Schelling continues in §69 to seek for
the potences the sublime and beauty in art itself and not, as up to now, in the more
general terms of finitude and infinity:
§69. Der Gegensatz der beiden Einheiten in der Kunst fiir sich betrachtet kann
sich nur als Sty! and Manier ausdriicken.183
§69. This contrast of the two unities within art viewed in and for itself can express
itself only as style and mannersim.184
In Poesie this same unity is expressed as the naïve and the sentimental 185 where the
naïve allows nature or externality to appear and somehow shame art. This
overwhelming of the creative urge leads to a kind of basic reflective redistribution of
182 See Philosophie, 55-6, in particular the notion of das durchschimmern Lassen.
183 Philosophie, 118.
184 Philosophy, 94.
185 Philosophic', 114-7.
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nature through art, but remaining nonetheless as pure nature. The sentimental, on the
other hand, is the relentless subjectivity of the individual as the reflex for all he sees
and reproduces. In this sense, the naïve is the primitive or antiquarian impulse whereas
the sentimental is the 'modern' impulse:186
Es erhellt schon aus Schillers Abhandlung, daB der Grundcharakter der
Modemen im Gegensatz gegen die Alien als der sentimentale ausgedriickt
werden kann.187
It is clear from Schiller's essay that the basic character of modernity in contrast to
antiquity can be expressed as sentimentality.I88
This antithesis in Poesie or particularised creative production is, in Kunst, the antithesis
of Styl and Man ier.
This distinction has the same critical edge as that in poesy. Style is the perfect
unity, the resulting of an intuiting in concrete form, thus informing an immanent
objectivity, richly laden with the chaotic consequences of its opposite, infinity. Thus,
for art, as the real par excellence, synthesis takes place in the realm of the objective.
Mannerism, then, like sentimentality, is somehow imbued with a sense of
incompleteness. It strains outwards beyond the objective and yet its result has to be
objective:
Allgemein kOnnen wir nun die Manier im verwerflichen Sinne, demnach die
Manierirtheit, erklaren als emn Geltendmachen der besonderen Form statt der
allgemeinen. Da dem Kiinstler tiberhaupt nur die Form zu Gebot steht, so daB
er allein durch diese das Wesen erreicht, dem Wesen aber nur die absolute
Form adaquat ist, so lost sich mit der Mauler in diesem Sinne unmittelbar auch
das Wesen der Kunst selbst auf. Am meisten zeigt sich Manierirtheit in einem
Bestreben nach oberfldchlicher, nur ungeiibte Augen blendender Eleganz und
schwachlicher SchOnheit, in dem Geleckten, Verwachsenen mancher Werke,
deren einziges oder Hauptverdienst wenigstens das Saubere ist.189
In general we can now accordingly explain mannerism in the objectionable sense, and
accordingly as affectation, as an assertion of the particular form instead of the
186 The usage of the term 'modern' here is less weighted with eager progressivist cries of 'forward,
forward' than with expressions of dismay at the loss of a former glorious art. Having said this, the
critical edge here is not to be likened with the dogmatic atavism of a MOser in the Osnabrackische
Geschichte.
187 Philosophie, 116.
188 Philosophy, 93.
189 Philosophic, 120-1.
177
universal one. Since in general the artist only has as his disposal, such that he
expresses or achieves the essence only through form, and since only absolute form
itself fully corresponds to that essence, mannerism in this sense directly suspends the
very essence of art itself as well. Affectation manifests itself most often as a striving
for superficial elegance that bedn7zles only unpractised eyes, and toward insipid
beauty, and in the pale, washed-over element of some works whose only or main virtue
is at /east cleanliness.190
This implicit critique, once again, of Cartesian notions of visible conspicuity
and semantic clarity centres around the notion of particular form. If affectation or
mannerism is mesmerised by form in itself, as a particular that strives only for
objectivity, which, like sentimentality, it raises to the false heights of absoluteness and
then thinks itself to have 'returned', all the wiser, to objectivity, then it too is
incomplete. Instead, this time, of the creative urge feeling overwhelmed by the colossal
objectivity of nature, the inventive/productive urge poesy) is overwhelmed by the
fragmented particularity of form. In this sense, Schelling's apparent call for autonomy
in art is always mediated by an unwillingness to give in completely to absolute
immanence. This, in Schelling's system, would be to recognise the absolute impervious
'given' of the cameralist encyclopaedic order. If absolute immanence is always mediated
by the internally resonating semantics of the organic order, then autonomy exists only
as a posited norm around which Schelling's potences oscillate, returning never to rest,
never to absolute autonomy and yet recognising implicitly in each other the 'centre'
from which it is constantly displaced.
Taking this metaphor further, it becomes clear that autonomy never exists
absolutely: such a positing would mean the dreadful consequence of no dynamism and
absolute inertia: if one potence is a displacement from its centre, autonomy, then its
antithesis represents an equal but opposite displacement:
Diese Gegensatze gehOren alle zu einer und derselben Familie und gehen
sammtlich aus dem ersten Verhaltnill der Kunst als absoluter Form zu der
besondem Form hervor, die durch die Individuen gesetzt ist, durch welche sie
sich auBert.191
190 Philosophy, 95-6.
191 Philosophie, 122.
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These antitheses all belong to one and the same family and arise from that initial
relationship of art, as absolute form, to the particular form posited by the individuals
through which it expresses itself,192
Thus antithesis is also identity in so far as displacement from the absolute
meaninglessness of autonomy has the same value as its antithesis and, simultaneously,
is always negative to its opposite's positive. This is the unity of antithesis and identity
and constitutes the 'absolute point of identity'.
In art, divided into the potences Kunst and Poesie, the displaced antitheses are
all within the real series and yet, because they are antitheses within that series, they
contain both the real and the ideal. This distinction is, as we have already seen, is made
between the 'formative' [bildende] and 'verbal' [redende] arts.
On Antithesis
So far, the antitheses we have encountered appear to be levels of perception,
approaches which, in themselves, choose to evoke the absolute from different
perspectives without abandoning the absolute in and for itself. These displacements or
modes of determination are reflected in ever more specialist layers of particularised
antitheses. In art we have the initial given of art as a part of the real series; within this
series, all elements of the absolute result finally in concrete form. Thus the real series is
inherently productive, resulting in a product that has objective inviolate presence. It
might prove useful here to retrace the steps this argument has taken us through and, in
particular, to analyse more closely the relationships between the various antitheses or
potences.
The first antithesis in art in and for itself is that between poesy and art, the
latter being best represented by the original German Kunst so as not to confuse it with
absolute art:
Productive Modes:
1.Kunst an sich
Poesie	 Kunst
naive sentimental	 style mannerism
192 Philosophy, 96.
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These antitheses represent two fundamental modes of production. Poesie, a general
productiveness resulting in a highly specific materiality is characterised by a largely
Cartesian mode of production, striving for clarity, craftsmanship and self-evident
transparent meaning. In historical terms, this mode is close to notions of functionality
or art as instrumental in communication of something external to it. The normative
problematic of mimesis is thus a good example of poesitic production.
Kunst, on the other hand, whilst resulting again in a product, attempts to strain
beyond the particular into the universal. This mode of production is characterised by a
post-Cartesian approach to creation that imbues the objective with a kind of immanent
universal or infinite significance. In this case, art is not instrumental in nor a function
of some type of message outside of art. Kunst constitutes in itself a unity of self and
that very unity against which poesy is upheld in contrast and comparison. Whereas
poesy constructs a false externality in the guise of the Cartesian reductive nature,
Kunst takes this externality into itself as part of itself and transforms it.
The antitheses beauty and sublimity are not modes of production but rather
modes of intuiting or perceiving the products of poesy and Kunst:
Aesthetico-Productive Modes:
1.Kunst an sich
sublime	 beautiful.
In other words, the sublime and the beautiful are to be intuited in the object as a result
both of its productive mode and of an external mode of evaluative determination that is
brought to bear upon the product. In the sublime, the determining individual is, as
shown previously, overwhelmed by the colossal objectivity of the product. Confronted
with such magnitude, the individual 'casts' the product out and posits a pseudo-
spirituality or other-worldliness to replace the terrifying objectivity. This mystification
is the result of a struggle between finitude and infinity where they are in constant revolt
against each other. In musical terms, this might be likened to the new Italian music that
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strives for 'wonderful' and 'magical' effects, a Baumgartian sustaining of the
Aufrnerksamkeit through the management of contrasts.
In the beautiful, however, the identity of production and perception results in
the invocation of the aesthetic category of unity. The finite and the infinite are perfectly
balanced in the product such that no struggle, no mystification occurs. Rather than a
deification of the object, beauty results in the perfect objective form and thus a kind of
general insight or showing of a formal truth, the antithesis of mystification. There is no
fear of colossal objectivity, no false casting out into the other-world here. The beautiful
in this sense seems more fitted to the German canon of Mozart, Haydn and possibly
Beethoven which much German aesthetic theory was subsequently to praise for its
discursive unity, its perfect coincidence of form and expressive means.193
So far the two modes of determination have been shown to constitute the
productive modes constituting poesy and Kunst and the aesthetico-productive modes
constituting the sublime and beauty. Within each of these modes there are further
antitheses. As we have seen, for example, the antithesis of the naïve and the
sentimental are internal antitheses or potences of the potence poesy. As a division of a
quasi-Cartesian poesy, the nave and the sentimental are falsehoods or partial modes of
determination.
The naive, clearly shown as an 'antiquarian' or, for our purposes, corporatist
mode of operation is, as we have seen, a mode of production that makes nature speak
as nature in art. There is no mediation, no will to expression, no will to autonomy, but
an overriding strain for mimesis in its purest sense, absolute instrumentality. This
comes close to Gottsched's first and lowest mode of Nachahmung. The natural,
redistributed through art, is primary. It is easy to see parallels between the nave and
the sublime and, indeed, they are both the most partial of the antitheses. As its closest
division, the sublime is nonetheless not an exact match for naivete. Whereas the former
creates an 'outward striving' by mystifying the overwhelming elements of nature, the
193 Schelling makes very little reference to specific examples in the section on music in Chapter 4,
Philosophie, 132-150, and no reference here.
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latter cannot 'cast out' for no such alienation has taken place. In this sense the sublime
and the naive are separated not only by differing modes of determination, the one
representing a mode of the aesthetico-productive mode, the other a secondary
antithesis of the objectively productive mode; they are also separated by history,
naiveté belonging fundamentally to antiquarian art and the sublime representing a kind
of 'sickness' of modernity.
The 'opposite' of the nave, the sentimental, is the antithesis that evokes a kind
of overblown subjectivity and yet, strangely, within the productive mode. As
productive subjectivity, sentimentality seeks to constantly bridge the gap between the
chaste ego and the product. In this sense, it is a thoroughly modern mode of
determination in so far as it seeks to place the ego and its sensory palate at the centre
of production, violating the unity of finite and infinite. The infinite microcosm of the
ego places itself in the foreground as a reflexive unanimity of one and subsumes
objectivity into itself, begetting its final object as nonetheless a loathing of objectivity.
The sentimental is thus characterised by intoxication, a giving up of art to the sensory
response, to the colossal world of the alienated individual and its almost existential
realm. Rather than 'bridging' the gap between objectivity and ego, then, the sentimental
sets up subjectivity in opposition to objectivity; just as the finite and the infinite are in a
constant state of war in the sublime, so subjectivity revolts against the objective,
turning inwards, away from nature and externality in general.
In poesy or general productivity, then, there is a tendency towards either a
wholesale negation of self, a giving up of oneself to the inviolate necessity of nature or,
conversely, a wholesale negation of objectivity such that the self marginalises non-self
in a constant refinement of its own isolated impotence. The negativity of the general
productivity is thus clear to see - in neither the naive nor the sentimental is there a
unity of finite and infinite; poesy is a potence which sets its internal elements against
each other.
The contrasting balance of Kunst is most clearly demonstrated in its lower
potence style [Styr]. Of the divisions discussed thus far, style is perhaps the most
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complex. The seeming contradictions of Schelling's prose with regard to Styl are best
seen in terms of style's absoluteness. It is for Schelling a system of art in so far as it
represents the objective results of an artist's efforts in amalgam, or rather the salient
characteristics of a reasonably comprehensive output:
Der Styl, welchen sich der individuelle Kiinstler bildet, ist ftir ihn, was emn
Denlcsystem fiir den Philosophen im Wissen, oder flir den Menschen im
Handeln ist..194
The particular style an individual artist cultivates for himself is for him that which a
system of thought is for the philosopher within the realm of knowledge, or what action
is for an individual person.195
The absolute balance of style is, in essence, the continuum of characteristics
either in an individual output or, as a more general style, in a specific historical
movement. Style contains particularity, then, both in terms of the individual and in
terms of the epoch. As a systematic production, or, rather, the result of systematic
creativity, style represents art in its absolute creativity. From the particularity of the
individual or of time, style posits a general characteristic but, conversely, returns to or
throws into relief the very particularity from which it springs.
By contrast, the antithesis of style, mannerism [die Maniertheit, die Manied, is
imbalanced or incomplete. Like the sublime and the sentimental, there is implicit to
mannerism a construction of a false externality. This manufactured externality is this
time a kind of cold mirror-like clarity through which a subsumed nature, shackled to
visible conspicuity, strains to speak. The so-called 'cleanliness' [das Saubere] of this
mechanistic reduction is facilitated via the formulaic reduction of externality to a set of
general principles. This mode can be likened to Gottsched's second lowest form of
Nachahmung from which Scheibe constructs his polemic for Affektenlehre. The
products of the Affektenlehre are thus highly manierirt in so far as they generalise the
inviolate multiplicity of nature according to the false principle of an overriding, single,
unified and absolute reason. As we have seen, reason in Schelling participated in reality
nnn••....
194 Philosophie, 121
195 philosophy, 96.
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as an element if it, not as some umbrella mode of determination that is indivisible. This
fragmentation and specialisation of reason is achieved largely in this case by the
introduction of chaos or semantic indeterminacy into the equation. Mannerism is thus a
falsehood in so far as it mistakes the machinations of mimesis for the essence of artistic
endeavour, creating a false instrumentality for art.
To the extent that all these antitheses are present in each other, there are no
absolute divisions but, rather, an array of attitudes to the product and the process of
the production of art. In poesy, production becomes the primary motive whereas in
Kunst, the productive and the creative are unified. It is, however, too easy to see these
divisions as mere equivalencies of each other within different modes of determination.
Every level or mode of determination is characterised both by generality or equivalence
across the modes and by an inviolate particularity. In this sense, Schelling's philosophy
of art is wholly organic or complex in so far as each 'part' oscillates constantly between
absolute isolation or autonomy and absolute giving up of its particularity to the
indivisible whole. Thus, to return to the metaphor of the antiquarian gods, there exists
in each division both limitation by characteristics and absolute divinity:
In jeder der beiden Urformen der Kunst kehren nothwendig alle Einheiten, die
reale, die ideale, und die, wormn beide gleich sind, zurtick - Denn jede der
beiden Urforrnen ist an sich absolut, jede die ganze Idee.196
§75. In each of the two primal forms of art all unities necessarily recur, the real, the
ideal, and the one in which the two are equal, for each of the two primal forms is in
itself absolute; each is the entire idea.197
The final set of modes of determination is that of Darstellung or
'representation' as shown in allegory, schema, and symbol, where symbol, as we have
said, evokes a unity of the infinite and the finite in concrete form. These lead on to the
various genres of art, which Schelling recognises in the following order:
196 Philosophie, 130-1.
197 Philosophy, 103.
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Divisions__sS_th	 rgitatel_a_1111_igi.L...uil_c- representation•  in r — enr -
a: matter - the formative arts:
the real in art
[real > > > > > > > > > > > > > »ideal]
a: music	 b :painting	 c: plastic arts
b: light - the verbal arts:
the ideal in art
[real > > > > > > > > > > > > > »ideal]
a: lyric	 b: epic	 c: drama
where a = allegory, b = schema and c = symbol
On Indifference and Music
Before proceeding to a detailed analysis of Schelling's pronouncements on
music, we must first pause to consider the nature of indifference. So far, it has been
described as absolute identity, a wholeness or non-separateness of antitheses. Can this,
then, be likened to our metaphorical centre of autonomy? For there to be an absolute
identity of opposites, there must, first of all, be that displacement which gives
opposites. Thus, displacement from the centre is a prerequisite for identity. The
'centre-point' or moment prior to displacement, is merely a theoretical Stills tand or
point of inertia before philosophy commences. Autonomy or inviolate immanence is
thus, in totality or extremity, something which violates philosophy and the signification
of the world according to the organic principle. It is a centre at which the oscillating
absolute never rests.
If indifference can be likened to the simple non-directional distance of the two
oscillations from the centre as mere displacement, then difference might be likened to
direction. Thus indifference is the acceptance of positive and negative as part of an
absolute cycle of the monotonous pendulum. It does not exist in art except beyond the
sphere of the merely generic which, in these terms seeks to differentiate and is thus
directional; no genre can encompass the non-directional unity of all in its particularity.
Each genre is partial and yet contains some degree of indifference, some positing of the
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possibility of the universal and, ultimately, the indifferent, as an organic remnant of the
larger structure. In Schelling's organicism, the partial conflation of antitheses is
motivated by an unwillingness to accept the totality of any extreme and, on the other
hand, the refusal to deflate such extremities in the interest of a neat classical system of
ordered visible conspicuity.
It is clear from chapter 4, the second part of the Philosophie, 198 that of all the
arts Schelling is least comfortable with music. And for this reason, little or no mention
is given of any specific examples. This does not violate the expressed intention of this
work - to find a metaphysical basis for the signification of art. A profound
understanding of this point is demonstrated in the title of Schueller's article, 'Schelling's
theory of the metaphysics of music'.199
How does Schelling construct a metaphysical argument for music? If
metaphysics is that 'discourse' which seeks to create inviolate absolutes or universal
'givens' for its objects of scrutiny, then the attempt here would seem to be to attain the
very essence of music and to fix it so that all musical truths can be judged by this
fundamental centre. This ontological drive, fundamentally at odds with Kant's rather
epistemological urges, excludes any detailed analysis of genres or styles. Although
Schelling gives numerous examples of works of art in his discussions of painting,
sculpture, poetry and drama, he gives none here. Even though this section is termed
the 'particular part' particularities are limited in music to purely metaphysical detail; the
more detailed accounts of the other arts merely suggest that Schelling is more
comfortable with the figurative or verbal art forms, a condition not uncommon
amongst philosophers.
In seeking for music's essence, Schelling is forced to give account of the
'scientific' or physical properties of music and to attempt to account for these in his
broader transcendental system. He begins with the following proposition:
198 'Besonderer Theil der Philosophie der Kunst' 132ff.
199 In The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XV/4: June 1957.
186
§76. Die Indifferenz der Einbildung des Unendlichen ins EndEche rein als
Indifferenz aufgenommen ist Kiang. Oder: In der Einbildung des Unendlichen
ins Endliche kann die Indifferenz, als Indifferenz, nur als Kiang hervortreten.2m
§76. The indifference of the informing of the infinite into the finite, taken purely as
indifference, is sonority. Or, within the informing of the infinite into the finite,
indifference can emerge only as sonority.201
In the real series (infinite into finite) then, the final result is the finite, which, in
art, is represented by the product. Yet, within this potence, the real, there is a kind of
indifference possible. This comes as no surprise if all potences contain each other
subsumed within:
In dem zunachst vorhergehenden Satz ist bewiesen, daB sich jede der beiden
Urformen in sich aufs neue und zwar in alle Formen differenziirt. Anders
ausgedriickt: jede der beiden Urformen nimmt alle andern Formen oder
Einheiten als Potenz auf und machen sie zu ihrem Symbol oder Besondern.202
The immediately preceding proposition proved that each of the two primal forms in
itself differentiates ever anew into all other forms. Expressed in another way: each of
the two primal forms takes up all other forms or unities as potence and makes them
into its symbol or particular.203
Thus, if these potences can be 'taken up' by each other, then there exists the possibility
of an internal or partial indifference, an inference of indifference so to speak, that,
within the real series, is termed 'sonority' by Schelling. He explains this in the following
manner. If the real series results in a product, it results in matter; matter is, so to
speak, an expression of the real series. And yet, this result, the seeming indifference of
real and ideal in concrete form, is too material, too corporeal, to encompass any
indifference gesture that is 'indifference as indifference' or a point of identity between
the two elements finitude and infinitude. If the real series represents an act of
implantation of infinitude into finitude, mere matter is insufficient as indifference within
the real. Schelling solves this problem with an outrageous claim. First, insofar as
indifference is a perfect form, it expresses itself in corporeality as magnetism. By this,
Schelling means that the forces of magnetism encompass all the qualities of abstraction
200 Pltilosophie, 132.
201 Philosophy, 107.
202 Philosophie, 132.
203 Philosophy, 107.
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and the ephemeral that indifference seems to require. And yet, this indifference in
corporeality is again insufficient insofar as it is 'bound to the particular body'; it is too
closely associated with pure corporeality. Regarding indifference, Schelling makes the
following point:
Rein als solche und als Indifferenz ist er [der Akt der Einpflanzung1 204 sie nur,
inwiefern er von dem KOrper abgesondert, als Form fiir sich ist, als absolute
Form.205
It is pure as such and is indifference only to the extent that it is separated from the
body and is a form unto itself, as an absolute form.206
This is the claim that calls Schelling's up to now reasonably coherent system into
question. If indifference is the identity of two antitheses, then the indifference must
contain both corporeality and ideality. If it is separated [abgesondert] from the body,
then it can no longer participate in indifference. The de-emphasis of corporeality might
even suggest that Schelling's system of even-handed indifferences is a complete sham.
Yet the solution that Schelling gives to his apparent inconsistency is brilliant:
Diese ist nur im Kiang, denn dieser ist einerseits lebendig - fiir sich anderseits
eine bloBe Dimension in der Zeit, nicht aber im Raume.207
The latter is found only in sonority, for sonority is on the one hand living and active -
in and for itself - and on the other hand a mere dimension in time, though not in
space.2"
Sonority209 can work as an indifference in so far as it is the result of an agitation or
excitement of the corporeal body, the result of a wholly corporeal movement. The
result of a resonance or oscillation leaps from the body and takes on a kind of temporal
autonomy which is nonetheless linked fundamentally to the corporeal.
204 The 'er' here refers to the preceding remarks regarding the 'act of implantation of the infinite into
the finite.' See Philosophie, 132, Philosophy, 107.
205 Philosophie, 133.
206 Philosophy, 108.
207 Philosophie, 133.
208 Philosophy, 108.
209 Klang is difficult to translate exactly. Stotts 'sonority' is probably as close as we can get in
English. Of most importance is the notion embedded in the German term of constant resonance, as we
shall see.
188
For one thing, the ability of a body to initiate sonority, its resonance, is
inextricably premised by its coherence. Thus a coherent body will spring readily into
agitation/oscillation and cast out sonority in a pure unfettered form. If this unfettered
form is the basis on which it acquires indifference status, then coherence empowers
indifference in the corporeal realm. If magnetism is a kind of fettered indifference, then
sonority represents magnetism in its abstracted essence, that is, as free:
In der Coharenz oder dem Magnetismus an und fiir sich war aber das ideelle
Princip ganz tibergangen ins KOrperliche. Die Forderung aber war, daB die
Einbildung der Einheit in die Vielheit rein als solche, als Form ftir sich
erscheine.21°
In coherence or magnetism in and for themselves, however, the ideal principle passed
over completely into the corporeal. The demand, however, was that the informing of
unity into multiplicity appear purely as such, as form in and for itself.211
Thus, in sonority, magnetism is freed and set adrift in its own abstraction as its own
essence:
DieB aber geschieht nur im Kiang, den dieser = Magnetismus, aber von der
KOrperlichIceit abgesondert, gleichsam das An-sich des Magnetismus selbst, die
Substanz.212
This occurs only in sonority, for sonority = magnetism, though detached from
corporeality, as it were the essential nature itself of magnetism, the substance.213
Schelling now draws on the harmonic series to demonstrate the credentials of the
indifference of sonority. Sonority, first of all, is to be differentiated from Scholl and
Laut, rendered as 'resonance' and 'sound' respectively by Stott. In Schelling's use,
confusing more normative distinctions between the two terms, Scholl is the generic
term. This being the case, Lout is therefore a kind of incomplete sub-category of
Scholl, interrupted, dissonant. Kiang, on the other hand, also a sub-category of Scholl,
should be seen as continuous resonance which is constant and uninterrupted. Thus,
Kiang is the higher of the two sub categories insofar as each tone in Kiang represents
210 Philosophie,133.
211 Philosophy, 108.
212 Philosophic, 133.
213 Philosophy, 108.
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the perfect balance of a number of simultaneously sounding tones, our 'fundamental'
and 'overtones':
Wir hOren narnlich in dem Kiang nicht bloB den einfachen Ton, sondem
eingehiillt gleichsam oder eingeboren in diesen eine Menge von TOnen, und
zwar so, daB die consonirenden Oberwiegen, anstatt daB dort die dissonirenden.
...Die Vielheit, welche in der Coharenz als solcher mit der Einheit verbunden
ist, wird also in dem Kiang eine lebendige Vielheit, eine sich selbst affirmirende
Vielheit.214
Within sonority we do not merely hear the simple tone itself. Rather, we hear clothed,
as it were, or imbedded in it a whole array of tones, and we hear them such that the
consonant ones predominate, instead of the dissonant ones, as in the other case... The
multiplicity that is combined in the coherence as such with the unity thus becomes a
living multiplicity within sonority, a multiplicity that affirms itself.215
The multiplicity of the consonant tone is thus a significant feature of sonority's
indifference. The coherence of the body initiates a resonance that is consonant, a
hierarchy of harmonics which constitute a set of proportions. Conversely, when a body
is agitated, it resounds sonorously in order to return to a state of rest, striving for its
most perfect state of coherence, as absolute material. We can say, therefore, that
sonority as a hierarchy is indifference, and yet as an agitation it is a striving for
indifference. It is both process and result:
Bedingung des Schalls ist daher, daB der KOrper aus der Indifferenz gesetzt
werde, welches durch Beriihrung eines anderen geschieht.216
The prerequisite of resonance is thus that the body be posited outside of indifference.
This occurs through contact with another body.217
Sonority, then, is both indifference and striving. It thus represents a complex
phenomenon within the real series. This 'complexity' is based around the presence of
extremes within a coherent framework oscillating between autonomy and
instrumentality within the absolute. This is the organic model we have already
discussed as applied to music. This organicism, based around Schelling's perceived
structure of the organic world, strives for a dynamic model that has both self-
--
214 Philosophie, 133-4.
215 Philosophy, 108.
216 Philo sophie, 134.
211 Philosophy, 108.
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awareness and yet still participates in larger structures. Sonority, on one level, is a
complex organic phenomenon that fundamentally problematises Cartesian conspicuity
and thus has a kind of richness. 218 As if to underline the metaphorical use of the term
'organic' in his system, Schelling proceeds now to admit that in reality sonority, as
organic indifference, is only partial. It is, for one thing, merely inorganic, it is not
animated in itself:
Wir miissen unmittelbar mit dieser Ansicht des Klangs die des Geheirs
verbinden. - Die Wurzel des GehOrsinns liegt schon in der anorganischen Natur,
im Magnetismus. Das GehOrorgan selbst ist nur der zur organischen
Vollkommenheit entwickelte Magnetismus.219
We must add to this view of sonority that of the sense of hearing. The root of the sense
of hearing resides within anorganic nature, within magnetism. The hearing organ is
merely magnetism that has developed to organic perfection.220
Thus as a metaphorically organic or complex phenomenon, sonority attains perfection
only in the aesthetico-productive mode where sonority is perceived in its multiplicity
by the hearing organ. Music, therefore, the product of controlled agitation of
numerous bodies, gains organic complexity upon perception. And yet, because this
perception is somehow implicit in the product, the product itself takes on a kind of
self-fulfilling function. Of course, music is created in order to be heard, but this
assumption is made at the outset, built into the creative process such that the very
material of music, sonority or essential magnetism demands perception. But, having
said this, because the 'eventual' perception of the work is implicit to music, the music
itself somehow exists
......../r
218 This 'richness is captured by Schelling with his term Reiz meaning literally 'charm'.
219 Philosophic, 134.
220 Philosophy, 109.
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beyond real perception as idealised perception. Whilst Schelling never asserts the
above overtly, this position is implicit here. It is as if sonority and the sense of hearing
are united before any agitation of bodies begins. Probably for this reason music seems
to be the most material of all art forms:
§77. Die Kunstform, in welcher die reale Einheit rein als solche zur Potenz,
zum Symbol wird, ist Musik.221
§77. The art form in which the real unity as such becomes potence and symbol is
music.222
The unity of the sense of hearing and sonority is thus an indifference of the inorganic
and the organic and as such belongs fundamentally in the realm of the real. In this
sense it might be said to be the most autonomous of the arts in that its internal
antitheses are always beholden to corporeality at some level. Thus music creates
indifference in concrete form completely at the level of the real. Thus Schelling is able
to assert that it is the only art form that presents the real series as a symbol of itself; it
is the only art form that creates a meaningful complexity within the material realm.
The next fundamental element of music that must be addressed for Schelling is
its form. As generalised or essentialised magnetism, sonority cannot participate in mere
spatiality. It must participate in the universal dimension of time. This Schelling terms
the necessary form of music, die Succession. With each passing moment, a possibility
either dissipates into nothing or becomes an event. Time is thus the eternal passing of
infinity into finitude. In this sense, it is the real dimension par excellence.
This real dimension, then, is the lattice against which the real series moves
towards result. But time in the musical sense is not time in actuality but merely a
proportional representation of actual linear time. Thus musical time is linear time as
form, somehow abstracted from reality and presented in its formal essence. The
apparent suitability of music for 'stirring the soul' can be seen to stem from its use of
abstracted or essential time for consciousness of linear time bears striking resemblance
to abstract musical time. Both are concerned with linearity, with the passing of one
221 Philosophie, 135.
222 Philosophy, 109.
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moment into the next, but neither consciousness of time nor musical time are, in
reality, accurate demonstrations of time in actuality. On the one hand, consciousness of
time involves no real universal unit to measure the passing of time - clocks may
provide a check, but actual consciousness of time's passing is a constant process of
estimation - and, on the other hand, musical time is subject to all the inaccuracies of
performance, the non-universality of speed between performances and the inevitable
shifts in the relationship between such musical units as bars and the 'actual' passing of
time as real linearity.
The profound set of parallels between time consciousness and musical time
leads Schelling to invoke the age old Pythagorean notions of music as proportion and,
its corollary, the notion of soul as number:
Die Musik ist emn reales Selbstzdhlen der Seele - schon Pythagoras hat die Seele
einer Zahl verglichen - aber eben deBwegen wieder em n bewuBtloses, sich selbst
wieder vergessendes ahlen.223
Music is the real self-numbering of the soul - Pythagoras already compared the soul to
a number - yet for precisely that reason it is also an unconscious, self-forgetting
numbering or counting,224
Furthermore, insofar as rhythm is the basic element of music that divides the
continuum at various periods, we can see rhythm as an emphasising or outlining of
abstract musical time. In so far as musical periods are for Schelling regular, then
rhythm is the periodic subdivision of the homogeneity of abstract musical time:
Denn, urn mich jetzt zum Behuf des Beweises nur des allgemeinsten Begriffs
von Rhythmus zu bedienen, so ist er in diesem Sinn nichts anderes als eine
periodische Eintheilung des Gleichartigen, wodurch das EinfOrmige desselben
mit Mannichfaltigkeit, die Einheit also mit Vielheit verbunden wird.225
If for the sake of truth I may employ the most general concept of rhythm, then rhythm
in this sense is nothing more than the periodic subdivision of homogeneity whereby the
uniformity of the latter is combined with variety and thus unity with multiplicity.226
223 Pitii0SOphie, 135.
224 philosophy, 109.
225 Philosophie, 136. Emphasis added.
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If we take Stott's translation of der Gleichartige as 'homogeneity' to be appropriate,
then rhythm is a type of multiplicity, a basic reordering or breaking up of homogeneity
around periodical cessations of unity. This basic type of rhythm, of single points
equally spaced out, is seen by Schelling as the lowest form, or the most imperfect kind
of rhythm. A higher form emerges when periodicity emerges within those equally
spaced points, with the use of weak and strong:
Eine hOhere Art der Einheit in der Mannichfaltigkeit ist zunU.chst dadurch
erreichbar, daB die einzelnen Tone oder Schlage nicht gleich stark, sondern
abwechselnd nach einer gewissen Regel, starke und schwache angegeben
werden. Hiermit tritt als nothwendiges Element in den Rhytiunus der Tat em,
der auch iiberall gesucht wird, wo emn Identisches verschieden, mannichfaltig
werden soil, und der nun wieder einer Menge von Veranderungen fahig ist,
wodurch in die EinfOrmigkeit der Aufeinanderfolge eine noch grOBere
Abwechslung kommt.227
A higher kind of unity within multiplicity is acquired first of all lithe individual tones
or beats are not sounded with equal strength, but rather alternate according to a certain
regularity as strong and weak ones. With this the necessary element of tact 228 enters
into rhythm. This, too, is sought wherever something identical is to become
different or varied, and it is capable of numerous variations itself whereby an
even greater variety enters into the uniformity of the sequence.229
The relationship of rhythm to time is thus a rather complex one. In the lower
form of rhythm, time is uniformly interrupted, dissipated, by a set of points or beats
that impose upon it regulation that moulds our consciousness of it. In this sense, this
base mode of rhythm, mere equidistant divisions, provide consciousness with a
framework against which to place less unitary or regular events. Beyond this crude
regulation we acquire through the systematic cycles of strong or weak beats the so-
called bar. At this point, regulation becomes broader and each cycle consists of smaller
unitary points, each equidistant, but differentiated by a kind of periodic grammar. Each
beat has a higher function within the bar cycle.
This second, higher, ordering of time, this second mode of rhythm, is
significant in that it not only regulates but it signifies:
227 Philosophie, 137.
228 'Bar'.
229 Philosophy, 111.
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Allgemein nun angesehen ist Rhythm us iiberhaupt Verwandlung der an sich
bedeutungslosen Succession in eine bedeutende. Die Succession rein als solche
hat den Charakter der Zufalligkeit. Verwandlung des Zufdlligen der Succession
in Nothwendigkeit = Rhythmus, wodurch das Ganze nicht mehr der Zeit
unterworfen ist, sondem sie in sich selbst hat.230
In general, rhythm is viewed as the transformation of an essentially meaningless
succession into a meaningful one. Succession or sequence purely as such possesses the
character of chance. The transformation of the accidental nature of a sequence into
necessity = rhythm, whereby the whole is no longer subjected to time but rather
possesses time within itself.231
This transformation or metamorphosis [Verwandlung] of the 'meaningless' into the
meaningful involves a sequence, via cyclical repetition, of a small unit, the bar,
acquiring or taking time up into itself as abstract. This 'time', as we have said, does not
constitute the passing of real time. Signification, then, involves here a kind of
absorption of time into the fabric of the sequence such that time has immanent
presence within music:
Artikulation der Musik ist Bildung in eine Reihe von Gliedem, so daB mehrere
Tone zusammen wieder emn Glied ausmachen, welches nicht zufallig oder
willldirlich von andem unterschieden ist.232
Articulation within music is the forming of units into a series such that several tones
together constitute yet another unit, one that is not accidentally or arbitrarily separated
from others.233
This is the beginning of the sketching of a system of musical signification based on ever
increasing levels of rhythmic complexity, a hierarchy of mutually related, organic,
pulses. From the single regularity of the beat to the bar cycle of two or more such
beats is the first Anschauung or Hervorbringung of the system. From there, Schelling
posits upwards in typical organicist style:
Dieser noch immer bloB einfache Rhythmus, der darin besteht, daB die Folge
der TOne in gleich lange Glieder eingetheilt wird, wovon jedes durch etwas
Empfindbares unterschieden von dem andem, hat dennoch schon sehr vielerlei
Arten, z. B. er kann gerad oder ungerad seyn u. s. w. Aber mehrere Takte
zusammen kOnnen wieder zu Gliedem vereinigt werden, welches eine hOhere
230 Philosophic, 137.
231 Philosophy, 11 1.
232 Philosophic, 137.
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Potenz des Rhythmus - zusammengesetzter Rhythmus ist (in der Poesie das
Distichon),234
This as yet merely simple rhythm - consisting of a tonal sequence divided into units of
equal length, each of which is distinguished perceptibly from the other - can
nonetheless display a wide variety of types. For example, it can be even or uneven, and
so on. Yet several tacts [bars] together can be further combined into units that then
constitute a higher potence of rhythm - complex rhythm (in poesy: the couplet).235
The positing of the phrase as the next level of ordering is then propounded across even
larger regulatory units:
Endlich kOnnen auch aus diesen schon zusammengesetzten Gliedern wieder
grOBere (Perioden) gemacht werden (in der Poesie die Strophe) u. s. f. bis zu
dem Punkt, wo diese game Ordnung und Zusammensetzung ftir den inneren
Sinn noch iibersehbar bleibt.236
Finally, larger units (phrases) can be made from these complex units (in poesy: the
stanza), and so on until this entire structure and composition still remains
comprehensible to the inner poetic sense.237
The organic credentials of this system of ever larger units, each referring to both its
smaller member units and the larger unit to which it belongs, are clearly demonstrated
here. In the manner of Goethe's Urpflanze or Wackenroder's OrakelhOhlen, there lies
in Schelling's organic model a hidden depth, a kind of Gestalt structure. The mature
language of the so-called classical style emerged as a complex, organic language that
seemed to draw the listener into it, sustaining the Baumgartian Aufmerksamkeit by the
careful control of contrast and unity. The cadence-articulated phrase, consisting of its
smaller units, the bars, making up, in turn, the larger sections seemed to afford a
plausible unity of expressive means and semantic content. The signifier itself seemed at
last capable of carrying an immanent signified within it._ This is the most significant
claim of Schelling's system for music so far.
Immanent signification, through the workings of the bar-phrase-stanza-section
hierarchy, represents a fundamental challenge to functionalist aesthetics of music. Such
aesthetics, including the mimesis aesthetic, had already been implicitly challenged by
234 Philosophic, 138.
235 Philosophy, 111.
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the German instrumental music of the late eighteenth century. Despite the metaphysical
nature of Schelling's argument, its closeness to the Baumgartian debate is clear.
Aufmerksamkeit is now sustained not merely by contrasts, but by the organic interplay
of homogeneity and its periodic cessation. Thus, Schelling now claims rhythm as prime
element of music.
Der Rhythmus ist die Musik in der Musik - Denn die Besonderheit der Musik
ist eben darauf gegriindet, daB sie Einbildung der Einheit in die Vielheit ist Da
nun nach §79 der Rhythmus nichts anderes ist als diese Einbildung selbst in der
Musik, so ist er die Musik in der Musik, und also der Natur dieser Kunst
gemdB das Herrschende in ihr.238
Rhythm is the music within music, for the particularity of music is based precisely on
its character as the informing of unity into multiplicity. Since according to §79 rhythm
is nothing more than its informing within music itself, it is thus the music within music,
and, according to the nature of this art form, is the predominating feature within it.239
As a 'music within music,' then, rhythm constitutes the most primal of music's
elements. It is that element which most closely participates in organic structure:
...keine Erfindung scheint den Menschen unmittelbarer dutch die Natur selbst
inspirirt zu seyn. 240
...no human invention appears to be more immediately or directly inspired by
nature.241
This inspiration by nature is not some obscure form of mimesis. Nature's proportions,
her structures or forms directly inspire the organicism of the late eighteenth century
musical language only in so far as these structures serve as a parallel. Music does not
participate in mere Nachahmung but aspires to a parallel complexity and thus to an
organic autonomy, to the complex ability to sustain the Baumgartian Aufmerksamkeit.
The music within music, then, brings an internal time, a multiplicity and a unity
and, finally, a hierarchy of unitary levels resonating across the total musical structure.
Immanence is served then by an increased complexity of conception, a striving for
internal structural integrity and organic unity; only when these organic requirements
.n•n•n,. 
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are fulfilled can the signifier and the signified unite such that the signifier itself bears
the message, bears the external as an integral element of the internal.
In Schelling's emergent semiology of music we see, not surprisingly, significant
parallels with his pronouncements on language in chapter three. He seeks to align
language, in some kind of abstraction, with the ideal (hence the 'idealism' of the verbal
arts):
§73. Die Ideale Einheit als AuflOsung des Besondern ins Allgemeine, des
Concreten in Begriff, wird objelctiv in Rede oder Sprache... 242
§73. The ideal unity, as the resolution of the particular into the universal, of the
concrete into the concept , becomes objective in speech or language. ••243
Thus, the ideal process from the concrete to concept, as resolved into objective form,
is language. Forgetting the 'objective form' for the moment, language in abstract can be
seen as roughly equivalent to the notion of the signifier. Therefore, the objective
resolution of the Schellingian signifier into 'concrete form' can be likened to the more
Saussurean signifier, although it is clearly not wholly synonymous. Therefore, where
language signifies or gives meaning is where the transformation of the Schellingian
signifier into signified occurs, it does so in order, finally, to reach the ultimately
objective, the referent. Thus, as an objective form itself, language too can represent a
referent for itself, referred to by a signifier from within itself. Hence, the Saussurean
closure of language into a self-contained system is not an equivalent of the Schellingian
semiology. In particular, Schelling's notion of an 'externality' within, of the referent
somehow deposited into the heart of the signifying agent, is at odds with Saussure's
semiology.
Where the Schellingian signifier and the signified unite in music, where the
'ideality' of the musical language and the reality of the musical signified244 unite such
that the one is inseparable from the other, music remains stubbornly self-referential,
242 Philosophie, 126.
243 Philosophy, 99.
244 And here there is the emergence, after Gottsched's apparently simple division, of layers of
mediation between sign and thing. Hence Schelling's embryonic semiology strains for the middle
ground represented in the later Saussurean sign, signifier, signified where 'sign' can represent both a
relatively 'material' element and also a somewhat 'ideal' or conceptual element.
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excelling at recreating in sound those propensities of language for self reflection. In a
sense, the referent of music is the music itself, and itself only. The objective status of
music in Schelling's system, as the 'most real of the real arts,' can be explained, then, in
terms of the absence of an overt referent. Indeed, the so-called unity of real and ideal
consists in music of a one-sided unity, a unity within the real series since the internal
referent precludes a general or ideal result to the process of Anschauung: if music is
internally significant, then it can never abstract, never generalise or aspire beyond its
corporeal realm, never reach beyond the real series.
This materiality of musical rhythmic matter is close to the Schopenhauerian
suggestion that rhythm expresses in archetypal form the Wille zum Leben. As the
black, inviolate force of life, the sibling that torments human existence, Schopenhauer's
Wille or 'will' can be shown in music's primal element, rhythm. Whilst Schelling's
metaphysic is free from this kind of melancholy, there is a kind of ultra-materiality, a
profound absence of verbal or figurative resonance in both models.
In contrast to the material element of rhythm, Schelling now turns to the
second element or potence of music, that of 'modulation'. This is defined thus:
...In dieser Beziehung ist nun Modulation die Kunst, die Identitat des Tons,
welcher in dem Ganzen eines musikalischen Werks der herrschende ist, in der
qualitativen Differenz ebenso zu erhalten, wie durch den Rhythmus dieselbe
Identitat in der quantitativen Differenz beobachtet wird.245
In this respect modulation is the art of maintaining the identity of the one tone that is
the predominating one within the whole of the musical work, to maintain it in the
qualitative difference just as through rhythm itself the same identity is observed in the
quantitative clifference.246
If rhythm is quantitative difference, then, modulation is qualitative difference. Each
tone requires its 'quality' in terms of the general framework of modulation. Clearly this
does not mean 'modulation' merely in the sense of movement from one to another tonal
area but means everything from an essentially ontological notion of notes or tones as
having quality or character in themselves through to broader notions of tonal functions
,,n..n10n•
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within a relative-function order to the broadest notions of tonal function and large-
scale hierarchy. In general, then, we can see modulation to mean the intuition and
maintenance of a tonal hierarchy sustaining the dominance of the tonic. Indeed,
Schelling de-emphasises the 'modern' sense of modulation in the next sentence,
preferring a static, and, as we have said, ontological model for pitch functions:
Ich mull mich in dieser Allgemeinheit ausdriicken, weil Modulation in der
Kunstsprache so verschiedene Bedeutungen hat, und damit nicht etwas von der
Bedeutung sich einmische, die sie nur in der modemen Musik hat. Jene
kiinstliche Art, durch die sogenannten Ausweichungen und Schltisse Gesang
und Harmonie durch mehrere Tone hindurchzufiihren, zuletzt aber wieder auf
den ersten Haupten zu kommen, gehOrt schon ganz der modemen Kunst all.247
I must express myself in generalities here because modulation has so many different
meanings in the language of art, and I do not want any of that particular meaning that
modulation possesses only within modern music to suggest itself here. That artificial
method of guiding song and harmony through several tones by means of so-called
modulation and cadences, and of finally returning to the main tone, belongs to the
modern art of music.248
This strange comment would seem to suggest that Schelling's organicist musical
aesthetic is confined to rhythm, or rather that his organicist notions of harmony are not
as far reaching as those of rhythm. His insistence on the ontological function of the
tonic, his disdain for complex tonal structures and his dismay at the propensity of so-
called 'modem' music for ever more frequent and distant movements away from the
tonic suggest a fundamental conservatism.
This might be explained by the distortive significance musicology places on the
Mozart-Haydn-Beethoven canon for this period. Although Haydn and Mozart had
composed some fine examples of the mature classical style by 1804, the year Schelling
completed Philosophic, the Mozart-Haydn legacy seemed almost to have faded into
obscurity. The so-called galant style of such lesser known symphonists as Anton
Koz'eluh, Jan Kr'ititel Van'hal, Franz Anton Hoffmeister and Franz !Cram& seemed in
Vienna, for example, to momentarily overshadow the likes of Mozart and Haydn
completely. The comparatively successful commercial careers of these galant
../....,
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composers as compared with Mozart is attested to in Gerber.249 Also at this time,
Beethoven had, admittedly, produced his first symphonies including the Eroica which
did not receive performance until 1807 in Leipzig. It is extremely difficult to know
exactly how much of this music was accessible in Jena and Wiirzburg, where Schelling
wrote Philosophie. The small town of Jena, in particular, was probably somewhat
removed from the mainstream musical culture of the big centres. 250 Similarly, it is
unlikely that much if any Beethoven was played in Jena, although chamber recitals are,
of course, not out of the question.
Certainly, from the remarks Schelling has made so far, he would seem to be
very unsympathetic to middle period Beethoven with its use of alternative dominants,
its extended, meandering development sections and its juxtaposition of ever remoter
tonal areas. The apparent conservatism of Schelling's music aesthetic in this regard is
extremely difficult to understand. If, as we have already suggested, Schelling's dislike
of more 'modem' tonality is due merely to his unfamiliarity with the new music due to
its non-availability in the small towns of Prussian Jena and Bavarian Wiirzburg, then
we can ignore it as merely a quirky part of his system that has Little bearing on the
major structures. But, on the other hand, if Schelling's apparent conservatism is real
and founded on a systematic exclusion of modernism from his system, we must
question the extent to which he represents the radical culture of the Friihromantiker
accurately. In the context of his radical immanent model for musical rhythm and his
insistent avoidance of concrete examples, however, Schelling's contribution to the
emergence of a discourse on art as self-regarding, remains significant. Indeed, whilst
those places in Philosophie where Schelling makes overt empirical critique of specific
examples are often excruciatingly amateur, his general system is highly useful in its
249 Gerber, Ernst Ludwig, Historisch-biographisches Lexikon der Tonkanstler, modem edition in 4
volumes, publ. Othmar Wessely, Graz 1966-9. Gerber (1746-1819) is interesting in that he undertook
one of the most extensive surveys of musicians in the early nineteenth century.
250 My analysis of the Eitner index, for example, places Jena at rank 26 for 1750-1800 and rank 19
for 1800-1850. This suggests a somewhat small scale participation in the commercial dissemination of
sheet music.
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delineation of general metaphysical principles of the musical culture of the
Gelehrtenstand at this time.
Indeed, as if to counter the apparent conservatism of Schelling's notions of
Modulation, Schelling proceeds to his notion of melody. It comes as no surprise that
Schelling sees melody as the indifference of rhythm and modulation. On the one hand,
melody arches between cadences, and is thus profoundly connected with periodicity
and, in the final analysis, rhythm, and on the other hand it is fundamentally concerned
with the succession of tones, each imbuing a qualitative character to the melodic line.
The fundamental, primal significance of rhythm which Schelling likens to 'music
within music' is to be contrasted with modulation which Schelling likens to 'painting
within music'. Rhythm provides a vehicle for self-consciousness whereas modulation is
a vehicle for feeling and judgement. The indifference of theses two internal potences is
'intuition' or 'imagination' as shown below:
Man kann also sagen: der Rhythmus = erster Dimension, Modulation = zweiter,
Melodie = dritter. Durch den ersten 1st die Musik ftir die Reflexion und das
SelbstbewuBtseyn, durch die zweite fiir die Empfindung und das Urtheil, durch
die dritte fiir Anschauung und Einbildungskraft bestimmt.251
One can thus say: rhythm = first dimension, modulation = second, melody = third. The
first determines or qualifies music for reflection and self-consciousness, the second for
feeling and judgement, and the third for intuition and the power of imagination.252
If the two potences rhythm/modulation are music and painting within music, then
melody as Anschauung und Einbildungskraft is the plastic element in music. To
juxtapose these two elements within the potences of the real and the ideal gives a clear
indication of the organic unity of music's three elements. This juxtaposition begins with
an historical point already made in Chapter 3:
Inwiefern nun das Ganze der Musik, demnach Rhythmus, Modulation und
Melodie, gemeinschaftlich wieder dem Rhythmus untergeordnet, insofern ist
rhythmische Musik. Eine solche war die Musik der Alten.253
251 philosophie, 140.
252 Philosophy, 112.
253 plalosophie, 140.
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Insofar as the entirety of music - hence rhythm, modulation and melody - might be
subordinated collectively to rhythm, we have rhythmic music. Such was the music of
antiquity.254
As we have already seen in Schelling's proto-romantic or friihromantische analysis of
antiquity, there is a kind of naive acceptance of nature as nature such that art and
mythology are somehow non-proactive responses to antiquarian naïveté. Thus, in such
moments, the real persists to such an extent that religious abstractions are practically
impossible. The real worship of antiquity was the anthropomorphism of the natural
elements in a communal divinity of individually character-limited archetypes. This is
mythology. In such a culture, it stands to reason in Schelling's system, that music
should be beholden to the real principle:
Es me jedem auffallen, wie genau in dieser Construktion alle Verhaltnisse
eintreffen, und daB auch hier wieder der Rhythmus als Einbildung des
Unendlichen ins Endliche sich auf die Seite des Antiken stellt, indeB die
entgegengesetzte Einheit, wie wir finden werden, auch hier das Herrschende
des Modernen ist.255
Virtually anyone can see how precisely in this construction all relationships and
qualifications recur, and that here, too, rhythm as the informing of the infinite into the
finite resides on the side of antiquity, whereas the opposite unity, as we will see, is the
predominating element of modernity.256
Thus, whereas antiquity achieved a kind of indifference of finitude and
infinitude in concrete form, a kind of nave beauty, contemporary art of Schelling's day
seemed to have forsaken the 'music within music' of rhythm as its primary element and
sought instead to posit outwards into infinity, to subordinate the three elements
rhythm, modulation and melody under an indifference more akin to allegory, that of
harmony:
Die einzige obgleich hOchst verstellte Spur der alten Musik ist noch in dem
Choral iibrig. Zwar hatte, wie Rousseau sagt, zu der Zeit, als die Christen
anfingen in eignen Kirchen Hymnen und Psalmen zu singen, die Musik schon
fast allen ihren Nachdruck verloren. Die Christen nahmen sie, wie sie dieselbe
fanden, und beraubten sie noch ihrer grOBten Kraft, des Zeitmal3es und des
254 Philosophy, 112.
255 philosophie, 140.
256 Philosophy, 112-3.
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Rhythmus, aber doch blieb der Choral in den alten Zeiten immer einstimmig,
und dieg ist es eigentlich, was Canto Firmo heigt.257
The only trace - and a highly distorted one at that - of the music of antiquity still
resides in the chorale. It is true, as Rousseau says, that by the time the Christians
began to sing hymns and psalms in their own churches, music had already lost virtually
all its emphasis. The Christians took it as they found it, and in addition robbed it of its
most powerful energy: tempo and rhythm. Yet in those early times the chorale always
remained monophonic, and this is actually what Canto Firmo means.258
This element of ancient music left to us in these ancient hymns and psalms is
now somehow subsumed under the Christian world-vision, subordinated to the
allegorical mode of representation. If allegory is, for Schelling, a straining outwards, a
yearning for the infinite, but resulting in ever greater particularisation/concretisation,
then the Christian culture's distorted discourse of abstraction and yearning beyond the
particular for the ideal is somehow a delusion. In the sense that Christianity is seen
here as a kind of 'filtering out' of the particular in favour of ever greater abstraction it is
the denial of the absolute for, without the real, the absolute is not absolute as such.
The distinction between the allegorical and the symbolic, as demonstrated here,
is that fundamental distinction Schelling makes between Religion and Mythologie in
chapter 2.259 In mythology, as we have seen, finitude or the objective realm is a symbol
of the infinite in that no distinction is drawn between the two. There is thus in music
from this time a predominance of the rhythmic: rhythm is the real in music and is at one
with the infinitude of harmony. Thus the naive presentation of nature as nature was
not problematic. The ideal was always present in concrete form. The gods as collective
divinity were both particular and divine.
In religion, however, we have seen the negation of the naive community of
natural elements in the collective divinity and the allegorisation of nature into a single
abstract God:
§46. Im ersten Fall ist das Endliche als Symbol, im andem als Allegorie das
Unendlichen gesetzt.26°
257 Philosophic, 141.
258 philosophy, 113.
259 Philosophie, 50-101.
260 Philosophic, 96.
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§46. In the first instance the finite is posited as a symbol of the infinite, in the other as
an allegory of the infinite.26I
The 'unlimited' God of Christian monotheism is a violation, then, of limitation, of
Beauty. Thus Christian culture is left with the sickly striving of the sublime. 262 In this
sense the musical antithesis of melody and harmony is a formal antithesis which
represents, in turn, an allegory of the higher antitheses of real and ideal:
§82. Der Melodie, welche die Unterordnung der drei Einheiten der Musik unter
die erste ist, steht die Harmonie als die Unterordnung der drei Einheiten unter
die andere entgegen.263
§82. Melody, which is the subordination of the three unities to the first unity, can be
juxtaposed to its opposite: harmony as the subordination of the three unities to the
other.264
If melody is the synthesis of allegorical rhythm and schematic modulation under
symbolic indifference, then harmony is a similar indifference, but seen from the ideal
side:
Nur ist dabei im Auge zu behalten, daf3 Harmonie, inwiefem sie der Melodie
entgegensetzt, wieder ftir sich das Ganze ist, also die Eine der beiden Einheiten
bloB, inwiefem allein auf die Form reflektirt wird, nicht abet inwiefem out das
Wesen, denn insofem ist sie wieder die Identitat an sich, also die Identitdt der
drei Einheiten, abet ausgedriickt in der idealen.265
It is important to remember here that harmony, to the extent that it is juxtaposed to
melody, is in its own turn the whole, and it is thus the one of the two unities insofar as
one reflects only the form, but not insofar as one reflects on the essence. In the latter
case harmony is itself identity in itself and thus the identity of all three unities, yet
expressed here in ideal form.266
If melody is real, then it must be an informing of the infinite into the finite. It does this
by relying more on rhythm and its internalised layers of articulation than on allegorical
modulation. Thus harmony is the informing of finitude into infinity by relying more on
the qualitative differences of the tones and their complex juxtaposition according to the
261 philosophy, 79.
262 See Philosophic, 98 and 108.
263 Philosophie, 142.
264 Philosophy, 113.
265 philosophic, 143.
266 Philosophy, 114.
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laws of the triad, dissonance and resolution. In the final instance, Schelling draws a
powerful analogy with rhythm's internal semantic resonance:
Diese selbige Vielheit in der Einheit nun angewendet auf die grOBeren
Momente eines ganzen Tonstticks, so besteht Harmonie darin, daB in jedem
dieser Momente differente Tonverhaltnisse dennoch wieder zur Einheit im
Ganzen gebracht seyen, sowie dieselbe in Ansehung des ganzen Tonstticks
wiederum die Resumtion aller mOglichen besonderen Einheiten und aller -
nicht dem Rhythmus, sondem der Modulation nach verschiedenen -
Verwicklungen der TOne in die absoluten Einheit des Ganzen bedeutet.267
If we now apply this same concept of multiplicity within unity to the larger units of an
entire musical piece, then harmony consists of different tonal relationships within each
of these units nonetheless being brought into a unity within the whole. Similarly, that
same unity as regards the tonal piece as a whole means the resumption of all possible
particular unities and of all complexities of tones - not different as regards rhythm, but
as regards modulation - into the absolute unity of the whole.268
This analogy draws on the organic resonance of small scale to large scale resemblance
across a composition already posited in the realm of the rhythm. The same small to
large scale resemblances are at work for Schelling in the realm of harmony, beginning
from the initial premise of the harmonic series. The simultaneous sounding of a
fundamental and its harmonics in a single tone functions for Schelling as a proof of
multiplicity within an apparent unity. The basic law of modulation, then, is most
prominent in harmony, whereas the rhythmic is most prominent in melody. As two
potences in formal opposition within music, the rhythmic and the modulatory can thus
be subsumed into the two higher potences of melody and harmony.
Aus diesem allgemeinem Begriff geht schon zur Gentige hervor, daB sich
Harmonie zu Rhythmus und insofem auch zu Melodie, da Melodie nichts
anderes als der integrirte Rhythmus ist, daB sich, sage ich, Harmonie zu
Melodie wieder wie die ideale Einheit zur realen oder wie die Einbildung der
Vielheit in die Einheit zu der entgegengesetzten der Einheit in die Vielheit
verhalte, welches eben zu beweisen war.269
This general concept shows us adequately that harmony is related to rhythm and to that
extent also to melody, since melody is nothing but integrated rhythm - I repeat:
harmony is related to melody just as the ideal unity is to the real or as the informing of
267 Philosophie, 142-3.
268 Philosophy, 114.
269 Philosophie, 143.
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multiplicity into unity is to the opposite informing of unity into multiplicity - which
was what we wanted to prove.270
Thus, we return to the notion of antithesis as a result of a kind of formal separation, an
ordering into extremes based around two deliberately constructed contrasted modes of
determination. This is demonstrated in the extract from page 143 given previously.271
Perhaps most significant here is the ontological posturing evident in the term Wesen.
The essence of music is a fundamental identity, in beauty, of the 'three unities' rhythm,
modulation and melody or harmony (depending on which side the indifference is seen
from), an identity that is invalidated by the very naming of the antitheses
rhythm/modulation. In a sense, modes of determination create formal antitheses wholly
alien to Wesen insofar as Wesen is a point of identity, an absolute indifference. To
articulate is thus to violate absolutely, to evade essence in favour of abstracted form.
This form/essence dichotomy resides deep within the Schellingian system. It is as if
essence, a kind of absolute in microcosm, retains something for itself, a kind of
discursive autonomy. Thus notions such as melody/harmony, historically grounded in
the great debate on whether music should aspire to a kind of inarticulate spirituality or,
conversely, spring naturally from the natural intonations of a passionate human
utterance, are products of a particular mode of thinking, a particular epistemological
configuration. Schelling acknowledges implicitly the impossibility of their separation in
the culture of antiquity and bemoans their absolute conflict in the Christian culture of
the sublime and allegory.
This argument, despite the recognition of certain historical determinants is
extremely close to the Wackenroderian suggestion given in 'Das eigentiimliche innere
Wesen der Tonkunst' in Phantasienm that language or articulation somehow defiles
art:
Wenn alle die inneren Schwimmungen unsrer Herzensfibern - die zittemden der
Freude, die stiirmenden des Entztickens, die hochklopfenden Pulse
verzehrender Andeutung -, wenn alle die Sprache und Worte, als Grab der
inneren Herzenswut, mit einem Ausruf zersprengen: dann gehen sie unter
n•nnn••••
270 Philosophy, 114 	
271 'Nur ist dabei 	 in der idealen.'
272 Gustav Kiepenheuer Verlag, Potsdam 1925, 182ff.
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§83. Die Formen der Musik sind Formen der ewigen Dinge, inwiefem sie von
der realen Seite betrachtet werden...277
§83. The forms of music are the forms of the eternal things insofar as they are viewed
from the real perspective. •278
Just as, for Wackenroder, music stood as a kind of proto-organic model of the cosmos
in all its divisions and profound mysteries, so, for Schelling, music responds to its
environs by abstracting them into pure form, as models of the 'eternal things'
themselves. These eternal things function here either as ideal entities created in the
systematic philosophical discourses, abstractions in themselves, or as objective things
given in the world of phenomena, transformed and reunited with the absolute in the
realm of music:
Allgemein geht die Philosophie, wie die Kunst, nicht auf die Dinge selbst,
sondem nur auf ihre Formen oder ewigen Wesenheiten...Die Kunst bestrebt
sich z. B. in ihren plastischen Werken nicht, mit den ahnlichen
Hervorbringungen der Natur, was das Reelle betrifft, zu wetteisem. Sie sucht
die bloBe Form, das Ideate, von wekhem aber das Ding selbst doch wieder nur
die andere Ansicht ist. DieB angewendet auf den vorliegenden Fall, so bringt
die Musik die Form der Bewegungen der WelkOrper, die reine, von dem
Gegenstand oder Stoff befreite Form in dem Rhytlunus und der Harmonie als
solche zur Anschauung.279
In general, philosophy, like art, is not concerned with things themselves, but rather only
with their forms or eternal essence...In its plastic works, for example, art does not
strive to compete with similar products of nature as regards actual concrete elements. It
seeks rather the pure form, the ideal, of which the thing itself, of course, is simply the
other perspective. Applied to the case at hand, in rhythm and harmony music portrays
the form of the movements of the cosmic bodies, the pure form as such, liberated from
the object or from matter.280
and, more specifically:
Hiemach bestimmt sich nun auch die Stelle, welche die Musik in dem
allgemeinen System der Ktinste einnimmt. - Wie sich der allgemeine Weltbau
ganz unabhangig verhalt von den andem Potenzen der Natur, undje nachdem
er von der einer Seite betrachtet wird, das HOchste und allgemeinste 1st, worin
sich unmittelbar in die reinste Vemunft auflbst, was im Concreten sich noch
verwirrt, von der andem Seite aber auch the tiefste Potenz 1st so auch the
Musik, welche, von der einen Seite betrachtet, die allgemeinste unter den realen
277 Philosophic, 145.
278 Philosophy, 115.
279 Philosophic., 145-6
280 Philosophy, 116.
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Kiinsten und der AuflOsung in Rede und Vernunft am nachsten ist, obgleich
von der andern nur die erste Potenz derselben.281
The position of music within the general system of arts is also determined according to
this evidence. The general world structure operates completely independently from the
other potences of nature. Depending on the perspective, it can be the highest and most
universal element, the sphere in which the confusion of concrete reality directly
suspends or dissolves itself into purest reason. Or it is also the deepest potence. So also
music, which viewed from the one perspective is the most universal or general of the
real arts and closest to that dissolution into language and reason, even though from the
other perspective it is merely the first potence of the real arts.282
Music, for Schelling, cannot be hierarchised, as we shall see it in Hegel's system, as the
modes of determination invert its significance. Hence the ontological confusion of
significance is moulded into the philosophical system as a fundamental category of it; it
manifests itself, as in Wackenroder's, admittedly less systematic, deliberate confusion
of meaning and sensuality in 'Das eigentiimliche innere Wesen der Tonkunst' in the
Phantasien283 , as complete invertibility such that the juxtaposition of essential elements
of determination leaves the entity's Wesen completely intact. Music, in this regard, is a
profoundly ontological construct, indebted to its internality for its profundity. In terms
of their insight into the romantic epistemology and the general epistemological
configuration of musical meaning in the early romantic paradigm, the lectures of
Philosophie der Kusnt are invaluable. The neglect by music aestheticians may stem
from the relatively small part of the lectures set aside specifically for music.
Schelling's contribution to the emergence of an ontological discipline of musical
semantics is a high-point of the post-Schillerian aesthetic. In his precise analysis of the
relationship between art and non-art (the external), Schiller demonstrated the
possibility of conflating the apparent duality of sign and thing in a profoundly critical
tirade against the Cartesian fixity. In its demonstration of the organic unity of form or
shape and content, Schelling's Philosophie started from this Schillerian premise of an
ontological order of meaning and attempted to demonstrate the internal relations of art
and non-art within the art-work itself. This striking resolution of the problems of the
,
281 philosophic, 148.
282 Philosophy, 118.
283 Kiepenheuer Verlag, 182ff. Full references given above and in previous chapter, three.
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new diversity of the 'new Italian music' recognised in Gottsched and dismissed by him
as mere Gerausch, at last furnished the musician with a metaphysical apologia for the
caprice of merely instrumental music. Indeed, this was no mere apologia; it was a
fundamental argument for a music free of the false externalities of the Cartesian
discipline.
In the problem of the sublime, however, both Schelling and Schiller take pains
to integrate the material/corporeal into a broad schema of mutually dependent
epistemes - artefacts of the post-Cartesian epistemology. This endeavour is
characterised in general by a profound urge to suspend the sensual-intellectual dilemma
and to raise the Cartesian process of Verstand to a higher, autonomous process of
Begreifen. The category das Begreifliche emerges, then, as a cipher of intent, a
brutally forced synthesis of the stubbornness of Kant's separate realms. If the sublime
represents this synthesis at its most problematised, we can read the sublime, with some
irony, as a metaphor of the problems inherent in the notion of a unified epistemology
of the Friihromantik. If sublimity casts out incomprehensible externality and redefines
it as a mystical enigma, then the positing in Schelling of a higher unity of external and
internal in dos Absolute, the wilful construction of a new unattainable in the form of
utopian non-difference is a process of positing outwards not too indistinct from the
false generals of the Schillerian sublime.
Both Schelling and Wackenroder define the sublime as a metaphysical deferral
of literal or concrete meaning in favour of a deliberately constructed negation of
objectivity. The false intuition of such a construct involves a particular, posited as a
mysterious general, being raised upwards and outwards from its initial objectivity and
reinstated beyond the Vernunft as a kind of reified objectivity, which nonetheless hides
its materiality. The deeply corporeal origins of the sublime, therefore, are suspended in
a spirituality incurred purely in the act of aesthetic intuition [Anschauung]. As a
general aesthetic category, then, intuition is the central to the romantic epistemology
and initiates a process of modification brought to bear on a wilful reality. The
distinction between Wackenroder and Schelling, however, resides fundamentally at the
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level of semantics. In Wackenroder, the central aporias of the romantic epistemology
are inserted at the centre of the art-work, buried there as ciphers of the new world
vision. So, whereas for Schelling, the intuition of the sublime:
...tritt dann em, wenn die sinnliche Anschauung filr die GrOBe des sinnlichen
Gegenstands unangemmessen gefunden wird, und nun das wahre Unendliche
hervortritt, fiir welches jenes bloB sinnliche Unendliche zum Symbol wird.284
...enters only when the sensual, concrete intuition is seen to be adequate for the
greatness of the concrete object, and then the truly infinite appears for which the
merely concretely infinite is the symbo1,285
the sublime evokes in Wackenroder a deeply ontological dilemma, residing at the heart
of the art-work:
So hat sich das eigentiimliche Wesen der heutigen Musik...gebildei Keine
andre vermag diese Eigenschaften der Tiefsinnigkeit, der sinnlichen Kraft und
der dunkeln, phantastischen Bedeutsamkeit auf eine so rdtselhafte Weise zu
verschmelzen.286
Thus has the characteristic inner nature of today's music developed. ..No other is
capable of fusing these qualities of profundity, of sensual power, and of dark, visionary
significance in such an enigmatical way.287
In short, then, the sublime enters in Wackenroder at the moment of concrete
manifestation, as a product of that process of exegesis, as essential to it. This complex
ontology, a dynamic self-destructive mode of criticism, sets aesthetic production at
odds with cognition. To produce, in this sense, is to gloriously problematise, to show
the two sides at odds, to demonstrate or emphasise this struggle. That Schelling
deliberately separates das Scheine and die Erhabenheit is testament to the dilemma
itself and the inadequacy of Schelling's system in dealing with it. Beauty evokes the
utopian harmonious manifestation in concreto of the two sides, the finite and the
infinite, whereas the sublime evokes the finite in revolt against the infinite. The critique
that could be levelled at Schelling, then, is precisely the opposite of that to be levelled
at Wackenroder. Schelling's system is, in this regard at least, an inversion of the
284 F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophic der Kunst, 106.
285 Philosophy, 85-6.
286 W . H. Wackenroder, Phantasien fiber die Kunst, 183.
281 Aesthetics, 21.
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Wackenroderian sublime imperative. The revolt in Wackenroder leads to the ultimate
deification of complexity and dynamism whereas Schelling's system, sublime as it may
appear in its operation, strives for a state of rest, a unity of utopian grandeur beyond
the unhappy schism of self and object.
Chapter Five
Hegel: Music as Mediation
Introduction: Art in the Hegelian Trichotomy 
For Hegel, the pinnacle of our triangle, the sense of the aesthetic imperative
evoked in Wackenroder and Schelling , is mere barbarism dressed in a kind of pseudo-
rationalist language. 2 For him, the properties of art, apparently characterised by a
general ability to mediate between the sensual and the intellectual are more 'steps' on
the way to the totality of the system than beautiful ends in themselves. An is thereby
not the even-handed sister of Reason, as in Baumgarten, nor is it the reflex of concrete
indifference, the symbol of the absolute. The aesthetic is thus de-emphasised in Hegel
lying below both religion and the final perfection of philosophy. This is not to say,
however, that art for Hegel is mere trifle or pleasant diversion. Its place in the system
stems from a deep desire to account for the experience-system dilemma as a
microcosm of the sensual-intellectual paradox, thereby evoking a broad meta-theory,
one which springs from the dilemma and integrates the problem as a point of origin, as
an essential process of the system itself. Art is thus integrated into the system at a
lower point than in Schelling's intuitive system as a result of a clear meta-theoretical
agenda, striving for conclusion beyond the merely corporeal/spiritual divide.
This profound element of art's purpose is demonstrated not least by the
seriousness with which Hegel attempts to engage with its particularities in the massive
I Whilst Schelling avoids the sublimational consequences of the early romantic aesthetic, there is no
doubt that the category of 'intuition' so fundamental to his system, is a profoundly aesthetic process.
That the world is a kind of creative outpouring of the absolute, that God, as a form of the absolute,
created the world like a work of art and that both differentiation and indifferentiation consist in
responses to the bodily reception of the pleasure of creation: all these contribute to the argument for
Schelling as, first and foremost, aesthetician.
2 This point is, of course more appropriate for Satefling than for Wackenroder. Hegel, in fact, makes
no specific comment on Wackenroder whereas references to his friend and rival abound. See,
particularly volume I of the Vorlestingen.
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Vorlesungen iiber die Asthetik. A collection of lectures given at the university of Berlin
in 1823, 1826 and 1828-9, the Vorlesungen were constructed for publication from
Hegel's own notes by H. G. Hotho. This first edition of 1835 was closely followed by a
corrected and expanded second edition in 1842 and this latter edition has remained the
standard text. 3 That the Vorlesungen were conceived as a set of lectures, each building
on the last and culminating in the perfection of poetry as the highest art form, is shown
in Hotho's reconstruction. The linearity of the argument and the clear organisation of
the material is testament to Hotho's ingenuity. Whilst some have attempted to
reconstruct a more 'authentically Hegelian' volume, 4 Hotho's 2nd edition remains, in
itself, an important historical document. For these reasons we shall henceforward refer
to the Hotho 2nd edition of 1842.5
Whilst we are more concerned here with the specific role of music in the
Hegelian system, some of his general remarks at the opening of the first volume
provide some insight into the general system of the arts. The trichotomy of art as
propounded both in volume one and in more detail in volume two of the Hotho second
edition is clear to see: the so-called 'symbolic arts' such as parable, proverb, icon,
image, metaphor, simile and epigram are those arts which represent a kind of 'naive
totality' in microcosm. Social life and art are undifferentiated such that communicative
action constitutes both language and art as a single entity.
This argument can be seen to progress through Hegel's trichotomy of Idee-
Gestalt-Kunst. The Idee or idea in its basic or primal form represents the naive unity of
thought and action, of abstraction and particularity such that 'pure thought' and 'pure
action' are seen as identical:
3 Other editions in German are: H. Glockner (ed.), Jubilaumsausgabe der Werke He gels, volumes 12
-14, Stuttgart 1927 ff.; K. M. Michel and E, Moldenhauer (eds.), Theorie-Werkausgabe, volumes 13-
15, Frankfurt am Main, 1970 ff.; F. Bassenge (ed.), Asthetik, with a foreword by G. Lulcacs, Berlin
1955, reprint Frankfurt am Main, 1966.; H. Bartsch (ed.), Register zu Hegels Vorlesungen fiber die
Asthetik, 1844, reprint Stuttgart 1966.; W. Hencicmann (ed.), Einleitung in die Asthetik, Munich,
1967.
4 G. Lasson (ed.), Vorlesungen aber die Asthetik, a reworking of the original sources, Leipzig, 1931.
Lasson's Vorlesungen.. contains only volume one of the Hotho edition and draws mainly from the
1836 lectures with a few sections from the 1823 lectures. It is thus incomplete.
5 For more on the problems of the authentic text, see Knox's Preface to his translation of the lectures:
He gel's Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, 1975, v-xiv.
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Denn er ist an sich schon seiner eigenen Natur nach diese Identitat und erzeugt
deshalb aus sich selbst die Realitat als die seinige, in welcher er daher, indem sie
seine Selbstentwicklung ist, nichts von sich aufgibt, sondem darin nur sich
selbst, den Begriff, realisiert und darum mit sich in seiner Objektivitat in Einheit
bleibt. Solche Einheit des Begriffs und der Realitat ist die abstrakte Definition
der Idee.6
For, in accordance with its own nature, it is this identity already, and therefore
generates reality out of itself as its own; therefore, since this reality is its own self-
development, it gives up nothing of itself in it, but therein simply realises itself, the
Concept, and therefore remains one with itself in its objectivity. This unity of Concept
and Reality is the abstract definition of the idea.7
At this initial stage, what some might call the thesis stage, the identity of Concept and
Reality is a simple, given identity. Art participates in life as a constitutive part of it, as
identical to it. The relationship between the conceptual and the real, therefore, allows
for art to function as the ritualistic expression of everyday life, as integrated into the
communicative actions of such cultures. Given, however, that the dialectical
movement of Spirit springs from a necessity for movement, from some inadequacy in
the interaction of the two realms of Spirit and objectivity, Concept and Reality, this
simple identity of the two sides is evoked in art as something inadequate
[unangemessen]. Indeed, the relationship between the external shapes of Reality and
the internal abstraction of the Idea is premised on the fact that it still seeks 'genuine
expression in art' but is somehow over-stretched by the particularity of those external
forms. As we have seen, this is encapulated in Hegel's notion of the inadequacy of the
two realms:
Denn sie kann sie nur willkiirlich ergreifen und kommt deshalb statt zu einer
vollkommenen Identifikation nur zu einem Anldang und selbst noch abstrakten
Zusammenstimmen von Bedeutung und Gestalt, welche in dieser weder
vollbrachten noch zu vollbringenden Ineinanderbildung neben ihrer
6 G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen tiber die Asthetik, Reclam, Ditzingen 1971, 173. This edition is useful
for the first two parts of the Vorlesungen in that it follows Hotho's second edition. For the latter part of
the Vorlesungen, however, we use the Suhrkamp edition: 77teorie Werkausgabe, Bd. 15, Suhrkamp
Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1970. Unlike the Reclam edition, the Suhrkamp edition contains most of
Hotho's 2nd edition. The Reclam edition contains only selections of the third part.
7 Knox, T. M. (trans.), Hegel's Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art (henceforward, Lectures), Oxford
1975, 106. Translation modified.
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Verwandtschaft ebensosehr ihre wechselseitige AuBerlichkeit, Fremdheit und
Unangemessenheit hervorkehren.8
This is because it can grasp them only arbitrarily, and therefore, instead of coming to a
complete identification, it comes only to an accord, and even to a still abstract harmony
between meaning and shape which, in this neither completed nor completing mutual
formation, present equally their mutual externality, foreignness, and incompatibility.9
This notion of Anklang or 'accord' evokes the notion of 'resonance' which, as we have
seen, can be understood as a synonym of structural resemblance in the organic
structure. It is as if the wechselseitige Fremdheit and Unangemessenheit force a
resonance across the schism. As in Schelling's notion of Mythologie where the forms of
the ideal are posited as present, as actual, Hegel's Idee stage could be seen as referring
largely to pre-literate and pre-antiquarian attitudes to art. This part of the dialectic,
therefore, refers to those cultures which have a ritualistic or functionalist notion of art.
In such pre-literate cultures, art participates in life as a kind of 'marking' of certain
essential tasks of subsistence, and it is this happy involvement of art in reality which
Hegel appears to be invoking.
The Verwandschaft of the external and the internal in this mode of art is thus a
state of affairs characterised by a paradoxical sense of adequacy [Angemessenheit] in
inadequacy [Unangemessenheit]. This point can best be summarised not as a crude
conflation of opposites but, rather, as an historically determined expression of the
'otherness' of such cultures. Since Hegel seeks, from his Now, to articulate such
structures that are past, the apparent tardiness of his conflation is to be explained in the
fact that the dialectic is posited in time. 10 As we shall see later, time is no mere external
framework for Hegel, but is a Becoming, the very process through which we come to
apprehend the fullness of the Absolute. If the dialectic is to be grasped from its point of
completion then it stands to reason that the previous moments of that movement
should seem less coherent than its completion point. Hence, the apparent conflation of
Angemessenheit and Unangemessenheit are expressions of the absolute necessity of
8 Vorlesungen (Reclam), 420.
9 Lectures, 300. Translation modified.
10 See Mctaggart, John and Ellis, Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic, Cambridge, 1896, 2-3 and 16-17;
Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, London, 1976, 75-99.
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movement away from this state of affairs. It is as if the cultures of the Idee stage were
somehow unaware of this apparent inadequacy in the correlation between the external
and the internal and, since that mode of reasoning saw no such inadequacy, then this
'otherness' must somehow be expressed in the incommensurate structures of Hegel's
thought.
It is, however, in the emergence of an awareness of this inadequacy, in the
inviolate necessity of the movement away from that inadequacy, that the second stage
of art is born. Hence, the happy unity of the 'dee moves to a differentiation of itself. It
'becomes aware' so to speak of its own inadequacy. The naive Anklang of internal and
external in this stage is thus thrown into question. As Idee progresses through a
differentiation of itself, it loses its essence and becomes mere objectivity in the form of
Gestalt - usefully likened to the Hegelian stage of antithesis. The primacy in Gestalt of
the 'concrete arts' such as sculpture underlines the profound objectivity of Gestalt in
Hegel's system. Thus, matter - the objective world - is spiritualised in art:
Denn die AuBengestalt ist als au&re tiberhaupt bestimmte, besondere Gestalt
und verrnag zu vollendeter Verschmelzung selber nur wieder einen bestimmten
und deshalb beschrankten Inhalt in sich darzustellen, wahrend auch der in sich
selbst besondere Geist allein vollkommen in eine auBere Erscheinung aufgehen
und sich mit ihr zu einer trennungslosen Einheit verbinden kann.il
This is because the external shape, determined as external, is a particular shape, and
for complete fusion [with a content] it can only present again in itself a determined and
therefore restricted content, while too it is only the inwardly particular spirit which can
appear perfectly in an external manifestation and be bound up with that in an
inseparable unity.12
Hegel terms this stage of the arts the 'classical' stage. Whilst these stages of the
dialectic are not strictly historical and certainly do not evoke clearly determined epochs
of 'style', thay are historical in a more general sense. In sculpture, Hegel appears to be
intimating a tendency rather than a strictly delineated labour. In the tendency towards
more external and, by implication, mimetic forms, it is tempting to recognise certain
traits of Cartesianism. Whilst it would certainly be a crude generalisation to see in this
11 Vorlesungen (Reclarn), 420.
12 Lectures, 301. The parentheses are Knox's. Translation modified.
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'classical' stage a synonym of the Cartesian mimetic paradigm, there is little doubt that
they share certain significant features in common.
The Angemessenheit of Spirit to matter, expressed as such in external forms, is
close enough to Gottsched's semiological fixity to sustain this comparison. We might
therefore recognise in this stage the cultures of agrarian feudalism and proto-industrial
monarchical absolutism. That such cultures invested qualities of divinity in the mortal
deities of monarchy, that such mortal figures were seen as absolute expressions of
divinity, suggests a profound parallel between the practices of a culture and their
poltical/demographic institutions. This, admittedly somewhat coded, sociological
premise is perhaps one of the most striking features of the Vorlesungen.
In this stage, then, Spirit finds expression in matter, since its cultural and
political forces demand such an expression. Hegel terms Spirit here der in sich selbst
besondere Geist and this captures the sense of circumscription of the two realms
Concept and Reality at the heart of the 'classical' arts: the conceptual is circumscribed
by its own particularity because, as such, it is abstract, lending itself readily to external
mimickry in the proportions of matter. The beschrtinkter Inhalt of external forms,
therefore, expresses a mutual poverty across both realms. Thus, Spirit finds adequate
expression in a similarly circumscribed external realm of spatial juxtaposition. Their
mutual poverty or circumscription is what allows for their mutual Angemessenheit.
Matter thus emerges as a material manifestation of Spirit, adequate to it in a general
sense, as abstracted forms." The representation of Spirit in abstracted material form is
thus an expression of Spirit's own inadequacy to itself.
The Romantic Art Form 
The third stage of the arts is characterised by what Hegel terms the 'romantic
arts', poetry, music and painting:
13 To separate the strictly Hegelian Spirit [Geist] from mere spirit in the sense of a 'spirit of the age,' I
have always used it with an initial upper case. Some translators prefer Mind to Spirit, but neither
captures the complexity of the term. In general, the Hegelian Spirit represents a collective
consciousness and a removed sphere of generalised subjectivity which could conceivably be compared
with God or a generally external construct of internal subjective feelings, thoughts or ideas. It also
exists in the Hegelian world view as a driving force, as an instigator of change, as the prime causal
agent in history.
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Erfaf3t sich nun aber drittens die Idee des SchOnen als der absolute und dadurch
- als Geist - für sich selber freie Geist, so findet sie sich in der AuBerlichkeit
nicht mehr vollstandig realisiert, indem sie ihr wahres Dasein nur in sich als
Geist hat. Sic lost daher jene Idassische Vereinigung der Innerlichkeit und
duBeren Erscheinung auf und flieht aus derselben in sich selber zuriick. Dies
gibt den Grundtypus fiir die romantische Kunstform ab, fiir welche, indem ihr
Gehalt seiner freien Geistigkeit wegen mehr fordert, als die Darstellung im
AuBerlichen und Leiblichen zu bieten vermag, die Gestalt zu einer
gleichgiiltigeren AuBerlichkeit wird, so daB die romantische Kunst also die
Trennung des Inhalts und der Form von der entgegengesetzten Seite als das
Symbolische von neuem hereinbringt.14
But, thirdly, when the Idea of the beautiful is comprehended as absolute spirit, and
therefore as the spirit which is free for itself, it finds itself no longer completely
realised in the external, since its true determinate being it has only in itself as spirit. It
therefore dissolves that classical unification of inwardness and external manifestation
and takes flight out of externality back into itself. This provides the fundamental
typification of the romantic art-form; the content of this form, on account of its free
spirituality, demands more than what representation in the free external world and the
bodily can supply; in romantic art the shape is externally more or less indifferent, so
that art introduces, in an opposite way from the symbolic, the separation of content
from form.15
If, in the 'classical' stage, there was an adequacy of Spirit to the content of the material
realm, if, in short, Spirit and matter conflate their mutually empoverished forms as
content, then in the romantic stage the two realms find anew a self-sufficiency, a
satisfaction in themselves. In other words, both Spirit and externality are 'free' or able
to satisfy themselves in themselves. Initially, this self-satisfaction, evoked in Spirit as
für sich selber freier Geist, might seem to suggest an even greater circumscription of
the two realms, as if their finite withdrawal from each other expressed some deep-
seated dualism. Yet this initial dualism must be mediated by the notion of self-
satisfaction as self-knowing. Spirit's final awareness of itself, therefore, is an
expression, in another form, of interiority. The Innerlichkeit of Spirit suggests, as in
Schelling's notion of a 'taking up' [das Aufnehmen] by self-subsistent forms of the
external into their centre, an immanence of Spirit, a Spirit which is self-satisfied due to
its internalised awareness of the other within itself. This somewhat arcane point can be
usefully articulated in Hegel's notion of mediation [Vermittlung] which will concern us
14 Vorlesungen (Reclam), 421.
15 Lectures, 301-2. Translation modified.
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shortly. For the moment, however, it is sufficient to summarise mediation as a process
of interaction between two apparently mutually exclusive opposites deposited at the
very heart of Spirit or objectivity and as articulating their ontological confines.
At the romantic stage, then, art emerges as a complete comprehension of the
beautiful as absolute Spirit. That is to say that art, in this final - synthesic - stage,
apprehends completely abstract, self-contained Spirit as the most severe, extreme and
thus essentialised form of beauty. Hegel's Idealism thus emerges as a trichotomy with
apparently incomplete synthesis: as more an arc arising from and returning to modes of
self-determination, self-subsistence. Hegel's system seems on this first reading to
account for the role of the material in the romantic art-form in only the most partial
manner.
The outer extremes of the trichotomy of the romantic arts are painting, the
least 'romantic' for Hegel, and poetry, the height of 'romantic' perfection. Thus music
lies at the centre of the romantic arts, sitting between the 'spatial sensuousness' of
painting and the 'abstract spirituality' of poetry:
Die zweite Kunst, durch welche das Romantische sich verwirklicht, ist der
Malerei gegeniiber die Musik. Ihr Material, obschon noch sinnlich, geht zu
noch tieferer Subjektivitdt und Besonderung fort. Das Ideelsetzen des
Sinnlichen durch die Musik ist ndmlich darin zu suchen, da sie das
gleichgilltige Auseinander des Raumes, dessen totalen Schein die Malerei noch
bestehen laBt und absichtlich erheuchelt, nun gleichfalls aufhebt und in das
individuelle Eins des PunIctes idealisiert.16
The second art through which the romantic form is realised is, contrasted with
painting, music. Its material, though still sensuous, proceeds to still deeper subjectivity
and particularisation. Music's positing of the sensuous as ideal is to be sought, that is,
in the fact that it sublates, 17 and idealises into the individual singularity of one point,
the indifferent self-externality of space, the total appearance of which is accepted in
painting and deliberately simulated.I8
This idealisation of the 'self externality of space' into the 'individual singularity of one
point' is, for Hegel, a significant quality. In painting, the eye is free to fleet across the
16 Vorlesungen (Reclam), 147-8.
17 Knox's translation of aufhebt - 'cancels' is problematic. As we shall see later, the verb aufheben is
used by Hegel to express the movement from one qualitative state of the dialectic to the other. A more
common, and, perhaps, more useful translation is 'sublates'.
18 Lectures, 87-88. Translation modified.
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painting's surface, taking account of form and balance, taking time to take in the spatial
sensuousness of its construction. In poetry the eye is drawn through the narrative
direction of the exposition, but even here, free to pause, to re-read, to compare and
contrast or to follow references between lines and stanzas. In music, however, the
particularity of the moment is unavoidable: the ear receives only a momentary
fragment of the overall structure thus providing a powerful indictment of the sobering
materiality of the sensuous moment. On the other hand, the human mind is well
equipped to place such moments into a broader context, to retain the framework of
what has passed and to posit a future framework, against which it can measure the
proceeding parts of the composition. This dynamic of Erinnerung and Mutmaflung,
remembering and positing, and the materiality of the moment make music a highly rich
and reconciliatory art form:
[In solcher Weise] bildet die Music, wie die Skulptur als das Zentrum zwischen
Architektur und den Ktinsten der romantischen Subjektivitat dasteht, den
Mittelpunkt wiederum der romantischen Ktinste und macht den
Durchgangspunkt zwischen der abstrakten raumlichen Sinnlichkeit der Malerei
und der abstrakten Geistigkeit der Poesie.'9
...music forms the centre of the romantic arts and makes the point of transition between
the abstract spatial sensuousness of painting and the abstract spirituality of poetry just
as sculpture forms the centre-point between architecture and the arts of romantic
subjectivity.20
That music is the 'middle' of the romantic arts gives it a position at the centre of the
romantic pinnacle of the dialectical movement of art. This central function stems, in
part, from the relation it demonstrates with the general concept of the romantic. The
romantic in art, then, is the perfection of form and content such that the Spirit 'comes
to know itself:'
Diese Erhebung des Geistes zu sich, durch welche er seine Objektivita.t, welche
er sonst im AmBerlic hen und Sinnlichen des Daseins suchen muBte, in sich
selber gewinnt und sich in dieser Einigkeit mit sich selber empfindet und weiB,
macht das Grundprinzip der romantischen Kunst aus.21
19 vorlesungen (Reclam), 148.
Lectures, 88. Translation modified.
21 Vorlesungen (Reclam), 565.
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This elevation of spirit to itself through which the spirit wins in itself its objectivity,
which hitherto it had to seek in the external and sensuousness of existence, and in this
unification with itself it senses and knows itself, is the fundamental principle of
romantic art.22
As articulating a return of Spirit to itself, the romantic posits the absolute as a complex
state of corporeal negation where Spirit nonetheless carves images of itself in the
corporeal. This dilemma, a deliberate attempt at resolving the sensual-meaning
dichotomy evokes the notion of self-knowing as an ontological taking up of externality
into the centre. As a microcosm of this process, art evokes this same process and
hence the immanence of content in this final stage of the Hegelian aesthetic. Yet, unlike
in Schelling, the semantic indeterminacy of the romantic art-work stems in Hegel from
a suspension of the Real in favour of the Ideal. Even though Spirit's self-knowledge
comes about as a result of engagement with the semantic-sensual schism, the truth of
Spirit is evoked in the following manner:
...der Inhalt der romantischen Kunst, in betreff auf das GOttliche wenigstens,
[ist] sehr verengt. Denn erstens ist, wie wir schon oben andeuteten, die Natur
entgOttert, Meer, Berg und Tal, StrOme, Quellen, die Zeit und Nacht sowie die
allgemeinen Naturprozesse haben ihren Wert in betreff auf die Darstellung und
den Gehalt des Absoluten verloren. Die Naturgebilde werden nicht mehr
symbolisch erweitert; die Bestimmung, da13 ihre Formen und Tatigkeiten fahig
waren, Ziige einer GOttlichkeit zu sein, ist ihnen geraubt.23
The subject-matter of romantic art, at least in relation to the Divine, is very
circumscribed. For, first, as we have already indicated above, nature is emptied of
gods; the sea, mountains, valleys, rivers, springs, time and night, as well as the general
processes of nature, have lost their value in relation to the presentation and content of
the Absolute. Natural forms are no longer augmented symbolically; they have been
robbed of their ability to have forms and activities capable of being traits of a
divinity.24
This separation of the Divine from the Corporeal, seems, as we have already seen, to
function as a kind of false synthesis of the system which limits the materiality of the
work. This can be articulated as a progression from the materiality of sculpture, with
its three dimensions, its basis in matter, to the two dimensions of painting, the one
dimension (time) of music and the suspension of actual time in favour of a putative
22 Lectures, 518. Translation modified.
23 Vorlesungen (Reclam), 574.
24 Lectures, 524. Translation modified.
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time structure in poetry. And yet, the genius of constructing a stage of synthesis
composed of that very sensual-semantic schism emerges as a solution not dissimilar
from Wackenroder:
Trennen sich nun diese durch die Skulptur zum erstenmal einander gemaB
gemachten Seiten, so steht jetzt die in sich zurtickgetretene Geistigkeit nicht
nur dem AuBeren iiberhaupt, der Natur, sowie der eigenen Lieblichkeit des
Inneren gegentiber, sondem auch im Bereiche des Geistigen selbst ist das
Substantielle und Objektive des Geistes, insofem es nicht mehr in einfacher
substantieller Individualitat gehalten bleibt, von der lebendigen subjektiven
Einzelheit als solcher geschieden, und alle diese bisher in ems verschmolzenen
Momente werden gegeneinander und fiir sich selber frei, so daB sie nun auch in
dieser Freiheit selbst von der Kunst herauszuarbeiten sind.25
Now, if these two sides, made adequate to one another for the first time by sculpture,
are separated, then the spirit which has withdrawn into itself stands opposed not only
to externality as such, to nature and also to the inner life's own body but is also cut
apart from the living and individual subject in the sphere of the spiritual itself, so far as
the substantive and objective aspect of the spirit is no longer confined to simple and
substantive individuality. The result is that all these factors hitherto fused into a unity
become free from one another and independent, so that now in this very freedom they
can be fashioned and worked out by alt.26
Wackenroder's deliberate broadening of the divide in 'das eigentiimliche innere Wesen
der Tonkunst' is, however, thoroughly rejected in the next few sentences:
Worin nun aber beide Seiten den Punkt ihrer Wiedervereinigung finden, 1st das
Prinzip der Subjektivittit, welches beiden gemeinsam 1st. Das Absolute erscheint
deshalb ebensosehr als lebendiges, wirkliches und somit auch menschliches
Subjekt, wie die menschliche und endliche Subjektiviat, als geistige, die
absolute Substanz und Wahrheit, den gOttlichen Geist in sich lebendig und
wirklich macht.27
But both sides have their point of re-unification in the principle of subjectivity which is
common to both. On this account the Absolute is manifest as a living, actual, and
therefore human subject, just as the human and finite subjectivity as spiritual, makes
the absolute substance and truth, the divine Spirit, living and actual in itself.28
The ontology of Spirit, then, is founded on its closure from the contingency and
negativity of reality. That its content is 'absolute inwardness' and its form is 'spiritual
25 Vorlesungen, Suhrkamp Volume 15, Theorie Werkausgabe, 11-12. All Vorlesungen references in
this edition are to Volume 1.5.
26 Lectures, 792-3. Translation modified.
27 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 12
28 Lectures, 793. Translation modified.
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subjectivity'29 informs in it a sense of self so overwhelming that 'other' as determinate
negation (Reality) must be transcended. To this extent the truth of Spirit, the self-
identity in its most pure form reveals itself only in a manner that does not violate this
autonomy. It reveals itself, therefore, in contingent forms that pass away, that fleet and
fly past the finite consciousness of man and that emerge in his experience as a
perfection to be attained. This yearning beyond the negativity of Reality, therefore,
evokes in man a sense of the deep contingency of his own genius, of his sense of the
Spirit. Through art, this apparent schism is mediated.30
Mediation
So far, we have left the term Aufhebung [and aufgehoben, aufheben etc.1 as if
it were some self-explanatory magical cipher of the dialectical process, needing no
explanation, revelling in its multiplicity. The apparent ambivalence of this term to any
unified entity, process or thought can be best examined in terms of its location, first
and foremost, in the movement, the necessitated progression, from one qualitative
state of dialectic to another. Translated variously as 'sublation', 'raising up' and
'cancellation', it is best characterised as synonymous with the notion of dialectical
movement itself. In this sense, then, it is important to grasp dialectic as a process which
springs from the matter at hand, as grounded in the necessity within the objects of
scrutiny of an Aufhebung to the next qualitative stage. Aufhebung in its sense of
'raising up' captures the notion of progress towards a 'higher' state which is implicit to
the dialectic.
In his essay 'Die Idee der Hegelschen Logik' from Heseis Dialektik: fiinf
hermeneutische Studien31 Hans Georg Gadamer is keen to reinstate Hegel's
Wissenschaft der Logik (1812-16) to the centre of Hegel scholarship. His assertion
that Phanomenologie des Geistes (1807) has too often been raised to the level of a
29 Lectures, 519.
30 A useful metaphor for this, already intimated by Hegel in the Vorlesungen is that of 'light where
subjectivity is seen to be source of spiritual light. See Voriesungen (Suhrkamp), 1971. See also
Abrams, M. H., The Mirror and the Lamp, Oxford, 1971 and Blumenberg, Hans, 'Das Licht als
Metapher der Wahrheit' in Studium Generale, X (1957), pp432-54.
31 Tubingen, 1971.
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complete account of Hegel's project, resulting in some rather partial accounts of that
project, is further upheld in Stanley Rosen's remarkable G. W. F. Hegel: An
Introduction to the Science of Wisdom. We shall turn to the Wissenschaft shortly.
First, however, it might be useful to look closely at the earlier text and pay some
attention to the remarks made there regarding the notion of mediation.
The comments on 'truth' at the outset of Phanomenologie set the groundwork
for mediation in that 'truth' itself is posited both as the result of philosophical
speculation and as the process of such speculation. Expressed as a 'necessity', truth is
thus both a certainty and is that certainty's Becoming, the process by which it becomes
certain:
Die aufiere Notwendigkeit aber, insofem sie ...auf eine allgemeine Weise gefaBt
wird, ist dasselbe, was die innere Usti, in der Gestalt namlich, wie die Zeit das
Dasein ihrer Momente vorstellt.32
...the external necessity, so far as it is grasped in a general way.. .is the same as the
inner, or in other words it lies in the shape in which time sets forth the sequential
existence of its moments.33
Thus, as we have seen, necessity lies in the internalised account of its becoming, of the
process by which it is reached, as well as the final result of that process. The true, then,
is not merely the substantial, its existence in the abstract, but is also the apprehension
of itself. The term Subject captures here this sense of truth as grounded in a process of
apprehension by the knowing self, the Subject. In this sense, truth is the living
Substance, a state of being which lives by virtue of the fact that it is apprehended:
Es kommt...alles darauf an, das Wahre nicht als Substanz, sondem ebensoehr
als Subjekt aufzufassen and auszudriicken...
Die lebendige Substanz ist femer das Sein, welches in Wahrheit Subjekt oder,
was dasselbe heiBt, welches in Wahrheit wirklich ist, nur insofem sie die
Bewegung des Sichselbstsetzens oder die Vermittlung des Sichanderswerdens
mit sich selbst ist...
...nur diese sich wiederherstellende Gleichheit oder die Reflexion im Anderssein
in sich selbst - nicht eine urspriingliche Einheit als solche oder unmittelbare als
soche - ist das Wahre. Es ist das Werden seiner selbst, der Kreis, der sein Ende
32 Plzanomenologie des Geistes, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt an Main, 1970, 14.
33 Phenomenology of Mind, 3.
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als semen Zweck voraussetzt und zum Anfange hat und nur dutch die
Ausfiihrung und sein Ende wirklich ist.34
...everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as Substance, but
equally as Subject...
...the living Substance is being which is in truth Subject, or, what is the same, is in
truth actual only in so far as it is the movement of positing itself, or is the mediation of
its self-othering with itself.
...only in this self-restoring sameness, or this reflection in otherness within itself - not
an original or immediate unity as such - is the True. It is the process of its own
becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal, having its end as its
beginning; and only by being worked out to this end, is it actual.35
The notion of 'movement' embedded at the heart of truth is striking. If the true
is not to be reified as a simple given certainty, as, so to speak, a necessity without
necessity, it must be coupled to the notion of 'positing itself, a movement of
philosophy which sets up, within the true itself, a sense of self-mediation, a sense of
somehow 'capturing' within itself that which is external: process. If process is given as
a 'self-othering' or as a negation of the self of Spirit, then Spirit's return to itself is a
kind of double negation. Only by proceeding through this double negation, a process
of coming-to-be-true, is truth actually true.
We can explain this further in terms of the dialectic. It rests at its final stage
only if it can show the path to that final stage. In other words, the proof of something
as being true lies in being able to articulate how that truth has come about, how that
truth has reached its present manifestation. We reach finally now the notion of
mediation. Given, as we have seen, that Hegel articulates the past as containing the
necessity within itself of movement, of articulating, in itself, the manner in which it will
change, and given also that Hegel's apprehension of the 'symbolic' and 'classical' stages
of art is from his Now, then the Now of romantic art, the only art which exists for him
in the present, must somehow be able to show Hegel the truth of itself, the truth that it
contains in the system. Hence, since Hegel is able to apprehend the truth of romantic
art, it stands to reason that such art has, to put it bluntly, somehow suggested to Hegel
34 PdG, 22-3.
35 PoM, 10.
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the process by which he is to apprehend it. In other words, romantic art has, within
itself, traces or residues of the past, evidence of that past within itself.
Mediation, therefore, is the internalised evidence or, rather, the internalised
interaction of the forces of the dialectic which proves the 'truth' of the matter at hand.
It is a kind of encoding, within the ontological confines of a particular truth, of where
that truth has 'come from'. This gives a useful model for the romantic art work which
Hegel is happy to take up in the Vorlesungen. The romantic art work, as the 'truth' of
Hegel's dialectical system of the arts, is thus a kind of encoding of the processes by
which it comes to be apprehended. The notion of mediation, therefore, captures this
sense of an internalised process, of the internal evidence of a certain mode of
interaction between self and self-othering within either the object itself or Spirit.
Mediation and 'truth' are thus intimately bound together.
Gadamer's assertion that Phiinomenologie is not to be apprehended as a
complete account of the dialectic begs the question as to how far this earlier notion of
mediation integrates into the putatively complete project of Hegel's text. The notion of
Phanomenologie as a lesser, more prototypical work than Wissenschaft is true only to
the extent that it undertakes to bring to fruition a different project. Whereas
Phtinomenologie is an analysis of Spirit's becoming, articulated in such concerns as
ethics, culture, morality and religion, Wissenschaft attempts a detailed analysis of the
fundamental grammar of cognition and its parallels with the external world of
appearances, concerning itself with such 'abstracts' as determinateness, magnitude,
measure, essence, appearance, subjectivity and objectivity. To this extent, Wissenschaft
is a more specialised, detailed analysis of some of the issues raised in Phanomenologie.
Particularly useful is the section in Wissenschaft on subjectivity, which
rehearses some of the concerns already touched on in the preface of Phtinomenologie:
Der Begriff ist zuerst der formelle der Begriff im Anfang oder der als
unmittelbarer ist. - In der unmittelbaren Einheit ist sein Unterschied oder
Gesetztsein zuerst zunachst selbst einfach und nut emn Schein, so daB die
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Momente des Unterschiedes unmittelbar die Totalitdt des Begriffes sind und
nur der Begriff als solcher sind."
The Concept is, in the first instance, formal, the Concept in its beginning or the
immediate Concept. In the immediate unity, its difference or positedness is itself at
first simple and only an illusory being, so that the moments of the difference are
immediately the totality of the Concept and are simply the Concept as such.37
This initial remark suggests comparison with the initial unity of the symbolic arts -
what some insist on terming thesis. If art in this stage participates in an
Ineinanderbildung of the two sides of meaning and shape," premised, as we have
seen, on the notion of their having an Anklang, then the 'moments of the difference' as
'immediatedly the totality of the Concept' evoke a similar uniformity of internal and
external within a simple Concept.39
Beyond this, the differentiation of the Concept runs parallel to the moment in
Phtinomenologie where the simple, initial, - thesic - truth moves into a connectional
state of affairs, premised on notions of an 'adequacy' [Angemessenheit] of matter to the
external forms of Spirit. These mimetic forms, possibly synonymous with our notion of
Cartesian mimesis, can be seen in Wissenschaft to spring from the very structures of
cognition:
Zweitens aber, weil er die absolute Negativitat ist, so dirimiert er sich und setzt
sich als Negative oder als das Andere seiner selbst; und zwar, well er erst der
unmittelbare ist, hat dies Setzen oder Unterscheiden die Bestimmung, daB die
Momente gleichgiiltig gegeneinander und jedes fiir sich wird; seine Einheit ist
in dieser Teilung nur noch auBere Beziehung. So als Beziehung seiner als
selbsttindig und gleichgiiltig gesetzten Momente ist er das Urteil.4°
Secondly, however, because it [the Concept] is absolute negativity, it sunders itself and
posits itself as the negative or the other of itself; and further, because as yet it is only
the immediate Concept, this positing or differentiation is characterised by the fact that
the moments become indifferent to one another and each becomes for itself; in this
36 Wissenschaft der Logik, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1970, 272.
37 Science of Logic, henceforward Science, 599. I have replaced the translator's 'Notion' with
'Concept' so as to fall in line with the conventions of the translations of Vorlesungen and
Phanomenologie.
38 Vorlesungen (Reclam), 420.
39 'Concept' [Begriffl, as used here, might usefully be read as the logical counterpart, within the
grammar of cognitive processes, of das Wahre, die Wahrheit in Phanomenologie. In this sense, the
'logical' or cognitive immediacy of 'moments of difference' and the Concept as such runs parallel to
the non-mediacy of meaning and shape in the simple 'truth' of the 'symbolic' arts.
40 WdL, 272,
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partition, its unity is still only an external connexion. As such connexion of its
moments, which are posited as self-subsistent and indifferent, it is judgement.41
This notion of the concept as 'absolute negativity' is particularly obscure. It seems that
Hegel likens the concept in this antithesic stage to some unbalanced, incomplete, entity
which exists merely by nature of its opposition to something. Since, in the prior thesic
stage, the concept was a unified simple entity, it moves into a qualitative stage of
dialectic where it opposes itself. To oppose the self is, perhaps, the most extreme form
of negativity, hence absolute Negativittit. Yet it is still somewhat unclear as to why
Hegel begins this second part of the proposition with well er die absolute Negativittit
ist. There is no indication in the first section that 'negativity' is implicit to the thesic
concept. It is clear, therefore, that Hegel's use of weil in this second section is not a
simple sequitur to the previous statement. Indeed, it would seem that a pertinent
reading of this apparent leap of faith into the next, antithesic, stage demands a
redefined understanding of Hegel's notion of Negativittit. It would seem that negativity
does indeed refer to entities that bear their essence in relation to those things which
they oppose; and yet, a more complete reading of this term leads us to go beyond the
merely antithetical positing of ontological character. What is striking in Hegel's use of
'negativity' here is the manner in which it captures a sense of an immanent need in
something to move to a qualitatively different level of the dialectic. In other words,
negativity is a state of being that requires another.
If such forms as those present in the antithesis stage of the dialectical
movement of the concept are deposited at the very centre of logic, if, in short, there is
an opposition which, at this stage, is conflated to mimesis and which is natural to the
movement of Logic, then there is something essentially anthropological about Hegel's
parallelism: the 'classical' arts are an outward expression, a formal expression, of an
innate human process. The necessitated differentiation of meaning and shape springs
from man's social and historical evolution - his 'first step' so to speak along the arduous
path to truth.
41 Science, 599.
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It is at the final -synthesic - stage of Logic, however, that the parallelism is
completed:
Drittens, das Urteil enthalt wohl die Einheit das in seine selbstandigen
Momente verlorenen Begriffs, aber sie ist nicht gesetzt. Sie wird dies durch die
dialektische Bewegung des Urteils, das hierdurch der Schlufi geworden ist, zum
vollstandigen gesetzten Begriff, indem im SchluB ebensowohl die Momente
desselben als selbsteindige Extreme wie auch deren vermittelnde Einheit gesetzt
ist.42
Thirdly, though, the judgement does contain the unity of the Concept that has vanished
into its self-subsistent moments, yet this unity is not posited. It becomes so through the
dialectical movement of the judgement, through which is has become the syllogism, the
Concept posited in its completeness; for in the syllogism there is posited not only the
moments of the Concept as self-subsistent extremes, but also their mediating unizy.43
Clearly, this grounds the sense of Truth as mediated self and self-othering (as taking up
within itself residues or traces of its pathway - Becoming - to this fmal result) in the
forms of consciousness/cognition innate to man. The anthropological trio completes
itself in this mediating unity. Romantic art emerges, therefore, as an objectification of
the mediated necessity of form and content, meaning and shape, Spirit and objectivity,
autonomous Spirit and autonomous matter.
We can construct, now, a model of Hegel's notion of romantic art based on its
status as an objectified syllogism. The syllogism is defined as existing in three forms,
each of which reflects, within this final stage of mediating/mediated unity, the three
stages of its Becoming: the syllogisms of existence, reflection and necessity. It seems
that each of these types of syllogism, whilst encompasing the final syntheic truth of the
dialectic, are proof of our proposition that in any final truth there must be some 'proof
of its truth - it must, that is, show the path it has taken to this truth. We need not enter
into a detailed analysis of this syllogistic trio here, except to recognise in the structure
of each one the functional pivot of a 'midpoint' or 'middle term' [die Mitte]:
Dieser SchluB ist inhaltsvoll, weil die abstrakte Mitte des Schlusses des
Daseins sich zum bestimmten Unterschiede gesetzt, wie sie als Mitte des
Reflexionsschlusses ist, aber dieser Unterschied wieder in die einfache Identitat
sich reflektiert hat. - Dieser SchluB ist daher SchluB der Notwendigkeit, da
42 WdL, 272.
43 Science, 599.
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seine Mitte kein sonstiger unmittelbarer Inhalt, sondem die Reflexion der
Bestimmtheit der Extreme in sich ist. Diese haben an der Mitte ihrer innere
Identitat, deren Inhaltsbestimmungen die Formbestimmungen der Extreme sind.
- Damit ist das, wodurch sich die Termini unterscheiden, als tiufierliche und
unwesentliche Form, und sie als Momente eines notwendigen Daseins."
This syllogism is pregnant with content, because the abstract middle term of the
syllogism of existence posited itself as determinate difference to become the middle
term of the syllogism of reflection, while this difference has reflected itself into simple
identity again. This syllogism is therefore the syllogism of necessity, for its middle
term is not some alien immediate content, but the reflection-into-self of the
determinateness of the extremes. These possess in the middle term their inner identity,
the determinations of whose content are the form[al] determinations of the extremes.
Consequently, that which differentiates the terms appears as an external and
unessential form, and the terms themselves as moments of a necessary existence.45
This passage is particularly complex but, when grounded in our previous analysis, it
should become clearer. The remark that the syllogism of necessity is 'pregnant with
content' takes us once again to synthesic truth as a rich account of its own becoming,
as somehow showing the manner in which it has come about. As we have seen, each of
the three syllogisms is an account of the three stages of the dialectic such that the
syllogism of existence [der Schluf3 des Dose ins relates - in synthesic form - to the
thesic stage of truth where concept and reality are in simple naive unity. Hence, Hegel
refers to the 'determinate difference' of the second antithesic stage, which the syllogism
of existence posits in itself and thereby necessarily moves to the next qualitative stage,
the 'syllogism of reflection' [Reflexionsschlussesl. This syllogism, as the term
'reflection' might suggest, articulates the mimetic modes of truth to be found in the
antithesic stage of the dialectic and, despite its belonging to the synthesic stage - as do
all of the three syllogisms - it captures within itself the differentiated parallelisms of the
antithesic mimetic paradigm, characterised in Vorlesungen by the 'classical arts'. The
return of the determinate difference of the syllogism of reflection to itself, articulates
the movement to the synthesic syllogism of necessity. This final term 'necessity'
captures the sense in which neither naive unity nor naive opposition can, in themselves,
exist in pure isolated form without recourse to movement to a different qualitative
state of being. Hence, the necessity in moving to the final stage is captured in the
44 WdL, 391-2.
45 Science, 695-6.
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internal grammar of the dialectic. The 'extremes' articulated in the final syllogism are
thus mediated by an 'inner identity'. It is essential to grasp the sense of mediation not as
some static, obviated, identity but as an internalised process; this relates, as we have
seen, to the notion of resultant truth as showing its own Becoming, the manner in
which has come about.
The 'extremes' at work in the romatic art form can be captured in the terms
Spirit and Reality. The process of mediation at work here can best be summed up in
this context as a quasi-Schellingian organic resemblance. Thus the mediation or
resemblance of Spirit and Reality rests on an organic trichotomy of self, other and a
'characteristic' common to both where each term retains autonomy and yet functions as
both a 'model' of the larger structure in itself and as a mere part of the whole. In an
analysis of Hegels's romantic art, therefore, we should look closely at those moments
in the Vorlesungen which attempt to provide a middle term or a revealing of Spirit in
the material realm.
The Revealinuf Spirit in the Qbjective Realm
The shapes or forms of the absolute subjectivity of autonomous Spirit are
revealed in three manners, each reliant upon and fundamentally consequent upon the
mediated autonomy of Spirit. First, the absolute knows itself in its autonomy and yet is
active in Reality. Its activity is premised on organic resemblances across the schism:
Den ersten Ausgangspunkt mtissen wir von dem Absoluten selber nehmen,
welches als wirklicher Geist sich em n Dasein gibt, sich weiB und betaigt. Hier
wird die menschliche Gestalt so dargestellt, daB sie unmittelbar gewuBt wird,
als das GOttliche in sich habend. Der Mensch erscheint nicht als Mensch in bloB
menschlichem Charakter, beschrankter Leidenschaft, endlichen Zwecken und
Ausfiihrwigen oder als im bloBen BewuBtsein von Gott - sondem als der
wissende einzige und allgemeine Gott selber, in dessen Leben und Leiden,
Geburt, Sterben und Auferstehen sich nun auch für das endliche BewuBtsein
offenbar macht, was Geist, was das Ewige und Unendliche seiner Wahrheit
nach sei.46
The original starting-point we must take from the Absolute itself which as actual spirit
gives itself an existence, knows itself and is active. Here the human form is so
represented that it is immediately known as having the Divine in itself. The man [Jesus]
46 VOrieStalgen (Reclam), 569-70.
234
appears not as man in a purely human character with restricted passions, finite ends
and achievements, or as merely conscious of God, but as the knowing sole and
universal God himself in whose life and suffering, birth, death, and resurrection there
reveals itself even to man's finite consciousness what spirit, what the eternal and
infinite, is in its truth.47
God appears not merely to itself (and we may read God here as a synonym for the
Absolute, as in Schelling) nor merely in the guise of Christ but distributes itself, as
signs of its own signifieds in a marvellous plethora of signification. Thus by the action
of self signification, God shows itself:
Denn insofern es Gott, der ebenso in sich All gemeine, ist, der in dem
menschlichem Dasein erscheint, so ist diese RealitAt nicht auf das einzelne,
unmittelbare Dasein in der Gestalt Christi beschrankt, sondem entfaltet sich zur
gesamten Menschheit, in welcher der Geist Gottes sich gegenwartig macht und
in dieser Wirklichkeit mit sich selbst in Einheit bleibt."
For because it is God who appears in human existence, for all that he is universal in
himself too, this reality is not restricted to individual immediate existence in the form of
Christ but is unfolded into the whole of mankind in which the spirit of God makes itself
present, and in this reality remains in unity with itself."
This diffusion of autonomous Spirit through the contingency of man, then, stems from
what might be terrnd the unwieldy purity of its form which is so perfect as to reflect
itself with unceasing efficacy in the material realm. In other words, Spirit is a construct
which is so pure, so completely ideal, so overwhelmingly extreme in its abstraction,
that it is somehow unwieldy. This unwieldiness functions in the Hegelian dialectic in a
rather similar manner to an electrical charge in a cloud which, after a certain build up,
reaches a critical point where it must earth itself as lightening. Spirit, thus requires, or
strains for, its opposite, the unwieldy negative, the objective, which promises an
uncharged equilibrium. This unwieldy or austere perfection of Spirit thus functions like
one of the 'extremes' of the syllogism of necessity. It is as if, by articulating this
extremity, Spirit brings itself into a final synthesic syllogism and necessitates its
mediation with materiality. Hence the notion which is used here of an unceasing
efficacy, of an efficient delineation of pure Spirit (-uality), captures the very necessity
47 Lectures, 521. Translation modified.
48 Vorlesungen (Reclam), 570.
49 Lectures, 521. Translation modified.
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of the syllogism. It is the efficacy of Spirit's ability to be extreme that allows it to
participate in the syllogism of necessity. This efficacy is driven by a quasi-Schellingian
hankering for organic resemblance:
Die Ausbreitung dieses Selbstanschauens, Insich- und Beisichseins des Geistes
ist der Frieden, das VersOhntsein des Geistes mit sich in seiner ObjektivitAt -
eine gOttliche Welt, em n Reich Gottes, in welchem das GOttliche, das von Hause
aus die VersOhnung mit seiner Realit& zu seinem Begriff hat., sich in dieser
VersOhnung vollfiihrt und dadurch ftir sich selber 1st.50
The diffusion of this self-contemplation of spirit, of its inwardness and self-possession,
is peace, the reconciliation of spirit with itself in its objectivity - a divine world, a
Kingdom of God, in which the Divine, by virtue of the reconciliation of its Reality to
its Concept, consummates itself.51
The perfection or utopian sense of the reconciliation of Spirit to itself, then, is a kind of
post-Wackenroderian sublime which can at last find some kind of mediation with the
literal forms of contingency, the external forms of the material realm.
The second manner of manifestation consequent on the immanent mediation of
self and other within self is based on the ontological confines of Spirit itself. That Spirit
is limited, that it raises itself back to itself in self-subsistence or self-subsistence is, in
itself, an action, a process. Here Hegel parts company with Schelling on the most
fundamental level. We have already intimated that activity or process is a form of
mediation and that the efficacy of self-expression in the contingent realm constitutes
evidence for Spirit. Yet this very point must surely include the activity of Spirit on
itself.
Mit dieser ZerreiBung umgekehrt ist die Notwendigkeit verbunden, aus der
Abgeschiedenheit von sich selbst, innerhalb welcher das Endliche und
Nattirliche,.die Unmittelbarkeit des Daseins, das natiirliche Herz als das
Negative, Uble, Bose bestimmt ist, erst durch überwindung dieser Nichtigkeit
in das Reich der Wahrheit und Befriedigung einzugehen.52
With this dismemberment there is bound up, conversely, the necessity of rising out of
this state of scission (within which the finite and the natural, the immediacy of
existence, the natural heart, are determined as the negative, the evil, and the bad) and
50 Vorlesungen (Reclam), 570.
51 Lectures, 521-2. Translation modified.
52 Vorlesungen (Reclam), 570-1.
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of entering the realm of truth and satisfaction only through the over-coming of this
nullity.53
Thus the 'reconciliation' of the Spirit with the realm of negativity is to be defined in
terms of a mediation, a consequence of the activity of Spirit itself. In short, since
synthesic Spirit is a mediation of self and self-othering, since it is a 'truth' in the strict
sense postied in Phdnomenologie, then it is clear that there is some internal feature of
Spirit which is nonetheless external to it. Since man, too, is an internal mediation of his
own circumscribed subjectivity and contingent objectvity, then he can function as a
kind of 'model' of Spirit. Spirit thus represents man's essential qualities in the purest
and most extreme form. Therefore, man apprehends God or Spirit as a form beyond
contingency and this meta-physical utopia becomes a state for which man yearns. Man
thereby attempts to 'elevate himself to God' thereby elevating himaself to himself:
Denn wie Gott zundchst die endliche Wirklichkeit von sich ausscheidet, so
erhdlt auch der endliche Mensch, der von sich aul3erhalb des gOttlichen Reiches
anfdngt, die Aufgabe, sich zu Gott zu erheben, das Endliche von sich
loszulOsen, die Nichtigkeit abzutun und durch dieses Ertijten seiner
unmittelbaren Wirklichkeit das zu werden, was Gott in seiner Erscheinung als
Mensch als die wahrhafte Wirklichkeit objektiv gemacht hat.54
For, just as God cuts himself off from finite reality, so finite man, who begins of
himself outside the Kingdom of God, acquires the task of elevating himself to God,
detaching himself from the finite, abolishing his nullity, and through this killing of his
immediate reality becoming what God in his appearance as man has made objective as
true reality.55
The appearance of God in finite human form as Christ, then, leaves for finite man a
model of objective spirituality to which he aspires. This objective Spirit, therefore, is a
cipher or sign of Spirit returned to itself and thereby evokes in man a yearning not
merely for objective Spirit (Christ) but also for absolute, self-subsistent Spirit.
This final point leads to the third manifestation of absolute Spirit. That Spirit is
self-contained, as we have said, lays for it an ontological boundary which can only be
crossed by the sacrifice of particular or finite subjectivity in favour of a collective or
'absolute' subjectivity:
53 Lectures, 522. Translation modified.
54 Vorlesungen (Reclam), 571.
55 Lectures, 522.
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Der unendliche Schmerz dieser Aufopferung der eigensten Subjektivitat, Leiden
und Tod, welche mehr oder weniger aus der Darstellung der klassischen Kunst
ausgeschlossen waren oder mehr nur als natiirliches Leiden hervortraten,
erhalten erst im Romantischen ihre eigentliche Notwendigkeit56
The infinite pain of this sacrifice of the very heart of subjectivity, suffering and death,
which were more or less excluded from the representations of classical art or rather
appeared there as natural suffering, acquire their real necessity only in romantic art.57
To transcend the particular or contingent negativity of reality is to enter into a closed
ontology, Spirit. The apprehension of this closed realm, therefore, is strikingly similar
to the apprehension of a meaning-rich real in the Schellingian sense. The apprehension
cannot be intellectual or ideal but must be apprehended, first and foremost, through
the senses. It stands to reason, that is, that if Spirit is circumscribed, that it is somehow
impenetrable or closed to reason, then it is a kind of object where its content, as non-
litera1,58 is to be likened to the content of the sensual arts. The self-satisfaction of
Spirit, then, results in a double function. On the one hand:
[Einesteils namlich] ergeht sich der Geist, well er die Affirmation mit sich
gewonnen hat, auf diesem Boden als einem selber berechtigten und
befriedigenden Elemente, von welchem er nur diesen positiven Charakter
herauskehrt und sich selber in seiner affirmativen Befriedigung und Innigkeit
daraus widerscheinen laBt;59
...because spirit has won affirmation with itself, it issues on this ground as on an
element justified and satisfying in itself, and of this element it presents only the purely
positive character it has, out of which its own affirmative satisfaction and deep feeling
are reflected;6°
This 'positive' character must therefore be apprehended as the opposite of the
negativity of the contingent, as a profound contrast to the finite reality of man, as we
have already said. And yet, on the other hand:
56 Vorlesungen (Reclam), 571.
57 Lectures, 522. Translation modified.
58 The dialectic of form and content is central to the Hegelian aesthetic. For Hegel, the content
represents something similar to Schelling's Ideale in that it can be apprehended by the intellect as a
more or less simply reducible semantic construct. Hence, for Spirit to have any kind of 'content' in the
Hegelian sense, it must somehow strain for a clarity, a simplicity, a coherence. And yet, since Spirit
is, in a sense, pure form, it clearly cannot contain a literally semantic content in the most obvious
sense. Thus, in order to talk of content at all in Spirit, we must mediate the semantic quality of the
term 'content' with the qualifier non-literal.
59 Vorlesungen (Reclam), 573.
60 Lectures, 524.
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[anderteils aber] wird derselbe Inhalt zur bloBen Zufalligkeit herabgesetzt, die
keine selbststandige Giiltigkeit in Anspruch nehmen darf, da der Geist in ihr
nicht sein wahres Dasein findet und deshalb mit sich nur in Einheit kommt,
indem er für sich selber dies Endliche des Geistes und der Natur als Endliches
und Negatives auflest.61
...the same content is degraded to mere contingency which cannot claim any
independent validity because in it the spirit does not find its true existence and therefore
only comes into unity with itself by explicitly dissolving this finitude of spirit and
nature as being something finite and negative.62
The degradation of this content is a consequence of Spirit's action to the extent that in
becoming self-subsistent it becomes inconsistent with a literal' content. The objectivity
of Spirit in its final stage of return to itself, therefore, is consequent upon its
apprehension as objectivity by virtue of this indifference (not in the Schellingian sense)
to its content. The apparent semantic ambivalence of synthesic Spirit, therefore, can be
mediated by the intervention of art as a profound form of apprehension, neither purely
sensual nor purely intellectual. Spirit, in the end, can be apprehended through this
medium as object and yet it thereby does not require that it release itself into the
contingent realm of objectivity.
To summarise the points made so far, synthesic Spirit returns to itself as self-
subsistent and self-knowing. It thereby affects a schism between itself and objective
contingency. This 'negativity' thereby strives for Spirit as a result of the recognition of
this otherness in certain contingent ciphers. These ciphers, Christ for example, leave
'evidence' of Spirit in the contingent realm and inform into finite consciousness the will
to overcome self in favour of the positivity of Spirit. The action of Spirit on itself,
therefore, is also a cipher, in that activity constitutes 'evidence' here. This notion of
'evidence' or 'trace' captures the sense given in Phtinomenologie of truth as showing its
becoming, the pathway it has traversed to arrive at its present position. In the final
enclosure of Spirit, man, through the apprehension of the ciphers, becomes aware of
Spirit as an ontological phantom, as enclosed within a quasi-objective framework. To
use Schelling's terms, the Ideal of the Spirit takes on structural properties akin to a
61 Vorlesungen (Reclam), 573.
62 Lectures, 524.
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Real in that its content is non-literal and is to be apprehended first and foremost
through the senses. The self-diremption of its content, the negation of literal forms in a
supreme act of self-overcoming, is thereby consequent upon the autonomy of Spirit.
If Spirit is thus autonomous, the protocol of theory is upheld: namely, to find
expression in extremes. Hegel's supremely theoretical gesture evokes now a theoretical
standpoint that has considerable radical force. As we have seen, this radical theory of
mediation first sets out the mechanisms of separation and dynamism that sustain it in its
operation. The separation of Spirit and the Real is thus the first stage of the exposition.
It allows for the initiation of dynamic, complex, models of interaction between these
extremes, thereby providing an inroad into the apparent semantic nullity of the
objective realm. On the mediatory properties of romantic art in this regard, Hegel is
quick to stress the fundamental character of its content first, thereby attenuating the
Kantian consequences of the Spirit-World division. This content, as an expression° of
synthesic Spirit, renounces nature as its primary semantic resource and seeks only to
reveal God. 64 Hence, the denial of contingent content in favour of a content that is
imbued with Spirit is, for Hegel, the most essential feature of modern, romantic, art:
Der ganze Inhalt konzentriert sich dadurch auf die Innerlichkeit des Geistes, auf
die Empfindung, die Vorstellung, das Gemiit, welches nach der Einigung mit
der Wahrheit strebt, das GOttliche im Subjekt zu erzeugen, zu erhalten sucht
und ringt und nun nicht sowohl Zwecke und Untemehmungen in der Welt der
Welt wegen durchfiihren mag, als vielrnehr zur einzig wesentlichen
Untemehmung den inneren Kampf des Menschen in sich und die VersOhnung
mit Gott hat...°
The entire content [of romantic art] is therefore concentrated on the inner life of the
spirit, on feeling, ideas, and the mind which strives after union with the truth, seeks and
struggles to generate and preserve the Divine in the subject, and now may not carry
through aims and undertakings in the world for the sake of the world but rather has for
63 This is not to simplify the relationship between the Real and self-spirit. The resemblance across the
schism is not a mere 'expression' (although this term in itself is imbued with some complexity) but is,
rather, an equilibrium which, as unattained, imbues life with process. Thus the unattainable
equilibrium of the Real and Spirit finds frustrated manifestation in dark and hidden corners, in the
structures and contents of apparently semantically indeterminate phenomena. In this sense, expression
might better be replaced with the term resemblance. This is, however, not to be confused with
Foucault's account of the Renaissance notion of 'resemblance' in The Order of Things.
64 See previous quote from Vorlesungen (Reclam), 574 Lectures, 524.
65 Vorlestmgen (Reclarn), 574.
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its sole essential undertaking the inner battle of man in himself and his reconciliation
with God;oo
We return again to the notion of activity or process. If man strives for this Spirit, by
recreating the content of Spirit in particular, objective, form then reconciliation is, in
itself, merely synonymous with activity. The Ought of the Spirit thus provides a
momentum for activity or, more accurately, process (as linear activity) towards this
utopian re-unification. This linear activity is likened by Hegel to a kind of 'heroism':
Der Heroismus, der nach dieser Seite hin hervortreten kann, ist kein
Heroismus, welcher aus sich selber Gesetze gibt, Einrichtungen festsetzt,
Zustdnde schafft und umbildet, sondem emn Heroismus der Unterwerfung, der
schon alles bestimmt und fertig iiber sich hat und dem daher nur die Aufgabe
tibrigbleibt, das Zeitliche danach zu regulieren, jenes HOhere,
Anundfiirsichgtiltige auf die vorgefundene Welt anzuwenden und im Zeitlichen
geltend zu machen.67
The heroism which may enter according to this side is no heroism which gives laws
from its own resources, establishes organisations, creates and develops situations, but
is a heroism of submission which has everything determined and cut and dried and has
no task left to it but to regulate the temporal order, to apply what is higher and valid in
itself to the world confronting it, and to assert it in the tempora1.68
The schism residing here is that fundamental sensual-intellectual separation of the
Friihromantik. The drive to somehow 'capture' the Spirit and keep it in the contingent
realm is thus doomed, not least by virtue of the negation of reality that Spirit has
affected in order to return to itself. Yet the majesty or highness of the doomed project
of the romantic aesthetic consists for Hegel in this very tragedy, a point close to that
made by Wackenroder.69
Following from this point, there re-emerges the primacy of the subjective as the
only receptacle of Spirit in objective form. This term 'receptacle' might appear to
contradict the schism, but the manifestation of Spirit in the objective, determinate
realm, can be evoked, as we have seen, as a kind of cipher. This model of the cipher
captures the Hegelian sense of Spirit as 'truth' or 'meaning' in the broadest sense and
the world of contingent forms as mere signifiers. In this sense, the particular
66 Lectures, 525. Translation modified.
67 Vorlesungen (Reclam), 574-5
68 Lectures, 525. Translation modified.
69 Pltantasien, 164ff.
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subjectivity of humankind is a kind of microcosm of the broader subjectivity and its
relationship with the contingent realm is no less problematic than that of absolute
Spirit. The rather proto-Darwinian point that Hegel makes here is premised on a
fundamental category of linear activity. By virtue of man's apprehension of Spirit
through its various stages of external manifestation, klee, Gestalt, and Kunst man has
drawn ever closer to the essence of Spirit. In this sense, man has become ever more
like Spirit. When man's subjectivity withdraws ever more into itself, cuts itself free
from the contingency of the external and renounces the negativity of his environment,
he draws nature into himself as the receptacle of Spirit and not as mere negativity:
Indem nun aber dieser absolute Inhalt in den Punkt des subjektiven Gemiits
zusammengedrangt erscheint und somit aller Proz,eB in das menschliche Innere
hineinverlegt wird, so ist dadurch der ICreis des Inhalts auch wieder unendlich
erweitert.70
But since this absolute content appears compressed into the point of the subjective
heart, so that all process is transported into the inner life of man, the scope of the
subject-matter is therefore also infinitely extended again.71
If we stress, once more, the notion of mediation as a kind of internalised process, then
we get a sense of how romantic art takes up the external truth into itself in the
syllogism of necessity. Thus the internalisation of linearity in the guise of the temporal
'compressed into the subjective heart' is the suspension of one aspect of contingent
action and an elevation of it towards the spiritual. Yet this is not a suspension, in the
strictest sense, of the nullity of objectivity. It is, rather, an internalised mediation of
Spirit and objectivity within Spirit. Spirit in this final stage is like 'truth' in
Phanomenologie. In this sense, romantic art constitutes a step forward:72
Denn obschon jene objektive Geschichte das Substantielle des Gemilts
ausmacht, so durchlauft das Subjekt sie doch nach allen Seiten, stellt einzelne
Punkte aus ihr dar oder sie selbst in stets neu hinzutretenden, menschlichen
Ziigen und vermag auBerdem noch die ganze Breite der Natur als Umgebung
70 Vorlesungen (Reclam)575.
71 Lectures, 525. Translation modified.
72 It is not difficult to see how readings of Hegel by the Berlin Revolutionaries furnished notions of
history as necessarily progressive.
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und Lokal des Geistes in sich hineinzuziehen und zu dem einen groBen Zwecke
zu verwenden.73
For although that objective history constitutes the substantial basis of the heart, the
subject yet runs through it in every direction, presents single points drawn from it or
presents himself in steadily added new human traits and, over and above this, he can
draw into himself the whole breadth of nature as the surroundings and locality of spirit
and devote it to the one great end.74
This one great end, then, is the mediation of Spirit and the real in terms of a striving or
a process, the middle term of the syllogism of necessity. The ultimate goal, as we have
said, is no mere peace or free-standing equilibrium. That would be for Hegel a return
to the symbolic naive totality, a step back, an anachronism. No, the ultimate goal is one
of constant striving, constant yearning and constant movement - in short, of constant
mediation.
In the quest for the absolute content of art, posited in Hegel as absolute
subjectivity, romantic art strives for the dissolution of the dimensions of the objective
realm. This is a striving for the extremities of the syllogism. Hence:
Soil nun aber das Innere, wie dies bereits im Prinzip der Malerei der Fall ist, in
der Tat als subjektive Innerlichkeit sich kundgeben, so darf das wahrhaft
entsprechende Material nicht von der Art sein, daB sie noch filr sich Bestand
hat.75
But if the inner life, as is already the case in the principle of painting, is in fact to be
manifested as a subjective inwardness, the genuinely correspondent material cannot be
of such a kind that it persists on its own account.76
The objective inadequacy of painting's objective persistence to the content of Spirit
leads to a more intensified drive from the objective, external form in stable
manifestation to the withdrawal from objective stability into a form which persists not
on its own account but as a process, a movement from one moment to another.
73 Vorlesungen (Reclam), 575.
74 Lectures, 525. Translation modified.
75 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 133.
76 Lectures, 889.
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Time and Mediation. 
As Schelling had stressed succession as the fundamental form of music, so
Hegel stresses the temporal as a negation of the mere corporeality of other
manifestations of art:
Dies Tilgen nicht nur der einen Raumdimension, sondem der totalen
Raurrdichkeit tiberhaupt, dies v011ige Zuriickziehen in die Subjektivitat nach
seiten des Inneren wie der AuBerung, vollbringt die zweite romantische Kunst -
die Musik.77
This obliteration not of one dimension only but of the whole of space, purely and
simply, this complete withdrawal into subjectivity of both the inner life and its external
manifestation brings into complete being the second romantic art - music.78
Time is defined by Hegel in the Naturphilosophie of the Enzyklopiidie der
philosophischen Wissenschaften 79 as the negativity of space posited in the sphere of
self-externality. Space, first of all, is given as 'die abstrakte Allgemeinheit ihres
Aufiersichseins...
following points, therefore, must be understood regarding space - first that space is an
ideal side-by-sideness," second, that it is self-externality, 82 third, that it is void of
difference and finally that it is therefore continuous. This continuity is thus violated by
the positing of 'points of space' [Raumpunkten] which evoke difference or the
interruption of continuity. Hence, Hegel terms such points the negation of space:
Von Raumpunkten zu sprechen, als ob sie das positive Element des Raums
ausmachten, ist unstatthaft, da er urn seiner Unterschiedslosigkeit willen nur die
MOglichkeit, nicht das Gesetztsein des AuBereinanderseins und Negativen,
daher schlechthin kontinuirlich ist; der Punkt, das Rirsichsein, ist deswegen
vielmehr die und zwar in ihm gesetzte Negation des Raums.83
77 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 133
78 Lectures, 889. Translation modified.
79 G. W. F. Hegel, Werke in 20 Banden, Band 9: Enzyklopadie der philosophischen Wissenschafien
II: Die Naturphilosophie, Theorie Werkausgabe, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1970. Note
that the Zusdtze originally offered by the editor of the 1847 edition, Karl Ludwig Miche/et, are
standard inclusions in most editions. They are additional commentaries on Hegel's text apparently
compiled from other Hegelian sources.
80 Natutphilosophie, 41. The quotation translates: 'the abstract universality of Nature's self-
externality...'
81 'das ganz ideelle Nebeneinander' Natutphilosophie, 41.
82 'das AuGersichsein' Naturphilosophie, 41.
83 Natutpizilosophie, 42.
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It is not permissible to speak of points of space, as if they constituted the positive
element of space, since space, on account of its lack of difference, is only the
possibility and not the actual positedness of being-outside-of-one-another and of the
negative, and is therefore absolutely continuous; the point, the being-for-self, is
consequently rather the negation of space, a negation which is posited in space.84
Time, on the other hand, represents a negation of a far more complex order:
Die Negativitat, die sich als Punkt auf den Raum bezieht und in ilun ihre
Bestimmungen als Linie und Fldche entwickelt, ist aber in der Sphdre des
AuBersichseins ebensowohlfiir sich und ihre Bestimmungen darin, aber
zugleich als in der Sphdre des AuBersichseins setzend, dabei als gleichgiiltig
gegen das ruhige Nebeneinander erscheinend. So fiir sich gesetzt, ist die Zeit.85
Negativity which, as point, relates itself to space and develops its determinations as
line and plane in space is, however, in the sphere of self-externality, equallyfor itself
and so are its determinations; but, at the same time, these determinations are posited in
the sphere of self-externality and thus appear as indifferent to the inert side-by-sideness
of space. Negativity, thus posited for itself, is time.86
Whereas the points in space are internal differences which are affected by the evocation
of an Other, non-space, points in time emerge as a real difference posited within the
continuity of time. This point is made in Michelet's Zusatz:
Der Unterschied ist aus dem Raume herausgetreten, heiBt: er hOrt auf, diese
Gleichgtiltigkeit zu sein, er ist fiir sich in seiner ganzen Unruhe, nicht mehr
paralysiert_87
Difference has stepped out of space; this means that it has ceased to be this
indifference [nonchalance], 88 it is for itself in all its unrest, is no longer paralysed.89
In this sense, time is posited as a pure difference, an abstract self-externality which
constantly steps beyond the Now without ever leaving it - hence self-externality.
Contained within time is both the prison of present-being and the constant creation of
the external-to-self - that which is the Un-now, the past and the positing of the future.
The determination of time as abstract self-externality is thus apt, capturing the
Hegelian sense of pure negativity suggested here:
84 A. V. Miller (trans.), He gel's Philosophy of Nature, henceforward Nature, Oxford, 1970, 29.
85 Natutphilosophie, 47-8.
86 Nature, 33-4. Translation modified.
87 Naturphilosophie, 48.
88 Knox translates Gleichgtiltigkeit as 'indifference'. In the light of our previous chapter's engagement
with Schelling's notion of Indifferenz, however, it seems prudent not to confuse the specifically
Schellingian notion with this more informal usage.
89 Nature, 34. Translation modified.
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Die Zeit, als die negative Einheit des AuBersichseins ist gleichfalls emn
schlechthin Abstraktes, Ideelles. - Sie ist das Sein, das, indem es ist, nicht ist,
und indem es nicht ist, ist; das angeschaute Werden, d.i. daB die zwar
schlechthin momentanen, d.i. unmittelbar sich aufhebenden Unterschiede die als
aufierliche, d.i. jedoch sich selbst auBerliche, bestimmt sind.9°
Time, as the negative unity of self-externality, is similarly an out-and-out abstract,
ideal being. It is that being which, inasmuch as it is, is not, and inasmuch as it is not,
is: it is intuited Becoming; this means that the pure moments, the immediate self-
sublating differences, are determined as external, i.e. as external to themselves.91
Furthermore, the externality or abstraction of time's universal negativity92 is to be
likened, as in Schelling, to the principle of self-knowing or consciousness. Hence, as
time evokes the abstract environment of subjectivity, it evokes in general form the
principle I = I: 'Die Z,eit ist dasselbe Prinzip als das Ich = Ich des reinen
SelbstbewuBtseins.'93 And yet it is not merely the environment for becoming an
abstracted Ding an sich but the process of becoming: things do not become in time but
time, rather, is the very becoming of things. The 'concentional' wisdom of time
generally evokes it as a framework or environment in which process takes flight:
In der Zeit, sagt man, entsteht und vergeht alles; wenn von allem, namlich der
Erftillung der Zeit, ebenso von der Erilllung des Raums abstrahiert wird, so
bleibt die leere Zeit wie der leere Raum iibrig, - d.i. es sind dann diese
Abstraktionen der AuBerlichkeit gesetzt und vorgestellt, als ob sie Mr sich
waren.%
Everything, it is said, comes to be and passes away in time. If abstraction is made
from everything namely from what fills time, and also from what fills space, then what
we have left over is empty time and empty space: in other words, these abstractions of
externality are posited and represented as if they were for themselves.95
This notion of things coming to be and passing away within time is then immediately
repudiated by Hegel's formulation of time as pure becoming:
Aber nicht in der Zeit entsteht und vergeht alles, sondem die Zeit selbst ist die
Werden, Entstehen und Vergehen, das seiende Abstrahieren, der alles
gebdrende und seine Geburten zerstOrende Kronos.96
90 Natutphilosophie, 48
91 Nature, 34. Translation modified.
92 As we have already seen, negativity refers to a 'state of being that requires another.' Hence, time
represents pure negativity, negativity in its most universalised, abstract, austere, form.
93 Naturphilosoplae, 49.
94 Naturphilosophie, 49.
95 Nature, 35.
96 Nattaphilosophie, 49.
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But it is not in time that everything comes to be and passes away, rather time itself is
the becoming, this coming-to-be and passing away, the existent abstraction, Chronos,
from whom everything is born and by whom its offspring is destroyed.97
The contrast between the first extract's Abstraktionen der Aufierlichkeit and the
second's seiende Abstrahieren is that very contrast between a false concretising
ontology of time as kind of Ding and a constantly present process, the relationship of
kh to Ich. In this sense, time is located in the ' =' of self-reflexivity. It is, in this sense,
the proof, substance and environment of self s becoming aware of self.
The parallel of time to consciousness posited here demands comparison with
Schelling's formulation of soul as number. The Pythagorean terms of Schelling's
argument, it must be said, are located within a volume concerned first and foremost
with the general properties of art. The apparent simplicity of the Schellingian
formulation stems from the desire, it would seem, to have done with the more complex
metaphysical issues of the project of Naturphilosophie since such issues are well-
rehearsed elsewhere in Schelling's oeuvre.98 Yet the differences between Hegel's
formulations in the Naturphilosophie and those given by Schelling in Philosophie der
Kunst are not mere pragmatic spin-offs of the respective tasks at hand. Schelling
proposes time as an accumulative process of memory, of ever more insightful glimpses
into the nature of the relationship between God and his labour. Hence, as a microcosm
of God in the Wackenroderian sense, man's awareness of his consciousness, his
awareness of his being aware, is dependent upon time and is yet not located within it.
It is of no surprise, therefore, that Schelling should stress die Succession rather than
die Zeit as the environment of becoming:
Genug, wir stellen Dinge auBer uns vor, tragen aber erst in der Vorstellung auf
sie fiber Raum und Zeit, ferner die Begriffe von Substanz und Accidens,
Ursache und Wirkung u.s.w.; so entsteht Succession unserer Vorstellungen in
97 Nature, 35. I have omitted 'actually' which Miller inserts before 'abstraction', which strikes me as a
little fussy.
98 See, for example: Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie, 1799; System des
transzendentalen Idealismus, 1800; Uber den wahren Begriff der Naturphilosophie und die richtige
Art, ihre Probleme aufzulOsen, 1801, all available in reprographic edition from the Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1970.
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uns, und zwar eine nothwendige Succession, und diese selbstgemachte, mit
BewuBtseyn erst hervorgebrachte Succession heiBt man den Naturlauf.99
It is enough that we represent things as external to us. Only in the representation,
however, do we first carry space and time over to them, and further, the concepts of
substance and accident, cause and effect, and so on. Thus the succession of our ideas
arises in us, and indeed a necessary succession; and this self-made succession, first
brought forth in consciousness, is called the course of Nature.m
This last point might seem to negate the apparent separation of Zeit and Succession
because nature appears to be called forth as self-made succession. And yet the dualism
remains. Zeit is brought to bear upon the objective realm as a kind of hermeneutic tape
measure whereas Succession inheres in nature as its very becoming. The latter
category, therefore, is the abstraction of an unknown space between two cognitive
events, two points in the system of the world, and, as the abstraction of such an
unknown, it can be apprehended only as a formal organising principle. Zeit, on the
other hand, inheres in Anschauung or intuition as an element of the fundamental
aestheticising of the world in the Schellingian system. It is, so to speak, an external
tool, brought to bear upon contingent reality thereby furnishing a hermeneutic
framework for engagement with it.
For Hegel, however, time inheres in the objective realm only as becoming and
has no 'real' or grounded counterpart such as succession. This comparison might seem
at first rather arcane, yet it is essential to grasp this subtle difference since the
respective aesthetic function of music in the two philosophers' systems divide precisely
at this point. If, for Hegel, time is located in the of Ich = kh, then the temporal
forms of music are not merely objectified modes of a kind of general hermeneutics but
a self-becoming, immanent, self-product. It follows from this that Hegel ascribes
'idealism' or the quality of the ideal to the more 'autonomous' arts whereas Schelling
ascribes a kind of objective complexity, a 'thingness' to such arts.
99 F. W. J. Schelling, Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur; Einleitung, 1797, also available in
reprographic edition of first (1856) publication, from the Wissensschaftliche Buchgesellschaft,
Darmstadt 1967, 358.
1 °° Errol E. Harris and Peter Heath (trans.), Schelling's Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature,
Cambridge, 1988, 26.
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If time is the becoming of the dialectic, the very pathway to synthesic truth,
then it follows that time is something fundamentally at the centre of the notion of
mediation. Hence, in music, the very temporality of its form evokes mediation in the
most profound manner. If truth, to be actual, must show how it has become, then it
must, somehow, take time into its very being, capture it somehow in the ontological
confines of its existence. The self-reflection of final Truth, therefore, means, in the fmal
instance, that it must be posited in time and yet must somehow internalise time.
Hegel's idealism of music, therefore, can be seen to centre in his peculiarly
idealistic notion of time as a form of mediation or becoming, and, in particular, as a
mediation of the dimensions of the Aupersichsein of space and the autonomy of
subjectivity. As metaphor of the inward movement of Spirit, then, music evokes the
broad ontological authentication of an, as yet, inadequate content of Spirit - the
concrete externality of the three dimensions present in the 'classical' stage. In temporal
form, therefore, music finds a medium with which to negate the external, a
metaphorical pathway to the interiority of Spirit's self-subsistence:
Sie bildet in dieser Beziehung den eigentlichen Mittelpunkt derjenigen
Darstellung, die sich das Subjektive als solches sowohl zum Inhalte als auch zur
Form nimmt, indem sie als Kunst zwar das Innere zur Mitteilung bringt, doch in
ihrer Objektivitdt selber subjektiv bleibt...101
Thus viewed, it forms the real centre of that presentation which takes the subjective as
such for both form and content, because as art it communicates the inner life and yet
even in its objectivity remains subjective,102
Just as painting negated one of the dimensions of classical art, so music retreats
completely into the dimension of time, freeing itself from the shackles of spatial
objectivity. Indeed, the very essence of sound as process, as a fleeting coming-into-
being and passing-away, is circumscribed by the temporal. Hegel makes a point not
dissimilar to Schelling here, that sound springs from the objective realm as a fleeting
result of agitation:
101 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 133.
102 Lectures, 889.
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Die Aufhebung des Rdumlichen besteht deshalb hier nun darin, daB emn
bestimmtes sinnliches Material sein ruhiges AuBereinander aufgibt, in
Bewegung gerat, doch so in sich erzittert, daB jeder Teil des kohdrierenden
KOrpers semen Ort nicht nur verandert, sondem auch sich in den vorigen
Zustand zuriickzuversetzen strebt.103
The sublation of space therefore consists here only in the fact that a specific sensuous
material sacrifices its peaceful separateness, turns to movement, yet so vibrates in itself
that every part of the cohering body not only changes its place but also struggles to
replace itself in its former position.104
Yet the explicitly causal connection of sound to the body is not a cipher of its realness
in the Schellingian sense. Hegel strives to give an account of sound as a step beyond
the material, as a step closer to Spirit. The 'adequacy' of the content of Spirit in this
manifestation is thus premised by a removal of Schelling's Kiang from the sensual
Reale. Sound is raised here to the level of a 'double negation' [zwetfache Negation or
gedoppelte Negation] in that it first negates objectivity in springing free from the
oscillation of an object and thence negates itself as the object strives to come to rest. It
is thus no mere corporeality but a striving for the ideal content. The final point is also
premised by the negation of the corporeal and as a negation of that abstraction, a
returning to itself as regained corporeality. This return is thus a dissolution of its own
ontology, an ontology which in itself is a negation of a prior ontology. Sound destroys
itself by returning to itself. The relationship between the action of sound and that of
Spirit is thus one of organic resemblance. In its objective action, music evokes the
subjective action of synthesic Spirit. This argument is, again, given in more detail in the
Naturphilosophie:
Die Idealitat, die hierin w5 gesetzt ist, ist eine Verandening, die emn doppeltes
Negieren ist. Das Negieren des (auBereinander) Betsehens der materiellen Teile
wird ebenso negiert als das Wiederherstellen ihres AuBereinanderseins und ihrer
Kohasion; sie ist eine IdealitAt als Wechsel der einander aufhebenden
Bestimmungen, das innere Erzittern des KOrpers in ihm selbst, - der Klang.106
The ideality posited here is an alteration which is a double negating. The negating of
the persistence, in asunderness, of the material parts is itself negated as the re-
103 Vorlesungen (Suhricamp), 134
104 Lectures, 890. Miller's translation of Aufhebung as 'cancellation' is inconsistent and somewhat
confusing. Wherever possible, I have used 'sublation' and its other forms 'sublate', 'sublated* etc.
105 Refers to Elastizitat. See §§297-299 of the Naturphilosophie.
106 Nattuphilosophie, 170-1.
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establishing of their asunderness and their cohesion; it is a single ideality as an
alternation of the two mutually sublating determinations, the inner oscillation of the
body within itself - Sound. '°7
The essence of the differences between Schelling's Succession and Hegel's Zeit
emerges now as vital to the characterisation of their music aesthetics: the Idealit&
posited in sound in Hegel's formulation emerges as the double negation of matter, first
as the displacement and thence as its return to rest - vibration. Whilst this vibration is
linked to cohesion and gravity, it is posited in Hegel as their negation. 108 The quality of
a mechanische Seelenhaftigkeit, a 'mechanical soul-likeness', emerges as a ldnd of
idealised matter. Matter, posited within the two determinacies (Bestimmungen) of
specific gravity and cohesion, strains for a third determinacy in the manner of a simple
form, one which abstracts the other two into a higher form, a kind of 'middle term'
such as that given in the syllogism of necessity. This negation is likened by Hegel to
'das tibergehen der materiellen Rtiumlichkeit in materielle Zeitlichkeit' 109 where the
interior vibration of the body unites the subsistence of the two lower determinacies
with their negation and gives this process a formal existence as time. Just as time is the
becoming and passing away of nature, so sound lays itself to rest after the initial
agitation of the body. That this process has a beginning, a middle and an end, that it is
a becoming, demands the assertion that it too is the process of self-becoming in Ich =
Ich. Hence the notion of sound as a mechanische Seelenhaftigkeit: mechanical because
of its origins in material asunderness; soul-like because of its existence as becoming.
Sound should be grasped, therefore, as a complex embodiment of the sense-
Spirit dichotomy where the mechanics of its manifestation, mere external oscillation
[auPere Ortsveranderung] is to be contrasted with its Idealitbit, its negation of the
merely external asunderness of objectivity as freiwerdende Subjektiviteit.
As a double negation of corporeality, then, music has a content which is
'object-free':
••n•••..
107 Nature, 136. Translation modified.
108 Naturphilosophie, 171.
109 The transition of materialised space into materialised time...' Nattophilosophie, 171.
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Rir den Musikausdruck eignet sich deshalb auch nur das ganz objektlose
Innere, die abstrakte Subjektivitat als solche. Diese ist unser ganz leeres Ich,
das Selbst ohne weiteren Inhalill°
On this account what is alone fitted for expression in music is the object-free inner life,
abstract subjectivity as such. This is our entirely empty self, the self without any
further content.111
Indeed, the content is a subjectivity conscious only of the boundaries which
circumscribe it, a subjectivity free of the particularities of literal meaning or objective
persistence. In short, it is das an sich Subjektive.112
Having delineated music's place in the general metaphysical scheme, Hegel
proceeds to an analysis of the 'general characteristic' [allgemeine Charakter] of
music. 113
 The broader argument is now to be refined according to three operations: a
comparison of music with the other arts; an analysis of how music apprehends for itself
and portrays a subject-matter; an analysis of the effects [Wirkungen] music has on the
mind [das Gemiit}.
Comparison with the Visual and Plastic Arts. 
Music's separation from the other arts, in terms of its relationship with the
action of Spirit on itself, is not an absolute separation. The autonomy of music in the
Hegelian system is defined by virtue of a clear discursive space, the limits of which are
articulated according to its relation with the other arts. This point is made, first of all,
vis- à-vis architecture: 'Erstens steht sie [die Musik] zurArchitektur, obschon sie
derselben entgegengesetzt ist, dennoch in einen verwandtschaftlichen Verhaltnis:114
['First, although it stands in contrast to architecture, it still has an affinity with it.1 115
 The
nature of the relationship is essentially structural rather than ontological, premised on
Hegel's notion that both music and architecture are forms of accompaniment.
Denn das geistige Innere geht aus der bloBen Konzentration des Gemiits zu
Anschauungen und Vorstellungen und deren durch die Phantasie ausgebildeten
Formen fort, wahrend die Musik mehr nur das Element der Empfindung
110 vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 135.
ttt Lectures, 891.
112 'The subjective in itself.' Vorlesungen (SuhrIcamp), 136.
113 vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 137ff.
114 vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 138.
115 Lectures, 893.
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auszudrticken befahigt bleibt und nun die filr sich ausgesprochenen
Vorstellungen des Geistes mit den melodischen Klangen der Empfindung
umzieht, wie die Architektur out ihrem Gebiet urn die Bildsaule des Gottes in
freilich starrer Weise die verstandigen Formen ihrer Saulen, Mauern und
Gebalke umherstellt.116
For the spiritual inner life proceeds from mere concentration of mind to views and
ideas and to forms for these developed by imagination; but music remains capable
rather of expressing only the element of feeling and it accompanies explicitly
enunciated spiritual ideas with the melodious sounds expressive of feeling, just as
architecture in its own sphere surrounds the statues of the god, in an admittedly rigid
way with the judicious forms of its pillars, walls, and entablatures.117
Embedded in this notion is a sense that 'proper' content is overtly literal or figurative
rather than merely proportional or structural:
Wenn namlich in der Baukunst der Inhalt, der sich in architektonischen Formen
auspragen soil, nicht wie in Werken der Skulptor und Malerei ganz in die
Gestalt hereintritt, sondem von ihr als eine auBere Umgebung unterschieden
bleibt, so ist auch in der Musik als eigentlich romantischer Kunst die ldassische
Identitat des Inneren und seines auBerlichen Daseins in der ahnlichen, wenn
auch umgekehrten Weise aufgelOst... 118
If, in architecture the subject-matter to be impressed on architectonic forms does not go
wholly into the shape as it does in sculpture and painting but remains distinct from it as
merely an external environment for it, so too in music, as a properly romantic art, the
classical identity between the inner life and its external existence is dissolved again in a
similar, even if opposite, way...119
The 'external environment' of architectonic forms, the context it affords for the 'proper'
content of literal or figurative forms, is a manifestation not wholly adequate to classical
Spirit; there is in this overt externality of architecture a predominance of device, of
artistic operation above and beyond the 'content' which properly evokes externality as a
medium, not as an externality in itself. In other words, architecture is informed
primarily by issues of construction rather than issues of 'content' and thus differs from
the more overtly 'classical' art of sculpture in that its main function is as a formal
outline or profile of some aesthetic Idee rather than the communication of its content.
Similarly in music, its device-ridden nature negates the expression of true interiority
since the forms in themselves are too inward in their construction: just as architecture
116 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 138.
117 Lectures, 894. Translation modified.
118 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 138.
119 Lectures, 893. Translation modified.
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cannot express any kind of content, that is anything external to itself, so music cannot
express anything internal to itself - in both cases their content and from, their interior
and exteriors are undifferentiated. Hence, architecture is general externality and music
is general interiority. Just as music expresses merely the 'element' of feeling, mere
feeling in its most archetypal forms, its most structural expression, so architecture
expresses merely the proportional environment, the mathematical context of the
dimensions within which the literal content of sculpture can find expression. In both
forms of art, then, the device becomes a predominant, self-present element of
operation, an element of artifice:
Auch in dieser Riicksicht kann die Musik nailer mit der Architektur verglichen
werden, welche ihre Formen nicht aus dem Vorhendenen, sondem aus der
geistigen Erfindung hernimmt, urn sie tells nach den Gesetzen der Schwere,
teils nach den Regeln der Symmetrie und Eurhythmie zu gestalten.120
In this respect too music may be compared more closely with architecture which
derives its forms, not from what exists, but from the spirit's invention in order to mould
them partly according to the laws of gravity and partly according to the rules of
symmetry and eurhythmy.121
In terms of the non-literal, non-figurative nature of these 'contents', both music
and architecture demonstrate a degree of artifice which might be likened to 'autonomy'
or a kind of self-subsistence: since their internal 'content' and their external 'form' are
undiffrentiated, the self-refernce of these two artforms seems clear - they are, so to
speak, semantically indeterminate. That music should appear more adequate to the self-
subsistence of Spirit, as shown in the general argument for music, is now underlined by
its device-ridden modes of manifestation. Spirit's self-subsistence, therefore, is
structurally reflected at this stage in autonomy.
These modes of autonomy, music and architecture, are finally differentiated not
by the preponderance of device, the distinctions drawn between these preponderances,
but by the media in which the two operate:
..........
120 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 138-9.
121 Lectures, 894. Translation modified.
254
In beiden Ktinsten geben zwar die quantitativen und naher die MaBverhaltnisse
die Gmndlage ab, das Material jedoch, das diesen Verhaltnissen gemall geformt
wird, steht sich direkt gegeniiber. Die Architektur ergreift die schwere sinnliche
Masse in deren ruhigem Nebeneinander und rUumlicher auBerer Gestalt, die
Musik dagegen die aus der raumlichen Materie sich freiringende Tonseele in
den qualitativen Unterschieden des Klangs und in der fortstrOmenden zeitlichen
Bewegung.122
It is true that in both arts the relations of quantity, or more precisely proportion,
provide the foundation, but the material shaped in accordance with these relations is
directly opposite in the two arts. Architecture takes heavy visible masses in their
peaceful and external spatial shape, whereas music takes the soul of tone, working
itself free from spatial matter, in the qualitative differences of sound and in the
movement of the ever-rolling stream of time.123
Hegel then proceeds to compare music with the other figurative arts, sculpture
and painting. Clearly, sculpture is the furthest from music in that its material is
resolutely spatial, with all three dimensions and a figurative content, an adequate
matching of its form and its content. Painting, as the lowest 'romantic' form is more
inclined to a separation of the concrete manifestation and the 'content'
Zu der Malerei hingegen hat die Musik schon eine nahere Verwandschaft, teils
wegen der iiberwiegenden Innerlichkeit der Ausdrucks, teils auch in bezug auf
die Behandlung des Materials, in welcher, wie wir sahen, die Malerei bis nahe
an das Gebiet der Musilc heranzustreifen untemehmen darf.124
With painting, on the other hand, music has a closer relationship partly on account of
the prepondering inwardness of expression, partly in relation to the treatment of the
material in which, as we saw, painting may undertake to touch on the territory of music
very nearly.125
And yet even this 'closeness' within the romantic forms to music belies a fundamental
schism, an ontological abyss between the spatial sensuality of painting and the inward
spirituality of music. Whereas painting shows an externality, a microcosm of late
Cartesian systems, music is, in its very ontology, opposed to externality. Hence, as
regards the composer:
...die eigentliche Region seiner Kompositionen aber bleibt die formellere
Innerlichkeit, das reine TOnen, und sein Vertiefen in den Inhalt wird statt eines
Bildes nach auBen vielmehr emn Zuriicktreten in die eigene Freiheit des Inneren,
.,......
122 vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 139.
123 Lectures, 894. Translation modified.
124 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 140.
125 Lectures, 895.
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emn Ergehen seiner in ihm selbst und in manchen Gebieten der Musik sogar eine
Vergewissenmg, daB er als Kiinstler frei von dem Inhalte ist,126
...yet the real region of his compositions remains a more formal inwardness, pure
sound; and his immersion in the subject-matter becomes not the formation of something
external but rather a retreat into the inner life's own freedom, a self-enjoyment, and, in
some domains of music, even an assurance that as artist he is free from subject-matter
altogether.127
Music is thus a medium more attuned to the inwardness of romantic beauty, a beauty
which negates limits of the concrete type and strives for a kind of freedom which, far
from revoking the ontological, in fact constantly poses the ontological question of
itself: what am I essentially? In this sense, Hegel evokes, yet again, the notion of
mediation.
The constant quest for the Wesen in music is the formal element of its
romanticism. It is an art form which is 'free' as far as possible from the content and one
which represents an extreme in the romantic idiom:
Wenn wir nun im allgemeinen schon die Taigkeit im Bereiche des SchOnen als
eine Befreiung der Seele, als em n Lossagen von Bedrangnis und Beschranktheit
ansehen kOnnen, indem die Kunst selbst die gewaltsamsten tragischen
Schicksale durch theoretisches Gestalten mildert und sie zum Genusse werden
laBt, so fiihrt die Musik diese Freiheit zur letzten Spitze.128
Now, if in general we may regard activity in the realm of the beautiful as a liberation
of the soul, as freedom from oppression and restrictedness since, by theoretical figure-
forming for contemplation, art itself alleviates the most powerful and tragic fates and
makes them become satisfying, so music carries this liberation to the most extreme
heights.129
Here, at last, we see the detailed proof in the text of our notion of music as what might
be termed an objectified syllogism. It is in the strain for this extremity that music
makes for itself an efficacy similar to that of Spirit, an efficacy which is captured in its
unwieldy 'freedom from restrictedness', a Lossagen von Beschrtinktheit. This 'freedom'
is to be likened, therefore, to the extremity of the two sides of the syllogism of
necessity.
—
126 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 141.
127 Lectures, 895.
128 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 141.
129 Lectures, 895-6. Translation modified.
256
And yet this freedom in itself incurs a penalty. If music is free from the literal
objective content of painting, then it must acquire for itself a subject-matter that is only
vague, only general. In this sense, the unity of detail and structure, of form and content
is somewhat attenuated in music. The structural considerations always outweigh the
considerations of an articulated content:
Nun darf allerdings auch einem musilcalischen Werke die innere Gliederung und
Abrundung zum Ganzen, in welchem em n Teil den anderen nOtig macht, nicht
fehlen; teils ist aber hier die Ausfiihrung ganz anderer Art, teils haben wir die
Einheit in einem beschrankteren Sinne zu nehmen.13'3
Now of course a work in music may not lack an inner articulation and a rounding of
the parts into a whole in which one part makes the others necessary; but in the case of
music the execution is of a totally different kind and we have to take the unity in a
more restricted sense.131
This 'more restricted sense' in which musical unity is posited here encompasses
merely the device-ridden operations of the musical medium: development,
transformation. Hegel's approach to meaning here is classically immanent: meaning is
'already exhausted' [bereits erschdpft] in the theme. 132 The repetitions,
transformations, modulations, are all superfluous to the actual essence of the musical
theme. This strangely ontological notion of the theme should come as no surprise,
however. The notion of a closed theme, laden with its own internal meaning fits in with
the organic schema of structural resemblance across different levels of the artwork.
Hence, if music is immanent, to be understood by means of an internal operation on
itself, as a kind of 'meaning object,' then the theme, as a level within that construct,
should also apprehend itself according to an ontological model of meaning:
...wird es [das Thema] nun wiederholt oder auch zu weiteren Gegensatzen und
Vermittlungen fortgefiihrt, so erweisen sich diese Wiederholungen,
Ausweichungen, Durchbildungen durch andere Tonarten usf. flir das
Verstandnis leicht als iiberfllissig und gehOren mehr nur der rein musikalischen
Ausarbeitung und dem Sicheinleben in das mannifaltige Element harmonischer
Unterschiede an, die weder durch den Inhalt selbst gefordert sind, noch von
ihm getragen bleiben;133
••nnn••...
130 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 142.
131 Lectures, 896.
132 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 142.
133 Vorlesungen (Suhrkanip), 142.
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...if the theme is repeated or if it goes on to further contrasts and mediations, then the
repetitions, mediations, transformations in different keys, etc. readily prove superfluous
for an understanding of the work and belong rather to a purely musical elaboration and
an assimilation into the manifold realm of musical harmonic differences etc. which are
neither demanded by the subject-matter nor remain carried by it;134
So whereas the visual arts are concerned with ever more detailed, more accurate,
evocations of the external, music articulates self-quality by closing itself to the literal
externalities of nature, by creating an internal environment of elements for its
operations on itself. The initially ontological notion of the theme is now mediated by
the broader semantic framework Hegel brings into play against closure:
Doch 15.3t sich freilich nicht leugnen, daI3 auch in einem musikalischen Werke
durch die Art und Weise, wie em n Thema sich weiterleitet, emn anderes
hmzukommt und beide nun in ihrem Wechsel oder in ihrer Verschlingung sich
forttreiben, verdndern, hier unterzugehen, dort wieder aufzutauchen, jetzt
besiegt scheinen, dam wieder siegend eintreten, sich em n lhalt in seinen
bestimmteren Beziehungen, Gegensatzen, Konflikten, Obergangen,
Verwicklungen und LOsungen explizieren kann.135
Yet we cannot deny, it is true, that in a musical composition a topic can be unfolded in
its more specific relations, oppositions, conflicts, transitions, complications, and
resolutions owing to the way in which a theme is first developed and then another
enters, and now both of them in their alternation or their interfusion advance and
change, one becoming subordinate here and then more prominent again there, now
seeming defeated and then entering again victorious.136
The Explizierung of a content in this manner can be understood in two ways. First,
Hegel might be attempting a generally metaphorical reading of music's internal
operations such that the emergence of a theme might evoke the 'victory' of that mood,
notion or idea over another. Conversely, Hegel might understand the internal workings
of music here as mere devices which lend themselves to symbolic interpretation but
which, in the final analysis, are merely internal operations, carrying no external
meanings in themselves. The implicit/explicit problem of meaning in music is thus
evoked within the framework of a semantic confusion: either such meanings are
—
134 Lectures, 896.
135 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 142.
136 Lectures, 897.
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concretely semantic, literal in the strictest sense, or they are too vague, too bountiful in
their semantic possibilities to be singular or concrete in their meaning:
Aber auch in diesem Falle wird durch solche Durcharbeitung die Einheit nicht
wie in der Skulptor und Malerei vertiefter und konzentrierter, sondem ist eher
eine Ausweitung, Verbreitung, emn Auseinandergehen, eine Entfemung und
Zurtickftihrung, ftir welche der Inhalt, der sich auszusprechen hat, wohl der
allgemeinere Mittelpunkt bleibt, doch das Ganze nicht so fest zusammenhdlt,
als dies in den Gestalten der bildenden Kunst, besonders wo sie sich auf den
menschlichen Organismus beschrankt, mOglich j 5 137
But, even so, such elaboration does not, as in sculpture and painting it does, make the
unity more profound and concentrated; it is rather an enlargement, an extension, a
separation of elements, a flight and a return, for which the subject-matter to be
expressed does form the more general centre; but the content does not hold the entire
work so closely together as is possible in the figures of visual art, especially where that
art is restricted to the human organism.I38
Meaning in music is thus expansive and in drawing itself to itself, it expands the
possibilities of its articulation across an ever broader semantic arena. That the content
is a kind of 'more general centre' [der allgemeinere Minelpunkt] suggests a model of
musical meaning that is somehow free even of the intentionality of its conception:
Nach dieser Seite hin liegt die Musik, im Unterschiede der ilbrigen Kiinste, dem
Elemente jener formellen Freiheit des Inneren zu nahe, aLs daB sie sich nicht
mehr oder weniger iiber das Vorhandene, den Inhalt, hinaus wenden kOnnte.139
In this respect, music, in distinction from the other arts, lies too near the essence of that
formal freedom of the inner life to be denied the right of turning more or less away
above the sunbject-matter, above what is given.140
This point seems strange given Hegel's more general remarks on the nature of Spirit's
return to itself. If music is 'too close' to the inner life, the absolute subjectivity of Spirit,
then this suggests that some kind of 'distance' from it is advisable. Why is closeness a
problem here? What are the operations in music's ontology that make it somehow
imperfect?
137 Vorlesungen (Suhrkarnp), 142-3.
138 Lectures, 897.
139 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 143.
140 Lectures, 897.
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Comparison with Poetry. 
This can be explained in the passage Hegel devotes to the comparison of music
with poetry, the 'most romantic' of all the arts. The relationship between music and
poetry seems for Hegel the most close. His analysis of the nature of the two art forms'
use of sound is particularly striking. Sound is only present in poetry as a posited. The
sign of the written word evokes the human voice and yet, present in the written word
is no sound whatsoever. Hence poetry, posited here not as an oral tradition but as a
written tradition, represents a degrading of sound, of the spoken externality of words,
for the merely significatory power of the written word. For poetry, sound is a mere
accident of ideas and feelings, as a mere medium for their transmission. In music,
however, sound becomes not merely a medium, but the formal and essential quality of
the content itself.
In music, then, sound is not some secondary by-product of the dissemination
but is located at the centre of that dissemination, as the essential feature of it. In this
sense, the fixed mode of dissemination, sound, is bound into the music as
simultaneously its medium, its form and its ontology. Hegel sees this as a kind of
retreat into the medium away from content, away from the literal communications of
the other more figurative arts. As poetry loses an external objectivity and retreats into
its own self-proclaimed internal objectivity, so music renounces this internal objective
realm and conflates external medium and internal objectivity in favour of a vague
interiority. This point is obscure. Since poetry brings about a representation of the
external objectivity of the world through the internal world of human feelings or the
inner subjectivity of the author, it can negate the absolute objectivity of its medium,
just as it can negate the pure externality of nature by a deliberate confusion of its
dissemination: poetry is neither purely written nor purely oral in the literate tradition
and its dissemination is open-ended. This is what Hegel means by its internal
objectivity: poetry is like the final closure of Spirit itself which man apprehends in its
completion as a kind of ideal object, as a bountiful external to itself and yet as a
macrocosm of its own subjective world. Hence:
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Die Poesie hingegen spricht die Empfindungen, Anschauungen und
Vorstellungen selber aus und vermag uns auch emn Bild UuBerer Gegenstande zu
entwerfen, obgleich sie ihrerseits weder die deutliche Plastik der Skulptur und
Malerei noch die Seeleninnigkeit der Musik erreichen kann und deshalb unsere
sonstige sinnliche Anschauung und sprachlose Gemiitsauffassung zur
Erganzung heranrufen mu13.141
Poetry. ..expresses the feelings, views and ideas themselves and can sketch a picture of
external objects for us, although it cannot approach the clear plasticity of sculpture and
painting or the depth of soul of music. It must therefore summon in supplementation
our other sensuous perceptions and our wordless apprehension of our emotions. 142
This notion of an apprehension of the subjective feelings of the individual from a kind
of 'non-sensual' distance suggests that poetry is somehow higher than music as an art
form. Clearly there is some kind of affinity between music and poetry in the sense that
they both close themselves from the externality of literal feeling in favour of a
generalised moment of feeling. Yet even here, the distinction is maintained, as is
evident in this passage concerned with musical settings of texts:
Auch in geistlichen Musiken ist der Text meistenteils entweder em n bekanntes
Credo oder sonst aus einzelnen Psalmenstellen zusammengebracht, so daB die
Worte der Veranlassung zu einem musikalischen Kommentar anzusehen sind,
der ftir sich eine eigene Ausfiihrung wird und nicht etwa nur den Text heben
soil, sondem von demselben mehr nur das Allgemeine des Inhalts in der
ahnlichen Art hernimmt, in welcher sich etwa die Malerei ihre Stoffe aus der
heiligen Geschichte auswahlt.143
Even in sacred music the text is for the most part a familiar Credo or is put together
out of some passages in the Psalms, so that the words are only to be regarded as an
opportunity for a musical commentary which is an independent construction of its own;
it is not meant in any way merely to emphasise the text but rather derives from it only
the universal [element] of its subject-matter in much the same way that painting may
select its material from sacred history.144
The passage regarding the relationship of music to poetry makes the following points
which are taken up later 145
 under the notion of 'music as an accompaniment': first,
music is distinct from poetry in that it has sound as a fundamentally ontological feature
of its dissemination; second, music's dissemination is fixed and thus has an immediacy
141 Vorlesungen (SuhrIcarnp), 146.
142 Lectures, 900.
143 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 148.
144 Lectures, 901. Translation modified.
145 See Lectures, 933-937 and, in particular, 937-951.
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that cannot acquire the internal objectivity of poetry; third, music has an affinity to
poetry in that it is largely concerned with the more general or archetypal emotions; and
finally, poetry reaches beyond the scope of music in that it can enter into the absolute
subjectivity of Spirit which music only evokes as a possibility.
Music and Text: Simple Mediation? 
Regarding music's treatment of its subject-matter, Hegel makes the following
point:
[...so sagte ich bereits friiher,] daB die Musik unter alien Kiinsten die meiste
MOglichkeit in sich schlieBe, sich nicht nur von jedem wirklichen Text, sondem
auch von dem Ausdruck irgendeines bestimmten Inhalts zu befreien, urn sich
bloB in einem in sich abgeschlossenen Verlauf von Zusammenstellungen,
Veranderungen, Gegensatzen und Vermittlungen zu befriedigen, welche
innerhalb des rein musikalischen Bereichs der Tone fallen.146
...of all the arts, music has the maximum possibility of freeing itself not only from any
text but also from the expression of any specific subject-matter, with a view to finding
satisfaction solely in a self-enclosed series of the conjunctions, changes, oppositions,
and modulations falling within the purely musical sphere of sounds.147
This suggests a general sympathy in Hegel for the notion of musical autonomy. Yet the
qualification bloft sows the seeds of a general dissatisfaction in Hegel with merely
independent music. This articulates another difference between the Hegelian and
Schellingian music aesthetics. It emerges here as located in the approach they take to
music without text. Schelling makes no reference to music as an accompaniment in his
Philosophie and we must assume, therefore, that music in its 'independent' form is
Schelling's first consideration. Hegel, on the other hand, approaches the verbal arts as
the most ideal (and we may read poetry as the zenith of those arts). Certainly,
Schelling makes the same point, but for Schelling, music's absence of so-called literal
content is an essential feature of its ontology. It is, by nature of this absence, the most
'real' of the arts. We have already encountered the distinctions between the Schellingian
and Hegelian approaches to sound and time, distinctions which set their music
aesthetics apart from the outset. Here, is a further indication that Hegel approaches
146 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp) 148.
147 Lectures, 901-2. Translation modified.
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music in a less ontological way than Schelling, For Hegel, the world presents us with a
chain of apparently unmediated ontologies which must be uncovered as illusions or
confusions of a deeper schism between the sensual and the ideal. Hence, music's
apparent impenetrability is a sign of a deeper lying truth which is undermined by reified
norms of cognition or consciousness.
In this sense, we might apprehend the Hegelian music aesthetic as an aesthetic
of correction: music's ontological status is to be undermined, to be uncovered by the
close watch of the good dialectician. Much misapprehension of the Hegelian music
aesthetic stems from a misunderstanding of this point. Those that would dismiss Hegel
as a brutish totaliser, as one who would violate the complexity of the world in order to
squeeze wilful reality into a neat Hegelian formula, fail to recognise the significantly
critical content of his work. As Julian Johnson has shown, 148 Hegel's main contribution
to music aesthetics has been his theory of mediation, an aspect of his Vorlesungen that
is frequently ignored. Similarly, Hegel's remarks given above might seem to indicate a
glaring anachronism: that music had long since thrown itself free from the mimetic
theories of the mid-eighteenth century and that Hegel's apparent difficulty with
'independent music' stems from his misunderstanding of the contemporary music.
Whether Hegel liked this music or not, there is no doubt that critiques of this notorious
passage are inadequate. If we read Hegel's apparent disdain for independent music not
as an antiquarian residue of eighteenth-century Cartesian theories of music, but as a
deliberate attempt to violate the normative ontology of instrumental music, then
Hegel's apparent 'inadequacies' emerge as a deeply dialectical, critical, distrust of false
ontologies. In this sense, music should, for Hegel, always be contextualised within a
broader dialectic of mediation, be this between music's form and its content or between
its ontology and the external. In this sense, music's apparent subservience to the text in
the Hegelian aesthetic is, in fact, a spin-off of the dialectical imperative of the critical
discourse. Hence text, as a ready externality, facilitates a simple mediation of music
148 Julian Johnson, 'Music in Hegel's Aesthetics: a re-evaluation.' in The British Journal of Aesthetics,
volume 31, no. 2, 1991.
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and the external. 149 And yet this text-centrism is not the only mediation that Hegel
attempts to furnish. By reading on we encounter the heart of the dialectic:
Erst wenn sich in dem sinnlichen Element der Tone und ihrer mannigfaltigen
Figuration Geistiges in angemessener Weise ausdrtickt, erhebt sich auch die
Musik zur wahren Kunst, gleichgtiltig, ob dieser Inhalt ftir sich seine nahere
Bezeichnung ausdrOcklich durch Worte erhalte oder unbestimmter aus den
TOnen und deren harmonischen Verhaltnissen und melodischer Beseelung
miisse empfunden werden.150
Only if music becomes a spiritually adequate expression in the sensuous medium of
sounds and their varied counterpoint does music rise to being a genuine art, no matter
whether this subject-matter has its more detailed significance independently expressed
in a libretto or must be sensed more vaguely from the notes and their harmonic
relations and melodic animation.151
On the one hand, then, music is inadequate since it has no literal or detailed content of
its own and, on the other, it can define for itself a sensual content which need not
necessarily conform to a text of any sort. This dichotomy springs from the very heart
of the dialectic: the romantic arts represent both a mediation of form and content and
yet demonstrate their internal struggle, their mutual incompatibility. The notion, in the
syllogism of necessity, of an internal mediation of extremes suggests the importance of
articulating such extremes, of recognising in that syllogism the functional centrality of
the self-subsistence of two opposites so that they can mark out for themselves a space,
so to speak, in which to operate. It is in this mutual incompatibility [wechselseitige
Unangemessenheit] that the striving for the middle term is born:
In dieser Rticksicht besteht die eigenttimliche Aufgabe der Musik darin, da13 sie
jedweden Inhalt nicht so ftir den Geist macht, wie dieser Inhalt als allgemeine
Vorstellung im Bewatsein liegt oder als bestimmte auBere Gestalt fiir die
Anschauung sonst schon vorhanden ist oder durch die Kunst seine gemMere
Erscheinung erhalt, sondem in der Weise, in welcher er in der Sphare der
subjektiven Innerlichkeit lebendig wird. Dieses in sich eingehtillte Leben und
Weben für sich in TOnen wiederklingen zu lassen oder den ausgesprochenen
Worten und Vorstellungen hinzuzuftigen und die Vorstellungen in dieses
Element zu versenken, um sie fOr die Empfindung und Mitempfindung neu
hervorzubringen, ist das der Musik zuzuteilende schwierige Geschaft.152
149 for more on mediation in the Hegelian aesthetic, see Johnson, 'Music...'
150 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 149.
151 Lectures, 902.
1 52 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 149.
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In this respect the proper task of music is to vivify some content or other in the sphere
of the subjective inner life, not however for spiritual apprehension in the way that
happens when this subject-matter is present in our consciousness as a general idea, or
when, as a specific external shape, it is already present for our apprehension to acquire
through art its appropriate appearance. The difficult task assigned to music is to make
this inwardly veiled life and energy echo on its own account in notes, or to add to the
words and ideas expressed, and to immerse ideas into this element of sound, in order to
produce them anew for feeling and sympathy.I53
The dichotomy is located, then, within the problematic of musical content. The first
characteristic of this content is defined in terms of an inwardness:
Die Innerlichkeit als solche ist daher die Form, in welcher sie ihren Inhalt zu
fassen vermag und dadurch befahigt ist, ales in sich aufzunehmen, was
iiberhaupt in das Innere eingehen und sich vornehmlich in die Form der
Empfindung Icleiden kann. Hierin liegt dann aber zugleich die Bestimmung, daB
die Musik nicht darf ftir die Anschauung arbeiten wollen, sondem sich darauf
beschranken mul3, die Innerlichkeit dem Inneren faBbar zu machen, sei es nun,
daB sie die substantielle innere Tiefe eines Inhalts aLs solchen will in die Tiefen
des Gemiits eindringen lassen oder daB sie es vorzieht, das Leben und Weben
eines Gehalts in einem einzelnen subjektiven Inneren darzustellen, so dal3 ihr
diese subjektive Innigkeit selbst zu ihrem eigentlichen Gegenstande wird.154
Inwardness as such is therefore the form in which music can conceive its subject-
matter and therefore it can adopt everything which can enter the inner life as such and
which above all can be clothed in the form of feeling. But in that case this implies that
music's purpose cannot be an attempt to work for visual apprehension but must be
limited to making the inner life intelligible to itself, whether by making the substantial
inner depth of a subject-matter as such penetrate the depths of the heart or whether by
preferring to display the life and energy of a subject-matter in a single subjective inner
life so that this subjective deep feeling itself becomes music's own proper subject-
matter.155
In short this relationship of the subjective inner world to the feelings which consist in
its content is the Hegelian Ich = kh. Music brings the inner life into self recognition,
into a familiarity with itself, just as sound represents the 1=1 of the double negation of
objectivity. To this end, music's connection with feelings, as its form or content 156
 and
its existence as sound make it the most adequate of the arts at expressing subjectivity
in its own terms. This should not be confused, however, with the final and perfect
153 Lectures, 902.
154 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 149.
155 Lectures, 902.
156 The two seem interwoven here such that the inner life is described on the one hand as the 'form in
which music can conceive its subject-matter' and, on the other hand, as the 'sphere to which 'music
has laid claim. Lectures, 902 and 902-3.
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stage of poetry which is the art form which most adequately demonstrates Spirit's
return to itself. Music is merely a type of closure, one which somehow prepares the
way for the final closure of poetry. As we stated earlier, Spirit's new-found perfection
makes it easier to represent something outside of itself; the diffusion of autonomous
Spirit through the contingency of man, then, stems from the unwieldy purity of its form
which is so perfect as to reflect itself with unceasing efficacy in the material realm. To
this extent, poetry's more literal forms, despite their circumscription by subjectivity, are
ciphers of this unceasing efficacy, the unceasing tendency to mediate the self and the
external. Music's apparent absolute closure is thus something like a concentrated etude
in closure from the Real. It is an extreme mode of romantic obscurity and is the
pathway to poetry.
The romantic fascination with music, however, stems perhaps from the
circumscribed manner in which music is seen to rehearse the issues of self-sufficient,
immanent meaning. In this sense, music might seem an unmediated utterance:
Schon auBerhalb der Kunst ist der Ton als Interjektion, als Schrei das
Schmerzes, als Seufzen, Lachen die unmittelbare lebendigste AuBerung von
SeelenzustAnden und Empfindungen, das Ach und Och des Gemiits. Es liegt
eine Selbstprodulction und Objektivita der Seele als Seele darin, em n Ausdruck
der in der Mitte steht zwischen der bewuBtlosen Versenkung und der Riickkehr
in sich zu innerlichen bestimmten Gedanken, und em n Hervorbringen, das nicht
praktisch, sondem theoretisch ist, wie auch der Vogel in seinem Gesang diesen
GenuB und diese Produktion seiner selbst hat.157
Outside art a sound as an interjection, as the cry of pain, as a sigh or a laugh, is
already the direct and most living expression of states of soul and feelings, is the 'och'
and 'oh' of the heart. What lies in it is a self-production and objectification of the soul
as soul, an expression midway between (a) the unconscious immersion, and reversion
to self, in inward specific thoughts, and (b) a production, not practical but
contemplative, just as the bird has in its song this delight and this production of
itself. 158
And yet the mere vagaries of expressive utterance are not the realm of pure subjectivity
in art. Romantic art must rather circumscribe these external relations within its own
157 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 150.
158 Lectures, 903. Translation modified.
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confines, take the externality of meaning and internalise it. Hence, music must arrange
sound within the confines of its own discursive space:
Die Musik muB im Gegenteil die Empfindungen in bestimmte Tonverhaltnisse
bringen und den Naturausdruck seiner Wildheit, seinem rohen Ergehen
entnehmen und ihn ma3igen.159
Music must, on the contrary, bring feelings into specific tone-relationships, deprive the
natural expression of its wildness and crude deliverance, and mitigate it.160
What music takes into the centre it transforms considerably. It is the art which, most of
all the romantic arts, must transform the external into new internalised proportions and
structures, just as dos Wahre and der Schlufl der Notwendigkeit articulate both their
own completion and their pathways to such completion:
So machen die Interjektionen wohl den Ausgangspunkt der Musik, doch sic
selbst ist erst Kunst als die kadenzierte Interjektion und hat sich in dieser
Riicksicht ihr sinnliche,s Material in hOherem Grade als die Malerei und Poesie
kiinstlerisch zuzubereiten, ehe dasselbe befahigt wird, in kunstgemaBer Weise
den Inhalt des Geistes auszudriicken.161
Interjections do form the starting-point of music, but music is itself art only by being a
cadenced interjection, and in this matter has to dress up its perceptible material
artistically to a greater extent than is the case in painting and poetry; not until then can
the material express a spiritual subject-matter in an artistically adequate way. 162
The final point that should be made regarding Hegel's understanding of the relationship
between music and poetry is that music approaches its subject-matter in a more acutely
ontological manner: music attempts to offer, in the relations of tones, rhythms and
proportions, the simple essence of the subject-matter which poetry can represent in a
much clearer or more articulated form:
Wenn sich daher die Musik auch als begleitende Kunst mit der Poesie oder
umgekehrt die Poesie sich als verdeutlichende Dolmetscherin mit der Musik
verbindet, so kann doch die Musik nicht auBerlich veranschaulichen oder
Vorstellungen und Gedanken, wie sic als Vorstellungen und Gedanken vom
SelbstbewuBtsein gefaBt werden, wiedergeben wollen, sondem sic muB, wie
gesagt, entweder die einfache Natur eines Inhalts in solchen Tonverhaltnissen
an die Empfindung bringen, wie sic dem inneren Verhaltnis dieses Inhalts
_
159 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 151.
160 Lectures, 903. Translation modified.
161 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 151.
162 Lectures, 903. Translation modified.
267
verwandt sind... [und] durch ihre die Poesie begleitenden und verinnigenden
Tone auszuddicken suchen.163
When therefore music is linked with poetry as an art accompanying it, or, conversely,
when poetry as the elucidating interpreter is linked with music, music cannot propose
to give an external illustration to ideas and thoughts as these are consciously
apprehended by us, or to reproduce them, but on the contrary, as I said, must bring
home to our feelings the simple essence of some subject-matter in such note-
relationships as are akin to the inner nature of that subject-matter...and to do this by
means of its notes that accompany and inwardize the poetry.164
The Effect of Music
The assumption that music is a kind of subjective inwardness, objectified and
closed within its own introspective world, runs through the whole of the Hegelian
music aesthetic. This notion of an inwardness, in particular, is perhaps the most
significant element of the Hegelian argument. Yet, as we have seen, the dialectic does
not allow for the ontological complacency that such a notion might at first suggest.
Indeed, the tension between the closure of music in on itself and the notion of
immanent critique - the notion, that is, of the dialectic as entering into movement not
as some pre-determined method, but as responding to the subject matter at hand, as
grounded within that subject matter - propels music into a paradoxical position in the
Hegelian system of the arts. This paradox is best articulated in the reflexivity of self
and musical content.
As we have seen, 'content' for Hegel constitutes those elements of music which
articulate something external to it. This might be the libretto or poem set to music or
the more vague archetypal narrative of musical structure, what Hegel terms emn
unbestimmter Inhalt. 165 The relationship of this undetermined content, the 'purely
musical' content, to the self is complex. In a kind of embryonic reception theory, Hegel
suggests that this relationship is essentially circular: first, music strains for a
generalised or non-literal (non-textual) content; the heart or mind [dos Gemiit]
responds freely to this skeletal content, a kind of archetypal representation of the
inward emotions, and is somehow stirred by it; the heart's response to this skeletal
163 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 152.
164 Lectures, 904. Translation modified.
165 vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 149.
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account aligns itself with the content 'presented' in the music; the now almost
undifferentiated nature of the two thereby furnishes a powerful 'feed back loop' where
the heart recasts the musical content anew, adding to it its initial response as an
intensification of it, from its 'undisclosed depth' [unaufgeschlossene Tiefe],166
somehow casting it back into the music in an accumulative frenzy. This quasi-
hermeneutic cycle, a kind of hedonistic indulgence in the undetermined materials of
music, is a process whereby music 'volatises' [verf7achtigt1 167 its objective existence.
As we have already seen, the volatility of the musical signifier springs from the
Hegelian notion of time in the Naturphilosophie as the Selbstwerden of
Selbstbewupsein, the becoming of self in the consciousness of self. As a form of
becoming, then, music is able to affect the heart, or self-consciousness, by showing it
the structures it works on itself, the structures it imposes on its own sense of its
existence. Selbstbewufitsein, thereby evokes a unity of Gestalt and Inhalt that is
persistent in the realm of subjectivity. The individual consciousness of the listener,
then, is a microcosm of the absolutely subjective realm of Spirit_
Music's engagement with the particularised subjectivity of the individual is a
mediation of the absolute subjectivity of Spirit and the absolute objectivity of the
contingent realm; it is, in this sense, like the third term of the syllogism. As free self-
engaged consciousness, particular subjectivity regards the objective realm as the
storehouse of objects for its scrutiny, and it can uphold them as reflections of itself in
the unceasing efficacy of its self-manifestation: objectivity is the other, which
subjectivity yearns for as its opposite, its promise of balance. Yet, the constant slippage
of the musical objectivity, its continual dissolution into the next moment and the
manner in which it demonstrates, through archetypal models, the workings of self on
itself, both draw the contemplative self into a negation of itself, into an engagement
with the pseudo-self of the musical unbestimmter Inhalt:
166 Ibid., 152.
167 Ibid., 153.
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Sie befangt daher das BewuBtsein, das keinem Objekt mehr gegeniibersteht und
im Verlust dieser Freiheit von dem fortflutenden Strom der Tone selber mit
fortgerissen wird.168
Therefore it captivates the consciousness which is no longer confronted by an object
and which in the loss of freedom is carried away itself by the ever-flowing stream of
sounds. 169
Hence, Hegel suggests, the 'power' of music lies in its ability to draw the selffrom
itself, to regard the self as its own object of scrutiny and to lose the self-subsistence for
which it has so long strained. Since both music and the self exist in the same medium,
time, then self is drawn into that medium of time-sound and music takes over the
structuring of the selfs experience of itself by the use of the articulated time of the
musical idiom:
Denn insofem es das subjektive Innere selbst ist, das ist die Musik sich mit dem
Zweck zum Inhalt nimmt, sich nicht als auBere Gestalt und objektiv
dastehendes Werk, sondem als subjektive Innerlichkeit zur Erscheinung zu
bringen, so ma die AuBerung sich auch unmittelbar als Mitteilung eines
lebendigen Subjekts ergeben, in welche dasselbe seine ganze eigene
Innerlichkeit hineinlegt.17°
For music takes as its subject-matter the subjective inner life itself, with the aim of
presenting itself, not as an external shape or as an objectively existing work, but as that
inner life; consequently its expression must be the direct communication of a living
individual who has put into it the entirety of his own inner life.171
Music as Mediation 
Springing, once again, from the differences in their respective theories of time
in the Naturphilsophie and Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur, the opposition of the
notions of music on the one hand as, for Hegel, ideal and, on the other, as, for
Schelling, real, belies some significant similarities. In particular, it was Schelling's
apparent attendance at some of Forkel's lectures and Hegel's familiarity with the work
of Forkel that forms the link in their aesthetics. Whilst the differences should not be
minimised, the similarities are often striking, forming a systematic extension of some of
the thoughts on music expressed by Wackenroder in the Phantasien. In particular, it is
168 vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 154.
169 LectureS, 906.
170 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 158-9.
171 Lectures, 909.
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the notion of the relationship between time and soul that is most striking in the more
general remarks of the two. The reference in Schelling's Philosophie to Pythagorean
notions of the soul 'as number' or linear accounting of the passing of time, as
experiencing itself within that medium, and the remarks discussed above regarding the
archetypal representation in music of the Becoming of self-consciousness, both
articulate a particular notion of consciousness, and the experience that we, as
particular subjectivities, have of that consciousness.
The central assumption of this external representation is organic. The structures
and proportions of the musical work set up profound resonances between themselves
and the structures of the conscious individual, and thereby, as we have seen, either
confuse that consciousness with a rich bounty of possible meanings, as in Schelling, or
somehow infiltrate the consciousness of that individual by constantly deferring musical
objectivity in the coming into being and passing away of each 'now'. The organicism of
these partially synonymous concepts stems in Schelling from the emergence of organic
resemblances across all levels of the world and in Hegel from the dialectical virility of
his conception of a music as, on the one hand, profoundly closed in its ontology, and,
on the other, as structurally sympathetic with the internal structures of consciousness.
The main point of departure, however, springs not only from the distinct
notions of time in the two but also from the positioning of music in the respective
aesthetic systems. As we have already said, an obvious difference is seen in the real-
ideal contradiction, and yet this is not, in itself, the most fundamental demonstration of
the difference. Most significant in this regard, rather, is the distinctly Hegelian notion
of music as a kind of mediation. So far, the elements of the argument for music as
mediatory that we have encountered are: the notion that music forms the centre or
middle term of the romantic arts; the notion that music's medium, sound, is a kind of
objectified object-free empty self; the notion that the musical note is both something
external to subjectivity and yet somehow expresses it; the notion that music, whilst
objective in strict terms, engages with a content that is purely subjective.
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Each of these elements of the argument for music as a mediation springs from
the tension discussed above between the notion of music as 'inwardizing' and,
conversely, the implicit distrust in the dialectic of 'given' or totally 'closed' ontologies.
There can be no obviated essence in the Hegelian system. Whilst Schelling is content to
ascribe to music a one-sided realness, Hegel constantly attempts to balance the
ontological objective closure of music with the archetypal representations of
subjectivity that it provides. Music is not as capable of showing the unceasing efficacy
of the external manifestation of Spirit as poetry, and the implicit notion of mediation in
the Hegelian music aesthetics should not be confused with this by-product of unwieldy
purity of form. It is, in fact, the very fact that music does not and cannot express itself
as this happy self-subsistence, whilst, conversely, yearning for its own closure, that
gives it this special quality.
What, then, are the essential features of this mediation? Or, rather, what two
modes of being does music attempt to mediate? First, we can jettison the notion that
mediation exists within the stage of antithesis. That stage is characterised by simple
separations of extremes and they are mediated only to the extent that they can enter
into a simple dialogue. It is clear that Hegel wishes to align the romantic arts, painting,
music and poetry, with the stage of synthesis or the syllogism of necessity. Spirit, as
we have seen, returns to itself at this stage and withdraws from the externality of the
objective realm. The separation of internal and external that this process represents
could conceivably constitute an antithesis in so far as it seems to recall the Anklang-
driven structures of simple opposition familiar to us from the classical arts. Yet this
reading is undermined by the notion of mediation presented in music. Music, it would
seem, functions as a mediation of these two separated, isolated, modes of existence, a
separation that Heidegger was later to describe in an 'etymologising' of the terms Sein
and Dasein. For the moment, however, the separation exists as the confrontation of
consciousness and objectivity. In drawing consciousness into an examination of itself,
by positing the self as the its own object of scrutiny, music thereby suspends the
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self/external hiatus. This is exactly what Hegel means when he suggests music as the
representation of the Becoming of self-consciousness.'72
Hegel is also able to demonstrate these mediatory qualities in the musical
structures themselves, as structural ciphers of its function within the broader aesthetic
system. In rhythm, for example, Hegel recognises both the presence of external time
and the internal animation, through bar and cadence, of time in rhythm. Hence, the
relationship of self to self is interrupted in its linearity by external moments of
periodised articulation:
Es [das MI] beugt das Aufheben seiner, wodurch es sich zum Objekte wird,
zum Fiirsichsein urn und ist nun durch diese Beziehung auf sich erst
Selbstgefiihl, SelbstbewuBtsein usf. In dieser Sammlung liegt aber wesentlich
emn Abbrechen der bloB unbestimmten Verdnderung, als welche wir die Zeit
zunachst vor uns hatten, indem das Entstehen und Untergehen,Verschwinden
und Erneuen der Zeitpunkte nichts als em n ganz formelles Hinausgehen tiber
jedes Jetzt zu einem anderen gleichartigen Jetzt und dadurch nur emn
ununterbrochenes Weiterbewegen war. Gegen dies leere Fortschreiten ist das
Selbst das Beisichselbstseiende, dessen Sammlung in sich die bestimmtheitslose
Reihenfolge der Zeitpunkte unterbricht, in die abstrakte Kontinuitat Einschnitte
macht und das Ich, welches in dieser Diskretion seiner selbst sich erinnert und
sich darin wiederfindet, von dem bloBen AuGersichkommen und Verandern
befreit.173
It [the self] turns the process of self-sublation whereby it becomes an object to itself
into self-awareness and now only through this self-relation does it come to have a sense
and consciousness, etc. of itself. But this concentration of experiences essentially
implies an interruption of the purely indefinite process of changes which is what time
was as we envisaged it just now, because the coming to be and passing away, the
vanishing and renewal of points of time, was nothing but an entirely formal transition
beyond this 'now' to another 'now of the same kind, and therefore only an uninterrupted
movement forward. Contrasted with this empty progress, the self is what persists in
and by itself, and its self-concentration interrupts the indefinite series of points of time
and makes gaps in their abstract continuity; and, in its awareness of its discrete
experiences, the self recalls itself and finds itself again and thus is freed from mere
self-externalization and change.174
This articulation of time, therefore, gives the self a complexity beyond merely empty
time; it brings it to an awareness of the discrete moments of experience which
constitute it and it is thereby saved from the monotony of the unknowing self, 'self-
172 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 914-5.
173 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 164-5.
174 Lectures, 914. Translation modified.
273
externalisation' [das Aufiersichkommen]. Of particular significance in the recognition of
self is Takt. 175 As a unit, imposed upon time, Takt nonetheless articulates the
possibility of the cessation of the monotony of self-ignorance. Since self recounts time
in a mediated manner, that is it is articulated and marked, cordoned off into parcels by
the self, then the articulation and parcelling of time in music constitutes a powerful tool
or a model of self s recognition of itself:
Die Befriedigung aber, welche das Ich durch den Takt in diesem Wiederfinden
seiner selbst erhalt, ist urn so vollstandiger, als die Einheit und GleichfOrmigkeit
weder der Zeit noch den TOnen als solchen zukommt, sondem etwas ist, das
nur dem Ich angehOrt und von demselben zu seiner Selbstbefriedigung in die
Zeit hineingesetzt ist.176
But the satisfaction which the self acquires, owing to the bar, in this rediscovery of
itself is all the more complete because the unity and uniformity does not pertain either
to time or the notes in themselves; it is something which belongs solely to the self and
is inserted into time by the self for its own self-satisfaction.177
It would seem from this passage that Hegel takes an essentially functionalist view of
music. The suggestion here seems to be that music, in itself, is so clearly abstract that
meanings are brought to it from external sources, as if music itself were somehow
empty, incapable of any kind of overt communication. Indeed, the notion of an 'applied'
semantic content seems to offer some useful links with our contemporary notions of
meaning as a culturally-mediated construct. Yet there is still something absolutist in
Hegel's notion of signification. Since music is so constructed as to appear unwieldy,
extreme, then it follows that it somehow resonates with the unwieldy purity of
subjectivity. In short, Hegel seems to want to balance the functionalist view of music
with more romantic notions of music's immanence: on the one hand, music is empty of
any explicit meaning and yet, on the other, its very mode of construction necessitates
its organic/structural sympathy with the structures of consciousness. The self thus
recognises in music the structures of its own becoming.
175 It is probably too crude a reading of the term Tula to conflate it mererly with our notion of the 'bar'
or 'measure'. Implicit to the term is a unit or measurment of time that carries a certain immanent
structural meaning. Thus, the passage given below (Vorlesungen, 166) invest Takt with an immanent
ability to give account of beat, pulse and periodicity. See also Vorlesungen 168-172.
176 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 166.
177 Lectures, 915.
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Whilst both rhythm and harmony exist in the medium of sound, they process
from one moment to another. The manner in which Hegel sees them achieving this
movement, the manner in which they bring self to self, comes about as a result of two
quite distinct processes. Rhythm articulates time in pure linearity, it numbers the
moments of the experiences of the self and brings self to self in a simply accumulative
manner. Harmony, on the other hand, whilst still linear, brings the external proportions
into play, the inter-relationships of the tones and chords to each other and their
consequent functionality. The more proportional aspect of music, a dimension not, it
must be said, wholly absent from mere rhythm but, rather, less explicity engaged, is an
aspect of the externality of self:
Die andere Seite nun, durch welche die abstralcte Grundlage des Talctes und
Rhythm us erst ihre Ethillung und dadurch die MOglichkeit erhalt, zur eigentlich
konkreten Musik zu werden, ist das Reich der Tone als Tone. Dies
wesentlichere Gebiet der Musik befaBt die Gesetze der Harmonie. Hier tut sich
emn neues Element hervor, indem emn KOrper durch sein Schwingen nicht nur fiir
die Kunst aus der Darstellbarkeit seiner rdumlichen Form heraustritt und sich
zur Ausbildung seiner gleichsam zeitlichen Gestalt hernberbewegt, sondem nun
auch seiner besonderen physikalischen Beschaffenheit sowie seiner
verschiedenen Lange und Kiirze und Anzahl der Schwingungen nach, zu denen
er es wahrend einer bestimm ten Zeit bringt, verschiedenartig ertOnt und deshalb
in dieser Riicksicht von der Kunst ergriffen und kunstgema8 gestaltet werden
muB.178
The other side, through which the abstract foundation of the bar and rhythm is fulfilled,
thereby acquiring the possibility of becoming truly concrete music, is the realm of
notes as notes. This more essential province of music comprises the laws of harmony.
Here a new element enters because by its vibration not only does a body cease to be
portrayable by art in its spatial form and move over to the development of, as it were,
its temporal form, but, depending on its physical character, its varying length or
shortness, and the number of vibrations it makes during a specific time, it sounds
differently. Therefore, this is something which art must seize upon and mould to its
artistic purposes.179
It is interesting that Hegel inverts Schelling's assessments of rhythm and
harmony since for Hegel rhythm is that element of music which most readily enters into
the consciousness of the individual, and is, we might therefore assume, the most ideal
element. Similarly, harmony is apprehended as the inverse of rhythm, as the objectivity
178 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 171-2.
179 Lectures, 919. Translation modified.
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of music's existence or, rather, the more objective side of music. It should be noted,
however, that the 'easy' division of potences given in Schelling is not so easily
compared with the Hegelian aesthetic. Whilst Schelling admittedly constructs a
complex system of organic inter-relationships in his Philosophie, the divisions with
which he starts seem more ontological than Hegel's. Indeed, clear labelling of the
various aspects of music in terms either of the real or the ideal (or their indifference) is
absent here. Each articulation of real or ideal quality seems, in Hegel, to undermine or
complicate the previous point, and this complexity springs from the overtly dialectical
nature of the project of the Vorlesungen.
Yet some similarities persist, as Hegel's notion of melody in music, given in this
short comparison with harmony and rhythm, demonstrates:
Die Harrnonie namlich befaBt nur die wesentlichen Verhaltnisse, welche das
Gesetz der Notwendigkeit fiir die Tonwelt ausmachen, doch nicht selber schon,
ebensowenig wie Takt und Rhythmus, eigentliche Musik, sondem nur die
substantielle Basis, der gesetzmaBige Grund und Boden sind, auf dem die freie
Seele sich ergeht.180
Harmony comprises only the essential proportions constituting the necessary law for
the world of notes; yet, as little as the beat, bar and rhythm, are they already in
themselves music proper, for, on the contrary, they are only the substantive basis, the
ground and soil which conforms to law and on which the soul expatiates in its
freedom. ' 81
This, then, is a straight forward summary of the first part of the more specific analysis
of the expressive means of music we have already discussed. Yet, even here, there is an
apparent contradiction to our previous notions of rhythm as the more ideal element of
the two. Hegel merely lumps them together as die substantielle Basis and der
gesetztntifiige Grund of music. This apparent contradiction immediately reveals itself as
a kind of dialectical preparation for the 'unity' of melody:
Das Poetische der Musik, die Seelensprache, welche die innere Lust und den
Schmerz des Gemtits in Tone ergieSt und in diesem ErguB sich iiber die
Naturgewalt der Empfindung mildernd erhebt, indem sie das prasente
Ergriffensein des Inneren zu einem Vemehmen seiner, zu einem freien
Verweilen bei sich selbst macht und dem Herzen eben dadurch die Befreiung
180 vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 185.
181 Lectures, 929.
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von dem Druck der Freuden und Leiden gibt - das Freie TOnen der Seele im
Fe1de der Musik ist erst die Melodie.182
The poetic element in music, the language of the soul, which pours out into the notes
the inner joy and sorrow of the heart, and in this outpouring mitigates and rises above
the natural force of feeling by turning the inner life's present transports into an
apprehension of itself, into a free tarrying with itself, and by liberating the heart in this
way from the pressure of joys and sorrows - this free sounding of the soul in the field
of music - this is alone melody.183
As a kind of internal mediation between harmony and rhythm, melody constitutes the
most powerfully expressive element of music since it alone constitutes the whole
articulation of the dialogue between the closed ontology of musical material and the
structures it imposes by example upon the heart or soul. In this way, the melodic line
represents the element of music which, by nature of its own groundedness in the
musical material and its straining for the externality of expressing something, draws
together the ontological closure of music and the opening of it into human
consciousness:
...und so allein iibt die Musik in ihrem eigentiimlichen Elemente der
Innerlichkeit, die unmittelbar ÃuBerung, und der AuBerung, die unmittelbar
innerlich wird, die Idealitat und Befreiung aus, wekhe, indem sie zugleich der
harmonsichen Notwendigkeit gehorcht, die Seele in das Vernehmen einer
hOheren Sphare versetzt.184
In this way alone does music in its own element of inwardness perfect the immediate
expression of inner life, and it imparts to that expression, immediately becoming inner,
the ideality and liberation which, while being obedient to the necessity of harmonic
laws, yet at the same time lift the soul to the apprehension of a higher sphere.185
1 i I.Casig ilLAAThiktag_usi_e_ifigul rm* /
The parallels already drawn between the notion of 'truth' in Phtinomenologie or
the Schlufi der Notwendigkeit in Wissenschaft der Logik with music suggest two
mediatory functions for music. First, as the most extreme of the romantic arts, it
articulates one of the two sides of the Schlufi which are to be brought into mediation.
Second, as articulating within itself the self-mediating structures of consciousness, it
stands as a kind of 'model' of mediation, as a kind of distilled, objectified demonstration
182 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 185.
183 Lectures, 929-30.
184 Vorlesungen (Suhrkamp), 190.
185 Lectures, 933.
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of that process. It is particularly important, here, not to conflate these apparently
contradictory functions, which, in themselves, constitute two extremes within a
syllogism, to be mediated by dialectical thought. Indeed, it is this very dualism in the
Hegelian aesthetic of music, the very conflict of the two sides - severe objectivity and
self-regarding subjectivity - which locates the aesthetic within the dialectic.
Michael Rosen's rather scathing account of mediation in Adomo's thought
suggests that his appropriation of Hegel's terminology is a 'bewitchment' or reification
of the irrationality of Hegel's project or, rather, that Adomo's neo-Hegelianism exerts
a bewitchment on the conceptual language of Hegel's thought:
So, in this case, it is not the later text [Adomo's Negative Dialektild which
'completes' the earlier one [Phanomenologie], but the return to the earlier text
which enables us to dispel the 'bewitchment' which its concepts place upon the
later. Only when restored to their speculative-mystical shell does the irrational
kernel of Hegel's concepts become apparent.186
Whilst Rosen's reading of mediation is both rigorous and comprehensive, his critique
demands a refutation. The necessity of this refutation springs from a deep
misunderstanding in Rosen of the notion of dialectic as immanent critique. If, as Rosen
suggests, the dialectic in Hegel demands an 'openness' in its procedure, 187 then it might
seem to us that dialectical thought in Hegel is little more than a mystified 'metaphicised'
scepticism, a mode of thought completely subservient to the overriding necessity of its
own negativity. Yet this critique of Hegel (and Adomo) ignores perhaps the most
fundamental feature of the dialectic, that it is its grounding in its historical moment and
its very socio-cultural underpinnings, which facilitate its action. The critique given of
He gel's false completion, therefore, as summarised in our Introduction, springs from a
woefully unhistorical engagement with the critical project of dialectic. Whilst Rosen
recognises the roots of dialectic in discussion, dialogue, debate, he fails to engage with
the purpose of the Hegelian project: to ground the self in its historically and, by
implication, culturally determined environment of externality.
186 Rosen, Michael, Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism, Cambridge, 1984, 178.
187 'Dialectic is legitimated, therefore, not with reference to absolute (or Absolute) principles, but by
the ability which it has to deal with objections and to satisfy them on their own terms'Ibid., 28.
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Whilst it is reasonably easy to cast doubt on Hegel's conclusions in their
particular forms, it is not so easy to dismiss Hegel as an unmitigated irrationalist. In
failing to judge dialectic according to its deeply historical nature, and in failing to
ground the distinctly Hegelian dialectic within the problematics of early nineteenth-
century thought, Rosen shows a glaring insensitivity to the notion of immanent
critique as a response to a contemporaneous problematic. The anthropological thrust
of Wissenschaft demands more than mere critique of the minutiae, but a
contextualisation of Hegel's other works within this broad notion of there being an
innate, autonomous, quality to the various stages of the dialectic. In other words, the
notion in Wissenschaft of a deep-rooted reflexivity in the cultural/social practices of
man and the very structures of human thought, provides clear evidence of the
anthropocentric radicalism of the Hegelian project. History is the domain of man, and
man eschews the dialectic as if to find representations of his own unceasing efficacy in
the objective realm. The 'quality' of each stage of dialectic is a deep-seated expression
of the 'quality' of the epistemological landscape contemporaneous to that stage.
The somewhat encoded accounts in the Vorlesungen of music as grounded
within a network of parallelisms with cognitive, social and historical phenomena, can
be explicated, therefore, when grounded in an understanding of the broader project of
the dialectic as essentially historical. As we have seen, many of the social and historical
implications of Hegel's analysis have to be teased out of the text. In the 'classical' arts,
for example, it is possible to decode the simple Angemessenheit of Concept and Reality
as a kind of 'syntax' of that socio-historical paradigm. In the 'adequacy' of mortal
monarchy to an expression of divinity, therefore, we can recognise a demonstration of
a deep structural relationship between Kant's noumenal and phenomenal spheres, a
relationship which is 'taken up' [aufgenommen] by the cultural products of that
paradigm.
Both Adorno and Hegel, therefore, are keen to analyse the nature of the
relationship between two types of activity: that which confers meaning and that which
produces. Marxists would suggest that activities which infer meaning are mystified or
279
reified modes of production. Yet this conflation, common to 'vulgar' Marxism, is
avoided in Hegel by mediation. Certainly, in a culture such as our own, where access
to the various mechanisms of cultural dissemination has almost become a Darwinian
test of the 'greatness' or 'success' of a work, there is no doubt that there is an insidious
invasion of the work of art by the relations of production. Yet even here, it is not
sufficient to confuse the manner in which a musical work is constructed with the
manner in which it is disseminated. It is in this Hegelian notion of Verminlung that we
find a tentative solution to the conflation-separation dichotomy.
Just as in Schelling there is a complex interaction between autonomy and
function which is deposited at the very heart of organic structure, so, in Hegel, there is
a similar interaction. Mediation in this sense articulates, in aesthetic application at least,
the manner in which, to use Adorno's term, art engages in a mimesis of its external
environment and yet, manages to sustain what Foucault has termed a 'formidable
materiality'. This apparent 'magical' state of affairs is sustained by resemblance-
modelling across the two poles where the formidable materiality of music nonetheless
demonstrates its own 'centredness' in that divide. In other words, music's material
models itself to the environment in which it is propagated and takes into itself the
Concept-Reality dilemma, the self-subsistence of the two realms and their mediation.
As characterised in the Schlufi der Notwendigkeit, mediation can be likened,
also, to a point of mutual interaction, to the moment where both self and other, internal
and external, overlap or share a point of similarity. This is not a rebuttal of the
polarised structure of the syllogism, but captures that sense (often invoked in textbook
definition of metaphor) of a shared characteristic. This is our 'middle term'. We might
represent the interactions of the various levels of mediation in the following manner
where '0' refers to Reality, 'S to Concept and 'Al' to mediation:
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Vermittlung
<--das Objektive	 das Subjektive-
the general	 the general
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I	 \
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I	 1
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I 1 1 1
Ai MM Ai
I\ /\ I\ /\
0 S	 0 sO So	 s
the particular	 the particular
Thus, the various levels of the dialect, contextualised in two polar arrays (particular-
general and subjective-objective) mediate between polarities by taking the universal
structure of the syllogism into themselves. Just as Schelling attempted to show the
organic resembling or modelling of various levels of the world structure, so Hegel
stresses the unifying agent of internal process to deny the simple separation of internal
and external, general and particular, objective and subjective. The distribution of
becoming-truth across these various levels - the various qualitative configurations of
the dialectic - is like a complex metaphorical array of syllogistic modelling.
As we have seen, then, syllogistic modelling manifests itself in music in the
manner in which it: (i) articulates its own ontological boundaries; (ii) takes the external
poles into itself; (iii) internalises the process of becoming; (iv) internalises Vermittlung
and thus represents the multifaceted process of Aufhebung in modelled form. Each of
these functions must sustain for itself a degree of autonomy, for such terms as
Selbstbeherrschung, Aufnehmung, das innerliche Werden, Vermittlung and, finally,
Aufhebung are not mere synonyms. They articulate, rather, a configuration of functions
which characterise the Hegelian romantic paradigm.
What is so striking in Hegel's oeuvre is not the complexity of the texts nor
merely their engagement with the philosophical debates of the time, but the element
they bring to the project, above and beyond the merely philosophical, of man's
groundedness in his environment.
Conclusion
Three distinct categories of philosophical enquiry into music, each of which
revolves around the central notion of closure - the notion that art can somehow
articulate its own separateness from the external environment from which it springs -
emerge as central to this inquiry: autonomy, ontology and the ideal. As we have seen,
closure articulates not merely a new response to the Cartesian aesthetic but also, one
might say, gives an encoded account of the new structures of music dissemination in
the era immediately after the vital revolution. Its firm basis in the commodity-
equivalence-paradigm, its participation, that is, in the tabulating of small units of
exchange - Foucault's labour hours - and its grounding in the metaphysical discourses
of the nascent philosophical aesthetics of Hegel and Schelling, make the notion of
closure the central category of the epistemology of the Friihromantik.
In short, closure seems to enter at those moments of existence that go beyond
the realms of theory and somehow call for a limitation on the activities of deductive
reason: when, that is, the object, now turning inwards upon itself, becomes 'saturated'
with or threatened by the prescriptive, pejorative jibes of theoretical scrutiny. Music, in
this sense, had been so prodded, violated, vilified by the Cartesian project that it
withdrew itself from that mode of reasoning , hid itself below the detritus of the
rationalist industry and, for a moment at least, closed itself completely to scrutiny. This
was the moment of Wackenroder.
Autonomy
The three terms autonomy, ontology and the ideal, are by no means mere
identical categories. They each articulate a different sub-species of activity within the
general activity of closure. The notion of autonomy has, as we have seen, many
synonyms in the Friihromantik. Amongst these are a group of terms each of which
refers in a general sense to impenetrability: vereinzelt, einsam, abgelegt, sinnlos,
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bedeutungslos, rechertigend, geheimnisvoll, innerlich, dunkel, unbeschreiblich,
innewohnend, immanent, unversehrt, unbegreiflich, unergrandlich, unbefeigbar and
so on. Each term, then, is either a category of impenetrability in the physical sense, or
accounts for this aspect of closure in a more abstracted manner, in terms of its
impenetrability to reason. Of the first category, the most notable are einsam,
rechertigend, vereinzelt, abgelegt, unbefeigbar l and, to lesser extent, beschrankt.
They articulate the epistemological possibility of closure in terms of the spatial
dimension, mapping out that area in which music operates as a kind of removed sphere
of activity. Such notions, as we saw, are captured in Wackenroder in the metaphor of
the Orient as a removed, magical, Heimat alles Wunderbaren, 2 and in the imagery of
the frOhliche grane Insel, floating like a lost realm on the dunkele unergrandliche
Ozean. 3 In the second group, the more abstracted accounts of music's impenetrability
to reason, we find two sub-groups of terms, one which is concerned overtly with
meaninglessness and one which announces the drawing of lines of defence. In the first,
we find sinnlos, bedeutungslos, unbeschreiblich, and unbegreiflich, each of which"
deals explicitly with the problematic of interpretative readings of musical content. In
the second, concerned more to construct an inviolate boundary around music as a
defence against instrumental reason, the terms defensiv, rechyertigend, unversehrt,
and geheimnisvoll and its synonym dunkel all articulate this sense of marking out a
kind of safe area.
The terms objektiv and kOrperlich,4 along with beschriinkt or begrenzt,5 whilst
not exclusive to this group of synonyms concerned with impenetrability, capture some
of the sense of this first major group, but this implied impenetrability is consequent
upon the lines of defence having already been drawn. Similarly, allegorisch,
innewohnend and immanent could be said to belong more to the notion of an
articulated ontology than a mere defence, although the synonyms innewohn end and
1 Schelling, Philosophie der Kunst, 109.
2 Wackenroder, Phantasien fiber die Kunst far Freunde der Kunst, 158.
3 Ibid., 164. Literally 'happy green island' and 'dark unfathomable ocean' respectively.
4 Schelling, Philosophie, 133.
5 Ibid., 42.
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immanent are consequent upon the articulation of this impenetrability so that the
'meaning' can somehow be 'held in' or restrained.
Ontology 
Clearly the notion of impenetrability locked into the term Autonomie6 has some
elements in common with the notion of ontology. Certainly, the notion of limits or of a
defence against 'semantic seepage' can assist in the articulation of ontology, but the real
drive of this discourse is inwards, regardless of the defences drawn up by autonomy.
The strain for the characteristics of the inwardizing discourses of music lead us to the
terms eigentiimlich, wesentlich, eigensttindig, selbstbeherrschend and
selbstbefriedigt,7 all of which attempt to capture the notion of self-animation present in
Wackenroder's terms aus freier Willkiirg and zu eignem Behagen. 9 The essential terms
immanent and innewohn end, as consequent upon the first category of impenetrability,
are also to be included in this group since they are concerned with the articulation of
the internal dialogue. Indeed, Foucault's image of the 'clear discursive surface' of a
'secret but sovereign mass" captures most eloquently the sense of interiority that
ontology or Wesenll suggests. The essentialising of this discourse, then, evokes images
in the aesthetic of internal secrecy, premised, once again, on the notion of the
impenetrable. Yet Wackenroder's invocation of the Vogel PhOnix12 can suggest also
the category of Selbstbelebung or Selbstbeherrschen both of which bring the work of
music into the heart of the proto-scientific paradigm of Naturphilosophie. This
paradigm was not as overtly analytical, in the empirical sense, as the later positivist
paradigm and yet it strained for an engagement with the externality of nature, that
plethora of closed ontologies, without losing the virility of instrumental reason. The
weakening of the 'reflexivity' between analysis and compositional pedagogy that Ian
6 Philosophie, 388.
7 Hegel, Vorlesungen fiber die Asthetik, (Suhrkarnp) 166.
8 Phantasien, 164.
9 Ibid., 164.
Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, 237-8.
11 Phantasien,183.
12 Ibid., 164.
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Bent° recognises as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century suggests there
may be a case to argue for the emergence of a deep structural relationship between the
ontologising of certain modes of Naturphilosophie l4 and certain analytical approaches
to the score. In a sense, the early analytical moments in the pedagogical discourses,
still joined to or framed by the eighteenth-century neo-Aristotelean traditions of
textbook teaching, point towards a verticality in the history of musical theory where
analysis began to emerge as a separate autonomous discourse.
The notion of an ontological account of the musical work was premised on the
Forkelian categories of the internal mechanisms of music's material: Phrase, Periode,
Stil, Gattung, Einhalt, Charakter. The apparent empiricism of some of these early
moments' s stands, it would seem, some distance from the sensual reasoning of
Naturphilosophie. Such obsessive engagement with the internal devices of
construction that some of these analyses represented would certainly have confronted
the dialectical Hegel, the aestheticising Wackenroder and the hermeneutic Schelling
with an apparently alternative vision of reasoning. Yet the notion of ontology, to which
we have returned over and over again, provided a framework in which the analytical
urge could gratify itself. Schelling's organicism, in particular, provided a model of
interaction between these apparently differing world views where the works of art
represented 'little universes' or self-engaged organisms which, as Ian Bent suggests:
...were not self-sufficient mechanisms, explainable in purely physio-chemical
terms, nor were they natural entities governed by some unmeasurable external
life-force; they were something between the two: functioning wholes that
regulate and control their own growth processes.'6
In this sense, the new reflexivity between music analysis and the nascent philosophical
science of Naturphilosophie is based on three essential conditions which functioned as
13 Ian D, Bent (ed.) Music Analysis in the Nineteenth Century, volume 1, Cambridge 1994, xiii.
14 Most notably, perhaps, in Schelling's Ideen or his System and Hegel's Natutphilosophie.
15 Abt Vogler, Zwei und dreisig Praludien far die Orgel und fie das Fortepiano: nebst einer
Zergliederung in asthetischer, rhetorische und harmonischer Racksicht, mit praktischem Bezug auf
das Handbuch der Tonlehre von Abt Vogler in Bent, Analysis, volume 1, 136-45. The term
Zergliederung, here, captures a whole clutch of synonyms which articulate the analytical paradigm of
the early nineteenth century. See Bent's account of it, Ibid., 21-2.
16 Ibid., 11-12.
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'incubators' for the emergence of the analytical-ontological paradigm: first, the
centralisation and rationalisation of the structures of music dissemination, establishing
the new Leipzig/Vienna axis; second, the emergence of a new vision of the
Kultumation as an organic whole, linked by the improved communications required by
the new Staatsvemunft; third, the emergence of the philosophical paradigm of
organicism and the consequent closure of the discrete parts of the world into self-
contained microcosms of the complex whole.
The emergent ontological impulses suggest, then, a point of cohesion between
the disparate social and philosophical ruptures, deeply embedded in a unified
epistemological paradigm shift. Hence, the musical score begins to furnish an
interiority, free from the functionalism of the Cartesian aesthetic, opening itself only to
the most specialised scrutiny. The score, then, emerged as a Schellingian Symbol of the
real side, as an intuiting of the infinite notion of ever more colossal ontologies, of
infinitude itself, into the finite genres of the musical work. As a problematic final
synonym of ontology, the real (or the finite-intuiting, das Reale, das Reelle)
represents one side of the bipartite division of the artistic genres into sense-
apprehended forms, such as music, and intellect-apprehended forms such as poetry or
drama. As the Symbol of this real process, then, the score can be seen to present itself
as an object of scrutiny through its causal connection with the sound-world it posits.
Hence, since the causality in Schelling and Hegel's notions of sound and its connection
with matter engenders a point of Charakter or Eigentum, an internal quality or
essence, we can read this causal connection between the score and the 'musical work'
as evoking the very Charakter of that work. In other words, the connection of the
score to the authoritative centre of the work is premised by this causality and imbues
the score with a sense of self-enclosed or self-animating authority. In short, we might
liken this new approach to the possibility of an object of scrutiny for an embryonic
Musikwissenschaft as a kind of anatomical discourse.
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The Ideal 
Less closely linked with the other two categories, and yet not antonymous with
them, the notion of the 'ideal' confronts the inevitable tensions inherent in the attempt
to find a common ground between the ontologising of Schelling, the mystifying of
Wackenroder and the dialectics of the Hegelian aesthetic. Yet, the apparent
contradiction in the Schellingian and Hegelian aesthetics in the confrontation of music
as the real and music as the ideal, announces a deep-lying ambivalence in this term to
the other two category groups we have already encountered. The synonyms for this
term seem reasonably clear: abstrakt, abstrahiert, schematisch, bodenlos, leer,
geistlich, gOttlich, subjektiv. All of these suggest the absence of the material and the
participation within the spiritual or subjective realm. By 'spiritual' we can infer not
merely the otherworldly or divine but also those processes that are undertaken by the
mind, since Geist means both Spirit and mind.
Some of the elements already discussed are common to the ideal, most notably
the notion of separation or 'removedness', a sense of dos Wunderbare, springing
perhaps from Baumgarten and Meier's notion of Verwunderung. Hence the inclusion
here of certain of those synonyms might seem appropriate: unversehrt, selbstbewupt,
selbstbefriedigt. Yet it is not the sense of closure that most properly captures the sense
of the ideal in the Frahromantik. Since certain elements of closure involve the
impenetrability of the first group of synonyms, then that also includes the possibility of
the notion of an Objektivittit, or a Ktirperlichkeit since the status of the closed entity is
often conflated to the merely objective or corporeal. Indeed, as we saw in the last
chapter, Hegel's notion of Spirit's return to itself has many features common to the
closure of objective ontology. In particular, the notion of Hegel's Spirit as a kind of
inverse Schellingian real, where the seepage of meaning is plugged by the unceasing
efficacy with which Spirit manifests itself in the objective realm. In short, Hegel's Spirit
and, to a certain extent, Schelling's gtittliche Ausgiefiung both demonstrate the deep
structure of the ideal: as an unwieldy or colossal purity, it unceasingly displays itself in
the objects of the real realm and thereby seeks modes of mediation with that
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structurally sympathetic mode of existence. Since both ideality and reality share the
notions of ontological interiority and quasi-objective closure and the Schellingian
bounty of meaning of the real side, the connection of the ideal to the other synonyms is
through both mediation and through certain points of common ground.
Diese Unendlichkeit muB sich gegentiber dem Verstand dadurch ausdriicken,
daB kein Verstand fahig ist sie ganz zu entwickeln, daB in ihm eine unendliche
MOglichkeit liegt, immer neue Beziehungen zu bilden.17
As far as understanding is concerned, this infinity must express itself such that no
understanding is capable of developing it entirely, and such that in it there resides the
infinite possibility to formulate ever new relationships.18
The ambivalence of the ideal is thus to be understood in terms of the Hegelian
notion of self-Spirit, where Spirit, returned to itself, gives the broad metaphysical proof
of the truth of closure. The ideal, therefore, is a mediation between the closure of the
musical work and its proof. This infinity can also be understood in the Schellingian
sense of a semantic bounty which, by its irreducibility, evokes a kind of inverse ideal,
the 'ideally objective' or the objective in a form which captures an element of the
infinite within itself, just as musical rhythm takes up the external world and articulates
it as a 'meaning' from within itself. Meaning eschews from the real side, just as from the
ideal side, by means of an extremity or purity, the first rule of theoretical protocol.
Only in the extremity of the real or ideal side can the forms manifest themselves in
unceasing efficacy in the opposite potence. The bounty of meaning that eschews in the
most real of the Schellingian arts, music, places itself into the ideal, the Hegelian
subjective, by means exactly of this principle of connection between purity or austerity
and the efficacy with which it manifests itself in its opposite potence.
The synonyms of the ideal are thus its antonyms to the extent that the two
extremes are mutually dependent upon each other and thereby somewhat synonymous
at a deep structural level.
17 Philosophic, 58.
18 Philosophy 50.
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Naturphilosophie as semiology? 
So far, we have intimated that it may be possible to construct a unified, or at
least a reasonably coherent, attitude to the distribution of meaning in the musical work
at this time. Whilst the attempt to 'reconstruct' such a coherent attitude or a 'body of
theory' from the three figures presented here could fall foul of a tendency to over-
generalise, it is nonetheless possible that the organicism of the Friihromantik
represents a kind of meta-semiology, an analysis of the 'meanings' of the world and the
structures which eschew them. Certainly, the notion that a clearly articulated
semiology of music exists in the texts of the Naturphilosophie is ludicrous. The
semiological consequences of that body of theory have to be constructed through
intimation and suggestion.
Perhaps the most powerful semiological image is that of the living organism. As
we have seen, this model of structural sympathy across discrete parts of the whole is
premised by the notion that such sympathies are somehow deeply embedded in the
operations of the world. To this extent, the structures of meaning and their
dissemination were, for a moment, embedded in the dendritic structures of the
organism. If the sign and the referent represent a simplified, bipolar division of the
world in a manner indebted to the Cartesian theories of meaning, the branches of the
organic structure distributed this bipolarity across a complex set of internal resonating
sympathies, such that the division is ever more internalised:
[the universallexternal]
Absolute
apprehension through
the modes of determination
(the senses)
	
(the intellect)
Real
	 Ideal
	
R	 I
	
R	 I
	
ri	 r i	 r	 i	 r i
riririri	 riririri
[the particular/internal]
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Whilst this conflation of the terms universal and external, particular and internal is
something of a 'leap of faith' there is a sense in which, for music at least, the internal
structures of the object of scrutiny, as representations in microcosmic form of the
broad general of the whole, progress in this organic analysis through ever smaller
discrete parts and thereby proceeding ever 'deeper' into the interiority of the music.
This notion of the synonymity of particular and internal is thus an inversion of the
later Schenkerian notion of 'depth' as synonymous with generality or universality.
The matter of the synonymity of the Schellingian potences with the bipolarity
of sign and thing is more difficult to resolve. There may be something in the very
structure of identity philosophy which confuses the bipolarity: Schelling's notion that
the two potences can be inverted such that what was real becomes ideal and vice versa.
Hence the alignment of the strictly Saussurean sign as a kind of synthesis of the
material and conceptual elements with one or the other sides is problematic. But, if we
take the bipolarity of the post-Cartesian semiology and assign it to the real and ideal
potences, then the clear conceptuality of the sign and the clear materiality of the
referent or, conversely, the clear conceptuality of the concept as referent and the clear
materiality of the sign as objective, whilst conforming to the laws of the Schellingian
identity philosophy, can also be allocated to one side or the other as a fundamental set
of potences of the Schellingian semiology. Hence, given below is the allocation taking
the 'thing' as the referent and the relatively conceptual 'sign' as the ideal where T, t refer
to 'things', S, s to 'signs' and A to the Absolute.
[Real]	 A	 [Ideal]
T	 S
T S	 T S
t s	 t s	 t s	 t s
ts ts ts ts	 ts ts ts ts
Clearly, as the rules of identity philosophy imply, this structure can be inverted such
that the relatively material sign refers to the real and the relatively conceptual 'concept'
refers to the ideal.
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The conflation of sensuality and intellect that both Schellingian identity
philosophy and the Hegelian dialectic infer is consequent upon the structural
sympathies that resonate across the two poles. Hence, the spatial and temporal
referent, the 'thing', is pinpointed by the three dimensions of space and the fourth
dimension of time. Even here, as we have seen, there is an organic division that refers
to the real-ideal divide of Naturphilosophie. Space articulates the most extreme forms
of reality, the Ding an und für sich as the first potence. It is the merely empty
objectivity of static materiality, wholly inviolate and wholly concrete. The dimension of
time, on the other hand, is a negativity of the Anundfiirsichsein of this first dimension,
and, as the Becoming of Now into Now, it is the empty negation of the first negation
of space. Hence, as a double negation, time places the process of signification, of the
excretion of meaning, into a dimension that also controls the realm of the conceptual.
Hence the spatiality of the material referent is the real within the real and the
temporality is the ideal within the real; or expressed another way, the former is the
referent within the referent and latter is the sign within the referent.
Conversely, the inversion of this structure, as good identity practice, invokes
the sense of the sign as relatively material, as the temporally and spatially grounded
side and the referent, as the static 'concept', as wholly subjective:
[Real]	 A	 [Ideal]
S T	 ST
St	 St	 St	 St
St St St St	 St St St St
The same is also true of this structure in that each pole has within it the structural
representation of the opposite pole.
As regards a semiology of music, the notion of the internal and the particular
sharing the same extreme end of the system returns us to the notion of the closure of
the musical work. As we have seen, Zergliederung, as a largely anatomical metaphor,
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suggests the sense of 'dissection' or the parcelling of an organism into its discrete
parts. 19 The early nineteenth-century analytical moments seemed, therefore, to
redistribute the organic structures of Naturphilosophie in terms of a dismantling of the
structure and a reassembling of them in a new configuration that made the organic
structures clear.
As a kind of organism, then, the notion of depth seems somehow inappropriate
as a metaphor for the 'essential' structures. Certainly, the notion of interiority, of
investigations within the organism, gives a sense of the hierarchy of Zergliederung but
the notion that one level of the structure might be more significant than another is alien
to the proper rules of the identity philosophy of Schelling. To this end, therefore, it
may be possible to ascribe to 'depth' some synonymity with interiority, but only to the
extent that the 'deep' structures be apprehended as 'hidden' structures. In this sense, the
analytical paradigm was more concerned with the result of its undertakings, with what
it 'uncovered' [entdeckt] than with which level was of most structural significance.
The avoidance of hierarchisation, then, evokes the fundamental laws of the
Schellingian identity philosophy and there is still much work to be done on the
relationship between the meta-semiological structures of German Idealism and this
nascent discourse of analysis. The account given here, of the analytical consequences
of Naturphilosophie, consents to be largely metaphorical. Indeed, the Idealists'
reading of music, an extension of Wackenroder's metaphorical frenzy, connects
discrete elements of the organic structure in terms of similarity. As one pole of the
connectional devices of language, the metaphor transports meaning from one
phenomenon to another by means of some central characteristic that is common to
both. Thus the structural resemblances operating in the organism of the musical work
are linked to the external world by means of metaphor which operates according to the
dendrite of its own interiority.
19 The term had a tremdous currency in the early nineteenth century. Bent gives some of its synonyms
as: auffassen, betrachten, beurtheilen, entdecken, entrathseln, erklaren, erlautern, phrasieren,
zerlegen. Bent, Analysis, xii.
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Accounts of music are inevitably metaphorical, and yet the connections
demonstrated in the organicist models show a profound sense of how to construct a
metaphorical world system that forces the closure of a phenomenon into a broader
contextualising dialogue or dialectic of the world. Whilst identity and dialectic are not
mere synonyms, they have in common the notion that structures of resemblance can
evoke a deep sense of the order of things. The semant of the musical work, therefore,
provided for the Idealists a problematic or discursive space in which to rehearse the
purely structural elements of their world systems. Hence, this inquiry has attempted to
show how the history of music theory and the history of theory in the broader sense
can converge to provide insight into the interiority of the world systems of early
nineteenth-century German thought. In this regard, music has served as a cosmic
model of that interiority.
Score and Musical Work: the Division of Labour in the FrUhromantik
For the contemporary mind, perhaps one of the most disturbing aspects of the
Idealist texts on music is their consistent avoidance of any detailed analysis of musical
works and, perhaps more significantly, the complete absence in such texts of any
engagement with the musical score. This might be explained in two ways: either these
writers were insufficiently knowledgeable about music to engage with the notated
medium or there was some fundamental, perhaps ideological, characteristic of Idealism
which precluded such an engagement. It would seem, however, from our engagement
with the demographic and epistemological environment of early nineteenth-century,
that neither of the above explanations accounts wholly for the absence of any empirical
analysis in Idealism's engagement with music.
This avoidance of detailed engagement with musical works/scores is usefully
characterised in terms of the Marxian notion of the 'division of labour'
[Arbeitsteilung]. 2° This notion is addressed more specifically at the process of
industrialisation which rationalises the forces of production thereby instigating ever
more specialised modes of productive behaviour. The division of labour, in this sense
20 See Karl Marx, Das Kapital, Hamburg, 1867, volume I, Chapter 1.
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springs from an internal necessity in bourgeois society to parcel labour into ever more
clearly delineated, differentiated, spheres of activity such that the efficacy of the
production process is constantly reinforced and refined. There is thus a striking
resonance of Hegel's Schlufl der Notwendigkeit in this process: reason articulates the
boundaries of its action according to the ever more refined mechanisms of polarisation.
Hence, the notion of a protocol of theory, as posited in the Introduction to this thesis,
is one which usefully engages in a characterisation of theory as a mode of labour. Its
proactive function is thus subsumed into its socio-historical predicament. As a cipher
of labour, as an aggrandised forgetting of labour, theory evokes, in early nineteenth-
century Germany, the division of itself from other activities. Theory, as protocol-
driven, is thus a self-articulating activity.
As we have seen, Bent recognises a breakdown in the 'reflexivity' of analysis
and neo-Aristotelean pedagogy at the turn of the nineteenth century. Arguably, the
'reflexivity' of philosophy and music theory had been somewhat weakened with the
demise of medieval cosmology and to characterise the 'division' of philosophy and
analysis at this time as evidence of a division of labour is clearly ludicrous. Yet it might
be pertinent to ascribe to the demise of the neo-Aristotelian pedagogy an
intensification of a process that had been under way for some time. It is against this
background of an intensification or acceleration of the division of labour that the
wilful avoidance in Idealism of more overtly empirical engagements with musical
material should be scrutinised. The early nineteenth century does not so much instigate
a separation of philosophy and analysis but, rather, is characterised by an intensification
in the mutual antagonism between the musical object of dissemination - the score - and
the musical creation - the work.
This intensification is further articulated in the emergence of specialised
centres of distribution such as Berlin, Leipzig and Vienna. As we saw in Chapter 1, the
vital revolution or rapid population increases of the mid- to late eighteenth century
placed the older corporatist relations of production under considerable strain. The
decline of guild-restricted labour, improvements in communication and the ever more
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distanced acquisition of musical scores from remote centres were the infrastructural
requirements of a newly commoditised culture. In a sense, it is this 'distancing' of the
centres of distribution (the expansion of their service areas) which might be likened to
the notion of alienation [Verfremmdung], a term frequently invoked in Mandan
critiques of capitalist culture. The term can be applied here to capture the sense in
which distance, both physical and cultural, expands between the producer and the
consumer, and in this 'distancing' of score production from score consumption, the
score itself becomes imbued with an 'authority'. It is this 'authority', a trace of the
structures of the score's dissemination, which finds expression in the notion of
immanence, captured in the texts of Idealism as Selbstbeherrschung,
Selbstbefriedigung and so on.
The relationship between these apparently mutually exclusive realms - between
the objective realm of the economics of musical dissemination and the introspective
realm of Idealist speculation on music - is thus somewhat similar to a Schellingian
(organic) resemblance, based on certain shared structural characteristics: on the one
hand, the objective score is charged with an almost metaphysical authority since it is
disseminated from highly specialised centres of distribution and, on the other hand, the
work is charged with an introspective, immanent 'significance' or 'meaning' by virtue of
the ontological tendency of aesthetic theory at this time. In short, then, this relationship
goes well beyond a mere resemblance, a metaphorical resonance. It is, in this
coherence, that the 'centredness' of German Idealism within a socio-historical
environment is expressed - the Idealist texts articulate, in codified or 'mystified' form,
an economic-political agenda. Hence, the taking up of the 'other' in to the centre of the
object of scrutiny - the taking up of both metaphysical unity in to the objective score
and articulated objective closure into the score - are expressions of a wilful agenda: the
mystification of the forces and realtions of production attendant upon both phenomena.
Hence, the expanding distance between the producer and the consumer - their
alienation from each other - is necessarily reflected in all levels of discourse. Indeed,
one might say that it is in the extent to which this process of alienation is
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mystified/codified that the ideological duplicity of the aesthetic is to be found: the more
a text codifies the economic basis of immanence, the more acquiescent that text is to
the bourgeois commoditised agenda. In this sense, then, alienation provides a way of
(apparently) removing certain spheres of activity from the explicit discourse of
economic causality. In providing what seems like the possibility of an activity which is
removed from production, alienation fulfils the need in such a culture for an 'escape
route' from the processes of production. In providing the 'other' to the isolated self, in
providing the opposite extremes at work in the dialectic, in articulating the
predicament of the self in terms of non-self, alienation sustains commoditisation on its
relentless path to the moral relativism of late capitalism.
The term alienation, however, should be used with some caution. In its usual
Mandan designation it articulates the 'distancing' of the producing self from the process
of production and therefore is concerned more with the relations of production
themselves and not explicitly with the relation of that process to consumption. Yet
there is still the sense here that the process of alienating labour from production can be
compounded by the 'distance' of the producing centre from the consuming self. It is in
this dislocation of the producing self from the consuming self that the rift opens up
between score and work: the delegation of score-dissemination to a third party (or to a
distinct sphere of activity in the production process) is thus intimately bound up with
the alienation of labour.
It becomes a much more difficult task, however, to locate the notion of a work
within this account. Since works in this sense are the ontic constructions of a literate
culture, their 'presence' has to be premised on the presence proper of the score. Yet
this by no means gives rise to a simple even-handed causality of score to work.
Certainly, it might be possible to see the work as a kind of 'reified' or 'mystified' score,
since the former cannot exist without the latter, but there is little justification for
merely conflating the two. The German term Werk is, indeed, a deeply ambiguous
term. It invokes both notions of an 'undertaking' or a distinct activity within the
process of production and also the idealised result of such a process, the 'opus', so to
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speak. It does not capture the sense of the more material 'product' which is usually
rendered das Produkt or das Erzeugnis. Only where the English term 'product' is used
figuratively as in 'the product of a sick mind' can Werk be used: das Werk eines
kranken Geistes.
It seems plausible, therefore, to ascribe to a work the quality of a score which
has somehow been 'raised up' or 'sublated' [aufgehebt] in the Hegelian sense, which is
to recognise the work as somehow qualitatively different from the score. In this sense,
the musical work evokes a particularly 'modern' notion of the authoritative creative
centre, a notion often intimately linked with the idea of 'genius'. Since such a work
emanates from the subjective centre, it is difficult to ascertain where or how it might
exist. Clearly, the notion of a work as somehow the singular property of the composer,
as existing somehow 'in his mind', is inadequate. It seems to 'exist', rather, as a kind of
posited 'general', as accumulated or constructed through the individual and collective
experience of performances and/or, for the musically literate, through 'readings' of the
score itself.
Positioning this 'constructed general' in the culture of post-cameral Germany is
difficult. In a sense, it might be more appropriate to talk of an idealised musical
material, an ontological generalisation of die Musik an sich selbst, in early nineteenth-
century German aesthetics. Indeed, as we have seen, overt references to any scores or
'works' are rare in the philosophical texts of the Friihromantik. Clearly, this state of
affairs could, as we have said, be explained by the unfamiliarity of Schelling, Hegel,
and so on, either with the more rarefied practices of music theory or with much of the
contemporary repertoire. Yet this only goes some way to explaining the relationship
between the nascent practices of Musikzerg/iederung and Musikasthetik. Perhaps the
most fruitful way in which to position the score/work dichotomy in this culture is to
recognise in the Hegelian Schlty3 and the Schellingian organische Strukntr largely
synonymous attempts to bring about a re-integration of two distinct objects of scrutiny
- the musical score and the musical work: the apparent division of labour articulated in
the two ontic constructs of score and work articulates itself in an organic or mediated
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manner. The score is the product of objective forces of relation and the 'work' is the
Geisteswerk of creative subjectivity, returned to itself like a microcosm of the Hegelian
Spirit. In short, Musikzergliederung constructed for itself an object of scrutiny ripe for
dissection, laid out like a relic of some lost process, maintaining the faintest presence,
within its confines, of a now distanced self, whereas Musikasthetik constructed for
itself an 'object' which mediated between various levels of subjective activity from the
poiesic to the hermeneutic.
Seen in this admittedly rather neo-Hegelian manner, the division of self and
other evoked in the confrontation of these two distinct objects of scrutiny seems like a
symptom, an Adornoesque mimesis, of the radicalisation of liberal capitalism. As an
ascendant economic-political agenda, liberal capitalism was charged with the task of
attaining for itself a culture capable of sustaining two apparently opposed processes:
the ever more intensified rationalisation of the forces and relations of production and
the accelerated retreat of the individual from that ever more objectified realm.
In the acrobatics of the organic and the syllogistic, then, we can recognise an
attempt to balance these two opposed dynamics and it is, in particular, in Hegel's
notion of mediation that the anxiety of the bourgeois citizen is most eloquently
articulated. In our account of mediation, we suggested that it existed as an internalised
process, as an internalised becoming of phenomena. As 'internalised externality',
therefore, mediation evokes the manner in which an abstract ideal might take the
'opposite' or 'external' forces of objective production into itself - the notion of a
musical 'work' or, indeed, of a generalised musical idiom, for example, being inexorably
linked with the objective score. Similarly, the opposite must therefore also be true:
that the objective results of production, scores, are imbued with the uniqueness of their
creative (subjective) origin.
Idealism and these early modes of analysis, therefore, both spring from a single
process. For the analyst, the notated medium offers some cipher of 'workness' or
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creativity. 21 For the Idealist, on the other hand, it is in the organic resemblances of
subjective and objective that a greater unity can be discovered, the third term, a
residue of a kind of cultural anxiety at the dislocation of the self from external nature.
The division of score and work, therefore, can be seen either, from within the great
systems of Idealism, as two sides of a syllogistic proposition or, from a more overtly
politicised point of view, as ciphers of the alienation of the self from its labour. It is,
however, in the huge rift that opens up between the prose styles of the analytical and
Idealist texts that the coming-to-be of the brutalised bourgeois ego is most eloquently
articulated: the separation of the musically subjective and objective as work and score
is a mediated recounting of the very confrontation of commodity and bourgeois self.
This bourgeois self is thus a strange phenomenon. He is the victim of his own
false consciousness, a consciousness he seeks to clothe in the systematic mystificadons
implicit to the category of the aesthetic, as if there were some non-material alternative
to the objective processes of production. Yet it is in the notion of the 'absolute truth' of
closure - of the ontic nature of music, for example - that the bourgeois citizen of the
organic state expresses a Sehnsucht for consumption, a mystified and spiritualised
consumption, magically transformed into the gratifying, alienated pleasures of the
impotent self.
Yet how could it be that the austere complexities of German Idealism, with its
self-denying, disciplined penchant for the systematic exposition of its materials, might
articulate an uncritical acquiescence to consumerism? The answer lies in the
metaphysical nature of the arguments which reduce socially mediated constructs such
as closure, autonomy, the ideal, to articles of faith. Since Idealism is motivated by an
anxiety - an anxiety which has an ethical starting point., one which yearns to be able to
undermine the relentless savagery of commoditised culture - it uncritically accepts the
illusion of 'otherness' as an escape from that savagery. Despite the nobility of the
21 This finds an objective - economic - resonance in the distanced authoritative centres of
dissemination. It seems appropriate, therefore, to accept that therer may be some kind of parallelism
between this notion of 'creativity in the score' for the analyst and 'authority in the musical commodity'
for the consumer.
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attempt to find a critical 'other' against which to measure the objective, the
construction the aesthetic - a systematised discipline of consumption, a mystified,
distanced consumption that dislocates the self from bodily gratification - serves merely
to create the illusion of an activity that is removed from the forces and relations of
production. The danger in such an illusion is that it makes gestures towards a critique
of the commodity, and yet, in so doing, it provides it with a radicalised metaphysical
function, 'raising it up' from the brutal machinations of the capitalist relations of
production to the level of an unquestionable absolute.
It would seem, then, that Michael Rosen's critique of Hegel as some kind of
necromancer, casting his spell over much subsequent thought holds some water. 22
 Yet
the acquiescence to the capitalist project demonstrated above, grounded first and
foremost in the notion of 'dialectic as mystification', still does not grasp the essential
complexity of the relationship between the Idealistic text and its historical predicament.
Perhaps the most profound manner in which the critical Idealism of Hegel and
Schelling transcends its historical predicament is in the implicit argument it constructs
against ontological complacency. Whilst, on the one hand, the dialectical and organicist
reasoning of Idealism is deeply embedded within its own historical configuration and,
to a cetain extent, a prisoner of that configuration, there is, on the other hand, much
that can be saved from that tradition which has a striking contemporaneity even today -
in particular, the unwillingness it has to accept 'simple' truths simply because they seem
real. This avoidance of the empirical solution denies the object of scrutiny a simple
ontological existence and leads to a mode of reasoning that is concerned first of all to
dissipate the conspicuity of Cartesian and early empirical forms of reason.
The consequence of this historically grounded concern is radical. In dissipating
the conspicuous ontology of the Cartesian paradigm, German Idealism is radical in the
sense that its arguments spring from the materials under scrutiny, from their historical
predicament and yet it maintains a critical distance from that predicament. In other
words, Idealism encounters the new 'absolute' of the commodity, articulating its
22 Rosen, Michael, Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism, Cambridge, 1984, 178-80.
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ontological boundaries, and yet stands back from 'completed' or circumscribed forms.
If we accept, then, that a commodity is some reified entity, reduced to its most simple
economic function, carrying such a function within itself, as if that function were
simply moulded into its own interior storehouse, then this avoidance of completed or
circumscribed forms can be read in two contradictory ways: either Idealism mystifies
the economic function of the commodity, so making it seem to spring from some
natural metaphysical source, or it attempts to undermine the apparent simplicity of
commoditised - closed - forms through the careful and critical application of dialectical
and organic reason.
In the notion of musical autonomy, these two agendas jostle for supremacy. On
the one hand, autonomy gives the score, the neat musical commodity of the literate
post-Cartesian culture, a central position and facilitates the commoditisation of the
dissemination of music in printed form. On the other hand, an 'autonomous' music
sustains for itself a kind of cool, clear distance from the society from which it sprang,
casting a critical eye over the social intitutions from which it emerges, throwing the
flaws of such institutions into clear relief. The confrontation of these two agendas
springs, it would seem from the great dichotomy of liberal capitalism, an economic
model characterised both by a sense of political life as properly an expression of the
majority of the enfranchised populace and by the necessity for sustainable economic
difference. In short, the great dichotomy of liberalism has always been expressed in its
janus-faced attitude to the individual. As a constructed, culturally mediated model, the
lowest unit of the liberal society, the individual has always been upheld as an
autonomous 'free' protagonist, an agent of wealth generation and yet, he is nonetheless
consistently in retreat from the processes of rationalisation that provide the economic
framework for that 'freedom', he is the victim of such processes.
The anxiety of the Friihromantik is thus founded on this dichotomous state of
affairs: the position of the individual as both the heroic protagonist and as the impotent
victim and it is this anxiety that lies at the heart of German Idealism. In short, the
profoundly dialectical problem of autonomous music is a problem that reflects the two
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liberal individuals: critical autonomy as an encoded parallel of the heroic protagonist
and uncritical (commoditised) autonomy as a similar parallel of the brutalised victim. It
seems, then, that critiques of the Western European art music canon based purely on
notions of its autonomy as a simple 'turning inwards' from or wilful rejection of the
public domain are uncritical in their undialectical apprehension of the problem. It is
certainly possible to draw simple causal connections between an impotent German
bourgeoisie, frustrated by political isolation, and the 'inwardising' genres of the early
nineteenth century. Yet such simple causal connections reduce the complexity of post-
Cartesian culture to a mechanistic set of ideological agents. These 'vulgar' Mandan
arguments fail to grasp the matter at hand as a sophisticated array of socially mediated
codes. To decode this culture, therefore, requires not a simple ideological toolbox
drawn from the nearest and dearest tradition, but a willingness to confront, on all
levels, the mutual ambivalence of autonomy and function in the musically aesthetic
object of scrutiny. The fact that such terms as autonomy, ontology and the ideal are
not clearly articulated fixed points in this epistemological configuration bears witness
to Idealism's awareness of its precarious position between covert propagandist
mystification and radical critique of the newly commoditised culture.
This precariousness is eloquently expressed in the fluent interaction between
the categories of the ontological and the ideal. The former seems, as we have said, to
articulate a drive inwards, a retreat from external conspicuity into a secretive world of
intimated treasures whereas the latter offers a schematic account of general forms,
removed from the profanity of particularity. The interplay of these two categories in
musical autonomy is complex. On the one hand, they share a synonymous function in
the articulation of separation from the external, closing the sphere of the work from the
mundanities of objective reality. Yet, on the other hand, their antagonism is based
precisely around this relationship to the external. Since, for ontological modes of
speculation, the inner space is the storehouse of truth, of the essential reality of the
object of scrutiny, there are some useful resonances of the commoditised object that
carries its economic function within its own internal storehouse of truth as a kind of
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ontological materiality. This commodity parity in ontological thought is thus to be
contrasted with the schemata of the ideal. In this mode of speculation, the sphere of
activity is articulated not according to its unique interiority but according to its
generality, the ability it demonstrates to show all levels of the world in a single closed
and pure structure. Its 'ideality' is thus consequent upon its ability to spread itself
outwards across all levels of discourse as a universal demonstrative model whilst
maintaining its status as 'model'.
Autonomy is thus confronted with the dichotomous coexistence of a mutual
compatibility and a mutual antagonism within its operation. In this sense, it is perhaps
wisest to ascribe to autonomy the status of a sphere of activity, a socially mediated
practice. As an activity, autonomy is thus encountered not as a unified ideological
phenomenon but as a dynamic and complex response to a nascent culture in the
process of cohering around the economic model of the commodity. Autonomy,
therefore, is not commodity by another name.
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